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Abstract  
This thesis focuses on the extent of security interests in property. A 
security interest is a right of a creditor to resort to an asset with priority 
to at least some other creditors of the grantor of security when debtor 
defaults on the secured obligation.  This works examines to what extent 
the secured creditor’s right is, or ought to be, affected when the 
encumbered asset undergoes changes that result in a new derived asset. 
Three scenarios are looked at: where new assets (“fruits”) are derived 
from the original collateral; where the original collateral is substituted 
for another asset or where it is incorporated or mixed with other assets 
into a new product. 
The question has attracted little judicial or academic attention. In the 
key case Buhr v Barclays Bank Plc [2001] EWCA 1223 it was held that 
that the secured creditor had a right to sale proceeds of collateral by 
virtue of its property right. This was termed as a “principle of 
substitutions” encompassing accretions, fruits and proceeds of the 
original collateral. It is suggested that this “principle” does not exist in 
current English law. This is so whether the security is fixed or floating. 
If a security interest is to extend to derived assets, parties ought to 
bargain for it. If new assets are a result of dispositions unauthorised by 
the secured creditor the creditor may claim the proceeds by asserting a 
new right based on unjust enrichment, not by virtue of the original 
property right. 
English law contrasts with Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
in the US, where the secured creditor automatically acquires right to 
proceeds. Law and economics analysis suggests that extending security 
to proceeds promotes efficiency of secured credit but only if proceeds 
are understood narrowly and do not include fruits. 
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Preface 
When I started my PhD, my plan was to write a comparative law thesis 
about security interests. I had received solid education as a Civil Law 
lawyer but my knowledge of English law was limited to the core 
subjects covered in the Diploma in Law course which I read for after 
coming to the UK. Commercial law, personal property law and 
restitution were not among them. It seemed natural that my doctoral 
research on secured credit would involve comparison of the Civil Law 
jurisdictions I was familiar with (mainly Polish, French and German 
law) with only some aspects of English law. The result surprised me. 
With the exception of a few footnotes, the thesis is not about Civil Law 
at all! English law proved to contain too many fascinating complexities 
and nuances to use the precious space to talk about Civil Law. The 
inspiration to write this thesis came to me when I read – with my 
Civilian mindset – a section on “Derivative Security Interests” in 
Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security edited by Professor 
Louise Gullifer. The question that budded in my mind was this: how 
can a property right, created by an owner in favour of another person in 
a particular asset, shift from one asset onto another? In Civil Law this is 
quite exceptional; in Common Law not so. The concept of a trust, 
which developed in Common Law, is a paradigm case of rights being 
asserted to traceable proceeds. Yet security interests are not the same as 
beneficiaries’ rights under a trust. The aim of this work is not to explore 
the secured creditor’s right to traceable proceeds by comparison with 
trusts but to look at the nature of security interests under the current 
English law and to ask if it could be improved. Given that the reform of 
secured transactions is “in the air” the timing for asking this question 
could not be better. Although the scope of this work may be narrow, it 
highlights a crucial question of how far property rights in assets should 
extend. Rights of owners, even beneficial owners, to traceable assets 
are one thing; but non-ownership property rights granted over an asset 
may be entirely different. This work suggests that it should not be 
automatically assumed that just because a right is proprietary it extends 
to traceable proceeds. 
 
Magda Raczynska 
Norwich, 17 October 2012 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis investigates the extent of security interests in property. A 
security interest is a right in an asset conferred on a lender to resort to 
the asset in priority to other creditors of the borrower, should the 
borrower default on an obligation to pay. Security interests may be 
conferred by law or created on the basis of an agreement. This work 
sets out to examine the latter, consensual security interests. It is 
concerned only with real security, that is rights in assets, whether 
tangible or intangible, which provide the creditor with a right in rem to 
resort to the asset to discharge the underlying debt.1 Outside of its 
scope are therefore personal security rights such as demand or 
suretyship guarantees. Rights in rem given for security purposes can be 
either granted or retained. If retained, for example in retention of title 
devices, hire purchase agreements or finance leases, they do not create 
security interests in law2, even though their economic effect is 
indistinguishable from “true” security interests.3 Such “quasi-security” 
interests are not discussed as the thesis focuses only on “true” security 
interests. Security interests may be granted by a debtor or by a third 
party – the grantor of security. To simplify the analysis we will assume 
throughout the thesis that the debtor granted security.  
Security interests are property rights in assets. What counts as a 
property right is controversial in English law.4 The orthodox view, 
accepted here, is that property rights are rights in particular assets 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 L Gullifer (ed), Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (4th edn Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2009) para 1-06.  
2 H Beale, M Bridge, L Gullifer and E Lomnicka, The Law of Security and Title-Based 
Financing (2nd edn OUP, 2012) para 1.20. 
3 Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (n 1) para 3-05.  
4 The discussion in literature centred around enforceability of property rights with 
things (assets) being a backdrop of these relations): WN Hohfeld, 'Some Fundamental 
Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning' (1914) 23 Yale LJ 16 
(emphasising enforceability of property rights against others); T Honoré, 'Rights of 
Exclusion and Immunities against Divesting' (1960) 34 Tulane L Rev 453, 460 
(importance of exclusion of others); T Honoré, 'Ownership' in T Honoré (ed) Making 
Law Bind. Essays Legal and Philosophical (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1987) 108 
(property rights as a bundle of rights, listing attributes that property rights entail).  
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exigible against third parties.5 This means that the secured creditor has 
a right enforceable against an indefinite number of people, including 
the liquidator or trustee in bankruptcy of a person against whom the 
right is asserted, although it does not mean that the right is enforceable 
against everyone in the world.6 For example, those who acquire legal 
title to an asset subject to an equitable security interest may take free of 
that security. The focus of the thesis is on subject matter of security 
interest (i.e. the collateral). Specificity of assets is deeply embedded in 
English law7 although there is some ambiguity over property 
understood as things and as wealth.8 A view preferred here is that 
security interests are in particular assets, not wealth.9 
Key to security interests is the continued existence of the encumbered 
asset (also referred to as the collateral10). If the asset ceases to exist, the 
creditor is left only with a personal claim against the borrower to repay 
the loan, which may be worthless if the debtor is insolvent. A secured 
transaction is a continuing relationship between the parties. During that 
time the collateral may undergo various changes, including changes 
that lead to destruction of the collateral or production of a new asset. 
This thesis explores how some of these changes affect the secured 
creditor’s right to resort to the asset to discharge the secured debt. 
These changes can be usefully divided into the following basic 
scenarios, depending on the position of the creditor: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See also J Penner, The Idea of Property in Law (OUP, Oxford 1997) 30-31. 
6 Beale et al, The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing (n 2) para 4.01; Goode on 
Legal Problems of Credit and Security (n 1) para 1-03. 
7 L Smith, The Law of Tracing (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1997) 50-52; D Sheehan, 
'Property in a Fund, Tracing and Unjust Enrichment' (2010) 2 J of Eq 225, 228. 
8 B Rudden, 'Things as Things and Things as Wealth' (1994) 14 OJLS 81; J Harris, 
Property and Justice (OUP, Oxford 1996) 140-143 (referring to ambivalence between 
use of things and allocation of wealth throughout the entirety of property law). See 
however H Smith, 'Property as Law of Things' (2012) 125 Harv L Rev 1691 (arguing 
that for information-costs reasons property is the law of things). 
9 This assumption is particularly controversial in relation to the floating charge, which 
is why in chapter IV we will discuss in more detail why it could be seen as a right to 
specific assets. 
10 The term “collateral”, popularised in the USA, is now widely used in English legal 
practice. 
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(a) the collateral is mixed with other assets in a way that allows 
the creditor to follow the original asset and continue to assert a 
security interest in it (e.g. collateral is transferred to a donee or 
some ear-marked sheep subject to security mingle with other 
sheep); 
(b) the asset subject to security has been improved, or another 
asset was added to it (an accretion), which enables the creditor to 
follow the original asset and assert security in  the original asset;  
(c) cases where collateral can no longer be followed and no new 
asset comes into being (e.g. an antique vase subject to security 
was shattered); 
(d) collateral is joined with other assets in such a way where it is 
no longer possible to follow the original collateral but it may be 
possible to claim a product of the mixture (e.g. a loaf of bread is 
baked from encumbered flour), or cases where the creditor may 
follow the original asset but can no longer claim it because it was 
transferred to a third party who raises a defence  (e.g. the debtor 
exchanged the flour subject to an equitable charge for sugar with 
a bona fide third party, who obtained legal title to the flour 
without notice of the charge11); 
(e) the collateral, remaining itself in existence, generates new 
assets; the creditor may follow the original asset and may be able 
to assert a right to the new asset that comes into being (e.g. lamb 
is born from a sheep; income is collected from a lease). 
We are not interested in scenarios (a), (b) and (c) here.  The purpose of 
this thesis is to examine what rights, if any, a secured creditor has to 
new assets that arise in scenarios (d) and (e). These new assets in 
scenario (d) are typically referred to as substitutes, which are further 
divided into proceeds (if they result from clean substitutions) and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Pilcher v Rawlins (1872) 7 Ch App 259 (CA). 
	   36	  
products (if they result from mixed substitutions). The new assets in (e) 
are referred to as fruits. Both substitutes and fruits are referred to as 
derived assets. The question has been asked before in Legal Problems 
of Credit and Security12 but it received little judicial or academic 
attention. Detailed discussions of claims to traceable proceeds of 
dispositions of assets subject to equitable ownership such as 
beneficiaries’ rights under trusts13 might partially explain the dearth of 
interest in this area. Yet rights of trust beneficiaries and rights of a 
secured creditor are different. The secured creditor has no beneficial 
ownership in the asset, merely a right to resort to an asset if the debtor 
does not pay. Even where the creditor has the legal or equitable title to 
an asset, this is only by way of security, which means that the creditor 
can only resort to the asset to the extent that the secured debt is 
discharged. This is not to say that the law of tracing is not useful in the 
context of security interests. The evidential rules of identifying the 
original asset (following) or rules identifying substitutes, which 
represent the value of original asset (tracing) are relevant in the context 
of security interests. Claims to traceable proceeds are a controversial 
matter and their analysis must take into account the nature of security 
interests. The most recent and highest authority in the area of a secured 
creditor’s claims to traceable proceeds is the Court of Appeal decision 
in Buhr v Barclays Bank Plc14. The Court of Appeal held that the 
secured creditor had, by virtue of his property right, an automatic right 
to any accretions (improvements and fruits alike) and substitutes 
(traceable proceeds) of the collateral. This rule was referred to as a 
“principle of substitutions and accretions”. The argument advanced in 
this thesis is that this “principle” does not exist. It is argued that 
substitutions and accretions ought to be treated differently and that the 
term “accretions” itself comprises two diametrically different notions 
(improvements and fruits), which also ought to be subject to different 
rules. The decision in Buhr v Barclays Bank reveals confusion in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (n 1) paras 1.57-1.69. 
13 The seminal work in this area is Smith, The Law of Tracing (n 7).  
14 [2001] EWCA Civ 1223, [2002] BPIR 25. 
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area of security interests in substitutes and fruits, which needs 
clarification. It seems that the “principle of substitutions and 
accretions” was used as a “wild card” to answer the question of whether 
a secured creditor may assert his security interests in new assets, 
irrespectively of the type of asset (proceeds, products and fruits). It is 
argued that the “principle of substitutions and accretions” is not 
sufficiently supported in the current English law.  
The task is approached primarily by doctrinal analysis of English law. 
We also use comparative law as well as law and economics. We 
examine rules governing security interests in derived assets under 
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).  The pragmatic 
solutions adopted in Article 9 UCC are aimed at preserving efficiency 
of secured transactions. Although such approach may be useful for 
commercial parties, its success relies on our ability to evaluate what is 
efficient. We will question the efficiency of some rules adopted in 
Article 9 UCC in relation to derived assets and suggest that if English 
law is to emulate the American model, it should do so with proper 
understanding of efficiency of security interests in derived assets. 
Despite the very rich debate on law and economics of security interests, 
little attention has been paid to the specific question of efficiency of 
security interests in derived assets. This thesis will attempt to fill this 
gap with basic economic analysis. It is hoped that it will be of use in the 
current debate on the law reform of secured transactions in England. 
Although the Government decided not to implement the Law 
Commission proposals in 2005 in the reforms leading to Companies 
Act 2006, the Consultative Paper and the Draft Company Security 
Regulations produced by the Law Commission in 200415 continue to 
form the basis for a debate on law reform in this area.16 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Law Commission, Company Security Interests (Law Com CP No 176, 2004), 
hereinafter referred to as LC CP. Draft Regulations contained therein are referred to as 
DR. 
16 The state of current law and the need for and shape of future reform are being 
examined within the Secured Transactions Law Reform Project, 
http://securedtransactionsproject.wordpress.com, last accessed 21 October 2012. 
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It is also important to say what this work is not about. First, we are not 
interested in personal claims of the creditor against the debtor for 
dealing with collateral in an unauthorised way because they are likely 
to be worthless if the debtor goes insolvent. We deal only with 
fundamental questions of whether the secured creditor has a proprietary 
right to new assets, which derive from the original collateral, and, if so, 
on what basis. Second, the thesis concentrates on non-possessory 
security interests. Thus, outside of the confines of this work are specific 
problems arising in relation to pledges in goods. In particular, we do 
not ask how a possessory security interest (a pledge) would be affected 
if the pledged tangible asset was substituted for an intangible.17 Third, 
if the collateral has changed due to someone’s action directed at the 
asset, we will assume that it was the debtor’s action or an action on 
behalf of the debtor. We do not, therefore, consider in detail situations 
where a third party caused the asset to change to a new asset outside of 
the debtor’s control. Fourth, we do not deal with questions of multiple 
secured creditors. Outside of the scope are issues of priority of security 
in the new asset if more than one creditor may have a claim to it.  
Finally, outside of the scope are problems surrounding sub-security, 
that is cases where a security interest in an asset itself becomes subject 
matter of another security interest. In such situations no new asset is 
created; the subject matter of the original security does not change. We 
may also note that although the primary concern of this work is with 
grantors who are a corporate bodies and who grant non-possessory 
security interests over personal property, it will be necessary, in order 
to find a coherent answer to the question posed, to look at situations 
where the grantor is an individual, an unincorporated business, or 
where the asset encumbered is real property.  
In order to establish the secured creditor’s rights to derived assets, we 
need to first set the context and define the basic notions. Thus, the first 
chapter explains the meaning and purpose of security interests. Security 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (n 1) para 1-67, especially fn 267. 
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interests are understood to be economically efficient devices. A 
question will be posed whether substitutions or accretions promote this 
efficiency or not. The first chapter will also set the basic background 
knowledge of security interests in English law and briefly under Article 
9 UCC. The second chapter looks at the principles developed under 
Roman law to address issues of property rights in assets that become 
mixed or generate fruits. It will be seen that these principles, 
incorporated later to some extent in English law, do not provide a 
sufficient response to deal with security interests. A new distinction 
will have to be drawn between assets resulting from a disposition by the 
debtor and assets that arise without the intervention of any person 
(fruits). Chapter three discusses situations where parties in the security 
agreement did not provide for any changes in the collateral. The 
distinctions drawn between accretions and other derived assets will be 
useful here as it will be shown that a secured creditor has an automatic 
right to accretions but he does not generally have such a right in 
relation to other derived assets. Chapter four is devoted to a scenario 
where the parties included a clause in the security agreement extending 
security to derived assets. Such clauses are problematic because they 
essentially create security in assets that do not exist at the time of the 
agreement. Derived asset clauses may also have an impact on 
characterisation of the security. It is particularly controversial to what 
extent a fixed charge is consistent with a provision for substitute assets 
in the security agreement. It will be argued that fixed charges are not in 
principle inconsistent with substitutions and that the debtor has a power 
to substitute but very limited authority to do so. A theory of a fixed 
charge will be suggested analogous to what would be no-authority 
agency. Where a security agreement creates a floating charge an issue 
arises whether this can be interpreted to imply that the parties agree to 
extend the security (the floating charge) to proceeds of disposition. 
Such a view has been presented in the literature but it will be argued 
that it is flawed. Finally, chapter five will deal with situations where the 
debtor disposed of property in a way not authorised by the creditor. It 
will be argued that the secured creditor can claim proceeds of such 
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dispositions, not on the basis of the security interest but as a new right 
arising on the basis of unjust enrichment.  
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CHAPTER I - The concept of security 
interests 
1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, it seeks to investigate why 
parties seek security and whether the same rationale that underlies 
taking security interest in an asset may also be said to support security 
interests in new assets that derive from the original asset. Of particular 
interest will be justifications of security interests on the basis of 
economic efficiency. If financing on a secured basis is more efficient 
than financing on an unsecured basis, a question, which we pose here as 
well, is whether security interests that extend to derived assets can also 
be said to promote this efficiency. We will consider separately security 
in new assets, which the debtor receives as a substitute for the original 
collateral (substitutes) and security in new assets, which arise without 
destruction of the original subject matter (fruits). If security interests in 
derived assets also promote efficiency, a legal system ought to contain 
a rule that security interest automatically extends to derived assets if the 
law is to promote more efficient transactions. The second purpose of 
this chapter is to present the basic types of security interests under 
English law and explain how the approach to security interests under 
the Uniform Commercial Code in the USA differs from English law in 
its present shape. The rights of the secured creditor to new assets 
derived form the original collateral depend on the rights the secured 
creditor has in the original collateral in the first place. Understanding 
the basic features of the law of security interests in property is 
necessary for the detailed analysis of security in derived assets in the 
chapters that follow. The chapter is divided into three parts accordingly. 
The first part presents the justifications for security interests. The 
second part is an overview of the types of security in English law, 
which are juxtaposed in part three with the single, functional idea of 
security under Article 9 UCC.   
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2 Rationale for security interests 
A question arises as to why the law differentiates between secured and 
unsecured creditors by awarding the former such an advantage over the 
latter.18 The riddle, which came to be known as the “secured debt 
puzzle”, has generated a lot of literature, particularly in the United 
States19. The puzzle is this: the secured creditors levy lower interest 
rates on loans because security reduces their risk of non-payment but 
unsecured creditors raise their rates because the lack of security 
increases that risk.20 From the borrower’s perspective, in a perfect 
market, secured financing is a “zero-sum game”: the benefits derived 
from secured financing are offset by the cost of higher rates of interest 
charged by unsecured creditors because of the increased risk that they 
undertake.21 This argument rests on the assumption that secured credit 
is cheaper than unsecured credit. Mokal showed, using empirical 
evidence, that this “rate reduction assumption“ is flawed.22 The interest 
rate charged is marginally related, if at all, to the decision to finance on 
a secured or unsecured basis. In practice, borrowers (at least small to 
medium businesses) do not seem to have a choice whether to borrow 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Posed originally by T Jackson and A Kronman, 'Secured Financing and Priorities 
among Creditors' (1979) 88 Yale LR 1143. Alternatively, one could ask why unsecured 
creditors do not offset the debtor’s savings, see B Adler, 'An Equity-Agency Solution to 
the Bankruptcy-Priority Puzzle' (1993) 22 JLS 73, 74; P Shupack, 'Solving the Puzzle 
of Secured Transactions' (1989) 41 Rutgers LR 1067, 1091. 
19 For a survey of literature see R Scott, 'The Truth About Secured Financing ' (1997) 
83 Cornell LR 1436, 1437; for literature in other common law jurisdictions see P Ali, 
The Law of Secured Finance (OUP, Oxford 2002) para 2.53 fn 81; V Finch, 'Security, 
Insolvency and Risk: Who Pays the Price?' (1999) 62 MLR 633, 633-634. 
20 A Schwartz, 'The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debts' (1984) 37 Vanderbilt LR 
1051; L Bebchuk and J Fried, 'The Uneasy Case for Priority of Secured Claims in 
Bankruptcy' (1996) 105 Yale LJ 857, 864; Finch (n 19) 644. 
21 This debate derives from Modigliani-Miller “irrelevance theorem”, F Modigliani and 
M Miller, 'The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment' 
(1958) 48 Am Econ Rev 261, according to which the cost of capital is, absent taxes and 
bankruptcy costs, independent of the firm’s capital structure (whether it is financed 
with debt or equity) and the level of investment is unaffected by the type of security 
used to raise finance. 
22 R Mokal, 'The Search for Someone to Save: A Defensive Case for the Priority of 
Secured Credit' (2002) 22 OJLS 687, 710, citing J Franks and O Sussman study The 
Cycle of Corporate Distress, Rescue and Dissolution: A Study of Small and Medium 
Size UK Companies, on behalf of the Working Group on Company Rescue and 
Business Reconstruction Mechanisms, Institute of Finance and Accounting (London 
Business School), Working Paper 306-2000; see now also J Franks and O Sussman, 
'Financial Distress and Bank Restructuring of Small to Medium Size U.K. Companies' 
(2005) 9 Review of Finance 65. 
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secured for a lower interest rate or unsecured for a higher interest rate. 
The lenders may simply not lend unless provided with collateral. 
Moreover, as Jackson and Kronman noted in the article, where they 
originally set the “puzzle”: 
“if the law denied debtors the power to prefer some creditors 
over others through a system of security agreements, a similar 
network of priority relationships could be expected to emerge by 
consensual arrangement between creditors. Permitting debtors to 
encumber their assets achieves the same result, but in a simpler 
and more economic fashion”.23 
The creditors have an advantage to be gained from securing priority 
and it is more efficient if the law recognises security interests as 
property rights than to multiply transaction costs. 
Even if the secured debt puzzle rests on a flawed assumption, the 
theories advanced in response to the puzzle are useful in understanding 
the rationale for taking and granting collateral. The justifications are 
grouped in three categories: a conventional theory, a property-based 
theory and a group of efficiency theories.24 The third, most 
comprehensive, category comprises not only considerations of cost and 
benefit of secured transactions but also issues of fair distribution of 
resources. It is worthwhile to look at these theories since they shed light 
on the rationale of security in substitutes and fruits and help answer the 
question whether a legal system should promote automatic extension of 
security interests to such assets.  
2.1 Conventional explanation of security interests 
Security interests in property make both the lender and the borrower 
better off than they would have been without security. This is 
encapsulated in the Roman tenet of Corpus Iuris Civilis: a security is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Jackson and Kronman, (n 18) 1157. 
24 Cf  F Oditah, Legal Aspects of Receivables Financing (Sweet & Maxwell, London 
1991) 17; Ali (n 19) 34-46.  
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given for the benefit of both parties: for the debtor because he can 
borrow money, and for the creditor since he can lend the money 
safely.25  
A. The benefit for the debtor: facilitating finance 
Some debtors are creditworthy enough to raise unsecured finance. 
Others may not be able to borrow at all either because of the risk they 
present26 or because they have no credit history.27 Security makes the 
credit market accessible to many debtors who, in the absence of 
security, would be unable to obtain finance.28  On a view drawn from 
practice, debtors do not grant security unless they are required to do 
so.29 It has also been shown that firms may not undertake certain 
profitable projects if only equity or unsecured debt is used to finance 
them, but will undertake them if they can be financed with secured 
debt.30 The debtors may not want to, however, to “immobilise” their 
assets. Selling assets free from security or using them to make new 
products may be essential to a debtor’s business or project. If such 
dealings defeat the security, the creditors may be unwilling to provide 
finance. A debtor’s ability to grant security in sale proceeds or new 
products may therefore offset the creditor’s risk of losing security and 
so facilitate provision of finance. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 I 3,14,4: Pignus utrisque gratia datur, et debitoris, quo magis ei pecunia crederetur, 
et creditoris, quo magius ei in tuto sit creditum.  
26 Mokal, (n 22) cf Oditah (n 24) 17. 
27 See G Jiménez, V Salas and J Saurina, 'Determinants of Collateral' (2006) 81 J Fin 
Economics 255. 
28 Oditah (n 24) 17; S Harris and C Mooney, 'A Property-Based Theory of Security 
Interests: Taking Debtor’s Choices Seriously' (1994) 80 Va LR 2021, 2042. 
29 Beale et al, The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing (n 2) para 1.07; M 
Bridge, 'The Quistclose Trust in a World of Secured Transactions' (1992) 12 OJLS 333, 
337; H Kripke, 'Law and Economics: Measuring the Economics Efficiency of 
Commercial Law in a Vacuum of Fact' (1985) 133 U Pa LR 929, 969; R Mann, 
'Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit' (1997) 110 Harv LR 625, 658.  
30 R Stulz and H Johnson, 'An Analysis of Secured Debt' (1985) 14 J Fin Economics 
501. 
	   45	  
B. The benefits for the secured creditor 
It is often emphasised that the first and foremost purpose of security 
interests is the reduction of credit risk.31 According to the classic 
banking theory collateral reduces risk because the lender may seize 
collateral even if the borrower has insufficient sources to repay its 
debts32, thus increasing the likelihood of obtaining performance of the 
contract with the debtor.33 Since the risk of non-payment materialises 
upon the debtor’s insolvency, it is at that stage that security is most 
needed.34 This is why the most considerable advantage that the secured 
creditor enjoys over the unsecured one is the priority position in the 
debtor’s insolvency.35 Furthermore, taking collateral gives the creditor 
a certain degree of influence over the events, which could not be 
achieved by personal covenants.36 Moreover, an all-embracing security 
may also affect the debtor’s market behaviour because in practice it 
may give the creditor an exclusive right to supply the debtor with 
credit.37 Security may deter unsecured creditors from enforcement of 
their claims, if these were to lead to restructuring since the would be 
likely to lose out in restructuring.38 We may also note that if a security 
interest is taken in investment securities held with a right of use, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (n 1) para 1-01; R Goode, 'Is the 
Law Too Favourable to Secured Creditors' (1983) 6 Can Bus L J 53, 56; E Kieninger, 
'Introduction and Context' in E Kieninger (ed) Security Rights in Movable Property in 
European Private Law (The Common Core of European Private Law CUP, 2004) 7; 
this is also recognised by international bodies that attempt to harmonise the law on 
secured transactions, see e.g. UNCITRAL,'Security Interests. Note by the Secretariat' 
(A/CN.9/496 United Nations, 2001) para 14. 
32 H Bester, 'Screening Vs Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information' 
(1985) 57 American Economic Review 850. 
33 A Diamond,'A Review of Security Interests in Property' (Department of Trade and 
Industry, 1989) para 3.3.  
34 Mokal, (n 22); P Wood, Law and Practice of International Finance (University edn 
Sweet & Maxwell, London 2008) para 16-07. 
35 D Allan, 'Security: Some Mysteries, Myths, & Monstrosities' (1989) 15 Mon ULR 
337, 343; Wood (n 34) para 16-06;  Kieninger (n 31) 8; Jackson and Kronman, (n 18); 
A Saunders, A Srinivasan, I Walter and J Wool, 'The Economic Implications of 
International Secured Transactions Law Reform: A Case Study' (1999) 20 U Pa J Int 
Econ L 309, 316. 
36 Goode (n 31) 56; Bridge, (n 29) 339 (pointing out that creditors could be branded 
shadow directors privy to wrongful trading under Insolvency Act 1986, ss214 and 251). 
See also R Scott, 'A Relational Theory of Secured Financing' (1986) 86 Col LR 901, 
934; J Armour and S Frisby, 'Rethinking Receivership' (2001) 21 OJLS 73. 
37 Finch (n 19) 638. 
38 Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (n 1) para 1-01.  
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including sale, the creditor gains the ability to raise funds itself and 
engage in market operations.39  
All these benefits depend on the continuing existence of the collateral. 
Risk of non-payment cannot be reduced if the asset no longer exists 
because there is no collateral to resort to discharge the underlying 
secured debt. Likewise, the benefits, which the creditor derives from its 
secured status, whether in relation to the debtor or vis-à-vis external 
bodies, also depend on the continuance of collateral. 
2.2 Property-based theory of security interests 
The fact that security interests provide both parties with certain benefits 
explains why it may be desirable for the parties to borrow or lend 
secured but it does not yet justify why a legal system should allow for 
security interests to exist. To address this Harris and Mooney40 
proposed a normative justification of security interests based on 
theories that justify the institution of private property. The right to own 
private property is part and parcel of a market economy. Inherent in the 
ownership are the following rights: to use an asset (usus); to take 
benefits from that asset (fructus); to change its form and substance 
(abusus); and to transfer all or some of these to others.41 In a market 
economy resources are allocated by exercising the right to transfer. 
Private property promotes market efficiency by providing incentives for 
the allocation of assets to those who place the highest value on their 
use.42 Given that security interests involve the alienation or transfer of 
property (like sales or debt repayments), granting a security interest in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Ibid. para 1-02. 
40 Harris and Mooney, 'A Property-Based Theory of Security Interests: Taking Debtor’s 
Choices Seriously' (n 28) 2047, called by Ponoroff and Knippenberg as “compelling for 
its simplicity”, L Ponoroff and F Knippenberg, 'The Immovable Object Versus the 
Irresistible Force: Rethinking the Relationship between Secured Credit and Bankruptcy 
Policy' (1997) 95 Mich LR 2234, 2260. 
41 See also Honoré, 'Ownership' (n 4) 161, 170 (arguing that power to alienate is one of 
the rudimentary incidents of the concept of liberal ownership). 
42 Harris and Mooney, 'A Property-Based Theory of Security Interests: Taking Debtor’s 
Choices Seriously' (n 28) 2049; S Pejovic, The Economics of Property Rights: Towards 
a Theory of Comparative Systems (Springer, 1990) 45-46 and 48; R Coase, 'The 
Problem of Social Cost' (1960) 3 J L & Econ 1. 
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favour of a creditor is merely a way of exercising the freedom of 
contract aimed at transferring or alienating an interest in the property.43 
The property-based theory was critiqued by Schwartz as not capable of 
justifying the rationale of security interests because it does not take into 
account market efficiency and costs that result from market 
externalities or asymmetric information.44  
Applying this theory to explain security in derived assets seems 
problematic. Derived assets are future assets. The basic premise, on 
which the law of property transfers is founded, is that no one can make 
a present transfer of something they do not presently own or otherwise 
have a power to dispose of. It is therefore not clear why the power to 
alienate (dispose of) one’s asset should include the power to make 
future dispositions.45 Another difficulty, relevant to rights in proceeds 
and products, is to explain why a legal system should allow one asset to 
be substituted for another instead of making the creditor always follow 
the original asset and, where that fails, extinguish his interest. These 
questions require considerations of economic efficiency and 
comparison of costs, for example arising from asymmetric information, 
of situations where security extends automatically to new assets and 
situations where it does not. Since the property-based theory of security 
interests does not address market efficiency, it cannot explain whether 
security interests should automatically extend to derived assets or not.  
2.3 Efficiency of security interests 
Security interests are said to make funding more efficient. There are 
many definitions of economic efficiency and we need not look at these 
here in detail. Pareto efficiency is achieved where no one can be made 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Harris and Mooney, 'A Property-Based Theory of Security Interests: Taking Debtor’s 
Choices Seriously' (n 28) 2049-2050. 
44 A Schwartz, 'Taking the Analysis of Security Seriously' (1994) 80 Va LR 2073, 
2081ff (general) and 2086 for that particular criticism.  
45 Cf Penner (n 5) 154. 
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better off without making someone else worse off.46 Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency has less stringent criteria. Even if some persons become 
worse off, an outcome can still become more efficient if sufficient 
compensation is arranged from those that are made better off to those 
that are made worse off so that all would end up no worse off than 
before.47 We adopt the latter definition of efficiency. Although we talk 
about an outcome being efficient if it makes all members of society 
better off, it is convenient to split the analysis of efficiency of security 
interests into two questions: (i) whether security interests increase 
efficiency between the creditor and the debtor and (ii) whether security 
interests are an efficient outcome for all members of society, in 
particular other creditors of the debtor. Most of the analysis of 
efficiency of security interests in the literature focused on addressing 
the first question. A convenient way of measuring benefits to parties is 
to look at economic surplus parties receive.48 There is a limit to the 
amount that each borrower is willing to pay for a loan. The maximum 
price the borrower is willing to pay can be called his willingness to pay. 
It measures how much the borrower values the loan. Each borrower 
would want to obtain a loan at a price below its willingness to pay. To 
simplify the analysis, we assume that the price the borrower is willing 
to pay is the amount of interest rate charged over the duration of the 
loan. If the borrower can obtain the loan below the maximum amount 
she is willing to pay, the borrower receives a surplus.49 For example, if 
the borrower is willing to pay £1000 for a loan but pays only £800, the 
borrower receives a surplus of £200. Assuming that borrowers are 
rational, willingness to pay can serve as a measure of benefit to the 
borrower (as the debtor himself perceives it). Similarly, the benefit to 
lenders (lender’s surplus) can be measured by the amount the lender is 
paid minus the cost to the lender. If, for example, costs of lending 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 It is Pareto-efficient, see eg H Varian, Intermediate Economics, International Student 
Edition (6th edn WW Norton & Company, 2003) 15. 
47 J Hicks, 'The Foundations of Welfare Economics' (1939) 49 The Economic Journal 
696; N Kaldor, 'Welfare Propositions in Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of 
Utility' (1939) 49 The Economic Journal 549. 
48 Cf N Mankiw and M Taylor, Economics (Thomson, 2006) 132. 
49 This is by analogy to buyer surplus, Ibid. 132. 
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amount to £700 but the lender is paid £800, the surplus to the lender is 
£100.50 Market equilibrium is reached at a point which indicates the 
price the borrower actually pays to the lender.  Resource allocation 
(including resource use) is efficient if the total surplus received by the 
lender and the borrower is maximised. If surplus to the lender and the 
surplus to the borrower are both maximised, we say that equilibrium is 
efficient. The surplus is at its highest when the amount that the 
borrower is willing to pay for the loan is as high as possible and the 
costs to lender are as low as possible. If the benefit cannot be increased 
any more without making the lender incur more costs and thereby 
making the lender worse-off then the equilibrium reached is efficient. If 
some gains from the financing are not being realised, for example 
because costs to the lender can be reduced, financing is inefficient. 
In order to see whether security interests make finance more efficient, 
we need to first understand the risks associated with an unsecured loan. 
The greater the risk, the greater are the costs to the lender and the 
greater is the price of the loan to the borrower. If the risk is too great, 
the lender will not lend, irrespective of price. We can think of the 
greatest amount of risk, which the lender is willing to take, as “safe 
credit”. If costs can be decreased in a system, more loans will be 
assessed as “safe credit”. Both lenders and borrowers are better off 
because lenders are able to provide more of their product whilst 
borrowers are able to obtain finance which otherwise would not have 
been available to them. Reducing costs of lending makes finance more 
efficient. Costs of lending depend on the assessment of risk that the 
creditor is willing to undertake. This assessment in turn is a function of 
a number of factors, which can be broadly grouped in two categories. 
The first group of factors relates to the creditor’s own attitude to risk-
taking. These may result from individual employees’ assessments, from 
financiers’ own business models or from factors external to the creditor 
and debtor’s relationship but which may nevertheless influence the 	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creditor’s behaviour such as market conditions or legal regulations. The 
second group of factors that affect the creditor’s assessment of risk is 
the creditor’s assessment of the probability of repayment of the loan. 
This assessment depends on the information, which the creditor has 
about the debtor. Each borrower knows, or can predict, its own 
expected return and repayment probability. In general the greater the 
return the more likely the loan will be repaid. This information is, 
however, not observable by lenders.51 Lenders can ascertain this only 
partially from the conduct of the debtor, its credit history or the 
borrower’s previous relationship with the lender. As the debtor has 
better knowledge than the creditor of its own willingness and ability to 
pay the loan, we say that this information is asymmetrically distributed. 
Once the loan has been made and priced according to the risk that the 
debtor poses, there is also additional risk that the debtor will 
subsequently undertake more risky investments or will seek to avoid 
payment. This is referred to as the moral hazard problem. It is through 
reducing the costs arising from information asymmetry and moral 
hazard that security interests have been primarily shown to increase 
efficiency of lending. Before we go on to discuss these in detail, we 
briefly address how security interests impact on the first category of 
factors: that is, the creditor’s own attitude to risk.  
A. Impact of security interests on creditor’s risk 
preferences  
Creditors’ risk-aversion differs, as noted by White.52 First, he observed 
that risk assessment is made by individual employees, whose interests 
may not be to maximise the employer’s profits. He argued that security 
interests might overcome excessive caution of particularly risk-averse 
employees. Scott questioned whether security is the most cost-effective 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 N Mankiw, 'The Allocation of Credit and Financial Collapse' (1986) 101 Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 455, 457. 
52 J White, 'Justifications for Personal Property Security' (1984) 37 Vanderbilt LR 473, 
491-502. 
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way of dealing with risk-aversion of particular employees.53 
Superfluous risk-aversion may be balanced out by using reward and 
incentive systems. The second point made by White was that the 
institutions themselves might exhibit differential risk distribution 
depending on the variations of legal rules that regulate their lending 
activity.54 Regulated institutions (commercial banks) are likely to be 
more risk averse than those that are not (financial institutions). Taking 
security alleviates the risk-aversion of the regulated institutions. Scott, 
however, noted that this is inconsistent with the evidence that regulated 
commercial banks have historically bought most unsecured debt whilst 
financial institutions have almost exclusively dealt in asset-financing.55  
In response to that debate, one could observe that taking security is 
relevant to the risk-weighting of capital for capital adequacy purposes 
under the Directive on capital adequacy56 and the Directive on taking 
up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions57, which are an 
application of Basel II.58 Capital adequacy rules set down the amount of 
capital a bank or credit institution must hold. This amount is based 
on risk. There are various financial instruments, which a credit 
institution may employ to mitigate risk. These include derivatives, 
corporate bonds and also asset-backed securities.  The legal rules on 
capital adequacy make secured credit more desirable in cases where 
there is willingness to reduce exposure for capital adequacy purposes. 
Thus, the choice of taking security is made on the basis of rules 
external to the relationship between the lender and the borrower. If 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Scott, 'A Relational Theory of Secured Financing' (n 36) 906, fn 19 and literature 
cited there. 
54 White (n 52). 
55 Scott, 'A Relational Theory of Secured Financing' (n 36) 906 and 943 
56 Directive 2006/49 on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions 
[2006] OJ L177/201, as amended, currently under review, see new proposals on capital 
requirements 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/regcapital/new_proposals_en.htm (last 
accessed 30 September 2012). 
57 Directive 2006/48 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit 
institutions  [2006] OJ L177/1, as amended, currently also under review, see n 56. 
58 An updated set of rules set up in June 2004 by the Basel committee, a part of the 
Bank for International Settlements. The rules are applied in the EU via directives 
2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC. 
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collateral is taken, capital charges may be reduced, which may make 
the capital available for other users.59 Secured credit is simply more 
advantageous than unsecured credit for calculating risk-weighted assets 
for capital adequacy purposes.  
B. Overcoming problems of asymmetry of information 
and adverse selection 
We now turn to discussing how security interests have been shown to 
maximise the lender’s surplus and to make lending more efficient. We 
begin with addressing the issue that the market is not perfect and 
information is asymmetrically distributed.60 With the potential debtor 
seeking the lowest-cost transaction and the cost at least in part being 
determined by the level of default risk he presents, the debtor has an 
advantage to be gained from presenting himself as a lower risk. With 
imperfect knowledge of the debtor the creditor is faced with the 
challenge of determining both the overall risk level of the transaction 
(and therefore whether to enter into it at all) and determining an 
effective pricing mechanism.  A simple solution would be to price 
credit at a level that seems the worse case scenario. However, this 
would not produce optimal efficiency of the credit market and would 
not match the priorities of debtor companies working in a competitive 
market to reduce prices to ensure they stay competitive.  As we have 
seen above when discussing the market equilibrium, it is only 
worthwhile for a person to borrow if the return on investment exceeds 
the cost of borrowing. The borrower is considered to have a better 
knowledge than his creditor to assess the return on investment and 
whether or not he will be willing and able to repay the loan at all. The 
lender could try to assess repayment probability by looking at how 
much interest rate the borrower is willing to pay, the assumption being 
the more interest the borrower is willing to pay, the more profitable the 	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60 See e.g. D Besanko and A Thakor, 'Competitive Equilibrium in the Credit Market 
under Asymmetric Information' (1987) 42 J Eco Theory 167; R Smith, 'Money and 
Credit with Asymmetric Information' (1994) 3 J Fin Intermediation 213; I Welch, 'Why 
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investment and so the greater the repayment probability. Such 
reasoning would be flawed. The interest rate as such cannot signal the 
willingness and ability to pay. If a debtor accepts a higher interest rate, 
it could reflect either the profitability of the undertaking or that the 
debtor is ready to take greater risk. Higher interest rates will, however, 
drive more trustworthy debtors out of the market, thus the ‘selection’ of 
borrowers may be ‘adverse’ from the viewpoint of the lender.61 
Adverse selection may be anticipated by the creditors and thus cause a 
decrease in the availability of credit.62 If the lender cannot compensate 
for the increased risk of “bad debtors” by charging a higher interest 
rate, the lender will not lend at all to debtors even if they are willing to 
pay a higher interest rate. 
Security interests reduce the asymmetry of information between the 
creditor and the debtor by providing a known and verifiable asset. The 
existence of the asset enables the creditor to better inform herself of the 
creditworthiness of the debtor and eliminate the need of a higher 
interest rate, thereby overcoming the adverse selection.63 Moreover, 
taking security may reduce the costs of evaluating the financial risk that 
debtor poses.64  Instead of collecting and analysing information on the 
debtor’s creditworthiness, the creditor may prefer to lower the 
immediate costs and obtain security.65 Security interest itself may serve 
as a tool of reducing the information asymmetry by sending the creditor 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 See G Akerlof, 'The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
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moral hazard) that prevents an efficient allocation of resources see S Djankov, R 
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a positive signal about the creditworthiness.66 Although typically 
lenders require collateral for loans granted to borrowers with lower 
credit quality (i.e. presenting a higher credit risk),67 in cases of 
borrowers with no record of previous financial or commercial activity 
willingness to give collateral may signal that they are creditworthy.68   
C. Overcoming the moral hazard problem 
The contract between the lender and the borrower is concluded on the 
basis of the lender’s assessment of the borrower’s repayment 
probability. After the contract has been concluded, the creditor risks 
that the borrower’s behaviour may be inconsistent with that assessment. 
If the rate was fixed, the debtor could try to reduce the real cost of loan 
by undertaking activity more risky than the one envisaged by the 
creditor. The borrower might, for instance, obtain a higher-risk loan at 
an interest rate commensurate with the price for a less risky activity69 or 
by distributing corporate assets to shareholders in the form of excessive 
dividend payments.70 Thus, the so-called “moral hazard” problem is 
created. It arises when one person (the agent) is performing a task on 
behalf of another (the principal). If the principal cannot perfectly 
monitor the agent’s behaviour, the agent may engage in dishonest or 
otherwise undesirable (“immoral”) behaviour.71 Misbehaviour 
generates conflicts known as agency costs, which inflate the cost of 
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(n 19) 641. 
71 Mankiw and Taylor, Economics (n 48) 446.  
	   55	  
credit.72 Compensating the creditor for its portfolio risk by increasing 
interest rates might increase moral hazard and inflate agency costs.73  
(a) Reduction of costs of monitoring  
One way to deal with moral hazard is to monitor the debtor.74 For 
instance, the debtor could be required to submit regular financial 
reports. This, however, could be cumbersome and costly. The creditor 
only has an incentive to monitor the debtor if the benefits of monitoring 
outweigh its costs.75 Security may reduce the need, as well as the cost 
of monitoring of the entirety of the debtor’s assets, to monitoring only a 
secured asset and thus overcome moral hazard problems.76 The 
presence of collateral does not eliminate the risk of the debtor’s 
misbehaviour but the creditor is shielded from the consequences of 
such misbehaviour and cost of borrowing need not be inflated by 
agency costs.77 The cost decrease would be noticeable in particular by 
creditors whose monitoring costs would otherwise be large because of 
lack of information of day-to-day business with the debtor.  
In addition, security interests avoid free-riding problems as they reward 
the monitoring efforts of the secured creditor in a multi-creditor 
scenario.78 Where the debtor borrows from different creditors and at 
least one creditor monitors the debtor, the other creditors have an 
interest to free-ride on the monitoring efforts of that creditor. The non-	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monitoring creditors avoid incurring costs of monitoring whilst 
benefitting from the fact that the risk of the borrower’s misbehaviour is 
reduced. Security interests compensate the efforts of the monitoring 
creditor by promoting its claim upon default over the claims of the non-
monitoring creditors. The non-monitoring creditors no longer benefit 
“for free” from the fact that someone else keeps an eye on the debtor.  
(b) A mutually-interested relation reducing moral hazard 
Scott argued that security interests, particularly in an exclusive lending 
arrangement, might cause “each party [to] ... act as if it owned all the 
property rights in the prospect”.79 Neither party would then act contrary 
to the interests of another for the fear of retaliation in either future or 
present transaction.80 It seems, however, that placing the interests of the 
lender and the borrower on a par is not fully justified, as the former will 
favour a more cautious approach than the interests of the latter would 
dictate.81 This theory, called the “relational theory”, may explain 
security interests in project and infrastructure finance, where the 
creditor-debtor relationship resembles a joint-venture, with some form 
of “fiduciary” duties owed by one joint-venturer to another82 but it does 
not seem to explain the efficiency of secured transactions more widely.  
D. Fair distribution and efficiency in a wider context – 
third party issues 
Efficiency is about maximising the surplus to all members of the 
society, not merely the lender and the borrower. Security interests, as 
property rights, are enforceable against third parties. In order to assess 
the efficiency of secured credit, it is necessary to consider whether the 
surplus of third parties is maximised when lending is secured. 
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(a) The net impact on society 
Schwartz argued that it is impossible to prove that security is efficient 
without first understanding how it reduces the social cost.83 Schwartz 
himself, after testing several economic theories, could not show that 
social gains exceed social costs and declared the efficiency to be 
unproven. Jackson and Kronman opined that secured credit reduces the 
overall costs to any particular debtor and since all parties share the 
resulting savings, there is an incentive for all to produce these cost 
savings.84 White called this benefit to all parties the “common 
welfare”.85 Barnes, in turn, argued that secured transactions do not 
produce any value (there is no “net societal gain”) but merely shift it 
from some participants to others.86 If this is true, it seems that it is not 
possible to say whether credit market equilibrium is more efficient with 
or without collateral. Barnes himself suggested that security interests 
could nevertheless be justified on the grounds of utilitarianism.87 
(b) The impact of security interests on unsecured creditors 
LoPucki famously and controversially stated: “security is an agreement 
between A and B that C take nothing”.88 He argued that secured 
creditors and debtors extract a subsidy from those who involuntarily 
became creditors.89 Consequently, security interests misallocate 
resources by imposing on unsecured creditors a bargain to which many, 
if not most, of them have given no meaningful consent.90 Although 
involuntary creditors cannot be said to take the risk of the debtor’s 	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86 R Barnes, 'The Efficiency Justification for Secured Transactions' (1993) 42 Kansas 
LR 13, 66. 
87 Ibid. 66. See also J Coleman, 'Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximisation' (1980) 8 
Hofstra LR 509, 510-12; R Posner, 'Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal Theory' 
(1979) 8 JLS 103. 
88 L LoPucki, 'Unsecured Creditor’s Bargain' (1994) 80 Virginia LR 1887, 1899. 
89 See Ibid., 1895 fn 36; also E Warren, 'Bankruptcy, Policymaking in an Imperfect 
World' (1993) 92 Mich LR 336, 354 refers to “involuntary creditors such as tort victims 
and environmental cleanup funds”. 
90 LoPucki (n 88) 1891, supported by S Knippenberg, 'The Unsecured Creditor's 
Bargain: An Essay in Reply, Reprisal, or Support?' (1994) Virginia LR 1967. 
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insolvency, they bear its consequences. LoPucki’s analysis is 
preoccupied with tort victims.91 He observed that tort claims form a 
substantial part of liabilities in bankruptcy proceedings,92 which lead 
him to argue, controversially, that secured credit is used purposely to 
defeat these liabilities.  
Mokal critiqued this reasoning.93 First, larger companies are more 
likely to take security when they aim to avoid bankruptcy.94 They do 
not set out to defeat tort claims by granting security when the company 
is solvent. For smaller firms liquidation bears comparatively significant 
costs, which are unlikely to be outweighed by the benefits from 
liquidating a firm in order to externalise tort liabilities.95 Second, 
companies often pay the “involuntary” liabilities anyway. Secured debt 
does not serve to externalise costs nor does it victimise the 
‘involuntary‘ creditors.96 The lawmakers in a given legal system may 
choose to protect certain creditors above secured creditors but this is a 
policy decision made by considering fairness of distribution. Unlike 
economic efficiency, it cannot be judged on positive, objective grounds 
but involves normative judgments from political philosophy97 such as 
equality of creditors at insolvency.98  
Notwithstanding the controversies, LoPucki’s analysis is a good 
illustration of an important theme: the legal system ought to ensure that 
one creditor is not unjustly enriched at the expense of another.99 The 
extent to which the debtor’s assets are subject to security is crucial in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Point noted by S Block-Lieb, 'The Unsecured Creditor’s Bargain: A Reply' 80 
Virginia LR 1989, 1993; Knippenberg (n 90) 1969-70, fn 13; Mokal (n 22) 692. 
92 Point also cited by Bebchuk and Fried, (n 20) 883, fn 89; L Bebchuk and J Fried, 
'The Uneasy Case for Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy: Further Thoughts and 
Reply to Critics' (1997) 82 Cornell LR 1279, 1296-97, fn 60; Finch (n 19) 645, n 80 
and in four other places as pointed by Mokal (n 22) fn 38.  
93 Mokal (n 22) 695-696. 
94 LoPucki (n 88) 1927 fn 153, pointed out by Mokal (n 22) 695. 
95 Mokal (n 22) 699. 
96 Ibid. 696. 
97 See Mankiw and Taylor, Economics (n 48) 141.  
98 See discussion of the pari passu rule as a contradiction of the principle of equality 
viewed as fairness of distribution: R Mokal, 'Priority as Pathology: The Pari Passu 
Myth' (2001) 60 CLJ 581. 
99 The importance of this theme is also placed by R Goode, 'The Modernisation of 
Personal Property Security Law' (1984) 100 LQR 234, 236.  
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achieving the fair balance. Fairness in individual cases may be 
impossible to reconcile with the utilitarian principle of greatest 
happiness for the greatest number but a legal system should at least 
strive to achieve fairness in the typical case and to remove unnecessary 
impediments to efficiency.100  
2.4 Efficiency of security interests in derived assets 
We said above that risks and costs associated with lending depend on 
the attitude to risk of the creditor and on the creditor’s assessment of 
the probability of repayment. We concluded that security interests 
increase efficiency of credit by overcoming information asymmetry and 
moral hazard problems. However, a problem that has only been 
partially addressed in the debate on efficiency of security interests is 
that taking security presents additional risks for the lender. If a loan is 
secured, the probability of repayment depends on additional factors 
such as the value of the collateral on the market at the time of 
enforcement of the security and the continuing existence of a security 
interest in an asset (whether the original collateral or a new asset). If the 
value of the asset falls, the creditor may not be paid in full. Neither the 
lender nor the borrower can predict with certainty the future market 
value of the asset and this is usually outside of their control.101 Yet, in 
some cases, secured lending itself may fuel moral hazard when the 
lender places ungrounded reliance on the value of collateral, for 
example where the lender counts on the collateral improving in 
value.102    
Key to this thesis is the risk posed by legal rules of security interests. 
This issue has not yet attracted the attention of law and economics 
scholars. The problem of potential inefficiency of security is a serious 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Ibid. 236. 
101 An exception is where the creditor has security over shares where the grantor of 
security has rights issue of shares. An exercise of the right would lead to the value of 
the creditor’s shareholding being diminished.  
102 See  J Niinimäki, 'Does Collateral Fuel Moral Hazard in Banking?' (2009) 33 
Journal of Banking & Finance 514, 515 and literature cited there.  
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one. The increased efficiency of the credit market equilibrium, which 
we discussed above, depends on the continuing existence of the 
collateral. If a security interest may cease to exist when the debtor 
withdraws assets from security or when encumbered goods are mixed 
with other goods, this creates a new risk for the creditor: a risk of losing 
security. If security interest can no longer be asserted in the old asset, 
the problem of moral hazard is not overcome. If, after security interest 
has been granted, the debtor tries to withdraw the collateral from 
security, a new moral hazard problem arises. Without an asset subject 
to security the debtor will present a higher risk than the creditor 
originally agreed to finance. Thus, a legal system permitting 
withdrawal of assets from security without consent of the lender may 
fuel moral hazard where the debtor may, by its behaviour, cause assets 
to be withdrawn from security.  
It is argued that a rule that automatically extends security interests to 
substitutes (whether clean substitutions or mixed substitutions) deals 
with this moral hazard problem and promotes efficiency of security 
interests. By contrast, it is argued, a rule that automatically extends 
security to fruits leads to inefficiency. The distinction between fruits 
and substitutes is not always clear-cut and we deal with it in chapter 
2.103 
A. Promoting efficient credit market equilibrium: 
security in substitutes   
The problem of moral hazard posed by collateral can be overcome if 
the creditor contracts to take security in the substitute resulting from the 
debtor’s disposition of the old asset to a bona fide purchaser or mixing 
of the old asset to create a new one. Additional contracting means 
additional transaction costs, which can be avoided if the security 
interests extend to substitutes by operation of law. A rule that security 
automatically extends to substitutes (“substitutes rule”) may be seen as 
preserving the bargain between the parties and avoid additional 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 See text to n 360. 
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transaction costs associated with contracting for this rule. A new asset 
acquired with the value represented in the old asset simply takes place 
of the old asset. The creditor still has a known and a verifiable asset, 
which preserves the reduced costs of monitoring of the debtor.104  It 
seems that whether the new asset is equivalent in value to the old asset 
is irrelevant at this stage because the creditor monitors a particular 
asset, not its value. 
Where there is a risk of the creditor’s security interest being defeated 
by a debtor’s disposition, a substitutes rule in a legal system is likely to 
promote the role of security. The creditor need not include the risk of 
losing security in the cost of borrowing. The likelihood of repayment is 
greater than if the creditor were to lose its security in the original 
(disposed of) collateral. This is true even if it may be difficult to 
estimate whether the likelihood of repayment differs depending on the 
type of asset encumbered: the asset which constitutes proceeds or 
product may be a different type of asset than the original collateral, 
which may in turn have an influence on the creditor’s ability to resort to 
that asset if the debtor defaults. Even if the likelihood of repayment is 
smaller when security shifts to a substitute compared to security in the 
original collateral (for example due to the smaller value of the 
substitute), it is still greater than not having security at all. While the 
creditor is better off by having a right to resort to proceeds or products 
(i.e. substitutes), the debtor is not worse off: the debtor surrenders 
security in one asset and substitutes it for another. Indeed, if security 
did not extend to proceeds and products automatically the creditor 
would likely be worse off (if he lost security in the original collateral) 
whilst the debtor would be better off as his assets would no longer be 
subject to a right in favour of the creditor. The substitution of the 
original asset for proceeds or products does not, as a matter of 
principle, change the position of the debtor’s other creditors, who will 
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need to give priority to the secured creditor with respect to the new 
asset instead of the original collateral.105  
B. Security in fruits as an impediment to an efficient 
equilibrium 
The rationale for extending security to fruits seems to be different than 
in the case of security in substitutes. Fruits are generated beside, not 
instead of, the original collateral. A rule automatically extending 
security interests to fruits (“fruits rule”) would enlarge the subject 
matter of security. A question to ask is whether such a rule, similarly to 
the substitutes rule, would work to promote efficiency of security. In 
the process of generating fruits, unlike with proceeds or products, there 
is no risk for the creditor of losing security in the original asset. Let us 
consider the costs and benefits to the lender and the borrower of such a 
rule. It is shown that the fruits rule causes oversecuritisation of the 
lender and a deadweight loss to the credit market. 
The debtor, however, is worse off because new assets become 
automatically encumbered, in addition to those already subject to 
security. This means that the debtor receives no new value and is 
limited in making use of the new assets, for example when seeking new 
credit the debtor cannot offer to his prospective new creditor a first-
ranking security in the new asset (the fruit) because a security already 
exists in that asset. This leads to a problem of oversecuritisation and 
deadweight loss. 
(a) Oversecuritisation 
It might be tempting to think that the creditor is better off with a right 
to fruits than he is without it because he has more assets to resort to 
(fruits as well as original collateral) in the event of debtor’s default. 
The value of these assets may be much greater than the amount of the 
loan secured. We need to remember, however, that the creditor can only 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Thus other creditors of the debtor also are not worse off. This matters if we take into 
account interests of third parties when discussing efficiency of secured credit. See text 
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resort to the assets up to the amount of the secured debt. Probability of 
repayment does not increase linearly with the increasing number of 
assets. The increase of repayment probability with extra assets being 
added is incremental.106 The benefit of having security automatically 
extend to fruits is therefore marginal.  
Extending security to fruits makes the credit market equilibrium less 
efficient if one takes into account the interests of third parties. The 
difference between proceeds and products on one hand and fruits on the 
other is that the former are new assets that do not represent new wealth 
available to the creditor since they are substitutes of assets disposed of 
or mixed. Fruits are new assets that represent new wealth in the 
debtor’s estate. The rule carves out a greater proportion of the debtor’s 
assets to the secured creditor, which is difficult to reconcile with 
interests of other creditors, thus making it further questionable from the 
perspective of fairness. The creditor ends up in a position where he can 
resort to assets worth much more than the secured debt. The creditor is 
oversecuritised. Yet the creditor does not gain a benefit (or gains only a 
very small benefit) from the greater number of assets as collateral 
because the increase in the repayment probability is incremental. 
(b) The deadweight loss of the fruits rule 
Another argument against an automatic extension of security to fruits is 
that such a rule would create a deadweight loss. In economic terms the 
rule extending security to fruits by operation of law would impede 
efficiency in a way analogous to deadweight loss in market 
equilibrium. A deadweight loss is the fall in total surplus that results 
from market distortion.107 A typical example is tax. In a market of 
goods when tax is imposed the price paid by the buyers rises but the 
sellers do not receive a greater price. This causes the supply and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 For example, if Andy lends £5 to Jenny, who gives security over her watch worth 
£100, the likelihood of repayment will not increase substantially (if at all) just because 
Jenny will add security over her computer worth £500.  
107 Mankiw and Taylor, Economics (n 48) 150-151. 
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demand curve to shift.108 For example, if the tax is levied on sellers of 
widgets, the price of widgets goes up and the supply curve shifts: fewer 
widgets are sold at the given price. A tax on a widget causes the size of 
the market for the widget to shrink. It is argued that a rule that 
automatically extends security interests to fruits (which we continue to 
refer to as a “fruits rule”) generates deadweight loss in a similar way as 
taxation does.  
We need to measure gains and losses to borrowers and lenders from the 
fruits rule. We already said that the benefits to the lender from the fruits 
rule are marginal. We can therefore assume that the lender is neither 
better off nor worse off with a fruits rule. The borrower, however, is 
worse off where the rule applies because the cost of borrowing rises for 
the borrowers. All assets, which the borrower can use to raise finance, 
present an investment opportunity to the borrower. The borrower can 
use the new assets to raise new finance. If the new assets are 
automatically subject to an interest in favour of the lender, the borrower 
loses that opportunity. What the borrower must give up is an 
opportunity cost.109 The borrower is worse off where the fruits rule 
applies because the costs of borrowing are enlarged by the opportunity 
cost. The borrower cannot offer the new assets as security to other 
lenders to gain fresh loans. He cannot borrow as much as he would be 
willing to. The market does not reach its efficient equilibrium because 
the surplus to both parties (i.e. the surplus of the borrower and the 
surplus of the creditor) is smaller. 
A legal system could provide that parties can contract out of the fruits 
rule but this increases transaction costs, as they need to spend time and 
money to consider whether to exclude this rule. It is more efficient to 
let parties decide to “opt-in” rather than to “opt-out”. Assuming that 
parties are rational, there is arguably no deadweight loss in a parties’ 
agreement to extend security to fruits because parties would have 	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considered why their relationship requires extension of security to 
fruits. For example, parties may decide to extend security to fruits 
because it is foreseen that the value of the original collateral will 
diminish on the market and so new assets will need to become subject 
to security.  
3 Types of security in England  
Rights of the secured creditor to assert security in new assets that derive 
from the original collateral depend on the legal rules of security 
interests in general. Before we can proceed with the discussion on 
security interests in derived assets we need to first examine the four 
available types of security in English law: pledge, charge, mortgage and 
contractual lien.110 As mentioned in the introduction, this thesis 
concerns non-possessory security interests, which means charges and 
mortgages. Equitable liens can also be non-possessory consensual 
security but their nature is controversial and practical importance 
minimal. Although not all types of security interests are of interest in 
this thesis, we need to briefly outline all of them to know what types of 
security remain outside of the scope of this work.  
3.1 Pledge 
Pledge111 is a possessory security. It is created by delivery of actual or 
constructive possession of the asset to the creditor by way of security112 
or by a third party attornment to the creditor.113 The pledgor remains 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Re Cosslett (Contractors) Ltd [1998] Ch 495 (CA) 508 (Millett LJ); Goode on Legal 
Problems of Credit and Security (n 1) para 1-42. 
111 See generally on pledge N Palmer and A Hudson, 'Pledge' in N Palmer and E 
McKendrick (eds), Interests in Goods (2nd edn, LLP, 1998) and Beale et al, The Law of 
Security and Title-Based Financing (n 2) paras 5.01-5.55. Where a pledge is used as a 
security for a short-term loan to an individual over tangible goods (a pawn) it is 
governed by Consumer Credit Act 1974, ss114-121. 
112 Dublin City Distillery Ltd v Doherty [1914] AC 823 (HL); Goode on Legal 
Problems of Credit and Security (n 1) para 1-43. 
113 Official Assignee of Madras v Mercantile Bank of India Ltd [1935] AC 35 (PC), 58 
(Wright LJ). Attornment means that the third party, or even the debtor himself 
(Meyerstein v Barber (1866) LR 2 CP 38, 52 (Willes J), agrees to hold the goods or 
documents for the creditor instead of the debtor.  
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the owner of the asset whilst the pledgee becomes a possessor and 
enjoys a “special property”.114 The possession gives the creditor a legal, 
albeit limited, interest in the asset.115 It entitles the pledgee to exercise 
the proprietary and possessory remedies against a third party 
wrongdoer, including (common law) damages calculated according to 
the full value of goods as if he were an owner. The pledgee has a right 
to use the asset, albeit at his own risk, as long as this will not impair 
it;116 a right to sell the interest as a pledgee or to assign it by way of 
gift; a right to sub-pledge the asset on the same conditions as he holds it 
and for a debt no greater than his own; a right to deliver the asset to 
another for safe keeping; and a right to sell the asset in the event of 
default in payment by the pledgor. The limited nature of the pledgee’s 
interest in the asset is seen first in the lack of a right to foreclosure117 
and, second, in the obligation of the pledgee, following discharge of the 
debt, to hold any surplus on trust for the pledgor if he recovers a sum 
greater than the secured debt.118  
Assets that can be encumbered with a pledge must be reducible to 
possession. Choses in action, such as shares, cannot be pledged.119 
Assets pledged in practice are goods and documentary intangibles (e.g. 
documents of title such as bills of lading, negotiable documents of 
entitlement to be paid120 and negotiable securities121). Unlike in the US, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 E.g. Ratcliff v Davies (1610) Cro Jac 244, 245 (Fleming CJ); Coggs v Bernard 92 
ER 107, 112; (1703) 2 Ld Raym 909, 916 (Holt CJ); Donald v Suckling (1866) LR 1 
QB 585, 595 (Shee J), 606 (Mellor J), 614 (Blackburn J); Sewell v Burdick (The Zoe) 
(1884-85) LR 10 AC 74, 106 (Fitzerald LJ). 
115 E McKendrick (ed), Goode on Commercial Law (4th edn Penguin Books, 2010) 
628. 
116 This is different now than was at the time of Coggs (n 114) 917 (Holt CJ), where 
pledge had “the nature of a deposit (…) not liable to be used” unless the asset pledge 
required use, e.g. a horse or a cow, then a reasonable use was permitted. 
117 Carter v Wake (1877) LR 4 Ch D 605. Unless the contract or a statute otherwise 
provide, the pledgee cannot become the owner of the pledged assets upon the default of 
the debtor. 
118 Mathew v TM Sutton [1994] 4 All ER 793, 793 (Chadwick J). Donald (n 114) 604 
(Mellor J); Chabbra Corp Pte Ltd v Jag Shakti (owners), The Jag Shakti [1989] AC 
337 (PC); The Odessa [1916] 1 AC 145 (PC) 159 (Mersey LJ); N Palmer, Palmer on 
Bailment (3rd edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 2009) para 23-034. 
119 Harrold v Plenty [1901] 2 Ch 314. 
120 E.g. bills of exchange, cheques, promissory notes, treasury bills.  
121 E.g. bearer shares, share warrants, bearer bonds and debentures, negotiable 
certificates of deposit. 
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where registered securities can be pledged insofar as they are 
certificated,122 under English law registered securities cannot be 
pledged. In England, a certificate relating to registered shares or 
debentures is not negotiable. However, if the certificate has been 
delivered and transferred, until registration takes place, the transferee 
has an equitable charge or equitable mortgage.123  
3.2 Lien 
Lien seems to be one of the most “confused” types of security interests 
in English law.124 Slade J explained in Re Bond Worth that the word 
“lien” is more commonly used in its narrow sense to mean a right 
arising by operation of law.125 As such it may arise by virtue of a 
statute, common law or equity. In a broader sense, lien may also signify 
a right, which arises on the basis of a contract. Contractual liens are 
said to take effect both by common law and equity. Common law liens 
connote a possessory lien, which involves a right to detain goods until 
the money owed to the detainee has been paid.126 When created by 
contract127 they are similar to a pledge: for a lien to arise there must be 
a (voluntary) delivery of possession to the creditor.128 In contrast to 
pledge, the goods subject to lien are usually deposited not for the 
purpose of security but for some other purpose such as custody or 
repair.129 Unlike a pledgee, a lienee cannot dispose of his interest and 
cannot generally sell the goods, which are subject to a lien.130 The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 UCC §9-313(a). 
123 Harrold (n 119); Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (n 1) para 1-47, 
fn 169 and case law cited there.  
124 J Phillips, 'Equitable Liens – a Search for a Unifying Principle' in N Palmer and E 
McKendrick (eds), Interests in Goods (2nd edn, Lloyds of London Press, 1998) ch 39, 
977; W Gummow, 'Names and Equitable Liens' (1993) 109 LQR 159, 162.  
125 Re Bond Worth [1980] Ch 228, 250 (Slade J); Beale et al, The Law of Security and 
Title-Based Financing (n 2) para 6.140. 
126 Hammond v Barclay (1802) 2 East 227, 235; 102 ER 356, 359 (Grose J); Tappenden 
v Artus [1964] 2 QB 185 (CA); Ibid. (n 2) para 5.57. 
127 Gladstone v Birley (1817) 2 Mer 401, 404; 35 ER 993 (Grant MR). 
128 Cosslett (n 110) 508 (Millett LJ). 
129 Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (n 1) para 1-49; see e.g. in Forth v 
Simpson (1849) 13 QB 680; Cosslett (n 110) 508 (Millett LJ). 
130 Donald (n 114) 604 (Mellor J). Exceptions may arise on the basis of a contract, trade 
usage or a statute (e.g. unpaid seller’s right of resale, Sale of Goods Act 1979, s48). 
	   68	  
position has been questioned recently. As a limited property right, it is 
perceived to be capable of assignment where the debt is also 
assigned.131 It has been argued that a contractual power to sale will not 
convert a contractual lien into pledge,132 although there are also views 
to the contrary.133  
Equitable liens, unlike common law liens, elude a definition.134 They 
are traditionally seen as not depending on possession.135 Consequently, 
they are thought to operate similarly to charges, for example by being 
enforced in the same way.136 However, a shadow of a doubt has been 
cast recently on whether intangible property could be subject to a 
lien.137 If the property subject to an equitable lien is disposed of to a 
purchaser of a legal interest in the asset, the purchaser takes free of the 
lien unless they had a notice of it. Equitable lien may be protected by 
registration if the asset is land138 but not if the asset is personal 
property.139 Equitable liens arise by operation of law in relation to a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Civil Procedure Rules 1998, r25.1(1)(c)(v) gives court a power to order the sale of any 
property which is of a perishable nature or which for any other good reason it is 
desirable to sell quickly; L Sealy and R Hooley, Commercial Law. Text, Cases and 
Materials (4th edn OUP, 2009) 1118. 
131 Ibid. (n 130) 1106; Palmer and Hudson, 'Pledge' (n 111) 636.  
132 Sealy and Hooley (n 130) 1108 citing Trident International Ltd v Barlow [1999] 2 
BCLC 506 – a contractual lien not converted into an equitable pledge, and Marcq v 
Christie Manson & Woods Ltd (t/a Christies) [2003] EWCA Civ 731, [2004] QB 286 
[41] (Tuckey LJ). 
133 Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (n 1) para 1-49. 
134 G McCormack, Secured Credit under English and American Law (Cambridge 
Studies in Corporate Law, CUP, 2004) 45 and case law cited there. Generally on 
equitable liens see I Hardingham, 'Equitable Liens for the Recovery of Purchase 
Money' (1985) Melbourne ULR 65; Phillips (n 124); Beale et al, The Law of Security 
and Title-Based Financing (n 2) paras 6.140-6.163. 
135 McKendrick (ed), (n 115) 661. 
136 Re Beirnstein [1925] Ch 12, 19. 
137 Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) [2012] EWHC 2997 (Ch) [34], [36] 
(Briggs J) (the arrangement of “general lien (…) on all other property held by [the 
custodian]” was characterised as a charge). 
138  Class C(iii) land charge where land is unregistered under Land Charges Act 1972, 
s2(4)(iii); a caution against first registration if registered land, Land Registration Act 
2002, s 15; as a notice, LRA 2002, s 32, or an overriding interest if the lien-holder is in 
possession, LRA 2002, s70(1)(g). 
139 Equitable liens are not registrable under Companies Act 2006, s860. This does not 
change under Draft Companies Act 2006 (Amendment of Part 25) Regulations 2013 
(revised draft, to come into force 6 April 2013): only charges created by the company 
are registrable. Liens are “created”: London and Cheshire Insurance Co Ltd v 
Laplagrene Co Ltd [1971] Ch 499. The revised Draft Regulations do not, however, 
expressly exclude registration of liens as the previous version of the Draft Regulation 
did (previous version of s859A(6)(c)). 
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contract or other relationship between the parties concerning an asset. 
The indicative circumstances sufficient (rather than essential) for a lien 
to arise are: (i) existence of a debt of the owner of an asset to another 
(the creditor of the debt) arising from a promise to pay consideration 
for acquiring the asset or payment of, or a promise to pay, an expense 
in relation to that asset; (ii) identification and appropriation of the asset 
to the performance of the contract; (iii) it would be unconscionable on 
the part of the owner to dispose of that specific asset to a third party, 
without consent of the creditor or without discharging the debt owned 
to that creditor.140 An example of an equitable lien is a vendor’s lien, 
which arises where legal or equitable title in an asset is transferred to a 
purchaser before the full payment of the purchase price. The vendor has 
an equitable lien in the asset to the extent the price remains unpaid as it 
is considered to be unfair for the purchaser to keep the property without 
paying for it.141 The greatest difficulties are around unconscionability. 
It seems that what must be unconscionable is the lack of priority of the 
lienholder in the event of the lienor’s insolvency as against other 
creditors of the lienor.142 Beale, Bridge, Gullifer and Lomnicka suggest 
that the relevant factors to be taken into account in determining 
unconscionability are issues of justice and fairness between the 
lienholder and the other creditor and whether it would be 
unconscionable for the lienholder to be an unsecured creditor.143 Thus, 
in order to find out if a lien arises we need to know whether the 
claimant deserves proprietary protection. We examine possible 
arguments in favour of proprietary protection when we examine claims 
to proceeds of unauthorised dispositions of collateral in the final 
chapter.144 The equitable lien we consider in the final chapter is a 
proprietary remedy, which usually arises as an alternative to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 Hewett v Court (1983) 149 CLR 639 (Aus H Ct) 668 (Deane J). 
141 Beale et al, The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing (n 2) para 6.154; 
vendor’s lien does not appear to apply in the context of sale of goods, see ibid. para 
6.144 but contrast Hardingham, (n 134) 75 and S Worthington, 'Equitable Liens in 
Commercial Transactions' (1994) 53 CLJ 263, 269. 
142 Phillips (n 124) 991-993. 
143 Beale et al, The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing (n 2) para 6.142. 
144 See text to nn 983-997. 
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constructive trust.145  This is a different role of the equitable lien than 
the one we find in relation to, for example, vendor’s equitable lien, 
where the lien secures specific obligations that relates specifically to 
particular property which is subject matter of the contract. As we shall 
see, however, the need to put the claimant above unsecured creditors 
justifies a proprietary response but it does not automatically help us 
explain the type of the proprietary reponse: a lien or a constructive 
trust. The sort of arguments based on fairness and justice, which may 
support the imposition of, for example, vendor’s equitable lien do not 
suffice to explain why the proprietary remedy should be a lien rather 
than a constructive trust in a given scenario. In the final chapter we 
shall therefore examine why a lien is more suitable than a constructive 
trust as a remedy in the specific context of a secured creditor’s 
restitutionary claim to proceeds of unauthorised dispositions of 
collateral.146  
3.3 Mortgage 
Mortgage147 involves a transfer of ownership of the asset, or any other 
lesser interest held by the transferor, by way of security upon the 
express or implied condition that ownership will be re-transferred to the 
debtor upon the discharge of his obligation.148 Traditionally, the 
mortgagor has a right to get the mortgaged asset back on redemption149 
and restrictions of such right are prohibited.150 A mortgagee exercising 
the power to sell to discharge the secured obligation is bound, similarly 
to a pledgee, to hold any surplus on trust for both the mortgagor and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 Beale et al, The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing (n 2) para 6.163. 
146 See discussion below, chapter V, section 3.3.C. 
147 See generally Beale et al, The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing (n 2) paras 
6.01-6.16; E Cousins and I Clarke, Cousins on the Law of Mortgages (3rd edn Sweet & 
Maxwell, London 2010). 
148 See Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (n 1) para 1-50 (identifying 
five ways of transfer of legal of title for the purpose of creating a legal mortgage). 
149 Kreglinger v New Patagonia Meat and Cold Storage Co Ltd [1914] AC 25 (HL). 
150 See however the criticism of the rule A Berg, 'Clogs on the Equity of Redemption—
or Chaining an Unruly Dog' (2002) JBL 335; see also Beale et al, The Law of Security 
and Title-Based Financing (n 2) paras 6.30-6.46. 
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any subsequent mortgagees.151 Unlike in the case of a pledge or a 
common law lien, delivery of possession is not a condition of creating a 
mortgage,152 which means that both tangibles and intangibles can be 
subject to mortgage. Mortgages are traditionally divided into legal and 
equitable. A legal mortgage is a transfer of legal title to the mortgagee 
whilst an equitable mortgage involves a transfer of an equitable title or 
a declaration of trust in favour of the mortgagee153. Requirements to 
effect transfer of legal title for the purposes of creation of a mortgage 
may differ depending on the asset or the person of the grantor.154 For 
example, a legal mortgage of a debt or other chose in action is effected 
by assignment in writing by the assignor accompanied by a notice of 
assignment to the debtor.155 Alternatively, a legal mortgage over such 
assets can be effected by novation. An equitable mortgage, as Lord 
Templeman explained, “is a contract which creates a charge on 
property but does not pass a legal estate to the creditor.”156 This may be 
because the owner of the property does some act, which is insufficient 
to transfer a legal estate or title in the subject matter upon the 
mortgagee, but it will, nevertheless, demonstrate a binding intention to 
create a security in favour of him.157 An equitable mortgage may also 
arise where the subject matter is a future asset; where the mortgage is 
of an equitable interest or where the mortgagor creates a second 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 Law of Property Act 1925, s105; prior to legislation see Banner v Berridge (1880) 
LR 18 Ch D 254, 260; Beale et al, The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing (n 2) 
para 18.54. See also text to nn 832-844 for discussion of the extent of the duty of the 
mortgagee and for discussion of whether the presence of a fiduciary relationship 
between the mortgagee and mortgagor underlies the rationale of this rule. 
152 For advantages of non-possessory security see e.g. Goode, 'The Modernisation of 
Personal Property Security Law'  (n 99) 234; M Bridge, 'Form, Substance and 
Innovation in Personal Property Security Law' (1992) JBL 1 (noting that possession 
may be integral to the operation of the debtor’s business and hence influence his ability 
to repay the loan). 
153 Approved in London & County Banking v Goddard [1897] 1 Ch 642. 
154 Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (n 1) para 1-13. 
155 Law of Property Act 1925, s136. 
156 Downsview Nominees Ltd v First City Corporation Ltd [1993] AC 295 (PC) 311 
(Templeman LJ). 
157 Swiss Bank Corporation v Lloyds Bank Ltd [1982] AC 584 (HL) 594-595 (Buckley 
LJ). 
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mortgage since the legal title is with the first mortgagee and legal title 
can be transferred only once.158 
3.4 Charge 
A charge159 is a non-possessory security, whereby the charged property 
is appropriated without the transfer of possession or title.160 A chargee, 
unlike a mortgagee, cannot foreclose or take possession. Whilst a 
mortgage involves conveyance of property subject to equity of 
redemption, a charge conveys nothing and merely gives the chargee 
certain rights over the encumbered property.161 Yet, sometimes the 
chargor may also be said to have a right to redeem.162 A mortgage does 
not create a right in the asset belonging to the debtor. Instead, it 
transfers the already existing right to the asset that the debtor has (i.e. a 
legal or equitable title) to the creditor. Thus, the right, which the 
creditor acquires, is not a new one. Thus, a mortgage creates a right in 
re sua (the right of redemption). By contrast, an equitable charge 
creates an interest in re aliena.163 The chargor creates an interest, which 
previously did not exist in the asset, and grants this interest to the 
chargee. Despite these differences between a charge and a mortgage, 
the term “charge” may be regarded as an umbrella expression to cover a 
right of recourse to property for security purposes, in which case it also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 Beale et al, The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing (n 2) para 6.07. 
159 See generally Ibid.(n 2) paras 6.17-6.29. 
160 Carreras Rothmans Ltd v Freeman Mathews Treasure Ltd [1985] Ch 207, 227 
(Peter Gibson J); Re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (in liquidation) 
(No 8) [1998] AC 214 (HL) 226 (Hoffmann LJ). 
161 Bond Worth (n 125) 250 (Slade J). 
162 Beale et al, The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing (n 2) para 6.30. 
163 Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (n 1) para 1-51. R Mokal, 
'Liquidation Expenses and Floating Charges - the Separate Funds Fallacy' (2004) 
LMCLQ 387 (argued that the distinction between the assets being encumbered in 
favour of a chargeholder rather than “belonging” to him, has been ignored by a HL 
decision in Buchler v Talbot [2004] UKHL 9, [2004] 2 AC 298. Irrespectively of the 
fact that the ratio has now been statutorily overruled, Gullifer counter-argued that the 
decision did not cast doubt on the distinction because it concerned statutory 
interpretation of unclear sections of the Insolvency Act 1986, L Gullifer, 'The Reforms 
of the Enterprise Act 2002 and the Floating Charge as a Security Device' (2008) CBLJ 
399). 
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includes the term “mortgage”.164 The two terms, “mortgage” and 
“charge”, are often used interchangeably.165 In this thesis we will use 
the term “charge” to mean either charge or mortgage unless it will be 
necessary to distinguish between the two. 
The juridical nature of charge is unclear. In National Provincial and 
Union Bank of England v Charnley166 a charge was said to arise where:  
“both parties evince an intention that property, existing or future, 
shall be made available as security for the payment of a debt, and 
that the creditor shall have a present right to have it made 
available (…) even though the present right which is 
contemplated can only be enforced at some future date, and 
though the creditor gets no legal right of property, either absolute 
or special, or any legal right to possession, but only gets a right 
to have the security available by an order of the Court”.167  
Based on Charnley Professor Goode defined charge as a present right 
which arises upon an agreement between the parties and by which a 
particular asset or class of assets is appropriated168 to the satisfaction of 
the debt.169 When a charge is created, the creditor acquires a right of 
recourse against the asset belonging to the debtor. 
A. Distinction between fixed and floating charges 
Charges are fixed or floating. Broadly speaking, a fixed (specific) 
charge “fastens on ascertained and definite property or property capable 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 Shea v Moore [1894] IR 158, 168 (Walker LC): “every charge is not an equitable 
mortgage, though every equitable mortgage is a charge”; Goode on Legal Problems of 
Credit and Security (n 1) para 1-52. 
165 London County and Westminster Bank, Limited v Tompkins [1918] 1 KB 515 (CA) 
528-9 (Scutton LJ); Bond Worth (n 125) 250 (Slade J); Companies Act 2006, s861(5): 
“in this Chapter “charge” includes mortgage”; under Law of Property Act 1925, 
s205(xvi) “mortgage” includes any charge or lien on any property for securing money 
or money’s worth”; see also Beale et al, The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing 
(n 2) paras 6.56-6.58. 
166 [1924] KB 431 (CA) 449 (Atkin LJ). 
167 Charnley (n 166) 449 (Atkin LJ), cited also in Goode on Legal Problems of Credit 
and Security (n 1) para 1-51. 
168 A mere contractual right to take or retain possession without a right of appropriation 
does not constitute a charge, Cosslett (n 110) 507-508 (Millet LJ). 
169 Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (n 1) para 1-50. 
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of being ascertained and defined”170 whereas a floating charge is 
“ambulatory and shifting in nature”.171 An agreement that the creditor 
has a right to sell assets and to apply proceeds to discharge debt may 
not, however, be sufficient to create a fixed charge.172 Where assets are 
to be dealt with in the ordinary course of business the charge created is 
typically the floating charge. It is important to understand the 
distinction between fixed and floating charges because this has a direct 
bearing on security interests in derived assets under the current law 
because some new assets are created as a result of dealings with assets. 
It would be an inaccurate simplification to say that whenever assets are 
dealt with, the charge must be floating. This section shows that not all 
dealings with charged assets secured mean that the charge is floating.   
(a) Hallmark of a floating charge: right to dispose free of 
security without consent 
Finding a hallmark of a floating charge has proven highly controversial. 
The quest for this Holy Grail of the floating charge has returned a 
number of results in cases and literature.  We cannot start retracing the 
steps in this “floating” odyssey other than by recounting the dicta of 
Romer LJ in the Court of Appeal in Yorkshire Woolcombers, who listed 
three characteristics of a floating charge:  
“(1) If it is a charge on a class of assets of a company present and 
future; (2) if that class is one which, in the ordinary course of the 
business of the company, would be changing from time to time; 
and (3) if you find that by the charge it is contemplated that, until 
some future step is taken by or on behalf of those interested in 
the charge, the company may carry on its business in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 Illingworth v Houldsworth [1904] AC 355 (HL), 358 (Macnaghten LJ). 
171 Illingworth (n 170) 358 (Macnaghten LJ). 
172 Smith (Administrator of Cosslett (Contractors) Ltd) v Bridgend CBC [2001] UKHL 
58, [2002] 1 AC 336. This was so because the assets in question – two coal washing 
plants – were considered capable of being replaced during the currency of the contract 
(at [44] (Hoffmann LJ)). For criticism see Beale et al, The Law of Security and Title-
Based Financing (n 2) para 6.104; P Walton, 'Fixed Charges over Assets Other Than 
Book Debts - Is Possession Nine-Tenths of the Law' (2005) 21 IL and P 5). 
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ordinary way as far as concerns the particular class of assets I am 
dealing with."173   
Not all three factors are our hallmark. The first one certainly is not. A 
class of future assets can also be subject matter of a fixed charge.174 
Assets, which are not in existence at the moment of creation of the 
fixed charge will fall within the charge as soon as the assets come into 
existence.175 The description of subject matter of security as a class of 
assets will also function as an after-acquired property clause, so a fixed 
charge will extend to such assets with retrospective effect from the time 
the charge was created.176 As the number of assets within the class 
grows, there are simply increasingly more assets in the pool of assets 
subject to a fixed charge.177 The second factor can also be dismissed 
because assets in a fixed charge can change.178 They can, for example, 
be wasted.179 Equally, a floating charge can exist over a diminishing 
pool of assets where the assets are disposed but none are added.180 
There is considerable attraction to view the third characteristic as the 
hallmark of a floating charge. Lord Scott in Spectrum certainly thought 
so.181 His Lordship said that the asset subject to the charge is not 
appropriated as security for the payment of the debt until the 
occurrence of some future event. He explained: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 [1903] 2 Ch 284, 295 and approved sub nom Illingworth (n 170).  
174 Siebe Gorman & Co Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 142 (Ch D); Re 
Keenan Bros Ltd [1986] BCLC 242 (Sup Ct (Irl)); L Gullifer, 'Will the Law 
Commission Sink the Floating Charge?' (2003) LMCLQ 125, 126-127. 
175 Or, in the case of assets which the debtor only has a power to dispose of, as soon as 
the debtor acquires a right to the new asset which includes a power to dispose of that 
asset.  
176 See chapter IV, section 2.1. 
177 Beale et al, The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing (n 2) para 6.97. 
178 Agnew v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (Re Brumark Investments Ltd) [2001] 
UKPC 28, [2001] AC 710 [13] (Millett LJ). 
179 Agnew (n 178) [37] (Millett LJ) (talking about a wasting asset). See also Beale et al, 
The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing (n 2) para 6.97 give an example of a 
cow that died but, we ought to add that a cow may not be wasted: it may be turned into 
meat and sold thus procuring proceeds.  
180 Bond Worth (n 125) 267 (Slade J). 
181 Re Spectrum Plus Ltd (in liquidation) [2005] UKHL 41, [2005] 2 AC 680 [107] 
(Scott LJ). 
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“[i]n the meantime the chargor is left free to use the charged 
asset and to remove it from the security”.182  
Lord Millett in Agnew also thought that withdrawing assets from 
security without the consent of the charge holder was the hallmark of 
the floating charge.183 He added that in terms of the parties’ intention 
the question is “whether the charged assets were intended to be under 
the control of the company”.184 It seems widely accepted that the 
hallmark of the floating charge is that the chargor has a right to dispose 
of the assets without the consent of the chargee.185 The application of 
this test is not easy but we do not describe these difficulties as it has 
been done elsewhere in the literature.186 The nature of the floating 
charge prior to crystallisation is controversial. By and large the theories 
that developed focus on explaining two aspects of the floating charge: 
first, whether or not it attaches to assets prior to crystallisation; second, 
why third parties take free from the charge even if they are not 
purchasers of legal title for value without notice. The theories are 
discussed in more detail in chapter IV.187 The choice of a theory 
impacts on the issue of priorities and the rights of the chargee against a 
third party following an unauthorised dealing with the charged asset, 
where the third party had notice of it. Further, the choice of a theory 
impacts on the issue of decrystallisation, which is easier to think of if 
the nature of the floating charge and fixed charge are similar.188  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 Spectrum (n 181) [111] (Scott LJ). 
183 Agnew (n 178) [32] approving Smith (n 172) [41] (Hoffmann LJ): “because the 
property is (…) a fluctuating body of assets which could be consumed or (subject to the 
approval of the engineer) removed from the site in the ordinary course of the 
contractor’s business, it was a floating charge”. 
184 Agnew (n 178) [32] (Millett LJ).  
185 R Goode, 'Charges over Book Debts: A Missed Opportunity' (1994) 110 LQR 592, 
598; A Berg, 'Charges over Book Debts: A Reply' (1995) JBL 433, 465; K Naser, 'The 
Juridical Basis of the Floating Charge' (1994) 15 Co Law 11; Beale et al, The Law of 
Security and Title-Based Financing (n 2) para 6.71; S Worthington, 'Fixed Charges 
over Book Debts and Other Receivables' (1997) 113 LQR 562. 
186 Beale et al, The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing (n 2) paras 6.96-6.119. 
187 See Chapter IV, section 3.2.A. 
188 Beale et al, The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing (n 2) para 6.77. 
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(b) Restriction on the dealing power as a necessary element 
of the fixed charge 
Consistent with the above conceptualisation of the floating charge is the 
description of a fixed charge in Re Yorkshire Woolcombers.189 
Vaughan-Williams LJ said in that case that once a fixed charge is 
created over assets:  
“[it] shall never thereafter at the will of the mortgagor cease to be 
a security. If at the will of the mortgagor he can dispose of it and 
prevent it being any longer a security, although something else 
may be substituted more or less for it, that is not a 'specific 
security’."190  
Two points follow from this definition. First, no charge can be fixed 
unless the creditor is able to ensure that the asset remains covered by 
the charge. Second, a fixed character of the charge does not prevent it 
being taken in future assets.191 Ensuring that asset is covered by a fixed 
charge can be done in two ways. First, the chargee may restrict the 
dealing power of the chargor192, for example by blocking the charged 
bank account or by otherwise taking control of the charged asset. This 
causes a problem whether the restriction ought to be legal or factual. A 
lack of a legal restriction means that the chargor is able to deal with the 
asset as a legal owner. It is argued in Chapter IV that if the debtor 
remains the legal owner of the asset, there is a hiatus between what he 
can legally do and what he is authorised to do by the terms of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 (n 173). 
190 Yorkshire Woolcombers (n 173) 294 (Vaughan-Williams LJ).  
191 Beale et al, The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing (n 2) para 6.97. 
192 Spectrum (n 181) [107] (Scott LJ), [138]-[139] (Walker LJ); Agnew (n 178) [22] 
(Millett LJ) citing Keenan (n 174) 246 (Henchy J); Ibid. (n 2) para 6.107: “Arguably 
the law has now reached the point, where, in order for a charge to be characterized as 
fixed, there must be a total restriction on any disposal of the charged assets by the 
chargor without consent of the chargee”; S Worthington, 'Floating Charges: The Use 
and Abuse of Doctrinal Analysis' in J Getzler and J Payne (eds), Company Charges: 
Spectrum and Beyond (OUP, 2006) 25, 28: “The essential difference between a fixed 
and a floating charge turns upon the ability of the chargor to deal with the charged 
assets, removing them from the ambit of the security without the consent of the chargee 
[italics in the original]”; S Worthington and I Mitchkovska, 'Floating Charges: The 
Current State of Play' (2008) 9 JIBFL 467.  
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charge.193 Second, the chargee may mark the asset in a way that would 
provide a notice of encumbrance to any potential buyer. This places 
monitoring duties on the chargee to ensure that assets are not 
withdrawn from security. Such duties are cumbersome,194 probably 
even more so in relation to intangibles195 than tangibles.196 Without 
such steps there is always a risk that the chargor may dispose of the 
asset into the hands of a bona fide purchaser of legal title without notice 
and thus defeat the security. In practice fixed charges are typically 
taken over “fixed” and more permanent assets such as land, interests in 
land, plant and machinery, which are not disposed of in the ordinary 
course of business. The assets must be unambiguously described in the 
debenture and subject to real control by the chargee.197 
The rule that a bona fide purchaser of legal title without notice of an 
equitable charge takes free of the charge is a necessary tool in a system 
that functions without a register of all security interests to strike a 
balance between competing interests of secured creditors and 
purchasers from the debtor who may have no chance to find out about 
the encumbrance. The tension between competing interests of innocent 
buyers and secured creditors in many jurisdictions is resolved by 
endowing the buyer with an opportunity to check for any existing 
encumbrance in a register. In jurisdictions, where all non-possessory 
security interests are registrable, the buyer of an asset or a subsequent 
creditor only takes the asset subject to security if the security is duly 
registered although some jurisdictions provide for an exception relating 
to the sale in the ordinary course of business so that even if a security is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 See Chapter IV, section 3.1.B. 
194 An attempt to avoid this and relieve the bank from giving consent to every 
withdrawal on an account, as shown e.g. by the debenture in Re New Bullas Trading 
Ltd [1994] BCC 36, 1 BCLC 485 (CA Civ Div), will result now in the charge being 
floating: see Agnew (n 178) [27] (Millett LJ). 
195 See e.g. Spectrum (n 181) [54] (Hope LJ) (listing in methods of restricting the 
freedom to deal with book debts of a debtor, based on S Worthington, 'An 
Unsatisfactory Area of Law: Fixed and Floating Charges yet Again' (2004) 1 
International Corporate Rescue 175, 182). 
196 Once a tangible is “marked” the creditor is not required constantly to check whether 
the markings have not been removed and whether the asset is still with the debtor 
197 Agnew (n 178); Spectrum (n 181); Cousins on the Law of Mortgages (n 147) para 
23-23. 
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registered, the purchaser takes free of the security.198 In English law the 
role of registration is less obvious. Not all charges are registrable. A 
charge granted by a company is registrable in the Companies House if 
it is a floating charge or a fixed charge over certain type of asset.199 It is 
not clear what the register is a notice of and to whom.200 It seems that 
registration serves as notice to those who are reasonably expected to 
search the register,201 not the whole world as it was sometimes 
argued.202 The burden of publicising a fixed charge is shifted onto the 
shoulders of the chargee. A financier seeking to take a fixed charge in a 
particular asset ought to ensure that the borrower cannot dispose of that 
asset. Otherwise, the charge may be recharacterised as floating because 
the mere fact that the debtor has a power to dispose of the equipment 
means that he may dispose into the hands of a bona fide purchaser and 
thus withdraw the asset from security.  
B. Practical consequences of characterisation as fixed and 
floating security 
Four practical consequences of characterisation are usually identified 
depending on the character of the charge.203  First, not all fixed charges 
have to be registered whilst all floating charges must be registered if the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 See e.g. Polish Registered Charge and Charge Register Law, art 7(2)(3). Similar 
effect is achieved in German law by a rule that an encumbrance of the grantor’s asset 
cannot limit the grantor’s freedom to do business, BGH ZIP 1998/793. If the grantor of 
security cannot trade because its assets are encumbered in favour of a creditor, this can 
be perceived as exploitation of another by procuring for himself promised or granted 
pecuniary benefits, which are conspicuously disproportionate to the performance he 
promised, which has been described as Knebelung. If this is established, the secured 
transaction can be set aside on the grounds of public policy (§138 BGB). Therefore, 
under German law the grantor is allowed to trade although the legal basis for this is not 
straightforward. 
199 Companies Act 2006, s860. Note, however, draft regulations to extend the system of 
registration to all charges The Companies Act 2006 (Amendment of Part 25) 
Regulations 2013, to come into force 6th April 2013. 
200 See discussion on registration as constructive notice in Beale et al, The Law of 
Security and Title-Based Financing (n 2) paras 12.04-12.17. One of the main problems 
with the current system is that registration does not ensure priority of registered security 
interests.  
201 Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (n 1) para 2-29; E Ferran, 
Principles of Corporate Finance Law (OUP, 2008) 402; McCormack (n 134) 106-107. 
202 W Gough, Company Charges (2nd edn Lexis Nexis, 1996) ch 32. 
203 Because of this, the meaning of the terms “fixed” and “floating” is normative rather 
than merely descriptive. For a contrary opinion see P Turner, 'Floating Charges - A 
"No" Theory: National Westminster Bank v Spectrum Plus' (2004) LMCLQ 319, 322-
323. 
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chargor is a company.204 If the document creating charge is not sent for 
registration within twenty-one days of the creation of charge, the 
charge is void against a liquidator or administrator of the company and 
against any other creditor of the company.205 Non-registrable fixed 
charges include206 charges over shares and other securities, charges 
over bank accounts and similar cash deposits,207 charges over insurance 
policies when no claim has arisen at the time the charge is created, 
charges over expected income from Private Finance Initiative contracts 
and other major projects, over computer software and over film 
negative rights.208  As pointed out in The Law of Security and Title-
Based Financing209 if charges are over shares and the chargee is 
entitled to the dividends, such a charge could be treated as a charge on 
a book debt on the grounds that the entitlements to dividends are book 
debts and thus would qualify for registration but it is exempted from 
registration under Financial Collateral Arrangements (No 2) 
Regulations (FCAR).210 Charges over contingent debts, such as 
proceeds of insurance policies when the claim has not yet been made 
are also not registrable.211 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204 Companies Act 2006, s860(7). There are separate registration requirement regarding 
certain categories of assets (e.g. patents, trade marks, designs, ships and aircraft) but we 
do not discuss these here. 
205 Late registration is possible with permission from the court. 
206 Beale et al, The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing (n 2) para 10.29. 
207 FCAR (see n 210) reg4 disapplies Companies Act 2006, s860 (if it would otherwise 
apply), to perfection of financial collateral arrangements (which relate to shares, 
securities, banks accounts and other cash deposits). For discussion of the role of 
registration see L Gullifer, 'What Should We Do About Financial Collateral?' (2012) 
CLP 1.  
208 See LC CP (n 15) para 3.13. 
209 Beale et al, The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing (n 2) para 10.29 
210 Financial Collateral Arrangements (No 2) Regulations 2003 (SI 2003/3226), as 
amended by the Financial Collateral Arrangements (No 2) Regulations 2003 
(Amendment) Regulations 2009 (SI 2009/2462) and the Financial Markets and 
Insolvency (Settlement Finality and Financial Collateral Arrangements) (Amendment) 
Regulations 2010 (SI 2010/2993), referred to as FCAR, implementing Directive 
2002/47 on financial collateral arrangements [2002] OJ L168/43 as amended by 
Directive 2002/47 on financial collateral arrangements as regards linked systems and 
credit claims [2009] OJ L146/37 (Financial Collateral Directive). 
211 Paul & Frank Ltd v Discount Bank (Overseas) Ltd [1967] Ch 348, 362 (Pennycuick 
J); Beale et al, The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing (n 2) para 10.25; LC CP 
(n 15) para 3.13. 
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Second, priority of charges runs from the moment of their creation,212 
whether they are registered or not. Floating charges are postponed to 
preferential creditors, whether the company is at the time in the course 
of being wound up213 or not,214 while fixed charges are not. 
Furthermore, for floating charges created after the Enterprise Act 2002 
came into force a proportion of the assets subject to a floating charge is 
ring-fenced and made available to the claims of unsecured creditors.215 
Unlike a fixed charge, a floating charge is also subordinated to the costs 
and expenses of administration216 and liquidation.217 Compared with 
fixed charges floating charges enjoy very poor priority but an argument 
has been rightly made in the literature that floating charges are not 
taken to ensure priority.218 
Third, a floating charge created not for new value in the period prior to 
insolvency may be avoided in the run-up to insolvency.219 The period is 
two years if the floating charge holder is a person connected to the 
company, and within twelve months of insolvency for any other person. 
By contrast, a fixed charge can only be avoided if it involves a 
preference.220 Finally, in certain cases holders of a floating charge may 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212 Rules on priority are exceptionally complicated in English law, involving the rule of 
nemo dat quod non habet with numerous exceptions, see generally Ibid. (n 2) part IV. 
213 Insolvency Act 1986 ss40, 175(2)(b); Sch B1 para 65(2). This does not apply to 
financial collateral arrangements to the extent to which they might amount to a floating 
charge: FCAR (n 210), reg10(2A). See also reg 10(1) and (2) which provides that the 
financial collateral cannot be set aside after commencement of a winding up, whether 
by court or voluntary, which otherwise could be held to be void under Insolvency Act, 
s127 (winding up by court) and s88 (voluntary winding up) respectively.  
214 Companies Act 2006, s754. This does not apply to financial collateral arrangements 
to the extent to which they might amount to a floating charge: FCAR (n 210) reg10(6). 
215 Insolvency Act 1986, s176A; on prescribed proportion rules Insolvency Act 1986 
(Prescribed Part) Order 2003 SI 2003/2097, art3. This includes the Crown, as the 
Crown preference has now been abolished. Insolvency Act 1986, s176A does not apply 
to financial collateral arrangements to the extent to which they might amount to a 
floating charge: FCAR (n 210) reg10(3). 
216 Insolvency Act 1986, Sch B1 para 99. 
217 Insolvency Act 1986 s76ZA 9(4), introduced by Companies Act 2006, s1282, 
reversing Buchler (n 163); see also Mokal, 'Liquidation Expenses and Floating Charges 
- the Separate Funds Fallacy' (n 163); G Moss, 'Liquidators Stung for Costs and 
Expenses' (2004) 17 Insolvency Intelligence 78. 
218 Mokal, 'Liquidation Expenses and Floating Charges - the Separate Funds Fallacy' (n 
163). 
219 Insolvency Act 1986, s245. This does not apply to financial collateral arrangements 
to the extent to which they might amount to a floating charge: FCAR (n 210) reg10(5). 
220 Insolvency Act 1986, s239. 
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appoint an administrative receiver.221 This was once a more widely 
prevailing advantage of floating charges but the Enterprise Act 2002 
has significantly reduced this.  
4 The concept of security interest under Article 9 UCC 
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code in the USA has adopted a 
universal, generic concept of a security interest, thus confining terms 
such as pledge or mortgage to legal history.222 Similarly, Article 9 UCC 
does not distinguish between fixed and floating security nor between 
legal and equitable.223 The term ‘security interest’ is defined in §1-
201(35) UCC. It stipulates that a security interest means an interest in 
personal property or fixtures, regardless of its form, that secures 
payment or performance of an obligation.224 It applies to sale of 
accounts, chattel paper (a record evidencing both a monetary obligation 
and a security interest225), payment intangibles (any personal property 
including things in action226 which the account debtor’s principal 
obligation is a monetary obligation227), promissory notes, consignment 
and agricultural lien.228 Since the form of the secured transaction does 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221 Insolvency Act 1986, s72A, introduced by Enterprise Act 2002, s250. A floating 
chargee can still appoint an administrative receiver (a) in pursuance of an agreement 
which is or forms part of a capital market arrangement if a party incurs a debt of at least 
£50 million under the arrangement, and the arrangement involves the issue of a capital 
market investment; (b) in the case of a project company of a project which includes step 
in rights of a person providing finance and is a public-private partnership project, a 
utility project, an urban regeneration project designed wholly or mainly to develop 
land, a financed project; (c) in the case of a company who created one of the listed 
financial market charge. 
222 McCormack (n 134) 71. Former section 9-102(2) provided that Article 9 applied to 
“security interests created by contract including pledge, assignment, chattel mortgage, 
chattel trust, trust deed, factor’s lien, equipment trust, conditional sale, trust receipt, 
other lien or title retention contract and lease or consignment intended as security”, as 
cited in R Broude, 'Secured Transactions in Personal Property in the United States' in M 
Bridge and R Stevens (eds), Cross-Border Security and Insolvency (OUP, 2001) 45, 50. 
223 See McCormack (n 134) 71 with literature cited there. 
224 Definition critique by Gilmore for being like a declaration of faith carrying little 
meaning, G Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property, Vol I (Boston & Toronto 
1965) 334. 
225 Broude (n 214) 49; see UCC §9-102(a)(11). 
226 Excluding accounts, chattel paper, commercial tort claims, deposit accounts, 
documents, goods, instruments, investment property, letter-of-credit rights, letters of 
credit, money, oil and gas or other minerals before extraction, see UCC §9-102(a)(42).  
227 UCC §9-102(a)(61).   
228 UCC §9-109(a). 
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not matter, Article 9 applies whether the title to the collateral vests in 
the secured party, as e.g. retention of title (a conditional sale), or it 
remains with the debtor.229 Article 9 UCC employs two crucial notions: 
attachment and perfection of a security interest. Both are crucial for 
understanding security interests in the US and England.230 The terms 
“attachment” and “perfection” are also becoming common usage in 
England and they are expressly used in the new scheme proposed by 
the Law Commission.231 
4.1 Attachment 
Attachment is the creation of the security interest as between the 
creditor and the debtor.232 §9-203(a) UCC defines attachment as the 
enforceability of the security against the debtor with regard to the 
collateral. A security interest that has attached will give the creditor 
rights in rem against the debtor but not necessarily against third 
parties.233 An attached but unperfected interest will not yet be good 
against the debtor’s trustee in bankruptcy.234 A right in rem effective 
only between the parties may seem similar in effect to a contractual 
right and be thus a prima facie contradiction in terms. However, such 
an attached albeit unperfected interest will take effect against certain 
third parties such as an unsecured non-insolvency creditor.235 As 
Professor Goode explains:  
“the purpose of the concept is to demonstrate that the debtor 
cannot dispute the conferment of real rights on the creditor, and 
the consequent restriction on the debtor’s own dominion over the 
asset, but that the same is not true of all third parties, some of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
229 UCC §9-202. 
230 Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (n 1) para 2-01. 
231 LC CP (n 15) paras 2.13-2.15. 
232 Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (n 1) para 2-02. 
233 Ibid. (n 1) para 2-02. 
234 Gilmore (n 224) 435 
235 Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (n 1) para 2-02. 
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whom may, in the absence of perfection, be able to contend that 
the grant of the security has no impact on them”.236 
It makes no sense to talk about an “unattached security interest”. Such 
an interest would be worthless as not enforceable by or against 
anybody.237 
4.2 Perfection 
Perfection signifies a point in time when the security interest becomes 
enforceable against third parties, including the trustee in bankruptcy, 
who represents the rights of the whole class of unsecured creditors 
when the bankruptcy petition has been filed by or against the debtor.238 
Perfection is considered to be an American term for what elsewhere is 
called publicity.239 Its purpose is not only to protect the secured creditor 
against other creditors but also to avoid the impression of false wealth 
of the debtor in the eyes of other (unsecured) creditors.240  Generally, 
publicity can be achieved through possession or control of the collateral 
by the creditor or a person the parties agreed to; by filing in a register; 
through a notice; or attornment.241Achievement of perfection depends 
on the type of the collateral.  
The most common method of perfection is filing. Unlike the English 
system, however, which is based on registering of the particulars of the 
charge (the so-called transaction filing), the US system requires filing 
of a notice only. This is one of the fundamental differences between the 
US and English systems242 and the proposed new regime takes the 
notice-filing approach as a simple and efficient solution.243 What is 
filed under §9-501 UCC is not the security agreement itself but only a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
236 Ibid. (n 1) para 2-02. 
237 J Brook, Secured Transactions. Examples and Explanations (4th edn Aspen, New 
York 2008) 52. 
238 Ibid. 86. 
239 Wood (n 34) para 17-01. 
240 Ibid. (n 34) para 17-01. 
241 Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (n 1) para 2-02. 
242 McCormack (n 134) 76. 
243 LC CP (n 15) paras 2.24-2.26 (outline) and 3.113-3.181. 
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financing statement, which contains a limited amount of information.244 
The notice indicates merely that a person may have a security interest 
in the collateral. Further information must be ascertained from the 
parties concerned.245 The creditor first to perfect by filing takes priority. 
This is the so-called ‘first-to-file-or-perfect’ priority rule.246  
4.3 Security interests in proceeds and products under Article 
9 UCC 
Article 9 UCC expressly provides for security interests in proceeds and 
products. It is commonly thought that a security interest would not 
fulfil its purpose if it did not extend to the proceeds when the debtor 
disposes of the collateral securing the interest.247 The rules governing 
debtor’s power to dispose of encumbered assets and security in 
proceeds of disposition are very closely linked. Without a continuing 
security interest in the proceeds of the collateral a secured creditor may 
altogether lose his security when collateral is disposed of because the 
creditor may not retain interest in the original asset when it leaves the 
hands of the debtor.248 Hence, the law in the USA developed, beginning 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
244 UCC §9-502 Official Comment 2. The difference between security agreement and 
financing statement has been explained in Thorp Commercial Corp v Northgate Indus., 
Inc. 654 F2d 1245, 1248 (8th cir, 1981): “The security agreement defines what the 
collateral is so that, if necessary, the creditor can identify and claim it, and the debtor or 
other interested parties can limit the creditor's rights in the collateral given as security. 
The security agreement must therefore describe the collateral.... The financing 
statement, on the other hand, serves the purpose of putting subsequent creditors on 
notice that the debtor's property is encumbered. The description of collateral in the 
financing statement does not function to identify the collateral and define property, 
which the creditor may claim, but rather to warn other subsequent creditors of the prior 
interest. The financing statement, which limits the prior creditor's rights vis-a-vis 
subsequent creditors, must therefore contain a description only of the type of 
collateral.” 
245 Special procedure under UCC §9-210 may require the secured party to make a 
disclosure at the debtor’s request. 
246 McCormack (n 134) 80. 
247 A Kaunders, 'Substitution of Proceeds Theory for UCC §9-306(5), or, the Expansive 
Life and Times of a Proceeds Security Interest' (1994) 80 Va LR 787, 788, see also at 
791-794 for the history of development of UCC §9-306(5). 
248 Brook (n 237) 350; R Skilton and D Dunham, 'Security Interests in Returned and 
Repossessed Goods under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code' (1981) 17 
Willamette LR 779, 781-782: “the original security interest in inventory is usually lost 
(…) either because the sale is authorized by the secured party or is to a buyer in the 
ordinary course of business”. 
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with the 1925 Supreme Court decision in Benedict v Ratner,249 in the 
direction of prohibiting security arrangements where the debtor would 
be allowed to dispose of the property and to be left to use the proceeds 
for his own benefit.250 
A security interest under UCC automatically attaches to any 
identifiable proceeds of collateral.251 A security interest in proceeds is 
perfected if the security interest in the original collateral was 
perfected.252 However, whilst a perfected security interest in the 
original collateral is normally continuous, a perfected security interest 
in proceeds becomes unperfected on the 21st day after the security 
interest attaches to the proceeds.253 The secured party is required to 
reperfect his interest in those proceeds unless an exception applies, for 
example proceeds are of a kind covered by the original filed financing 
statement or they are identifiable cash proceeds.254 The time of 
perfection of a security interest in collateral is also the time of 
perfection as to a security interest in proceeds.255  
5 Summary 
This chapter introduced the basic characteristics of security interests in 
property. It first canvassed three theories explaining the rationale 
behind security interests, one of which – efficiency theory of secured 
credit – lead us to explore in detail the economic benefits of security in 
derived assets. We saw that whilst extending security by operation of 
law to substitutes (proceeds and products) promotes efficiency of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
249 268 US 353 (1925), 45 S Ct 566. 
250 Benedict (n 249) 363 (Mr Justice Brandeis) and see at 364 (Mr Justice Brandeis): 
“where the unrestricted dominion over the proceeds is reserved to the mortgagor (…) 
the mortgage is void”. The decision effectively lead to prohibition of floating liens, see 
e.g. James Talcott Inc v Wilcox, 308 F 2d 546 (5th Cir 1962). 
251 UCC §9-203(f) juncto §9-315(a)(2). 
252 UCC §9-315(c). 
253 UCC §9-315(d). The loss of perfected status is prospective only, cf UCC §9-515(c) 
whereby a security interest is deemed never to have been perfected as against a 
purchaser of the collateral for value when purchased after the effectiveness of the 
financing statement lapses (as a general rule it is a five-year period after the date of 
filing), see Official Comment 4 to UCC §9-315. 
254 UCC §9-315(d). 
255 UCC §9-322(b). 
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credit market equilibrium, a rule automatically extending security to 
fruits makes the equilibrium less efficient because it creates a 
deadweight loss and it may lead to oversecuritisation of the lender.  
The overview of main types of security in English law showed that 
where the creditor has actual possession of the asset, the debtor’s ability 
to deal with the asset is limited. Determining who has possession 
(debtor or the lender) may, however, be important for determining who 
has a right to fruits, as we will see in Chapter III. In other cases of 
security interests collateral may change not only by yielding ‘fruits’ or 
income but the debtor may additionally deal away with the collateral, 
exchanging it for another asset. As we have seen, dealings with assets 
are treated differently depending on whether security is floating and 
fixed. In all these cases we deal with a form of derived asset, which are 
discussed in the next chapter. The focus of this thesis is on the question 
how these changes of the original collateral into a derived asset affect 
the rights of the secured creditor. A brief discussion of the functional 
approach to security interests under Article 9 UCC led us to observe 
that under UCC security interests are automatically attached to 
proceeds. We will explore this rule in Chapter III. Before we do so, we 
need to clarify the terminology relating to derived assets under English 
law. 
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CHAPTER II – Defining derived assets 
1 Introduction 
Proceeds, products and fruits can be classed as “derived assets”.256 
Derived assets are assets, which come into being in a way that allows 
us to establish a link with another asset (the original asset). The link 
could be transactional or based on another event. In a technical legal 
sense the idea of a derived asset is premised on a pre-existing right in 
the original asset. This means that the fact that an asset derives from 
another is not legally relevant unless there exists a right to the original 
asset.257 During the existence of that right the asset undergoes some 
changes. Sometimes these changes may be destructive to the right (e.g. 
if the right cannot exist without the asset in the original form). In other 
cases the right might not be extinguished despite the changes to the 
substance of the asset and it may continue to apply to a new asset. We 
could call this asset a “derived” asset (in a technical legal sense) to 
reflect the fact that the same right, which used to apply to the previous 
asset, now applies to the new asset. The term “derived asset” is relative 
to the right and assumes that the right does not change. Making such an 
assumption at the start would defeat the purpose of this thesis. For the 
same reason we do not call security interests that may arise in derived 
assets “derivative security interests”.258 This work sets out to show how 
lender’s rights are affected when the collateral undergoes some 
changes. We cannot therefore assume that the same security interest 
will apply to new assets. As a result, the term “derived asset” is used in 
a loose, non-technical sense. All tangible assets are in one way or 
another derived from other assets. Jumpers are made from wool; wool 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
256 See also Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (n 1) para 1-58 
(suggesting term “derivative assets”).  
257 It is irrelevant at this point how we conceptualise this right regarding an asset: 
whether as a proprietary right, a personal right concerning a thing (a right in personam 
ad rem) or A’s right against B’s right to an asset. 
258 Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (n 1) ch1 section 8 “Derivative 
security interests”. 
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is sheared off lambs; lambs derive from ewes and rams etc. All matter 
can be broken down to elementary particles,259 which interact leading to 
a constant change in the matter, which is responsible for transformation 
of one asset to another. At a level observable by human eye, even an 
eye clad with a microscopic lens, matter cannot be created ex nihilo.260 
In the physical world, all things are products of some other things, even 
newly born apples on an apple tree or newly born animals. Intangible 
assets are legal constructs. They cannot “derive” from the original asset 
in the same way as tangible assets do, which means that different 
considerations are likely to apply when determining rights to intangible 
derived assets. 
In this thesis we will use the term “derived assets” in a non-technical 
sense to denote “proceeds, products and fruits” and to highlight that 
these assets are derived from other assets (original collateral) during the 
secured transaction relationship, i.e. after security in an asset is created 
and before the debt is discharged or the lender otherwise relinquishes 
his interest in the underlying asset. It does not mean, however, that the 
lender will necessarily have the same interest in proceeds, products and 
fruits as it did in the original asset wherefrom the latter derived. We 
will be referring to a “process of derivation” to depict a process as a 
result of which the collateral undergoes changes. A clause in a security 
agreement, whereby the parties contractually stipulate that the security 
interest covers proceeds, products and fruits, will be referred to as a 
“derived assets clause”. 
From the perspective of the parties entering into a security agreement, 
derived assets have two characteristics, which are relevant to taking a 
security interest in them. First, derived assets are after-acquired 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
259 Elementary particles are particles that are not known to have substructure and cannot 
be broken down further. Fundamental forces (such as gravitational, electromagnetic, 
weak forces) are too made of elementary particles, although theoretical physicists 
continue to work on a unifying theory of the forces in nature. L Wolfenstein and J 
Silva, Exploring Fundamental Particles (CRC Press, Taylor & Francis, 2010) ch 10. 
260 Matter can be created very close to black holes but this is currently beyond the 
question of exercising rights in a legal sense. When created such particles can be 
detected by their electromagnetic field, they are not observable visually. 
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property (i.e. future assets) because they do not exist at the time the 
security is created but are acquired, or come into existence, at a later 
point. Second, in the case of some derived assets (substitutes) the 
original asset may be seen as continuing to exist in a changed form. 
These two features of derived assets may be seen to affect the lender’s 
security interest. It is sometimes thought that security interests in 
derived assets may arise either on the basis of a pre-existing right (i.e. 
security interest in the original collateral) or as security in after-
acquired property. If it is the former, theoretically there would only be 
one security interest in the original asset and in the new asset; if the 
latter, parties may be seen as creating at least two security interests: one 
in the original property and another in the after-acquired asset. It is not 
clear why a security interest in after-acquired property must necessarily 
be perceived as creating a different and new security interest in the 
derived asset. One property right may apply to a presently existing asset 
and when a new asset arises, the existing right may simply extend to it 
on the basis of the after-acquired property clause. In other words, if we 
accept that a security interest extends to derived assets on the basis of 
an after-acquired property clause it does not mean that that there are 
necessarily two security interests. The difference, even if it 
conceptually exists, it is likely to be negligible in English law.261 This 
work argues that security agreements containing derived assets clauses 
create only one security interest and that unless security extends to 
derived assets by operation of law, the security interests in derived 
assets arise on the basis of the parties’ agreement, i.e. on the basis of an 
after-acquired property clause. The fact that some assets derive in a 
way that leads to destruction of the original subject matter may in turn 
impact on the characterisation of security as fixed or floating or on 
rights of the secured creditor if the ‘derivation’ process was not 
authorised. How secured creditor’s pre-existing rights may be affected 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
261 The difference is of importance under Article 9 UCC because security interests in 
after-acquired property acquired after commencement of insolvency proceedings are 
not enforceable against the liquidators whilst security in proceeds, which come into 
being after commencement of insolvency proceedings, is enforceable. 
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will depend on the type of change, which the original collateral 
undergoes. This chapter discusses how assets derive from the original 
collateral. It will serve as a map of key concepts that we will use to 
navigate through the remaining work.  
Much of what we know about derived assets comes from Roman 
law.262 It is therefore necessary to begin the study of derived assets by 
looking at distinctions drawn in Roman law to see to what extent they 
could apply in the context of security interests in English law.  
2 Roman law of derived assets 
The principles that developed in Roman law in relation to derived 
assets can be of some assistance in the specific context of security 
interests in derived assets. Yet the assistance of Roman law in seeking 
to answer how secured creditor’s rights are affected by changes of the 
collateral is limited. First, Roman law addressed problems of 
accessions, mixtures and fruits, not proceeds of dispositions of assets. 
Second, Roman law only dealt with the question of ownership and did 
not deal directly with questions of how security interests, as limited 
property rights, are affected by changes to the collateral. We look at 
usefulness of Roman law in the context of security interests in two 
sections. First, we look at accession, confusion and specification, which 
relate to situations when assets were mixed or joined. Second, we look 
at how Roman law dealt with generation of new assets (fruits) where 
the original asset did not change. This section also shows that Roman 
law did not treat fruits as a type of accession (accession by natural 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
262 For illustration of the influence of Roman law in English law see Spence v Union 
Marine Insurance Co (1868) LR 3 CP 427, 437 (Bovill CJ): “we gladly avail ourselves 
of the codes and laws of (…) Roman Civil Law, to see what amongst civilized nations 
has usually in like cases been considered reasonable and just.” See also Greenstone 
Shipping Co SA v Indian Oil Corp Ltd (The Ypatianna) [1988] QB 345, [1987] 3 WLR 
869, and case comment: P Stein, 'Roman Law in the Commercial Court' (1987) 66 CLJ 
369. See generally also Smith, The Law of Tracing (n 7) ch 2; P Birks, 'Mixtures' in N 
Palmer and E McKendrick (eds), Interests in Goods (LLP Professional Publishing, 
London 1998); E Arnold, 'The Law of Accession of Personal Property' (1922) 22 
Colum L Rev 103; R Slater, 'Accessio, Specificatio and Confusio: Three Skeletons in 
the Closet' (1957) 37 Can Bar Rev 597; R Cross, 'Another Look at Accession' (1951) 
22 Miss LJ 138. 
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increase), which English law apparently does. The confusion of 
accessions (accretions) with fruits and substitutes in English law has 
lead to a creation of an unfounded “principle of substitutions and 
accretions”, the existence of which this thesis aims to disprove. 
2.1 Mixed or joined assets 
Roman law was relatively casuistic when it came to mixing or joining 
assets and concerned only ownership of corporeal property. To 
determine who owned what, Roman law looked at the sort of 
substances mixed or joined, whether the individual ingredients lost their 
physical integrity and whether the process of mixing was reversible or 
not. It distinguished between confusio (mixing liquids), commixtio 
(mixing solid things),263 specificatio (joining assets using skill and 
creating a new asset) and accessio, the later being based on the 
principle accessorium sequitur principale (the accessory follows the 
principal asset). There seems to be no single criterion according to 
which these processes were distinguished. It was not until the 18 and 
19th centuries, when the Pandectist doctrine of components 
(Bestandteilslehre) developed, that lawyers began classifying mixtures 
or joinders according to whether the component assets lost their 
individuality became a part of a “single essence or spirit like a horse or 
a stone”.264  
A. Accessio 
When two assets are joined the owner of the principal thing becomes 
the owner of what was added to it.265 A result of this process, treated as 
a mode of acquiring property,266 is that one asset continues to exist 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
263 I 2,1,27 and 28. 
264 C van der Merwe, 'The Adaptation of the Institution of Apartment Ownership to 
Civilian Property Law Structures in the Mixed Jurisdictions of South Africa, Sri Lanka 
and Louisiana' (2008) 12 EJCL www.ejcl.org (accessed 22 October 2011) fn 29, citing 
Kreller, Römiche Rechtsgeschichte, 105; Sokolowski Philosophie im Privatrecht (1902) 
I, 111ss; Kaser, Römische Privatrecht (1971) I, 382. 
265 D 34,2,19,13 (accessio cedit principali). 
266 Mackenzie, Studies in Roman Law with Comparative Views of the Laws of France, 
England and Scotland (6th edn William Blackwood, Edinburgh and London 1886) 177. 
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whilst the other ceases its existence.267 In Roman law accessio applied 
strictly to tangibles268: in cases of joining land with land, movable with 
land or movable with movable. The rules of accession were complex. 
For example, the owner of land next to sea or river owned anything that 
accumulated gradually to his parcel of land by water activity 
(alluvio).269 But where a plot of land became detached (for example by 
a sudden flood) from one owner’s land and acceded to another’s land 
(avulsio) and continued to be distinguishable, the original owner 
remained the owner of the added plot of land, at least until trees on that 
added plot took root in the new ground (presumably because it ceased 
to be distinguishable from the other land).270 If movable things became 
added to land by human activity, such as buildings (inaedificatio), 
plants (implantatio) or seeds (satio), then they also became the property 
of the land, so long as it became impossible to separate them.271  
There are two obstacles in establishing accession. First, assets must be 
sufficiently joined for accession to occur. In Roman law assets had to 
be seen as inseparable for accessio to occur.272 For example, an arm 
welded onto a statue where both were made from the same material was 
seen as inseparable. In such cases the owner of the statue became the 
owner of the compound (ferruminatio). However, if joining of two 
assets was reversible and the attached part could have been detached, 
the ownership of the part was suspended and was brought back when 
the part was detached (adplumbatio). Modern law recognises that the 
process of adding one asset to another is usually possible to reverse, 
although it may often be difficult to do so without substantial cost or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
267 Smith, The Law of Tracing (n 7) 104. 
268 Intangibles were not treated as ‘things’ capable of being subject to property rights. 
269 I 1,2,20. 
270 I 2,1,21. 
271 For example, it was considered that plants were inseparable from land if they grew 
roots, G 2, 74-75. This gave rise to the rule well known in modern laws: superficies 
solo cedit: I 2,1, 30 and 33 (anything built on or sown in the soil accedes to the soil). 
There were, however, separate rules on whether or not the owner of land was obliged to 
pay for the materials used or whether he was permitted to destroy the building erected 
by another.  
272 For discussion of tests determining degree of annexation necessary to constitute 
accession see A Guest, 'Accession and Confusion in the Law of Hire Purchase' (1964) 
27 MLR 505, 507-508. 
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damage to the constituents. The key point is that accession occurs 
where the added asset may be annexed to a considerable extent. It may 
continue to be physically identifiable but in the eyes of law it ceases to 
exist as a subject matter of property rights.273  
The second problematic area is deciding which asset is subsidiary 
(accessory) and which is principal. This is crucial because in the eyes 
of law the principal asset continues to exist whilst the subsidiary asset 
“disappears” as the owner of the principal asset becomes the owner of 
the subsidiary. Where a moveable accedes to land, land is always the 
principal asset. In cases of joining two moveables it is often much 
harder to determine which asset is principal. For example, in Roman 
law adding writing on paper or parchment, even if in gold letters, did 
not give the writer a better right to the written paper. It belonged to the 
owner of the paper.274 However, making a painting on another’s canvas 
gave the ownership of the finished product to the painter.275 A number 
of tests have been developed in modern laws to determine which asset 
is principal.276 The value-based test277 seems to have rightly been 
rejected in favour of a test, whereby the principal asset is an asset, 
which “predominates as a distinct entity”.278 Although there is some 
similarity between accession and mixtures as assets become merged, 
the two concepts differ.279 Accession presupposes that one asset is 
principal and another is accessory.280 Where neither asset seems to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
273 Smith, The Law of Tracing (n 7) 104-105. 
274 G 2,77; I 1,2,33; see also Digest 6,1,23,3 (Paulus): picture accessory to the board. 
275 G 2,78 and later I 1,2,34: “for it is ridiculous that a painting of Apelles or Parrhasius 
should be an accession to worthless tablet”; see also D 41,1,9,2 (Gaius): board 
accessory to the picture. 
276 See Smith, The Law of Tracing (n 7) 105-106; see also S Nickles, 'Accessions and 
Accessories under Pre-Code Law and UCC Article 9' (1982) 35 Ark L Rev 111, 118-
127. 
277 Guest, (n 272) 507 fn 11: “by ‘principal chattel’ is probably meant that which is 
greater in value”. 
278 R Goode, Hire-Purchase Law and Practice (2nd edn Butterworths, London 1970) 
751; S Whittaker, 'Retention of Title and Specification' (1984) 100 LQR 35;  
279 Peter Birks did not consider accessions as mixtures due to the relationship of a 
principal-subsidiary, see Birks (n 262) 227.  
280 Smith, The Law of Tracing (n 7) 107. 
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dominate there is no accession.281 Where neither item is principal each 
has lost its identity and a new thing has been created.282  
In English law accession, also known as “accretion”,283 comprises two 
separate concepts. It includes first accession by attachment, which 
means accession of moveables to moveables, moveables to land (in 
which case accessions are referred to as “fixtures”284) and land to land. 
Second, the term “accretion” is also used to mean accession by natural 
increase, which relates to accession of offspring to animals or fruit to 
land.285 In its second form of accession by increase, and by contrast to 
Roman law, the principle was also applied in English law to intangible 
assets (such as goodwill286). These two concepts are unrelated to each 
other except for sharing the common linguistic root of the doctrine of 
accessorium sequitur principale mentioned above. The rule accession 
by natural increase has been said to govern rights to fruits but we argue 
below that the rule is unhelpful and potentially misleading.287  
B. Commixtio and confusio  
In Roman law, mixing of solid objects, such as wheat, was referred to 
as commixtio whilst fusion of metals into one mass or mixing liquids 
was confusio.288 The rules of ownership were complex in Roman law 
and differed depending on whether liquid or granular substances were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
281 P Matthews, 'Proprietary Claims at Common Law for Mixed and Improved Goods' 
(1981) 34 CLP 159. 
282 Smith, The Law of Tracing (n 7) 107. 
283 See e.g. Jones v De Marchant (1916) 28 DLR 561 (fur coat belonging to the owner 
of beaver skins it was made of after it was given away to a third party).  
284 Smith, The Law of Tracing (n 7) 107-109. Fixtures must be distinguished from 
fittings, see Holland v Hodgson (1872) LR 7 CP 328; Hulme v Brighamn [1943] KB 
152; Berkley v Poulett [1977] 1 EGLR 86 (degree of annexation) and TSB Bank Plc v 
Botham [1996] EGCS 149, (1997) 73 P&CR D1 (purpose of annexation). 
285 As noted in Foskett v McKeown [2001] 1 AC 102 (HL) 121 (Hope LJ); Guest, (n 
272) 506; see also generally J Sohm, 'The Doctrine of Accession' (1870) 14 Journal of 
Jurisprudence 481 (discussing accession and specification). 
286 See text to nn 395-406. 
287 Text to nn 315-318. 
288 The term confusio was also used in the case of rights when the same person became 
the object of the right and the duty of an obligation (D 46,3,75) for example if a pledgee 
inherited the estate of the pledgor, the pledge was extinguished since the right of 
ownership and a pledge were joined in one person. We do not use the term confusio in 
this meaning here. For discussion of the difference between the two see also Birks (n 
262) 232-234. 
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mixed. If solid objects were mixed with owners’ consent, the original 
owners became co-owners (owners in common) of the compound.289 If, 
on the other hand, there was no mutual consent to mixing, either 
because one owner did not consent or it took place accidentally, each 
owner of the original thing remained an owner of that thing so long as 
the individual components were distinguishable and their substance was 
unaltered. If one owner kept such a compound asset, the other owner 
could assert a rei vindicatio claim to “take out” his portion of the 
compound.290 When liquid substances were mixed, e.g. honey and wine 
(forming mead) or silver and gold (forming electrum), both owners 
became owners in common, not only when they consented to mixing, 
as with solids, but also when mixing was accidental.291 The situation 
was even more complicated where mixing was both irreversible and 
without the owner’s consent. The claim of the owner, who did not 
consent to his asset being mixed (A), depended on whether the mixing 
process took place in good faith or in bad faith. If the mixing was in 
bad faith, A had actio furti or condictio furtiva against the person who 
became the owner of the mixture, which essentially resembled a claim 
against a thief. If the mixing was in good faith, A was entitled to 
compensation but if he did not obtain it he had a condictio for 
unjustified enrichment292 (probably condictio sine causa293). Condictio 
furtiva was regarded as either one of condictiones for unjustified 
enrichment or as based on delict.294 It was used against a thief, who was 
enriched by the sale price of the stolen thing. It was possible to use 
condictio furtiva alternatively with actio rei vindicatio or actio ad 
exhibendum (and in addition to actio furti) in order to recover the res or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
289 I 2,1,28. 
290 I 2,1,28; D 6,1,5 and 23. 
291 I 2,1,27. 
292 W Wołodkiewicz and M Zabłocka, Prawo Rzymskie. Instytucje (Roman Law. 
Institutes) (CH Beck, Warszawa 2001) 140. 
293 For definition of the condictio see D 24,1,6. 
294 Some have regarded it as based on delict, Minister van Verdediging v Van Wyk 1976 
91 SA 397 (T). See in general P Pauw, 'Historical Notes on the Nature of the Condictio 
Furtiva' (1976) 93 SALJ 395 (see also literature cited there). 
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its value.295 The key point that follows is that application of commixtio 
or confusio does not lead to creation of a new asset even though 
individual components are incapable of separate identification. Modern 
common law uses the term “confusion” to cover both commixtio and 
confusion.296 The term “confusion” means that constituent parts can no 
longer be identified as belonging to a particular person.297 Yet mixtures 
remain divisible, even if it is impracticable to extract from the mixture 
the exact assets mixed.298 For that reason, Professor Smith noted that 
the claimant is able to follow his asset and the ownership interest is not 
defeated in the thing that has been mixed.299   
C. Specificatio  
Specificatio was seen in Roman law as a legal event, which occurred 
when things were mixed into a new asset in a process involving 
someone else’s skill or workmanship, such as bread-making by C from 
A’s ingredients or making wine by C from A’s grapes. As a result of 
specification a new thing was created whilst the component assets 
ceased to exist in the eyes of law300 because they were physically 
altered or inextricably joined.301 Originally, there were two schools of 
thought in Roman law regarding such newly created assets. Sabinians, 
who focused on the importance of “substance and matter”, considered 
the new asset the property of the owner of the materials302 whilst 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
295 M Blecher, 'The Owner's Actions against Persons Who Fraudulently Ceased to 
Possess His Res (Qui Dolo Desierunt Possidere)' (1978) 95 SALJ 341, 345. 
296 Common law does not draw distinction between mixing liquids or granular 
substances, see Birks (n 262) 453-455; G McCormack, 'Mixture of Goods' (1990) 10 
LS 293; Smith, The Law of Tracing (n 7) 70; E Arnold, 'Confusion' (1923) 23 Colum 
LR 235, 235-236. 
297 Mixing oil and water would not lead to confusio since they would not create one 
mass. In an English case mixing of crude oil was held to be a case of confusio since the 
mixture could not be separated “[a]t least for practical reasons”: Indian Oil Corp Ltd v 
Greenstone Shipping Co SA (Panama) (The Ypatianna) [1988] QB 345, 354 (Staughton 
J). 
298 Smith, The Law of Tracing (n 7) 70. 
299 Ibid. 71: “discussion [in relation to mixtures] is not concerned directly with any 
alteration of proprietary rights which such mixtures bring about. Rather, the concern is 
with following; that is, identifying a thing with the same thing at an earlier time”.  
300 Ibid. 109.  
301 Ibid. 111. The test of annexation (whether it is inextricably attached) is the same as 
in accession.  
302 G 2,79: cuius materia sit, ilius et res que facta sit. 
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Proculeans, to whom form was more significant than substance, 
thought the new asset belonged to the manufacturer. With time a 
compromise solution (media sententia) was proposed by Gaius303 and 
accepted by Paulus. The ownership depended on whether the process of 
creating a new asset was reversible or not. If it was reversible, the 
owner of the materials became the owner of the new asset. If the 
process was irreversible, such as bread baking, the baker was the 
owner. Additionally, in either case, whoever became the owner of the 
new product had an obligation to reimburse the other one for materials 
used or work put in.304 Modern law draws on Roman law to some 
extent to determine if a new asset is created but in many situations the 
Roman law test based on reversibility is unsuitable. As one 
commentator argued, the rule based on reversibility alone “becomes 
absurd where a manufacturing process which vastly improves the goods 
can be reversed but only at considerable cost. Similarly, minor but 
irreversible changes will not be sufficient to transform goods”.305 The 
modern test should therefore look to a number of factors. It was 
convincingly argued that the crucial factor should be whether the goods 
have undergone a transformation, which in turn should be answered by 
taking economic considerations into account.306 The rules governing 
ownership in cases of specification become additionally complicated 
where there is wrongdoing, for example where corn is stolen to make 
whiskey.307  
D. An alternative approach to mixed assets under Article 
9 UCC 
Applying the Roman law of accessio, commixtio, confusio and 
specificatio was seen as overly complex for the purposes of security 
interests in assets by the drafters of the UCC. Article 9 UCC seems to 
resolve a number of problems with security interests in mixed assets 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
303 D 41,1,7,7. 
304 I 1,2,34.  
305 D Webb, 'Title or Transformation: Who Owns Manufactured Goods?' (2000) JBL 
513, 540. 
306 Ibid. 
307 See e.g. Smith, The Law of Tracing (n 7) 112-115. 
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(mixed substitutions) by drawing a distinction between “accession” and 
“commingled goods”. “Accession” has a different meaning to the one 
depicted above. It signifies goods physically united with other goods in 
such a way that the identity of the original good is not lost308 whilst 
“commingled goods” denote goods that are physically united with other 
goods in such a manner that their identity is lost in a product or mass.309 
This includes goods, which lost their identity through a manufacturing 
process, e.g. flour that has become part of baked bread, and goods, 
which were commingled with other goods from which they cannot be 
distinguished, e.g. wheat is mixed with other wheat. Under UCC a 
security interest does not exist in commingled goods as such but 
attaches to a product or mass that result when goods become 
commingled goods.310 If security interest in the commingled asset is 
perfected, the security in products is also perfected.311 If more than one 
security interest is perfected in the product, UCC provides a rule for 
resolving the conflicting priority, which is that the security interests 
rank equally in proportion to the value of the collateral at the time it 
became commingled goods.312  
Bearing in mind the difficulties with mixed assets and accessions under 
Roman law the rules in UCC are arguably more suitable for application 
in a modern secured transaction context because the distinction is 
merely between combined things that lost their identity and things that 
did not. Although this distinction may not always be clear-cut, it avoids 
the problems with identifying accessory and principal assets and a 
creditor with a perfected security interest does not risk losing its 
security. The simple rule that the secured creditor continues to have a 
security interest in the accession, not the whole asset unless the parties 
so agree, makes it unnecessary to consider which asset is principal and 
which is accessory.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
308 UCC §9-102(a). 
309 UCC §9-336(a). 
310 UCC §9-336(b). 
311 UCC §9-336(d). 
312 UCC §9-336(f). 
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2.2 Fruits 
Some assets are capable of bearing fruits. Fruits are assets derived from 
the original asset without any other thing becoming a composite 
element of it, for example an apple from an apple tree, milk from a 
cow, foal born from a mare. New things are created whilst the original 
asset continues to exist. The concept of fruits originally developed in 
the context of tangibles. In Roman law things brought about by natural, 
physical processes, for example birth of progeny, growth of apples on a 
tree, and separated from the original thing were referred to as natural 
fruits (fructus naturales). It seems that only living things can generate 
natural fruits. A machine that “produces” widgets does not generate 
them in the same way as a mare that gives birth to a foal. Widgets are 
products of a manufacturing process, involving mixing of components 
and using skill or work. Even if widgets are put together by a machine, 
the machine operates as a result of a human act (work and usually 
skill).313 Widgets are not fruits of a widget-making machine. 
A. Rights to natural fruits 
In Roman law fruits became generally the property of the owner of the 
original asset.314 In English law this is known as a rule of “accession by 
natural increase”315 by analogy to the accessio principle that subsidiary 
assets belong to the owner of the principal asset.316 It is suggested that 
rights to fruits cannot be governed by the same rules as accretions (i.e. 
rules of accessio).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
313 A machine cannot start operating without a force applied to it first. This results from 
the first Newton’s law of motion. 
314 I 2,1,19. Until about 2 century BCE a child of a slave (partus ancillae) also counted 
as a natural fruit, Wołodkiewicz and Zabłocka (n 292) para 192; contrast Seay v Bacon 
(1856) 4 Sneed (TN) 99, 36 Tenn 99 (Tenn), 1865 WL (Tenn) (Sup Ct of Tennessee), 
cited in Grant v YYH Holdings Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 360 [49]-[51], where the 
default rule was held to be that whatever rights and remedies the owner has against the 
mother, they extend to the mother’s born children since mother and her children are 
“aggregate property” until some further act. In the Grant v YYH Holdings the argument 
that the progeny of the original sheep was ”aggregate property” was rejected (at [52] 
(McColl JA)), so the owner had a separate title to the progeny “once the progeny were 
no longer in utero” (at [56] (McColl JA)). 
315 Goode, Hire-Purchase Law and Practice (n 278) 747; Guest (n 272) 506. 
316 See text to n 265. 
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(a) Accession by natural increase as an unhelpful rule in 
relation to fruits 
Determining legal relationships relating to fruits is more complex than 
in the case of accretions where one asset accedes to another. In the case 
of fruits new assets come into being, which have not been previously 
subjected to a property right. For example, one pear tree can generate 
twenty pears. The pears have not been owned before. Someone must 
own them when they acquire separate existence, which is usually when 
they are separated from the original asset (the tree).317 The nature of the 
process of derivation in the case of fruits, unlike accession, does not 
impose a rule that the new assets (the pears) must be subject to the 
same property right as the original asset. In the case of accessions one 
thing becomes a part of another. The end result of the process is that 
there is only one asset capable of being subject of a property right. The 
rule of accretions that the owner of the principal thing becomes the 
owner of accretion means that fruits belong to the owner of the original 
(principal) asset (partus sequitur ventrem).318 This rule becomes 
difficult to apply to fruits if they come into being whilst the principal 
asset is enjoyed in some way or possessed by a non-owner with the 
owner’s consent. To use the pear-tree example, the pears may separate 
from the tree whilst the tree is enjoyed by a non-owner. Property right 
to the tree does not change through the fact that pears have fallen on the 
ground but the pears are new assets, which may be subject to a different 
property right than the tree. It seems that this point has not been fully 
appreciated in English law, particularly in the context of security 
interests, where fruits may come into being whilst the principal asset is 
subject to a security interest. It is therefore useful to lay the basic 
distinctions in this chapter so that the analysis of the secured creditor’s 
rights to fruits becomes easier to follow in the next chapter.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
317 See also Smith, The Law of Tracing (n 7) 21. 
318 Case of Swans (1592) 7 CoRep 15b, 17a (Coke LJ). 
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(b) Specifically conferred right to fruits 
Whilst owners in Roman law had a right to fruits as an attribute of their 
ownership, they could part with that attribute by conferring it on 
another. Right to fruits was conferred by usufructus or emphyteusis. 
Emphyteusis was a property right over land belonging to another. It was 
almost unlimited right to the enjoyment of land, which included taking 
fruits.319 Ususfructus was a right in an asset belonging to another 
entitling that other (called usufructuary) to use the asset and take fruits 
from it.320 The owner was left with “naked” ownership (nuda 
proprietas).321  For example usufructuary had a right to use another’s 
house with a garden and take apples from their orchard. When 
compared with current English law ususfructus resembled to a certain 
extent a profit à prendre in that it entitled the holder of this proprietary 
interest to take a part of soil, minerals or natural produce and to a 
certain extent also easement in that it entitled a person to use the asset. 
It was only conferred on a specific person for a period of time and not 
longer than the life of that person.322 It could not be transferred (it was 
inalienable) but it was enforceable against third parties who became 
new owners of the asset in which ususfructus was established.  
(c) Relevance of possession  
If the owner does not specifically confer the right to fruits, the 
ownership of fruits can be determined by looking at the possession of 
the original asset from which fruits developed. In Roman law if the 
original asset was in possession of another and the possessor was in 
good faith, the (non-possessing) owner of the original asset did not 
obtain the ownership of fruits.323 For example, a person who possessed 
the original asset had a right to fruits as a ‘bonus’ for looking after the 
original asset (pro cultura et cura). Usufructuary under ususfructus also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
319 D 22,1,25,1. 
320 D 7,1,1. 
321 This may be compared to the owner being left with a legal title to property only. 
322 Usufructus was a type of servitutes personarum, and was treated similarly to 
servitutes praediurum (where the entitlement could not exist without land and was 
alienable only when land was transferred) D 8,1,1. 
323 Wołodkiewicz and Zabłocka (n 292) para 192. 
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had possession of the asset but his right to fruits did not arise on the 
basis of his possession in good faith but on the basis of an expressly 
conferred attribute under ususfructus. Consequently, there was a 
difference in timing of acquisition of fruits between a usufructuary and 
a possessor in good faith: a possessor in good faith became the owner 
of fruits from the moment the fruits separated from the main asset 
whilst usufructuary became owner only when he took control of the 
fruits.324  The good or bad faith of the possessor of fruits was also 
relevant when an owner made an actio rei vindicatio claim against the 
possessor of the original asset. A possessor in bad faith was obliged to 
return all fruits collected (fructus percepti) and even to give the owner 
the equivalent value of the fruits he failed to collect through his own 
fault. A possessor in good faith did not have to return any fruits to the 
owner but only until the suit began325 since at that point he became a 
possessor in bad faith. In post-classical Roman law a possessor in good 
faith had to return also any fruits that he took but which remained 
unconsummated (fructus extantes).326 
In English law the right to fruits has been a matter of some confusion. 
In Halsbury's Laws of England327 it was said that the property in the 
young of domestic animals inhered in the owner of the mother. This 
statement was expressly (and rightly) criticised as too wide in Tucker v 
Farm and General Investment Trust Ltd.328 In that case ewes were let 
on hire-purchase. During the currency of the agreement lambs were 
born. The hirer sold both the ewes and the lambs to a third party buyer. 
The finance company, which owned the ewes, seized not only the ewes 
but also the lambs. The third party buyer sued the finance company for 
conversion. It was held that where animals were bought on hire-
purchase terms their progeny belonged to the hirer, not their owner. 
The rule that the owner of the mother owns the progeny may be useful 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
324 Ibid. para 192. 
325 Or to be more precise, until litis contestatio. 
326 Wołodkiewicz and Zabłocka (n 292) para 200. 
327 (1952) 3rd ed, Vol 1, 656. 
328 [1966] 2 QB 421 (CA) 426 (Denning LJ). 
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in some cases, for example where different persons own the mother and 
the father, e.g. dam and the stallion,329 but it should not be extrapolated. 
Diplock LJ explicitly considered the relevance of the fact that property 
and possession were divided in a lease of livestock. He held: 
“[w]hen you come to a case like this, where there is a lease of 
livestock and where accordingly property and possession are 
divided, the English rule and the rule in the civil law is that the 
progeny and the produce of the livestock belong to the person 
entitled to the possession: that is to say, the lessee in English law: 
the usufructuary in civil law”.330 
All three Law Lords in Tucker found support for this proposition331 in 
an old English case of Wood v Ash,332 which made it unnecessary to 
rely directly on Roman law. The rules in Roman law and English law 
were held to coincide anyway.333 Wood v Ash concerned a lease of land 
with a stock of sheep for twenty years for rent. It was held that: 
“the increase of the stock of sheepe should be to the lessee, and 
the lessor shall never have them at the end of the terme: but they 
agreed, that if the lease were of the stock with lambs, calves, and 
pigs, there the increase belongs to the lessor.”334 
We should note that the right to fruits (lambs) arises on the basis of law 
(i.e. on the basis of the nature of the legal relationship between the 
parties) but the parties may modify their relationship by agreement. For 
example parties may agree that the non-possessing owner will have the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
329 This was the scenario considered by Sir William Blackstone (2 Bl Com 390), cited 
in Tucker (n 328) 426-427 (Denning LJ). The rule apparently did not apply to swans, 
where the young cygnets were divided equally between the owner of the cock and the 
hen because – unlike with other animals - the male was well known as constantly 
associated with the female (“Swans, as we all know, are faithful unto death and 
beyond” per Lord Denning at 427), which meant that the owner of the cock, as well as 
the hen, lost the benefit of the animals whilst the hen was pregnant and nurtured: Case 
of Swans (1592) 7 Co Rep 15b (Coke LJ).  
330 Tucker (n 328) 431.  
331 Tucker (n 328) 427 and 428 (Denning LJ), 429 (Harman LJ), 431 (Diplock LJ). 
332 (1586) Owen 139, 74 ER 958. 
333 Tucker (n 328) 431 (Diplock LJ) referring to Morkel v Malan [1933] SCR, CPD 
(SA) 370, 374, 375. 
334 Wood (n 332) 959. 
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right to fruits and, as in the case of Wood v Ash, the lease extends to 
new assets when they acquire separate existence. It is also possible for 
the parties to agree that the possessor (e.g. the hirer) will have the right 
to fruits with an obligation to pay the owner rent with the fruits or by 
selling fruits. This was labeled by Denning LJ in Tucker as “pay as you 
milk” option: when the farmer milks the cows, the milk becomes his, so 
that he can sell it and pay the rent with the proceeds of sale of milk.335  
Crucially, the court in Wood v Ash is reported to have drawn a 
difference between fruits (natural increase) and accretions (accession 
by attachment), which substantiates the argument made in this work 
that the latter is governed by the principle of accessio cedit principali:  
“[a]nd all the Court took this difference, sc. when a lease is made 
of dead goods, and when of living; for when the lease is of dead 
goods, and any thing is added to them for reparations or 
otherwise, the lessor shall have this addition at the end of the 
terme, because it belongs to the principle: but in case of a stock 
of cattle, which hath an increase, as calves and lambs, there these 
things are severed from the principle, and lessor shall never have 
them, for then the lessor shall have the rent, and the lessee shall 
have no profit.”336 
The rule that emerged is that the right to fruits inheres with the 
possessor of the original asset (the lessee), not the owner of the original 
asset (the lessor)337 unless the parties agree otherwise, for example if 
the lease agreement provides that the owner leases cattle along with any 
calves. This is different from a situation where an asset is improved or 
repaired because then the “increase” falls back to the lessor as the 
owner of the principal asset.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
335 Tucker (n 328) 429 (Denning LJ). 
336 Wood (n 332) 959. 
337 See also Guest (n 272) 506. 
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B. Rights to “civil fruits” (intangible “fruits”) 
In Roman law intangible “fruits”, referred to as “civil fruits” (fructus 
civiles), such as income from leases, were dealt with by analogy to 
natural fruits (loco fructus - “taking place of fruits”). Civil fruits were 
assets acquired on the basis of a legal relationship or a legal act, for 
example rents from a house lease. A person entitled to an asset yielding 
income was also entitled to income once it accrued. There are 
difficulties with drawing an analogy between natural and civil fruits. It 
is controversial whether intangibles, in contrast to tangible assets, can 
constitute subject matter of ownership or other property rights.338 Even 
if we accept that intangible assets can be subject to property rights, it is 
also controversial whether intangibles can be possessed.339 Bearing in 
mind what we said about the relevance of possession in determining 
rights to natural fruits, the parallels between natural and “civil fruits” 
are weak. It is suggested that it is better to think about “fruits” of 
intangibles as a set of rights attached to an intangible. Shares, for 
example, usually have three types of rights attached to them: rights to 
capital, voting rights and rights to income.340 When we say that a 
person has a right to income as “civil fruits” of a share, we mean that 
the person is entitled to the right to income, which is attached to the 
share, and when the right to income is realised, that person receives 
income. It is important to understand the relationship between a share, a 
right to income and the payment of income. A right to income does not 
mean that a person has a present claim to be paid dividends. A right to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
338 B McFarlane, The Structure of Property Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2008) 132-
136; A Pretto-Sakmann, Boundaries of Personal Property: Shares and Sub-Shares 
(Hart Publishing, 2005) part II (arguing that shares are not things capable of being 
subject to property rights).  
339 For a view that intangibles cannot be possessed see Torkington v Magee [1902] 2 
KB 427, 430 (Channell J), reversed on other grounds [1903] 1 KB 644 (CA). See, 
however, in relation to financial collateral Lehman (n 137) [124] (Briggs J) “in relation 
to intangibles (…) possession can be demonstrated wherever it is ‘held’ by the 
collateral taker, that this is sufficient regardless of control, but that to extent that control 
is also to be demonstrarted, it is satisfied by administrative rather than legal control”, 
see also [131] and [136] (Briggs J). 
340 L Gullifer and J Payne, Corporate Finance Law. Principles and Policy (Hart 
Publishing, 2011) 57; see also Borland's Trustee v Steel Brothers & Co Ltd [1901] 1 Ch 
279, 288 (Farwell J). 
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be paid a final dividend does not arise until dividends are declared.341 It 
is at that point that debt is created.342 In the case of interim dividends a 
right to be paid may arise even later as a resolution to pay such a 
dividend does not create immediate debt.343 But the question of who 
will have a right to dividend payment once dividends are declared is 
determined on the basis of who has the right to income. In other words, 
from the moment a share “comes into being” it is possible to determine 
who has a right to income. When income “comes into being” (e.g. final 
dividends are declared) there is little similarity between a right to be 
paid a dividend and a natural fruit. The latter is a new, previously 
unowned thing and the right to it may be determined on the basis of the 
right to possess the old thing from which the new asset (natural fruit) 
derived. The right to be paid a dividend is determined on the basis of 
who had a pre-existing right to income (as and when it would accrue), 
i.e. whether the right to income was still attached to the share or not. 
Thus, it is suggested it is better to think about rights to “civil fruits” as 
pre-existing rights attached to, or detached from, intangibles rather than 
new assets, right to which can only be determined by reference to the 
right to the original asset. 
Perhaps we could go a step further and say that ownership of natural 
fruits could also be determined on the basis of a pre-existing right to 
them rather than possession. This would be consistent with the analysis 
of attributes of ownership, one of which is an attribute to take fruits. As 
we have seen an owner of an asset transfers parts with this attribute in 
emphyteusis or usufructus. We could say in those cases that the owner 
expressly transfers a pre-existing right to fruits. On this analysis 
ownership of fruits that come into being and are separated from the 
other (principal) asset is established by finding who has the pre-existing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
341 Bond v Barrow Haematite Steel Co [1902] 1 Ch 353, 362 (Farwell J). 
342 Gullifer and Payne, Corporate Finance Law. Principles and Policy (n 340) 58. The 
debt is immediate when the company declares dividends on its shares (Re Severn and 
Wye and Severn Bridge Railway Company [1896] 1 Ch 559) even if not due to be 
discharged immediately, for example because payment date has been postponed (Re 
Kidner [1929] 2 Ch 121). 
343 Ibid. 58 citing Lagunas Nitrate Co Ltd v Schroeder & Co and Schmidt (1901) 85 LT 
22. 
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right to take fruits: whether the owner parted with that right or not. If 
this is right, ownership of fruits would be derived from the owner and 
not an example of original acquisition. The possible objection to using 
the pre-existing right analysis to tangible assets is that in cases where 
the owner did not expressly transfer the right to fruits to another, we are 
likely to have to resort to the notion of possession to determine the 
entitlement to fruits.  
Fruits pose different problems in relation to security interests than 
substitute assets. We may note that a secured creditor is not entitled to 
an absolute ownership of fruits but is limited to resorting to fruits up to 
the amount of the secured debt. Generally, two scenarios are possible 
depending on who collects fruits. First, if the secured creditor collects 
the fruits, he may be able to resort to fruits automatically on the basis of 
possession of the original asset (e.g. in the case of a pledge), in which 
case it is necessary to ensure that the creditor is not paid above the 
amount of the secured debt. Second, if the debtor collects the fruits, the 
question is whether the secured creditor has a right to resort to the fruits 
or whether they are unencumbered with security. These questions are 
tackled in detail in the next chapter.344 
3 Classification of changes to subject matter of security 
interests 
The purpose of this thesis is to establish in what way changes of the 
original collateral affect the security interest. Different situations, 
which we looked at above, may conveniently be divided into two 
groups: where no new asset arises and where a new asset arises. We 
will call the new asset a “derived asset” even though in some cases 
there is no actual physical derivation of new asset from the old one. The 
thesis focuses only on security interests in new assets, as stated in the 
introduction, but it is important to show where the line is drawn. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
344 See Chapter III section 4. 
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3.1 Changes of subject matter not leading to a new asset 
A. Following into the original collateral (accretions, 
confusion) 
Collateral can be followed despite accretions to collateral or confusion 
of collateral with other assets. In such cases the creditor is able to resort 
to the original collateral. Where an accession occurred the creditor 
simply claims the same asset, even though it may have gained value 
due to an accretion, fixture or improvement. It is suggested that it is not 
necessary to say that accretions “enure for the benefit of the 
creditor”.345 The basis for the secured creditor’s right to an improved 
asset is simply that it continues to be the same asset. It should not be 
relevant that the value of the asset is now greater or smaller than prior 
to accretion because a security interest, as a property right, is asserted 
in a specific asset, not its value.346 Market value of assets may also 
change and the creditor may have to suffer a shortfall of sale proceeds 
on enforcement. This is a risk that a secured creditor takes.347 For the 
same reason the creditor should not have a right to new shares if rights 
of issue of shares were exercised just because the original shares are 
worth substantially less.348 Where collateral becomes confused with 
other assets into a mixture, without a new asset being formed (confusio, 
commixtio), the creditor is said to be able to assert security in the 
proportion which the value of the original collateral bears to the 
mixture. It is not clear whether there is a reason why cases of accession 
and confusion should be treated differently. In both cases assets are 
mixed or joined in a way that makes separation of the component parts 
not practically possible. Such cases are outside of the scope of this 
thesis and we will not discuss them in detail. Suffice it to say that 
mixtures pose more complex problems than accessions. As we have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
345 Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (n 1) para 1-56 
346 It is the assumption of this work that property rights (including security interests) are 
rights in particular assets, having a discrete identity, not in the exchange value, which 
the assets represent at a given time, see text to n 8.  
347 There are different ways to offset such risks, e.g. insurance.  
348 For a contrary view see Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (n 1) para 
1-56. 
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seen above using the example of Roman law, the ownership rules of 
mixtures are more complex than the ownership rule relating to 
accession that the owner of the principal asset becomes the owner of 
the subsidiary. For example a mixture may be co-owned.349 It is evident 
that secured creditor’s right to resort to the mixture is dependent on the 
right of the owner (the grantor of security) in the mixture. If the mixture 
is co-owned, the creditor can only have security in the co-ownership 
share.  
B. Destruction of subject matter of security  
The creditor cannot assert security in the original asset where the 
original asset cannot be followed and a new asset did not come into 
being. The simplest example is when the collateral is physically 
destroyed. 
3.2 Changes of subject matter leading to a new asset 
A. Proceeds and products (substitutes) 
In some cases a new asset comes into being where the security interest 
is lost in the originally encumbered asset. This happens in two 
scenarios. First, the original collateral cannot be followed where it 
ceased to exist in law because of incorporation of the encumbered asset 
in another asset (accession) or a manufacturing process using collateral 
(specification). Two or more things are combined, whether identical or 
different, and result in an asset, which has its own individuality 
independent of its individual components (e.g. a house built from bricks 
and timber). Both processes concern tangibles only. The new assets that 
arise could be referred to as “products”. The term is ambiguous. It is 
sometimes used to refer to mixtures of assets, where goods cannot be 
distinguished but no new asset is formed (cases of confusion). In this 
thesis we use the term “products” to mean new assets resulting from 
accession of collateral to another asset or specification, sometimes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
349 Under English law see Sale of Goods Act 1979, s20A (a buyer of a share of 
identified bulk, who paid the price, becomes an owner in common of the bulk). 
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collectively referred to as “commingling”.350 We do not examine the 
question of tracing in this work. Thus, we do not ask to what extent the 
creditor may be able to trace the value of the original collateral in the 
new product, i.e. whether the creditor can assert his security interest in 
the entire asset or only in proportion which the value of the encumbered 
asset bears to the value of the new product. Under the UCC, as we have 
seen,351 the issue of whether the creditor makes a proportionate claim or 
asserts security in the entire new asset depends on competing claims of 
other creditors who had security interests in the components. Second, 
the original collateral cannot be claimed because the original asset was 
transferred to a buyer, who is able to raise a defence of bona fide 
purchaser of legal title for value without notice against the creditor. The 
new asset is whatever the debtor exchanged the collateral for with the 
buyer. The creditor traces the value of the original collateral into a new 
asset (proceeds of the transaction).  
Proceeds and products are both substitutes. Proceeds are clean 
substitutions while products are mixed substitutions. Both proceeds and 
products are traceable proceeds. Since the analysis in this work focuses 
on the question of claiming a new asset (the substitute), and not tracing, 
drawing a distinction between “proceeds” and “products” is a 
subsidiary issue. Throughout the thesis we will, therefore, use the term 
“products” only sporadically. Where we talk about “substitutes” or 
“proceeds” the analysis will concern both proceeds and products.  
B. Fruits 
In some cases the original asset can be followed and a new asset arises. 
In Roman law fruits, e.g. apples from an apple tree, were treated as new 
assets, not previously owned or subjected to property rights. We have 
suggested352 that a preferred way of looking at fruits is to think of them 
as arising on the basis of a pre-existing right attached to the original 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
350 Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (n 1) para 1-58. 
351 Text to nn 308-312. 
352 Text following n 343. 
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collateral. A right to the original collateral may or may not carry with it 
an attached pre-existing right to fruits. It is argued in the next chapter 
that whether or not the collateral carries with it an attached right to 
fruits is a matter for the parties to decide. In the case of natural fruits, in 
the absence of an express agreement, the right to fruits may also be 
determined on the basis of possession of the original collateral.  
We may also note that the approach should not change if after the new 
asset arises the creditor loses his claim to the original asset because the 
original asset is destroyed, for example the ewe dies after giving birth 
to lambs. Fruits cannot become substitutes of the original asset in such 
a case. Substitutes (traceable proceeds) must arise in the same act as the 
original asset was disposed of or ceased to exist. Having said that, there 
is some scope to treat fruits as traceable proceeds in the case of 
intangible fruits such as income from leased property. In this example, 
income accrues because the owner parted with a portion of his 
ownership of the property in return for the right to rents. The new assets 
(fruits) may therefore be seen as products of alienation of use-value of 
the original asset, analogous to proceeds of disposition of the asset, and 
so be treated as traceable proceeds of the asset (the so-called value-
based proceeds by contrast to disposition-based proceeds).353 Yet, there 
is an important difference between fruits and proceeds (understood as 
disposition-based proceeds). Professor Smith in The Law of Tracing 
emphasised that the basis of the claim to a fruit is different from the 
basis of a claim to traceable proceeds.354 He argues that an owner of an 
asset does not need to give up anything to be entitled to a fruit whilst 
this is not so in the case of tracing where the new asset is acquired by 
exchange of the original asset for another asset.355 On this basis, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
353 An example of such treatment of fruits (income) is seen in relation to security 
interests in proceeds under Article 9 UCC, see text to n 551. 
354 Smith, The Law of Tracing (n 7) 23. 
355 Ibid. 23 (the asset holder becomes the holder of a new asset “for no other reason 
than his holding of the original asset at the time the new asset was created”). Contrast 
this view with the view expressed above (text to nn 323-336) when another person than 
the owner possesses the original asset. 
	   113	  
view preferred in this work is that fruits and proceeds should be treated 
differently.  
Finally, an important point to make is that fruits do not become 
substitutes (proceeds) just because the value of the original collateral is 
reduced when fruits come into being. This is a controversial point. Let 
us consider pre-emption rights in shares.356 Some companies may raise 
further equity capital through a fresh issue of shares, which may have 
to be offered first to existing shareholders.357 When fresh shares are 
issued the value of an individual share drops proportionately. It has 
been suggested in the literature that pre-emption rights, once exercised, 
inure for the benefit of the secured creditor because otherwise every 
such issue would reduce the value of shares subject to security.358 If we 
agree with the basic premise, on which this thesis is based, that a 
secured creditor has a right to a specific asset (not its value)359 then a 
mere fact that the value of collateral is diminished should not extend 
security interest to new shares acquired by the exercise of a pre-
emption right. It is suggested that a pre-emption right, similarly to a 
right to income, is merely a right attached to a share. Whether the 
“benefit” of this right is conferred on the creditor or not should be a 
matter for the parties to decide.  In the absence of a clause extending 
the security interest to such shares newly issued, the secured creditor 
should not be able to extend security to them by nature of these 
rights.360  
C. Distinction between fruits and substitutes 
The distinction between fruits and substitutes can be drawn at a 
functional level and at a conceptual level. Neither is clear-cut. The 
difficulty with drawing the distinction between fruits and substitutes is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
356 Companies Act 2006, s561. 
357 Gullifer and Payne, Corporate Finance Law. Principles and Policy (n 340) 18. 
358 Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (n 1) para 1-57. 
359 See text to n 8. 
360 If this were not the case, we would probably have to consider consequences of the 
debtor’s refusal to exercise pre-emption right, depriving the creditor of the benefit. This 
puts us very closely to the law of fiduciaries. We argue below (text to nn 732-747) that 
grantors of security interests are not fiduciaries. 
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illustrated with the example of a long-term contract with amortised 
payments, where each payment diminishes the value of the contract. 
Should the contract be assigned after one of the payments is made its 
exchange value is lower than prior to the payment being made. When 
all payments due under a contract are made the contract’s exchange 
value is extinguished as no more debts are owed under the contract. 
Long-term contracts with amortised payments could be thought of as 
similar to a book debt where the debt is paid in instalments. Book debts 
and their proceeds are considered in this work to be self-same assets. 
A step removed from this is a situation where payments are made under 
an arrangement but the exchange value of the original asset is not 
necessarily diminished by the payments made. An example is payment 
of a dividend under a share. When a dividend is paid, the exchange 
value of the share is not diminished by the value of the dividend. This 
is because the exchange value of the share is determined by factors 
other than dividend payments, primarily by how much the market is 
willing to pay for the share. This is usually not dependent on whether 
dividends have just been paid out or not. Thus in the case of a share and 
a dividend, the dividend can be seen as a new asset. A right to 
dividends has a discrete existence. Another example is the relationship 
between a loan and interest paid on the loan. An interest is a right to 
paid that accrues periodically. Payment of interest does not diminish 
the exchange value of the loan.  
(a) Functional similarity based on economic efficiency  
At a functional level, whether the relationship between assets resembles 
that of an original asset and its substitute or between an original asset 
and its fruits, depends, it is submitted, on whether the exchange value 
of the original asset is determined solely by whether or not derived 
assets arise. If the exchange value of the original asset is permanently 
diminished when a new asset arises, the new asset may be functionally 
similar to a substitute. If the exchange value of the original asset is not 
affected by the new asset coming into existence, it is functionally 
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similar to a fruit. Functional similarity is only useful to the extent of 
assessing whether it is efficient in a legal system to allow security to 
extend to such assets.361 It is not suggested here that functional 
similarity implies that default rules applicable to fruits and substitutes 
should be the same as the rules relating to their functionally similar 
equivalents. When we say that security in amortised payments under 
long-term contracts are functionally similar to security in substitutes, 
we mean that a creditor who has a security in a long-term contract does 
not enjoy any windfall of benefits if his security extends automatically 
to the payment made under a contract. By contrast, a creditor whose 
security automatically extends to dividends does enjoy a windfall of 
benefits because the subject matter of security is enlarged: he has more 
assets to resort to. 
As far as default rules governing security in derived assets are 
concerned the rules applicable to substitutes and, say, functionally 
similar amortised payments under a long-term contract are likely to 
differ. The proper characterisation of such payments is likely to be a 
question of degree: whether they exhaust the exchange-value of the 
long-term contract proportionately when each payment is made. If they 
do, such payments are not likely to be substitutes. The derived asset 
(payment under the contract) is the same asset as the original asset. 
Each payment under a long-term contract constitutes a part-realisation 
of the contract. Each payment therefore represents a portion of the 
original asset and so the relation is similar as between a book debt and 
its proceeds. There is also a parallel between amortised payments made 
under a long-term contract and minerals extracted from land. Minerals 
are not fruits but “simply a subdivision of the original thing”.362 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
361 Efficiency of security in fruits and substitutes is explained and contrasted in section 
2.4 of chapter 1. 
362 L Smith, The Law of Tracing (n 7) 22. 
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(b) Conceptual distinctions 
Fruits do not derive from a disposition of the original collateral. Natural 
fruits are born from processes of nature. Intangible fruits arise as a 
realisation of a pre-existing right, even if for that right to be realised a 
third party may need to act, for example a right to be paid a dividend 
does not arise until a company declares it.363 Substitutes, by contrast to 
fruits, derive from an event that affects the original collateral, the event 
usually being a disposition. We give a wide meaning to the term 
“disposition” in this work to encompass any act affecting the asset in 
question, whether the act is physical (e.g. baking bread from flour and 
yeast) or legal (e.g. sale). The key point is that security interests in 
original collateral may be lost either through (i) a destruction of the old 
asset or (ii) a loss of claim to the original asset. The term “destruction” 
of an asset (in (i)) refers to cases where assets are destroyed in the eyes 
of law. Destruction does not mean that assets are physically reduced to 
nothing but rather that they are incorporated into a new product. Yet, 
the process, which leads to the secured creditor’s loss of right in the old 
asset is physical, not legal. Legal dispositions are transactions, whereby 
the debtor transfers a property right in the asset to a third party 
transferee or creates a property right in the asset in favour of another (a 
disponee). We are only interested in transactions, where the transferor 
obtains something in return (a new asset364). In (i) the creditor loses 
right to the old asset because under a set of default rules (such as 
specificatio365 or commingling under UCC366) the old subject matter 
ceased to exist as a result of a certain event (process). In (ii) the creditor 
loses right to the old asset because the law prevents the creditor from 
claiming the old asset. In both (i) and (ii) the new asset constitutes 
traceable proceeds. Perhaps it is this dichotomy that makes it still a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
363 Text to nn 341-342. 
364 It is a “new” asset in the sense that it previously did not exist in the estate of the 
debtor. 
365 See text to nn 300-307.   
366 See text to n 309. 
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question of debate whether tracing is merely an evidential process or 
one of establishing claims.367  
One area, which does not fit easily into the term “disposition”, involves 
cases, probably rare in practice, where tangibles are combined into a 
new asset accidentally or by an act of a third party outside of the 
control of the owners of assets joined. In such cases it may be more 
accurate to refer to an event affecting the original collateral rather than 
a disposition. An accidental destruction of the old subject matter may 
occur in cases of accession.368 For example, a plot of land may become 
a part of another plot of land by an earthquake and the subsidiary plot 
of land loses its existence. Assets may also be joined, whether by 
accession or specification, by an act of a third party, which is outside of 
control of the owners of mixed things. The secured creditor’s right to 
resort to the new asset will depend on the entitlement of the grantor of 
security in the mixture. In cases of specification, if the debtor ends up 
with a co-ownership share in the asset, the secured creditor ought to be 
able to assert security in that share. In cases of accession, where the 
principal asset belonged to the grantor, the secured creditor’s right to 
resort to the asset should not be affected (i.e. he may still assert security 
in the original asset, including the asset that acceded to it, because it is 
still the same asset). In cases of accession, where the principal asset 
belonged to a third party, the grantor loses ownership of the subsidiary 
asset. If the loss of ownership is not accompanied by acquisition of 
rights in any new asset by the grantor, the creditor seems to lose its 
security in the subsidiary asset.  
In this work we focus on cases where the grantor of security acquires a 
new asset as a result of an act of the debtor, not as a result of accidental 
accession or mixing by a third party outside of the debtor’s control. 
This means that in this work the term “disposition” amounts to an act 
of the debtor or at least an act in the debtor’s control that led to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
367 Text to n 917 and literature cited there. 
368 Specification cannot be a result of an event because specification assumes that there 
was work or skill (a human act).  
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acquisition of a new asset (a substitute) by the debtor. One key point 
advanced in this work is that rights to substitutes generated by debtor’s 
disposition do not arise automatically (i.e. on the basis of a “principle 
of substitutions”).369 As a result of the distinction in English law 
between fixed and floating charges dispositions of collateral are 
necessarily either authorised or unauthorised. The secured creditor is 
not entitled to substitutes by nature of the security interest. In order to 
establish the secured creditor’s rights to the new assets we will need to 
examine when dispositions are authorised and when they are not. In 
cases where dispositions of collateral are authorised security interests 
may arise in substitutes. It will be argued in chapter IV that whether or 
not security arises in proceeds of authorised dispositions depends on 
whether parties intended for security to extend to substitutes. If parties 
did not so intend, the secured creditor has no rights in proceeds of 
authorised disposition.370 In cases where dispositions of collateral are 
unauthorised, rights to proceeds may arise as a result of claims 
contingent on tracing. The basis for such claims is controversial and 
will be discussed in chapter V. Whether dispositions are authorised or 
not, it is argued that rights to proceeds do not arise automatically, as a 
result of a “principle” of substitutions. The analysis of security interests 
is different in the case of fruits because they do not derive from a 
disposition of the original asset by the debtor. As a result, rights to 
fruits cannot arise as a result of a disposition of the collateral. It is 
argued in chapter III that security interests in fruits do not usually arise 
automatically and are not inherent in the nature of the security interest 
in the original asset. Security interests in fruits are shown to arise as a 
result of an agreement between the parties. This may result from 
transfer of possession of the original collateral which bears natural 
fruits or from transfer of rights to intangible fruits attached to the 
original collateral, such as a pre-existing right to income attached to a 
share.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
369 See chapter III section 3, chapter IV section 3 and chapter 5. 
370 This is particularly controversial in the context of a floating charge, see text to nn 
785-797. 
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3.3 “False friends” of derived assets: rights to payment  
Some assets may seem like they undergo a change into a completely 
different asset but in fact they are not two different assets. This is the 
case of rights to payment, which are often assignable and valuable 
assets in the sense that they can be transferred (exchanged) for value. 
When these rights are exercised, payment is obtained. It seems that a 
new asset comes into being but in fact there is only ever one asset. Such 
is the case with book debts, which we examine in detail later when we 
discuss charges over book debts.371 A book debt is a right to payment. 
In the simplest example the right to payment is exercised when the 
payor (e.g. a buyer) performs her obligation and transfers money to the 
payee (e.g. a seller).372 From the perspective of the payee when the 
right is exercised, the right to be paid disappears and is replaced by 
cash or money in a bank account. This is not a result of a disposition 
(assignment) of the right to payment but a result of the exercise of the 
right. Analogous asset to a collected debt is the revenue from leasing 
agreements (as distinct from the leased equipment). If from the 
perspective of the lessor the benefit of the leasing agreement is income-
generation, then the relationship between the generated revenue under 
the agreement and the agreement is analogous to a collected debt and a 
book debt, even though the right to revenue is not usually exhausted 
after a single payment under a leasing agreement.373  
Another example is payment of a dividend that “derives” from a right 
to dividends on shares. A right to a dividend is merely realised when a 
dividend is paid. It is analogous to a book debt but only once dividends 
have been declared.374 We may also reiterate the point made above375 
that a right to be paid a dividend is separate from a right to a share. A 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
371 See text to nn 418-447. 
372 Obligation to pay may also be discharged in other ways, for example by way of set-
off. 
373 These types of assets pose problems for characterisation of charges, which is not, 
however, of primary concern here. For analysis see Worthington and Mitchkovska, 
'Floating Charges: The Current State of Play' (n 192). 
374 See also text to n 209. 
375 Text to nn 341-342. 
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right to be paid a dividend arises on the basis of a right to income, 
which may or may not be attached to the share. There is no analogy 
between a pre-existing right to income attached to a share and a book 
debt. When the pre-existing right to income is realised it gives rise to a 
right to payment of dividends. Once dividends are declared, a debt is 
created. It is at that point that an analogy can be drawn with book debts 
before a debt to pay is created. The relationship between book debts 
and proceeds of book debts is analogous to the relationship of an 
obligation to pay a dividend (once it arises) and the payment of a 
dividend.   
4 Conclusion 
We have seen that Roman law focused primarily on the right of 
ownership, not proprietary interests such as real security. The Roman 
law classification of derived assets helps to determine when assets 
mixed with others ceased to exist. Thus, the principles of accessio, 
specificatio and confusio/commixtio remain important in English law in 
determining whether a new asset has been created. The Roman law of 
fruits seems of less use and an alternative approach to understanding 
fruits has been suggested. Fruits, unlike substitutes, can be seen as 
arising on the basis of pre-existing rights attached to the original 
collateral. Whether or not a creditor is entitled to fruits can be 
determined before fruits come into being. Substitutes, on the other 
hand, are typically a result of a disposition of the original collateral. 
Whether or not a creditor can extend security to a substitute depends on 
whether the disposition was authorised by the security agreement or 
not. The rest of the thesis is structured to reflect this distinction.  
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CHAPTER III – Security agreements without 
a derived assets clause 
1 Introduction 
Investigation into the extent of security interests requires us to draw a 
distinction between two situations: first, where parties in the security 
agreement expressly agree that security is to extend to proceeds, 
products or fruits and second, where the agreement is silent as to these 
derived assets. This chapter is concerned with the latter situation. The 
question posed is whether a secured creditor can resort to assets derived 
from the original collateral automatically and by virtue of its 
proprietary interest in the originally encumbered asset if the security 
agreement is silent in this respect. Security agreements that expressly or 
impliedly extend security to derived assets are discussed in the next 
chapter.  
There is little authority on the point of automatic security interest in 
derived assets and the little case law that exists has not attracted much 
attention. In the leading case in the area, Buhr v Barclays Bank,376 
Arden LJ held that a secured creditor could automatically resort to 
accretions, fruits or substitutes purely by virtue of the nature of the 
secured creditor’s proprietary interest in the asset originally 
encumbered. The case concerned a farm mortgaged to two subsequent 
mortgagees. When the farm was sold the mortgagors used the sale 
proceeds to discharge the first mortgagee but not the second one. Since 
the sale was considered as unauthorised by the second mortgagee, the 
key issue was the right of a secured creditor to proceeds of an 
unauthorised sale. We treat unauthorised dispositions separately and 
discuss them in the last chapter.377 Buhr v Barclays Bank is of interest 
here, however, because Arden LJ spoke of a general principle of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
376 Buhr (n 14). 
377 See chapter V.   
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“substitutions and accretions”. The word “principle” seems to have 
been used by Arden LJ, and is used in this thesis, to mean that a certain 
result occurs even if the parties do not provide for that result in their 
agreement: the outcome is generated by the nature of the property right 
(the operation of law governing that property right). If the “principle” 
applies, it means that the chargee’s (or a mortgagee’s) proprietary 
interest automatically extends to both improvements to the property or 
assets acquired by the chargor in place of the original asset, whether or 
not the creditor authorised the disposition and whether or not the parties 
to a security agreement contemplated derived assets. In a section 
entitled “The general principle: the mortgagee has a right to accretions 
to and substitutions for the mortgaged property” Arden LJ said that 
“equity has for a long time taken the view that the mortgagee is entitled 
to a security interest in the fruits of the mortgaged property”378 and 
immediately went on to give an example of a mortgagee’s interest 
extending to a new lease when the previous lease was surrendered379 or 
expired.380 The case report is not detailed enough to fully assess how 
wide this “principle” is. It seems that Arden LJ herself talked about the 
“principle” in relation to unauthorised dispositions, accepting that the 
position may be different in relation to authorised dispositions.381 This 
work considers the accuracy of the notion of a “principle” not only in 
relation to unauthorised dispositions (chapter V) but it also asks 
whether the principle could be said to apply in relation to authorised 
dispositions (chapter IV). Before we do so, we must clarify the default 
rules on rights to derived assets where no provision has been as to what 
is or is not authorised, that is we need to consider security interests 
where no derived assets clause exists.  
It seems that the concepts of substitutes, accretions and fruits are 
confused in English law, as evidenced by the case of Buhr. A new 
lease, which replaces an old lease, is a substitute, not a fruit or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
378 Buhr (n 14) [40]. 
379 Hughes v Howard (1858) 25 Beav 575, 53 ER 756. 
380 Leigh v Burnett (1885) LR 29 Ch D 231. 
381 Buhr (n 14) [46].  
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accretion. Accretions are additions to the original asset that adhere to it 
while fruits are new assets, which are already separated from the 
original asset. It is not correct to think of a new lease in a conceptual 
category of a “fruit” of the mortgaged property. We take each of these 
three categories (accretions, substitutes and fruits) in turn. It is argued 
that while a security interest automatically extends to accretions to the 
originally charged asset, there is no support under current English law 
to say that security automatically extends to substitutes or fruits. We 
also make comparative law notes in this chapter. The current English 
law contrasts sharply with Article 9 UCC, whereby a security interest in 
the original collateral automatically extends to the proceeds of 
collateral by virtue of the statute. The definition of proceeds in the 
UCC is very wide, comprising, for instance, income. We will see that 
the automatic extension of security interests to income has caused some 
problems in the US law. Should a similar provision be adopted in 
English law, as the current proposals indicate,382 it is suggested that 
security interests should not automatically extend to income.  
2 Security interests in accretions 
A secured creditor is said to have a right to accretions. As we saw in the 
previous chapter the idea of accretions has suffered some confusion in 
general English law.383 Consequently, the idea of security in accretions 
has also not been fully understood and this section aims to clarify this 
notion. It is convenient to consider a basic example first. Let us imagine 
that a security agreement is entered into between a debtor and a lender 
to create a charge in a car but no provision is made for what happens to 
the chargee’s right when the car undergoes some changes. Some time 
later, in the period of duration of security, the borrower installs new 
alloys in the car, thus increasing substantially the value of the car.  
Alloys improve the car and as such are an accretion to the asset. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
382 LC CP (n 15) paras 3.182-3.187 and DR 2 (“proceeds”) and 29 (attachment and 
perfection of security in proceeds). 
383 See text to nn 284-285 and 315-337. 
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question is whether the secured creditor has a right to enforce his 
security by selling the car along with the alloys and if so, on what basis. 
2.1 Distinguishing rights to accretions from rights to derived 
assets 
In Fisher and Lightwood’s Law of Mortgage384 we read that whatever is 
added to the property to improve its value is an accretion to the 
property and is for the benefit of the mortgagee.385 This is so whether 
the addition is made by the debtor or a subsequent mortgagee.386 
Pursuant to this definition, the secured creditor in the example above 
would be able to enforce his security in the car with the alloys because 
the improvement of the value was for the benefit of the creditor. It is 
suggested that this definition of accretions is flawed. First, it assumes 
what it needs to prove: that the improvement is for the benefit of the 
secured creditor. Second, security interests are property interests in 
assets, not value. The first aspect has misled authors to treat “new 
leases” as “accretions”. It is argued below387 that “new leases” are 
substitutes, not accretions. If an asset is substituted for another for the 
benefit of the creditor, the creditor has a right to it. But it is false to 
assume that a new lease is taken for the benefit of the creditor and 
therefore is an accretion. In the case of accretions a person has a right 
to the accretion (i.e. the subsidiary asset) because it becomes a part of 
the principal asset. If a creditor had an interest in the old lease, it would 
be incorrect to say that the new lease automatically becomes a part of 
the old asset; the new lease usually replaces the old asset.388 The second 
aspect requires an explanation. It is not helpful to look at changes to the 
asset through the prism of increased value. If it were so, we would have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
384 W Clark (ed), Fisher and Lightwood's Law of Mortgage (13th edn Lexis Nexis, 
2010) para 8.7. 
385 Re Kitchin, ex p Punnett (1880) 16 Ch D 226 (CA). 
386 Maxwell v Ashe (1752) 1 Bro CC 444n; Landowners West of England and South 
Wales Land Drainage and Inclosure Co v Ashford (1880) 16 Ch D 411, 433, cited in 
Clark (ed), (n 384) para 8.7. 
387 See text to nn 459-462. 
388 A new lease or goodwill may be considered as an accretion when it is part of a 
business, see below text to nn 395-406. 
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to treat it on a par with an increase of the market price of a particular 
asset (increase in value resulting from the willingness of the market to 
pay more for a particular asset) and mixing of an asset belonging to 
another with collateral into a mixture. In the latter case, we would be 
doing an injustice if we said that the mixture represents “increase in 
value” of the original asset, and that it is “for the benefit of” the 
creditor (creditor A). Not only would the (possibly innocent) owner (O) 
of that other asset be automatically subject to a security interest but also 
any other creditor of O, who had a security interest in O’s asset, would 
automatically be subordinated to creditor A’s security. A better solution 
in such cases is to say that the secured creditor can assert interest to the 
new asset (product) in the proportion in which the originally 
encumbered asset was mixed with the other asset.389  
The definition of accretion as an “increase in value” also covers fruits 
and income. It was argued above390 that it is not accurate to treat fruits 
and income as “accretions” because they form an entirely new asset 
once they are separated from the original asset. Although on a literal 
reading of the definition in Fisher and Lightwood’s Law of Mortgage 
“fruits” are not accretions because they are not “added”, but rather form 
a natural increase from the original asset, it seems clear that “fruits”, 
e.g. progeny of livestock, have been treated as accretions to the asset in 
the literature.391 We will show below that there is little support under 
English law to say that the security interest extends automatically to 
fruits and income. Therefore, it is suggested that accretions should be 
treated as assets that are added to collateral, not assets that are 
generated from the collateral. 
Referring back to the example of the car with alloys above, it is better 
to say that the secured creditor can enforce the security in the car with 
the alloys because the alloys become a part of the car and it is the car 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
389 This is the solution under UCC §9-336(f), see text to n 312.  
390 See text to n 318. 
391 See Fisher and Lightwood's Law of Mortgage (n 384) para 8.7 referring in the 
section on “accretions” to Webster v Power (1868) LR 1 PC 150 (sheep) and Tucker (n 
328). 
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that is subject to security. It should not be relevant that the car is more 
valuable with the alloys and can be sold for more than it was possible 
before the improvement was made. The security interest is in the car, 
not in its value. Moreover, if the secured creditor takes the risk of 
diminution of market value of the asset, which may in some cases lead 
to the creditor’s debt not being discharged in full if sale proceeds are 
insufficient, it is only fair that he should also be entitled to the sale 
proceeds of the assets with accretions if the asset is worth more on the 
market.392 The secured lender will not be able to recover, however, 
more than the amount of the secured claim.  
A security interest extends to accretions to the original asset because 
the substance of the original asset does not change. In some cases the 
line between an accretion and a mixture forming a new asset may be 
hard to draw but we need not look at this here. The point made here is 
that the secured creditor can resort to the asset including accretion 
because it is still the same originally encumbered asset. It should also 
be added that in the case of a mortgage, where the mortgagee has a title 
to the encumbered property, although an accretion benefits the 
mortgagee because it enlarges his security, the asset still belongs to the 
mortgagor.393  
2.2 Specific examples 
The simplest example of an accretion is a fixture to house. Even if the 
parties do not agree expressly that the mortgage extends to fixtures, the 
mortgagee has a right to resort to land including any fixtures. A 
problematic example of accretion is goodwill. Although it seems clear 
in law that goodwill of a business, e.g. a public house, passes with the 
sale of a business,394 it is not clear whether the mortgagee automatically 
has a right to resort to the proceeds of sale of both the goodwill and the 
business. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
392 This may not be so if the subsidiary asset attached was subject to another security 
interest. However, questions of priority are outside of the scope of this thesis. 
393 Nelson v Hannam [1943] Ch 59. 
394 Kitchin (n 385) 233 (Jessel MR). 
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A. Goodwill as an accretion to the business not premises 
It has been noted in the literature that the general principle that 
anything added to the property becomes part of the property extends to 
goodwill.395 This does not seem to be fully accurate. It seems that 
whether or not the mortgage extends to goodwill depends on the 
intention of the parties.396 If the mortgagee wants the mortgage over 
premises (e.g. a public house) to extend to goodwill, he ought to 
bargain for it.397  However, this intention may be sometimes implied, so 
that the parties need not expressly state that mortgage extends to 
goodwill.398 For example, if the mortgage covers public house business, 
goodwill is part of the mortgaged property399 so that the mortgagee is 
entitled to an assignment of the licence400, but may not be entitled to the 
proceeds of sale of such rights.401 Further, unless parties intend 
(expressly or impliedly) for the goodwill to be subject to mortgage, the 
mortgagee cannot – merely by the nature of the mortgage – restrain the 
competitive activity of the mortgagor.402 Where the mortgage impliedly 
extends to goodwill the mortgagee may be said to have “de facto 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
395 Cousins on the Law of Mortgages (n 147) para 15-11. 
396 Whitley v Challis [1892] 1 Ch 64 (CA) 69 (Lindley LJ): “Would such legal 
mortgage comprise the goodwill and the business of that hotel? Clearly not, and it 
would be quite impossible under cover of the last words [i.e. that the mortgage should 
contain provisions as the mortgagee should require] so to enlarge the subject-matter of 
the security bargained for. (…) Those words cannot have the effect of bringing in 
property which the mortgagor had not agreed to mortgage. The security was intended 
to be confined to the house and buildings [emphasis – MR].”  
397 Whitley (n 396) 69 (Lindley LJ): “[The claimant] appears to me to be endeavouring 
to obtain an enlargement of that security, and to get a benefit to which he is not 
entitled—a benefit, that is, which he would have had if he had bargained for a mortgage 
comprising the goodwill of the business of the hotel keeper”; Re Bennett [1899] 1 Ch 
316, 321 (North J): “the mortgagees had never been in possession of the property. The 
goodwill of the business was not conveyed to them in terms” and see also 322-323 
(North J). 
398 Palmer v Barclays Bank Ltd (1972) 23 P & CR 30 (where the charge did not in 
terms extend to goodwill and no business was yet in existence when the charge was 
executed).  
399 Chissum v Dewes (1828) 5 Russ 29, 30; 38 ER 938 (Sir John Leach MR): “The good 
will of the business is nothing more than an advantage attached to the possession of the 
house; and the mortgagee, being entitled to the possession of the house, is entitled to 
the whole of that advantage. I cannot separate the good-will from the lease”; Cooper v 
Metropolitan Board of Works (1884) LR 25 Ch 472 (CA) 479 (Cotton LJ). 
400 Garrett v St Marylebone, Middlesex Justices (1884) LR 12 QBD 620. 
401 Re Carr [1918] 2 IR 448. 
402 Palmer v Barclays Bank (n 398) 37 (Goulding J). 
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goodwill from being actually in the enjoyment of the property”.403 In 
such cases, when the property is sold with goodwill, the mortgagee is 
entitled to have his debt paid from the proceeds of sale of both the 
property and the goodwill.404 Similarly, in cases where the mortgage is 
over a company running a business (e.g. a colliery), it seems to be 
implied that the parties intended that the mortgage extend to the actual 
business, which means that the mortgagee has a right to appoint a 
manager of the business.405 A mortgage does not extend to goodwill, 
however, if goodwill arises from the mortgagor’s personal reputation, 
for example as a result of his personal skill or expertise.406  
B. Additions that diminish the value of an asset 
An interesting question arises if as a result of “an addition” to the asset 
its value diminished though the asset itself is not destroyed.407 This is 
essentially a question of the secured creditor’s right to preserve the 
substance of security.408 A legal or equitable mortgagee is by virtue of 
his ownership able to a certain extent to protect his security against the 
acts of the mortgagor, which lead to reduction of value of the asset. As 
against the mortgagor the mortgagee is said to have a general right in 
equity to hold his security undiminished in value, whether or not the 
mortgaged debt is already due.409 It is not clear whether a chargee under 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
403 Re Bennett (n 397) 321 (North J). 
404 See also Pile v Pile (1876) LR 3 Ch D 36 where the Court of Appeal held that 
mortgagees who had taken possession of trade premises were entitled on compulsory 
acquisition to the whole compensation awarded not only for the land, but also for loss 
of future profits. 
405 County of Gloucester Bank v Rudry Merthyr Steam and House Coal Colliery Co 
[1895] 1 Ch 629 (CA): although the business of the colliery was not expressly 
mentioned in the mortgage deed (which covered lands, mines, and seams of coal, 
machinery) it was held that it was intended to pass and that it did pass to the 
mortgagees. As a result, the mortgagees were entitled to apply in the action for a 
receiver and manager of the colliery. 
406 Cooper (n 399). 
407 Loss of value of raw material being transformed into another asset may be 
interpreted, however, as an implied intention of the parties that title in the raw material 
is extinguished, see Re Peachdart [1984] Ch 131 (leather hide lost value as raw 
material when used to make handbags); see also Webb (n 305) 528. This would mean 
the original asset ceases to exist in the eyes of law and is withdrawn from security 
assuming the secured creditor had security in the raw material. 
408 Cousins on the Law of Mortgages (n 147) para 26-07. 
409 McMahon v North Kent Iron Works Co [1891] 2 Ch 148 (this is a floating charge 
case but the dictum is general). 
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a fixed charge also has the right to preserve the substance of security 
but it is difficult to see why he would not.410 The right to preserve 
substance of security seems to be based on pre-emption of the debtor’s 
act rather than sanction for that act. For example, if a mortgagor is 
wasting the collateral by cutting timber411 or by removing fixtures 
included in the collateral,412 the mortgagee may be able to restrain these 
acts if he can show the collateral to be insufficient to discharge debt 
and that it will be prejudiced. By analogy, the secured creditor can 
restrain accretions by debtor that would result in diminution of value of 
his security, although, admittedly, such a scenario is unlikely to happen 
in practice. In addition, the secured creditor may be able to sue the 
grantor of security for loss. This, however, is a personal claim for 
damages, not proprietary restitution. Suing for loss only makes sense if 
the claim is against a third party grantor. The debtor remains personally 
liable for the outstanding debt in any case where the value of the asset 
was insufficient to discharge the debt. 
3 Security interests in substitutes – the fallacy of a 
“principle of substitutions” 
In Buhr v Barclays Bank413 the secured creditor’s right to substitutes 
was said to arise automatically and as a matter of law. The term 
“substitutes” means here both clean substitutions and mixed 
substitutions (products).414 The “principle of substitutions” was 
deduced primarily from two groups of cases on security in leases and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
410 A chargee of a floating charge is not likely to have such a right if the dispositions 
are in the ordinary course of busienss. If the chargor can withdraw an asset from 
security and so altogether defeat the chargee’s right to the asset, then a majori ad minus 
he should also be free to act in a way that diminished the value of the asset. However, 
in the case of a disposition other than in the ordinary course of business before 
crystallisation, the chargee can obtain an order for the appointment of a receiver 
protecting such disposal: Hubbuck v Helms (1887) 56 LJ Ch 536; McMahon (n 409); 
Re London Pressed Hinged Co Ltd [1905] 1 Ch 576; see also Beale et al, The Law of 
Security and Title-Based Financing (n 2) para 6.74. 
411 Harper v Aplin (1886) 54 LT 383, cited in Cousins on the Law of Mortgages (n 147) 
para 26-07. 
412 Ackroyd v Mitchell (1860) 3 LT 236; Ellis v Glover and Hobson Ltd [1908] 1 KB 
388, both cited in Cousins on the Law of Mortgages (n 147) para 26-07. 
413 Buhr (n 14). 
414 See above chapter II section 3.2.A. 
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compensation money.415 Before we examine these cases as foundations 
of the “principle of substitutions”, it is useful to note that Arden LJ in 
Buhr rejected416 arguments made by the counsel that a parallel could be 
drawn between a mortgagee’s right to accretions to, and substitutions 
for, the mortgaged property and a chargee’s right to book debts and 
their proceeds. Although this work questions the existence of a 
“principle of substitutions”, it is thought that Arden LJ’s rejection of 
the parallel with security over book debts is correct.  
3.1 Rejection of the parallel with security interests in book 
debts  
In dismissing the parallel Arden LJ rightly held that:   
“[the mortgagee’s right to the accretions to, and substitutions for, 
the original asset] does not depend on the indivisibility of 
property from its proceeds, but rather on the derivation of the 
proceeds of sale. The authorities on book debts therefore neither 
assist (…) [nor] undermine the principle”.417 
It is worth exploring a little further why security interests in book debts 
and their proceeds are different from security interests in derived assets. 
Two points are made. First, security interests in book debts and their 
proceeds are not comparable to security interests in original assets and 
proceeds of disposition because a debt and a collected debt is one and 
the same asset, not two different ones. Second, as a result of the first, 
charge over a book debt automatically carries through to the proceeds 
of the debt. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
415 Apart from these Arden LJ also mentioned the following legislative provisions as 
support for the principle of substitutions: dealing with leasehold enfranchisement 
(Leasehold Reform Act 1967, ss8-13), compulsory acquisition and compensation for 
blight (for example Town and Country Planning Act 1990, ss 117(3), 162, 250) and 
provisions concerning disclaimer in the insolvency of the mortgagor (Insolvency Act 
1986 ss 181, 320). These were not discussed in detail by Arden LJ, so it is difficult to 
ascertain in what way they count as support. 
416 (n 14) [42]-[43]. 
417 (n 14) [43]. 
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A. The special relation between book debts and their 
proceeds  
A book debt is a creditor’s right to be paid a sum of money by the 
debtor. When the debt is paid, the creditor’s right to be paid can be seen 
as being “substituted” by the payment (“collected book debts”), 
whether cash in hand or – more likely – an increased balance in a bank 
account, which in itself is another right to be paid.418 In terms of their 
relation to each other book debts and their proceeds can be viewed as:  
(i) the same asset because they share and represent the same 
economic value; or 
(ii) as different assets but intrinsically economically linked in 
such a way that they form an indivisible asset; or 
(iii) as different assets.419  
The third conceptualization has been accepted in Re New Bullas 
Trading Ltd420 and subsequently rejected in Agnew v Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue421 and Re Spectrum Plus Ltd.422 The question has 
stimulated a rich academic debate and it is useful to revisit some of the 
arguments made in order to understand when a charge over an asset 
extends automatically to its proceeds. 
(a) Arguments in favour of the divisibility of book debts 
and their proceeds 
In New Bullas Nourse LJ held that book debts and proceeds could be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
418 If the bank account is in credit, the bank owes its customers an obligation to pay the 
amount represented by the bank balance, see D Fox, Property Rights in Money (OUP, 
Oxford 2008) para 1.43. In a sense one right to payment is substituted by another right 
to payment. A right to be paid is a more risky asset than payment in hand due to the 
residual likelihood that the debtor will not pay. In the case of banks this risk is 
considerably reduced, particularly due to depositor protection schemes. 
419 M Armstrong, '"Return to First Principles" In New Zealand: Charges over Book 
Debts Are Fixed - but the Future's Not!' (2000) 3 Insolvency Lawyer 102, 105. 
420 (n 194). 
421 (n 183). 
422 (n 181). 
	   132	  
treated as separate assets on the basis of freedom of parties.423 The 
divisibility of the two assets also has some academic support.424 First, it 
has been argued that collected book debts, once paid into a bank 
account, are an entirely different asset.425 Second, the value of a debt 
lies in more than just a right to sue the debtor for debt payment. A 
security on debts can be realised by factoring the uncollected debts.426 
Third, the priority of security in receivables depends, according to the 
rule in Dearle v Hall427 on notice given to the person owing debt, which 
in the case of a charge on book debts is the debtor of that book debt 
whilst in the case of proceeds paid into a bank account it is the bank 
assuming the account is in credit.428 Fourth, it was also argued that a 
contractual prohibition on the assignment of debts does not prevent the 
assignee from having to account for the proceeds of the debts, once 
received, to the assignor.429 It is difficult to see that this last point 
supports the argument that debt and debt proceeds are two separate 
assets. They do not exist simultaneously but when the original debt is 
paid and proceeds are paid into the hands of the assignee, a new debt 
(duty) arises to pay the proceeds to the assignor.  
(b) Arguments in favour of the indivisibility of book debts 
and their proceeds 
The approach in New Bullas was criticised first by Professor Goode and 
then judicially by Lord Millett in Agnew430 and Scott LJ in Spectrum.431 
Professor Goode argued that it is impossible to separate a debt from the 
proceeds since a debt is worth nothing unless and until it is collected 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
423 New Bullas (n 194) 492 (Nourse LJ) citing Tailby v Official Receiver (1888) 13 App 
Cas 523 (HL) 545 (Macnaghten LJ). 
424 G McCormack, 'The Nature of Security over Receivables' (2002) 23 Company 
Lawyer 84, 85-86; see also approving New Bullas Berg, 'Charges over Book Debts: A 
Reply' (n 185).  
425 Berg, 'Charges over Book Debts: A Reply' (n 185)  451. 
426 E Ferran, 'Fixed Charges on Book Debts - the Story Continues' (2000) 59 CLJ 456, 
456. 
427 (1823) 3 Russ 1, 38 ER 475.  
428 Berg, 'Charges over Book Debts: A Reply' (n 185) 451 
429 Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd [1994] 1 AC 85, [1993] 3 
WLR 408 (HL); Re Turcan (1888) 40 Ch D 5. 
430 (n 178) [46]. 
431 (n 181) [114]. 
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and turned into money.432 If the chargor has authority to collect debts, 
he can do so but for the charge to be consistent with a fixed security, 
the chargee must have a fixed security in the proceeds. The chargee 
must have a contractual control over the proceeds and the chargor 
cannot be collecting the proceeds for his own account.433 A security 
granted over the debt but not the proceeds would be worthless. Lord 
Millett contrasted inseparability of debts and their proceeds with the 
ability to separate a capital asset from its income in Royal Trust Bank v 
National Westminster Bank Plc.434 In this respect debts are a distinctive 
subject matter of security because they are “realised by payment, upon 
which they cease to exist”.435 A response to this argument is that the 
value of book debts can be realised also by selling them, not only by 
collection.436 A counterargument is found in the dicta of Lord Millett in 
Agnew:  
“A debt is a receivable; it is merely a right to receive payment 
from the debtor. Such a right cannot be enjoyed in specie; its 
value can be exploited only by exercising the right or by 
assigning it for value to a third party. An assignment or charge of 
a receivable, which does not carry with it the right to the receipt, 
has no value. It is worthless as a security. Any attempt in the 
present context to separate the ownership of the debts from the 
ownership of their proceeds (even if conceptually possible) 
makes no commercial sense.”437  
The reasoning of Professor Goode and Lord Millett in Agnew is 
compelling. It does not of course mean that debt and its proceeds are 
the same asset, but merely that they are closely linked. The link works 
only in one direction, though. A book debt is a right to proceeds (right 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
432 Goode, 'Charges over Book Debts: A Missed Opportunity' (n 185) 602. 
433 Ibid. 602. 
434 [1996] BCC 613 (CA) 618: “while it is obviously possible to distinguish between a 
capital asset and its income, I do not see how it can be possible to separate a debt or 
other receivable from the proceeds of its realisation”. See also Worthington, 'Fixed 
Charges over Book Debts and Other Receivables' (n 185).  
435 Goode, 'Charges over Book Debts: A Missed Opportunity' (n 185) 602. 
436 McCormack, 'The Nature of Security over Receivables' (n 424) 85-86. 
437 Agnew (n 178) 469. 
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to be paid), so debt is inevitably linked to proceeds, but proceeds, once 
collected, are not linked with the debt. Professor Worthington made a 
similar point. She argued that although uncollected receivables and 
collected proceeds can be treated as quite distinct and so subject 
independently to a fixed or floating charge or even no charge at all,438 
she noted that it is logically impossible for the parties to categorise a 
charge over receivables as fixed without considering how the parties 
have agreed to treat collected proceeds. Once proceeds of debt are 
collected and are held for example in a bank account439 they constitute 
an individual asset, capable of being a subject matter of a property 
right440 and it seems that its origin is not relevant for the purposes of 
taking security. Moreover, the argument of Nourse LJ that parties are 
free to treat debt and debt proceeds separately441 was met with a 
response in Spectrum by Lord Walker, in whose view the reason for 
overriding the freedom of the parties to draft the contract as they wish 
was public interest in the guise of the protection of preferential 
creditors.442   
The key point then is that when a book debt is collected it ceases to 
exist. A charge on a book debt cannot exist unless the chargee has not 
only a right to resort to the asset by selling the uncollected book debt 
but also by collecting proceeds of the debt. “Proceeds” of book debts 
generated when book debts are paid are a different type of asset than 
sale proceeds of an encumbered asset (including a sale of a book debt 
generating sale proceeds). Collected book debts are not a new derived 
asset; they are the same asset. The difference between proceeds of 
books debts and proceeds of sale of encumbered property is that in the 
latter case the original asset does not cease to exist upon sale.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
438 Worthington, 'Fixed Charges over Book Debts and Other Receivables' (n 185) 566, 
pointing to Re CCG International Enterprises Ltd [1993] BCC 580. 
439 The book debt can be substituted for a new asset in a number of ways, either as 
credit in a bank account or reduction of indebtedness (reduced debt).  
440 Berg, 'Charges over Book Debts: A Reply' (n 185) 451. 
441 Text to n 423. 
442 Spectrum (n 181) [141]. 
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B. Automatic right to collected debts 
Since a debt and proceeds of debt are indivisible, a charge over a book 
debt is a single, continuous security interest moving from assets to 
proceeds. This has important, if inconvenient in practice, consequences 
for characterisation of the charge over book debts. If the charge over 
book debts is to be fixed the chargee must have control over proceeds 
of book debts, whether resulting from sale of uncollected book debts or 
from collection of debts.443 If a company is free to collect proceeds and 
pay them into its own bank account the charge is floating, even if the 
chargee has a right to give instructions to the chargor how to deal with 
debts but does not in fact exercise this right.444 Similarly, a charge is 
floating if the debenture comprises a clause prohibiting the chargor to 
deal with or to charge, assign, discount or factor the uncollected debts 
without prior consent of the chargee but fails to do the same with the 
collected debts.445 The requirement of control over collected proceeds 
means that it is very difficult for the borrower to collect or deal with 
collected proceeds, which is often a commercially undesirable outcome. 
The once successful attempts to draft debentures creating a fixed charge 
over present and future debts and a floating charge over proceeds of the 
debts, enabling the chargor to collect the debts,446 now result in creation 
of just one (floating) charge. Following Agnew and Spectrum courts 
look at the agreement of the parties to determine not only the intention 
but also the effect of what the parties agreed is a matter of law.447 This 
means that a debenture enabling the debtor to collect the proceeds and 
to pay them into anything other than a blocked account is likely to be 
characterised as a floating charge. Similarly, a charge over book debts 
is floating if the debenture remains silent as to how proceeds of debts 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
443 Re Brightlife Ltd [1987] Ch 200, 209 (Hoffmann J), cited with approval in Agnew (n 
178) 723 (Millett LJ) and Spectrum (n 181) [104]-[105] (Scott LJ); similarly Keenan (n 
174) and Supercool Refrigeration [1994] 3 NZLR 300.  
444 A formal provision for a blocked account is not enough “if it is not operated as one 
in fact”: Agnew (n 178) 730 [48] (Millett LJ). 
445 Spectrum (n 181) [140] (Walker LJ). 
446 See e.g. clauses in Siebe Gorman (n 174); New Bullas (n 194). 
447 See also Ashborder BV v Green Gas Power Ltd [2004] EWHC 1517 (Ch), [2005] 
BCC 634 [183] (Etherton J). 
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are to be collected and kept, i.e. does not specify that the chargee has 
control over them. 
The absence of a parallel between security in debt proceeds and 
security in derived assets can be appreciated against the background of 
characterisation of charges. As we have just seen, a debenture creating 
a fixed charge in book debts must ensure the chargee has control of 
both book debts and their proceeds. By contrast, a fixed charge in a 
piece of equipment will not be recharacterised as a floating security if 
the chargee has control over the piece of equipment but no control over 
sale proceeds. This difference is understandable if we realise that the 
taking of control of a book debt is not a matter between the chargor and 
chargee but the chargee and the third party owing the debt. Restriction 
of the chargor’s power to deal with the book debt does not solve the 
problem of withdrawal from security as it does in the case of a piece of 
equipment because the debt subject to security may be paid and the 
proceeds withdrawn from security. The “transformation” from a book 
debt into proceeds, unlike the substitution of a piece of equipment for 
its sale proceeds, is not dependent on an act (a disposition) by the 
chargor. By taking control of the equipment the chargee diminishes the 
risk that the equipment will be sold and withdrawn from security 
because the chargor is not able to deal with the asset without its 
consent.  
3.2 Lack of support for the “principle of substitutions”  
It seems that the support for the “principle of substitutions” in Buhr v 
Barclays Bank is threefold. First, Arden LJ relied on two groups of 
cases: one relating to new leases, the other to compensation money.448 
Second, an assumption seems to have been made, albeit without 
detailed analysis, that rights to substitutions were the same as rights to 
accretions as the two were gathered under the umbrella of the 
“principle of substitutions and accretions”. Third, reliance was placed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
448 Buhr (n 14) [41] (Arden LJ noting similarity between the facts of Buhr and facts of a 
case, where security extended to compensation money).   
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on scholarly writings. Taking these in turn, this section questions the 
support that the two groups of cases have to offer for the “principle of 
substitutions”; it underlines the distinction between rights to 
substitutions and accretions and, finally, it notes that the academic 
support was misconceived.  
A. The questionable support in case law for the 
“principle” of substitutions 
(a) Security over new leases 
In Hughes v Howard449 the defendants were entitled to the equity of 
redemption of leaseholds encumbered with a mortgage. They attempted 
to get rid of the mortgage by fraudulently incurring forfeiture. They 
first induced the lessor to take advantage of the forfeiture and then 
obtained a new lease from him and subsequently sold it to bona fide 
purchasers. John Romilly MR had no difficulty finding that it was a 
case of fraud and enabled the mortgagee to assert mortgage in the new 
lease.450  In Leigh v Burnett451 Pearson J talked about a long-established 
doctrine that the mortgagor of a renewable lease could hold a renewed 
lease only subject to the mortgage.452 Neither case seems to provide 
support for the “principle” of substitutions. Hughes v Howard can be 
explained as a case of an unauthorised disposition of the subject matter 
of security: the mortgagee obtained a mortgage in the new lease 
because the new lease was traceable proceeds of an unauthorised 
disposition of the old lease. Although there is a controversy as to the 
basis of claims to proceeds of unauthorised dispositions, which we 
discuss in chapter V, a “principle” of substitutions is not needed to 
explain this case.  Leigh v Burnett is a case with complicated facts and 
it seems that Pearson J may have misinterpreted the previous case law 
purportedly underlying the doctrine he talked about. In Leigh v Burnett 
a lease was mortgaged by lessors in favour of Ingram and Dawkins. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
449 (n 379). 
450 Hughes (n 379) 580. 
451 (n 380). 
452 Leigh (n 380) 234.  
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The lessor normally renewed the lease by custom. The lessor then 
assigned the reversion Ecclesiastical Commissioners, who would not 
renew the lease. Almost thirty years later, when the lease coming to an 
end, Ecclesiastical Commissioners negotiated the sale of the reversion 
with Newman, who took a loan from Leigh promising that a mortgage 
would be created as soon as the conveyance was completed securing 
the repayment of the borrowed sum. The conveyance was executed. 
Newman soon went bankrupt. The question was whether Leigh’s 
mortgage was subject to prior mortgages of Ingram and Dawkins, 
which turned on the question whether Ingram and Dawkins could assert 
mortgage in a substitute asset – the reversion in fee that Newman 
acquired. They argued that they could because the agreement for sale 
was made when lease was still in existence so Newman could not 
acquire fee except for the benefit of Ingram and Dawkins. Pearson J, 
holding in favour of Ingram and Dawkins, made two points.453 First, he 
said that Newman was a mortgagor of the lease and so held the 
reversion on the same terms as he would have held a renewed lease of 
the property. Second, because Newman’s reversion took place of the 
renewed lease, Newman held the lease subject to the mortgage based on 
Rakestraw v Brewer.454 Pearson J in Leigh did not consider the fact that 
the court in Rakestraw applied this rule in order to ensure that the 
mortgagors are protected from the mortgagees.455 When mortgagees 
obtain a new term (and so enlarge the subject matter of security), the 
mortgagor’s right to redeem ought not change. Hence, a new term 
would be subject to the same equity of redemption. It does not 
automatically follow that a mortgagee would have a right to a new lease 
if the mortgagor renews it. It is arguable that when a mortgage is taken 
over a renewable lease the parties impliedly agree that the mortgage 
covers both the current lease and any renewed lease. The basis for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
453 Leigh (n 380) 234-235. 
454 (1728) 2 P Wms 511, 24 ER 839. 
455 Rakestraw (n 454) 513: “This additional term comes from the old root, and is of the 
same nature, subject to the same equity of redemption, else hardships might be brought 
upon mortgagors by the mortgagees getting such additional terms more easily, as being 
possessed of one not expired, and by that means worming out and oppressing a poor 
mortgagor”. 
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mortgagee’s right would be the agreement of the parties (more 
specifically, how the parties decided to describe the subject matter of 
security), not a “principle” of substitutions. 
(b) Security over compensation money for compulsory sale 
Under Law Guarantee and Trust Co Ltd v Mitcham and Cheam 
Brewery Co Ltd456 a company specifically mortgaged leasehold beer-
house to trustees. The company was refused the licensing authority to 
renew the licence to sell excised liquors, which entitled it under a 
statute to compensation. There was nothing in the mortgage deed about 
the compensation money, as it had not been contemplated that any 
would be received. The mortgagees were held to be entitled to receive 
the compensation money awarded to the company although they could 
not apply it to reduce the mortgage until the security became 
enforceable.457 We need to look carefully at the reasoning in the case. 
Despite the lack of an express provision in the security agreement 
extending security to compensation money, Kekewich J though that 
“the words of the deed must be applied to circumstances which were 
not contemplated, and so applied they do not entitle the mortgagor to 
come in and claim [proceeds of compulsory purchase] as his money.”458 
It seems that the mortgagees were able to assert security in 
compensation money on the basis of an implied bargain, not by 
operation of a “principle of substitutions”. 
B. Insufficiency of support for analogies between 
substitutions and accretions  
Substitutions are sometimes treated analogously to accretions. An 
example used is a new lease, which is considered to be an accretion to 
estate. This is misconceived. It is suggested that there is a difference 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
456 Law Guarantee & Trust Society Ltd v Mitcham & Cheam Brewery Co Ltd [1906] 2 
Ch 98, followed in Noakes v Noakes & Co Ltd [1907] 1 Ch 64; Dawson v Braime’s 
Tadcaster Breweries ltd [1907] 2 Ch 359. See also Cousins on the Law of Mortgages (n 
147) para 15-12. 
457 Law Guarantee (n 456) 105-106 (Kekewich J). 
458 Law Guarantee (n 456) 104. 
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between rights to accretions and to substitutions, which seems to have 
been thus far overlooked.  
(a) Argument from authority  
Arden LJ may have been misled by insufficiently discriminating 
wording in prior case law. For example, in Re Biss,459 a case to which 
Arden LJ referred,460 courts of both instances talk about a new lease as 
an “accretion” to an estate. It is argued, however, that insufficient care 
was taken in the way a new lease was considered to be an “accretion”. 
It had nothing to do with a substitution. In Re Biss a lessor (Stone) 
granted a lease for seven years of a house, in which the lessee (Biss) 
carried out a profitable business. When the lease expired Stone refused 
to renew but allowed the lessee to stay as a tenant from year to year. 
Biss subsequently died intestate, leaving a widow and children, who 
continued the business and the yearly tenancy. Stone then granted to 
one of the children “personally” a new lease for three years. Buckley J 
in the first instance held that the son stood in such a position as if he 
were a trustee for the estate461 and as a result of this the new lease was 
treated as an accretion to the estate of the deceased. The Court of 
Appeal disagreed with this ruling on the grounds that the renewal had 
been determined by the lessor himself, not the son. The son was only 
one of the next of kin and did not stand in a fiduciary position towards 
the estate. He did not obtain the new lease as a result of his possession 
or entitlement to the goodwill of the business. The new lease was 
therefore not traceable to the son’s interest in the old lease.462 The true 
question considered by the courts was whether the new lease was taken 
for the benefit of the estate. It was held that it did not and so the new 
lease was not an accretion. The point is that some assets may arise for 
the benefit not of a specific person but of a business (e.g. goodwill). If 
the creditor had a right in a business (here: estate) and a new asset is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
459 [1903] 2 Ch 40 (CA). 
460 Buhr (n 14) [47]. 
461 Biss (n 459) 48; on the authority of Ex p Grace 126 ER 962, (1799) 1 Bos & P 376. 
462 Biss (n 459) 58-59 (Collins MR) distinguishing Grace (n 461). 
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acquired for the benefit of the business rather than a particular person, 
it seems that the security interest may extend to such new asset 
automatically because it is seen to accede to the business as an 
accretion. There is, however, no analogy between cases where a new 
lease was treated as a substitute. Neither in Hughes v Howard463 nor 
Leigh v Burnett464 did the court find that the new lease would have been 
subject to a mortgage because it was acquired for the benefit of the 
asset. In Hughes the right to a new lease arose in order to avoid fraud 
whilst in Leigh it arose on the basis of an implied bargain between the 
parties. The courts did not draw an analogy between substitutions and 
accretions. Just because a new lease may in some cases be considered 
in the categories of an accretion and, in others, as a substitute, does not 
suggest that rights to accretions and substitutions arise in the same way. 
(b) Argument from principle 
It is argued that a new lease is a substitute of the old lease (traceable 
proceeds of the old lease), not an accretion to the estate. A new lease is 
a new legal relationship between the lessor and the lessee, whereby the 
lessee has a right to use an asset and a duty to pay rent whilst the lessor 
has a right to be paid the rent in return for making his property 
available for use of another. A property right in estate can exist without 
extending to rents from a lease. For example, an owner of a leased 
estate, which is subsequently sub-leased, need not have right to rents 
from a sub-lease just because he is an owner of the estate. A right to 
receive rents from a sub-lease may be created by a separate contract by 
the owner of the estate (the lessor) and the lessee. This contract 
concerns the estate but it is separate from it. By contrast, in the case of 
accretions, a property right to the principal asset cannot be separated 
from a right to the accretion. Consequently, a right to accretion to an 
asset has a different legal basis than a right to a substitute. The right to 
accretion to an asset arises on the basis of the property right to the 
principal asset, to which the subsidiary asset attaches. For example, if a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
463 (n 379). 
464 (n 380). 
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person (X) installs at his own expense heating in another’s (Y’s) house, 
the heating accedes to Y’s house; Y acquires a right to the heating 
system because the house is his and the heating system became a part 
of it, even if Y may be liable to reimburse X for expenses. Y may have 
a negotiorum gestio claim against X if it will be necessary. It is 
controversial whether English law recognises negotiorum gestio465 but 
we assume so here. It is not necessary to show that X owed fiduciary 
duties to Y to give Y a right to the improvement in the house. The basis 
for a right to accretion to an asset is the property right to the original 
asset, which continues to exist. The same consideration cannot apply in 
the case of a right to a substitute precisely because the original asset no 
longer exists in the hands of Y. From the perspective of the exercise of 
a security interest it does not matter whether accretions to the original 
asset were authorised or not. The secured creditor’s right to resort to the 
encumbered asset is not affected so long as the asset still exists and so 
long as it remains encumbered. If the alterations made to the asset 
decreased the value of the asset, this does not give the secured creditor 
any additional or new proprietary right because there is no new asset to 
have a property right in.    
Since “accretions” and “substitutions” are conceptually different, 
parallels between security in accretions and in substitutions do not hold. 
The correct analysis should therefore be that: (i) a security interest 
automatically extends to accretions to the original asset because the 
original collateral does not change;466 (ii) a security interest may extend 
to substitutes of the original collateral but this requires a different 
explanation to the one underlying (i). Although there is no single 
“principle of substitutions and accretions”, there could be two separate 
principles. We know already that the secured creditor’s right to resort to 
an accretion that acceded to the original asset is an automatic right, so it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
465 See D Sheehan, 'Negotiorum Gestio: A Civilian Concept in the Common Law?' 
(2006) 55 ICLQ 253 (arguing that English law recognises the concept of negotiorum 
gestio although in a diffent way than Civilian systems); contrast J Kortmann, Altruism 
in Private Law: Liability for Nonfeasance and Negotiorum Gestio (OUP, 2005) part II. 
466 See earlier in this chaper, section 2.1. 
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could be called a “principle of accretions”, although, it is suggested, it 
is unnecessary to employ the term “principle” to explain accretions.   
C. Misconceived scholarly support for an automatic right 
to substitutes 
The fact that accretions and substitutions are different does not yet 
mean that there is no “principle of substitutions”. Both the High Court 
and the Court of Appeal in Buhr v Barclays Bank relied on467 writings 
of Professor Goode in the third edition of Commercial Law468 and in 
the second edition of Legal Problems of Credit and Security469 to 
support the view that security in an asset carries through to its proceeds. 
We will examine these passages in detail and suggest that this reliance 
was misplaced. On a proper analysis, the relevant sections quoted by 
the courts contain no support for an automatic security interest in 
proceeds. It is convenient to quote both passages in full as they were 
used in Buhr. 
The section in Commercial Law reads as follows: 
“(iv) Security in an asset and security in its proceeds  
Unless otherwise agreed, security in an identifiable asset carries 
through to it products and proceeds, in accordance with the 
equitable principle of tracing. It is quite possible for the creditor 
to have rights in the same item of property both as proceeds and 
as original security, as where he takes a charge over debtor’s 
stock in trade and receivables and the debtor then sells items of 
the stock, producing receivables.  The strength and quality of a 
security interest in an asset is not necessarily the same as in its 
proceeds.  The debtor who gives a charge over his stock and 
receivables may be allowed full freedom to dispose of the stock 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
467 Buhr (n 14) [11], [39] and especially [45]. 
468 R Goode, Commercial Law (3rd edn Butterworths and Penguin Books, 1995) 667-
668; in a newer edition see Goode on Commercial Law (n 115) 659. 
469 R Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security (2nd edn Sweet & Maxwell, 1988) 
16; in a newer edition see Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (n 1) para 
1-59. 
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in the ordinary course of business free from the charge without 
reference to the creditor but be required to hold the proceeds 
separate from his own monies and pay them to the creditor or to 
an account which the creditor controls.  Such a charge will be a 
floating charge as regards the stock but a fixed charge as regards 
the receivables. The security interest in proceeds, unless 
separately created, is not a distinct security interest but is part of 
a single and continuous security interest, which changes its 
character as it moves from asset to proceeds. Moreover, a 
security interest in a debt cannot co-exist with a security interest 
in its proceeds, for upon collection debt ceases to exist.  
There are dicta, which on a superficial reading suggest that an 
obligation on the debtor to apply the proceeds of his asset 
towards discharge of the debt, and not for any other purposes, 
creates an equitable charge not merely over the proceeds but over 
the asset itself.  But the dicta must be taken in context and are 
not, it is submitted, intended to lay down any such rule, which 
would lead to great confusion.  A security interest in an asset 
carries forward to the proceeds”.470 
The passage in Legal Problems of Credit and Security reads as follows: 
“Security in an asset an in its proceeds 
Security in an asset will almost invariably carry through to the 
proceeds of an unauthorised disposition by the debtor and will 
also extend to proceeds of an authorised disposition where it is 
effected on behalf of the creditor rather than for the debtor’s own 
account”.471 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
470 Goode, Commercial Law (n 468) 667-668, as cited in Buhr (n 14) [12]; see also 
parallel text in the more recent edition Goode on Commercial Law (n 115) 659. 
471 Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security (2nd edn) (n 469) 16, cited in Buhr (n 
14) [13]; in a newer edition see Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (n 1) 
para 1-59. 
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These passages seem far from suggesting that a right to proceeds arises 
automatically by operation of law and a mention of a “principle of 
substitutions” is nowhere to be found here. Of course, the lack of 
mention of the “principle” does not prove the lack of its existence in 
law. It does show, however, that the passages cannot be relied on as 
support for its existence. There is an important distinction between the 
right to proceeds arising from authorised dispositions and a right to 
proceeds of unauthorised dispositions. Arden LJ herself seems to 
recognise this distinction although chooses not to decide this point.472 
This is crucial because the security interest in proceeds of an authorised 
disposition has a different basis than security interests in proceeds of an 
unauthorised disposition.473 Where dispositions are authorised, the 
secured creditor may be able to assert the same security interest in the 
proceeds as existed in the old asset. Where dispositions are 
unauthorised, it is not clear why the creditor should be able to assert the 
same security interest in the proceeds. We will argue in this thesis that 
the security interest does not carry through to the proceeds of an 
unauthorised disposition, which means that there are two rights: a 
security interest in the original asset and a new right in the proceeds of 
disposition. A “principle” of substitutions is not capable of coherently 
explaining secured creditor’s rights to substitutes. 
3.3 Inconsistency of an automatic right to substitutes with 
current English law 
We have seen above that there is insufficient support for a principle of 
substitutions in English law. We should now also observe that an 
automatic right to substitutes would not be consistent with the current 
English law. Explanation of this point will take the rest of the thesis but 
it is useful to signal and outline our arguments here. An automatic right 
to substitutes seems inconsistent with the fixed and floating charge 
divide, as it is understood in the current English law.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
472 As mentioned already above see n 381.  
473 See chapter IV subsection 3 and chapter 5. 
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A. The significance of the fixed and floating charge 
distinction 
If a secured creditor had an automatic right to substitutes in English 
law, we would have to accept that every substitution is effected on 
behalf of the creditor and for the creditor’s account. We know that this 
is not the case in English law because of the difference between fixed 
and floating charges.474 Dispositions of collateral subject to a floating 
charge are not on behalf of the creditor but on debtor’s own behalf. By 
contrast, substitutions of assets subject to a fixed charge are effected on 
behalf of the creditor. In chapter IV we develop an explanation of the 
fixed and floating charge as a creditor’s interest in an asset, where the 
debtor is given either very restricted authority to deal (fixed charge) or 
wide authority to deal (floating charge). Every disposition of an asset 
subject to a charge, whether fixed or floating, is either authorised or 
unauthorised by the secured creditor. Even if parties make no express 
provisions as to whether or not the chargor has authority to deal with 
the asset, the presence or absence of the authority is implied in the type 
of security.475 When a charge is fixed an authorised disposition leads to 
an “automatic” right to a substitute (proceeds of the authorised 
disposition) but this right arises not on the basis of a “principle” of 
substitutions but on the basis of the parties’ bargain, namely a 
specifically conferred right to withdraw an asset coupled with a 
sufficiently specific obligation to substitute.  Where a charge is 
floating, the secured creditor does not acquire an automatic right to 
proceeds of the disposition just because the disposition was authorised. 
The right to withdraw is not coupled with an obligation to substitute. 
This means that a holder of the floating charge does not automatically 
acquire a security in the substitutes.476 Where dispositions are 
unauthorised, whether under a fixed or a floating charge, as we have 
already indicated, a right to proceeds of such a disposition has an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
474 The security in Buhr (n 14) was fixed. 
475 See chapter IV, sections 3.1.B and 3.2.B. 
476 This is controversial; see text to n 785-799. 
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entirely different basis than a right to proceeds of authorised 
dispositions.477  
B. Further example: no automatic right in insurance 
proceeds 
We argued above that the cases cited in Buhr v Barclays Bank to 
support the “principle of substitutions” could be explained in other 
terms than by operation of this “principle”. A further example of the 
rule that security interests do not automatically arise in substitutes 
involves insurance proceeds, i.e. proceeds paid out upon the occurrence 
of a certain event affecting original collateral. Insurance proceeds are 
not derived from a disposition of the collateral. As a result, claims to 
insurance proceeds cannot be analysed in the categories of authorised 
or unauthorised disposition. A new asset,478 which is a personal right 
against the insurer, comes into being when a specified event occurs. It 
is far from clear under English law whether a secured creditor is able to 
assert a right to insurance proceeds by virtue of the property right that 
the creditor holds in the original asset.  
A view expressed in Legal Problems of Credit and Security479 is that 
the debtor, who insured the asset for its full value as opposed to the 
value of its interest represented by equity of redemption, must account 
to the secured creditor for an amount that exceeds the debtor’s interest. 
The case of Hepburn v A Tomlinson (Hauliers) Ltd480 is cited as 
support for this. The case concerned a property policy to cover a bailee 
from whom a consignment of cigarettes had been stolen in transit. The 
bailees insured the goods for the full value, not just to cover their 
insurable interest. It was held, inter alia, that the bailees could retain so 
much as would cover their own interest and they would be trustees for 
the owners in respect of the rest. It seems that the case could be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
477 See detailed discussion in chapter V. 
478 See Smith, The Law of Tracing (n 7) 234-236 (who argues that in the case of 
indemnity insurance the new asset is acquired through diminution in value of the 
insured asset and the payment of insurance premiums, at 234). 
479 Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (n 1) para 1-61. 
480 [1966] AC 451 (HL).  
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distinguished on the grounds that mortgagors are not bailees. Although 
the detailed categories of bailment listed by Holt CJ in Coggs v 
Bernard included security (pledge), it was the pledgee who was listed 
as a bailee, not an owner who retains possession of charged goods.481 
Further, bailees come under a tort duty to take care of the goods in their 
possession.482 Grantors of security are not subject to such a duty. There 
are also cases suggesting that the mortgagee has no right to the policy 
monies if the mortgagor insures the asset for his own account, which 
mean that there must be a contractual or a statutory provision that 
creditor’s interest would extend to insurance proceeds.483  
The importance of a contractual agreement that insurance proceeds are 
to be applied for the benefit of the mortgagee is illustrated in Lees v 
Whiteley.484 In that case the claimant was an assignee under a bill of 
sale of certain chattels. Although the mortgage deed contained a 
covenant to insure, there was no provision for the application of the 
policy monies in case of fire. The plaintiff was claiming there that he 
was entitled to have the money, which was received by the mortgagor, 
applied to the reduction of the mortgage debt. It was held that there 
were no terms in the bill of sale that the benefit the policy would pass 
by assignment.485 Hence, the mortgagee does not have a right to 
insurance proceeds purely by virtue of its property right in the original 
asset. As a result, the debtor does not generally hold the insurance 
proceeds on trust for creditor.486 In addition, we may note that there is 
also no automatic right to insurance proceeds in the base of bailment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
481 Coggs (n 114) 916 (Holt CJ). 
482 D Sheehan, The Principles of Personal Property Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford 
2011) 270.  
483 Lees v Whiteley (1866) LR 2 Eq 143; Sinnott v Bowden [1912] 2 Ch 414, 419 
(Parker J); Halifax Building Society v Keighley [1931] 2 KB 248, 254-255 (Wright J); 
CCG (n 438) 585-6 (Lindsey J); Colonial Mutual General Insurance Co Ltd v ANZ 
Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd [1995] 1 WLR 1140. 
484 Lees (n 483). 
485 Lees (n 483) 148-149 (Sir Kindersley V-C); see also Rayner v Preston (1881) LR 18 
Ch D 1 (CA) (the purchaser, who had completed his contract for sale of a house which 
had been insured by the vendor against fire, was not entitled as against the vendor to the 
benefit of the insurance). 
486 Halifax (n 483) 255 (Wright J). 
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unless the parties agreed otherwise. In Re Dibbens487 a company stored 
some furniture for a fee for its customers. Some customers expressly 
requested insurance and paid a premium while others did not. One of 
the warehouses burnt down and the company went into liquidation. It 
was held that the company owed a fiduciary duty to pay insurance 
proceeds only to those customers who had asked for and paid for 
insurance. 
As far as statutory right to insurance proceeds is concerned, a secured 
creditor can rely on section 108(4) of the Law of Property Act 1925 and 
ask to have the secured debt discharged from the proceeds received on 
an insurance of property against loss or damage by fire or on an 
insurance for maintenance.488 It seems that the effect of this section is 
similar to a security in proceeds based on an express provision with one 
difference. If the mortgagee’s right to insurance proceeds is based on 
the statutory provision, it is suggested that there is no risk of 
recharacterisation of the charge on the original property as floating if 
the borrower is left free to deal with insurance proceeds because section 
108(4) LPA 1925 merely states that the mortgagee may require the 
insurance proceeds to be applied to discharge the debt, not that the 
charge continues in the proceeds.  
The fact that there is a statutory rule in relation to insurance proceeds 
(at least of a certain kind and in relation to certain type of property) but 
not in relation to other type of proceeds can be seen as evidence of 
intention that security interests are not to extend in English law de lege 
lata to such types of proceeds. An example of similar reasoning can be 
seen in the Convention on the International Interests in Mobile 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
487 Re Dibbens & Sons Ltd (in liquidation) [1990] BCLC 577. 
488 Law of Property Act 1925, s108(4): “[w]ithout prejudice to any obligation to the 
contrary imposed by law, or by special contract, a mortgagee may require that all 
money received on an insurance of mortgaged property against loss or damage by fire 
or otherwise effected under this Act, or any enactment replaced by this Act, or on an 
insurance for the maintenance of which the mortgagor is liable under the mortgage 
deed, be applied in or towards the discharge of the mortgage money.” 
	   150	  
Equipment.489 Although the Convention allows priority to extend to 
proceeds490 the term “proceeds” is confined to insurance and other loss-
related proceeds so long as they are identifiable in the hands of the 
debtor.491 This is explained on the basis of a policy decision that the 
Convention does not govern receivables finance but merely interests in 
tangible assets (aircrafts objects, railway rolling stock and space 
assets).492 Otherwise there might be a clash between harmonisation 
instruments since receivables are covered by the UN Convention on the 
Assignment of Receivables in International Trade.493  
4 Security interests in fruits  
This section considers whether a secured creditor has a right to fruits 
derived from the encumbered asset in the absence of an agreement 
between the parties. In Buhr v Barclays Bank494 Arden LJ referred to 
Fisher & Lightwood’s Law of Mortgage495 to support a statement that a 
mortgagee is entitled to fruits of the mortgaged property. This section 
suggests that the statement is not supported under English law. 
Pursuant to Legal Problems of Credit and Security,496 which follows 
views expressed by Professor Lionel Smith in The Law of Tracing,497 in 
the absence of an agreement to the contrary, fruits may belong to either 
the debtor or the creditor, depending on the circumstances. More 
specifically it depends on the rights the debtor has in the asset. If the 
debtor is lawfully in possession of a tangible asset, fruits belong to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
489 Cape Town Convention, referred hereafter as CTC, presently applicable only to 
aircraft (on the basis of Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile 
Equipment on Matters specific to Aircraft Equipment) as the other two Protocols 
(relating to rolling stock and space assets are not yet in force).  
490 CTC, arts2(5) and 29(6). 
491 CTC, art1(w). 
492 R Goode, Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment and Protocol 
Thereto on Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment. Official Commentary (revised edn 
UNIDROIT, Rome 2008) 71. 
493 Unlike the CTC the UN Convention is not yet in force (as of 17 October 2012), so 
the clash of between the scope of these two international instrument is merely 
theoretical.  
494 Buhr (n 14) [40]. 
495 (1988, 10th edn) 55-57, as cited in Buhr (n 14) [40]. 
496 Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (n 1) para 1-61. 
497 Smith, The Law of Tracing (n 7) 21-24. 
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debtor.498 If, however, income is received by the debtor from an asset, 
with respect to which the debtor had no right to possession or had lost 
such right, e.g. because the creditor has a pledge of the asset, or in 
respect of which he had no right to enter into the transaction producing 
the income, fruits are said to belong to the creditor, “not, however, as 
proceeds but as the fruits of the creditor’s property”.499 The case of 
intangible property is more complicated due to the requirements of 
control in the case of a fixed charge. If the creditor has control of such 
property, for example an account is in the name of the creditor, income 
accruing on the account will enure to the creditor and the debtor will 
only have a contractual right to it for as long as the security interest 
lasts. Even if this is so, the creditor in such a situation will not acquire 
beneficial ownership of fruits but merely a right to resort to these assets 
in order to discharge the debt.500 As a result of the nature of the right, 
the creditor cannot recover over and above the secured claim. Fruits, 
like substitutes, are therefore treated differently to accretions. However, 
in contrast to many cases of substitutes, fruits are not generated through 
an act of the debtor, of which we would be able to say that it is 
authorised or not.501  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
498 Tucker (n 328). 
499 Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (n 1) para 1-61. 
500 Turner v Walsh [1909] 2 KB 484 (CA) 494-495 (Farwell LJ); this is derived from 
Casborne v Scarfe (1737) 1 Atk 603, 605; 26 ER 377, 379 (Hardwick LJ); Fairclough v 
Marshall (1879) 4 Ex D 37 (CA) 48 (Cotton LJ). Farwell LJ also noted in Turner (at 
496) that the mortgagee is not a trustee for the mortgagor except in special 
circumstances explained by Sir Thomas Plumer in Cholmondeley v Clinton (1820) 2 
Jac & W 1, 182; 37 ER 527, 593. 
501 There seem to be some parallels between fruits and insurance proceeds (which are 
substitutes, see text to n 478) insofar as neither are generated through a disposition by 
the debtor (and cannot be claimed on the basis of the disposition being authorised or 
not).  
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4.1 Mortgagee in possession  
A. Right to income but with duty to account 
(a) Right to rents as an incident of possession 
Right to receive rent when land is subject to a lease has traditionally 
been considered as an incident of the right to possession.502 The 
question of who is entitled to the income of the mortgaged property was 
expressed in Turner v Walsh to depend on:  
“whether the mortgagee has taken possession or given notice of 
his intention to take possession of the mortgaged property or not: 
if he has done so, then he is entitled; if he has not, the mortgagor 
was always and is still so entitled, and he receives and retains 
such income for his own benefit, without any liability to account 
either at law or in equity.”503 
Therefore, if the security is non-possessory the mortgagor is entitled to 
rents and profits for as long as he remains in possession and once 
profits accrued and were received prior to enforcement of the security 
the mortgagee could not recover them.504  
(b) Duty to account 
A legal mortgage confers on the mortgagee a right to take possession of 
the asset immediately and irrespective of the state of the mortgage debt. 
To determine the rights to fruits it is crucial to look at the character of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
502 Turner (n 500) 494 (Farwell LJ); Re Ind Coope Co Ltd [1911] 2 Ch 223 (Ch) 231 
(Warrington J); Rhodes v Allied Dunbar Pension Services Ltd [1989] 1 WLR 800 (CA), 
806 (Nicholls LJ); Re Atlantic Computer Systems Plc [1992] Ch 505 (CA), 532-534 
(Nicholls LJ). 
503 Turner (n 500) 494 (Farwell LJ). 
504 Heath v Pugh (1881) 6 QBD 345, 359 (Selborne LJ), affirmed (1882) LR 7 App Cas 
235 (HL). See also Ind Coope (n 502) 231-232 (Warrington J), declaring as no longer 
applicable earlier authorities to the contrary (Moss v Gallimore (1779) 1 Doug KB 279, 
99 ER 182 and Rogers v Humphreys (1835) 4 Ad & El 299, 314; 111 ER 799, 805 
(Lord Denman CJ), according to which the rent payable under a lease dated prior to 
mortgage could only be received by the mortgagor in possession by leave of licence of 
the mortgagee since the mortgagee was the reversioner expectant on that lease.) 
However on the facts of Ind Coope the mortgagees had a right to the specifically 
mortgaged rents in arrears. See also Cousins on the Law of Mortgages (n 147) para 26-
13 and Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp Ltd v Ilford Gas Co [1905] 2 KB 493 (CA) 
498 (Collins MR) (relating to right of action for trespass). 
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the mortgagee’s right to possession. Equity treats this right to take 
possession as part of the mortgagee’s security, not as a right to 
beneficial enjoyment.505 Consequently, a mortgagee in possession of 
the encumbered asset will be called on to account strictly for his use of 
it.506 The mortgagee is not entitled to get anything from the property 
beyond his security.507 He cannot obtain any profit for himself. Hence, 
the mortgagee will have to account for any profits he has taken or ought 
to have taken from the property.508 In taking the profit, the mortgagee 
may be able to obtain credit for his expenditure, but he cannot charge 
for his own time and effort509 unless he stipulates so in the contract.510 
He can apply the profits to the discharge of the debt but he must 
account for the rest. The mortgagee’s right to income and the duty to 
account applies whether the subject matter of the mortgage is tangible 
or intangible.511 From the perspective of the mortgagor it means that the 
mortgagor is still entitled to the profits but his right is subject to the 
mortgagee’s right to devote them to the satisfaction of the mortgage 
debt. In some cases, the mortgagee has to account for profits whilst the 
mortgage lasts. For example, if the mortgagee personally occupies land 
the mortgagor is entitled to obtain a fair occupation rent.512 
As Cousins and Clarke note, the mortgagee is bound to be diligent in 
collecting rents and profits.513 The mortgagee must give account to the 
mortgagor not only for rents and profits actually received but also for 
rents and profits, which but for his own gross negligence or wilful 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
505 Ibid. (n 147) para 29-11. 
506 Cockburn v Edwards (1881) LR 18 Ch D 449 (CA), 457 (Jessel MR); Ibid. (n 147) 
paras 26-13, 29-11. 
507 Ibid. para 26-20. 
508 Hughes v Williams (1806) 12 Ves 493, 33 ER 187; Chaplin v Young (No 1) (1864) 
33 Beav 330, 55 ER 395; Parkinson v Hanbury (1867) LP 2 HL 1; Shepherd v 
Spanheath (1988) EGCS 35 (CA). 
509 Langstaffe v Fenwicke (1805) 10 Ves 405, 34 ER 1071. 
510 It seems that it would not be considered as a “fetter” on the right of redemption: 
Biggs v Hoddinott [1898] 2 Ch 307. 
511 E.g. profits of a business, Chaplin (n 508). 
512 Marriott v The Anchor Reversionary Co (1861) 3 De GF & J 177, 193; 45 ER 846, 
852 (Turner LJ).  
513 Cousins on the Law of Mortgages (n 147) para 26-18. 
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default he would have received.514 The mortgagee must also take the 
usual steps to recover any arrears of rent in full from tenants who were 
able to pay it.515 However, the mortgagee need not, and even must not, 
speculate with the property (e.g. shares). If he does, he is liable for any 
losses.516 The duty to account whilst taking profits and income arises 
only when the mortgagee enters into possession in his capacity as a 
mortgagee, not, for example, as a tenant.517 The liability to account 
does not cease if the mortgagee decides to relinquish possession.518 
Although the mortgagee is not liable if the property deteriorates in 
value in the ordinary way, he is so liable if he was grossly negligent.519 
Mortgagees who subleased property are also liable for losses resulting 
from wrongful acts of the sublesees.520 
The extent to which the mortgagee is liable to account to the mortgagor 
depends on the circumstances. If the mortgagee was not in possession 
of the asset and took possession in order to sell it or to take net rents or 
profits because the debtor defaults it is likely that there may be no rents 
and profits left after the mortgagee paid any outgoings (e.g. insurance 
or taxes) and discharged his claims. A mortgagee may apply the rents 
or profits to payment of interest or to the reduction of the capital 
debt.521 If the mortgagee applies rents and profits to discharge interest 
and after doing so a surplus remains, the mortgagee is not obliged to 
apply the surplus to the reduction of the capital sum.522 This is by 
analogy with a rule that a mortgagee cannot be made to accept the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
514 Hughes (n 508); Parkinson (n 508) 9 (Chelmsford LC); Medforth v Blake [2000] Ch 
86 (CA). 
515 Noyes v Pollock (1886) 32 Ch D 53 (CA), 61 (Cotton LJ).  
516 Hughes (n 508); Rowe v Wood (1822) 2 Jac & W 553, 556; 37 ER 740, 740-741. 
517 Page v Linwood (1837) 4 Cl & Fin 399, 7 ER 154 (HL). 
518 Re Prytherch (1889) LR 42 Ch D 590. 
519 Wragg v Denham (1836) 2 Y & C Ex 117, 160 ER 335. 
520 Taylor v Mostyn (1886) LR 33 Ch D 226 (mortgagees liable for full value of coal 
wrongfully removed). 
521 Cousins on the Law of Mortgages (n 147) para 26-19. 
522 The mortgagee may hand over the sum to the mortgagor or he may pay the sum to 
the subsequent secured creditor if he received a notice from that creditor. If the first 
mortgagee received the notice from the subsequent mortgagee but nevertheless paid the 
surplus of rents and profits to the mortgagor, the first mortgagee is liable to account to 
the subsequent mortgagor: Berney v Sewell (1820) 1 Jac & W 647, 650; 37 ER 515, 516 
(Eldon LJ); Wrigley v Gill [1905] 1 Ch 241, 254 (Warrington J), affirmed [1906] 1 Ch 
165 (CA). 
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return of his capital in instalments.523 As with the timing of the account, 
the mortgagee is not usually made to account periodically.524 Rents and 
profits, which the mortgagee took, are taken into the equation when the 
final account is taken. 
B. Examples 
(a) Right to crops 
In terms of fruits that are not yet detached from the original asset, the 
mortgagee in possession is also entitled to them. This issue was 
examined in relation to growing crops. The mortgagee is entitled to all 
growing crops on the mortgaged land when he takes possession of 
land525 unless under an express contract of tenancy the mortgagor can 
claim them as emblements (i.e. fruits produced, not spontaneously, but 
by labour).526 Thus, a mortgagee on entering into possession may apply 
for an injunction to restrain a mortgagor or any person claiming under 
him, such as a trustee in bankruptcy, in order to prevent severance and 
removal of crops from land.527 However, if a mortgagee failed to take 
possession of severed crops before the mortgagor’s bankruptcy, the 
crops become personal chattels and the mortgagee has no rights to them 
against the trustee in bankruptcy.528 
(b) Right to rents with respect to tenancies 
A mortgagee can enter into receipt of rents and profits by serving notice 
to the tenant of the mortgaged property to pay rents to himself instead 
of the mortgagor.529 This applies in respect of any tenancies created 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
523 Nelson v Booth (1858) 3 De G & J 119, 122; 44 ER 1214, 1215 (Turner LJ); 
Cousins on the Law of Mortgages (n 147) para 26-19.  
524 A special periodical account may be ordered in exceptional circumstances, Wrigley 
(n 522); Cousins on the Law of Mortgages (n 147) para 26-20. 
525 Bagnall v Villar (1879) 12 Ch D 812. 
526 Bagnall (n 525); Re Phillips, ex p National Mercantile Bank (1880) LR 16 Ch D 104 
(CA). 
527 Bagnall (n 525). 
528 Phillips (n 526). 
529 See Horlock v Smith (1844) 1 Coll 287, 298; 63 ER 422, 428 (Sir Knight Bruce); 
Heales v M’Murray (1856) 23 Beav 401; 53 ER 157, 158 (Sir John Romilly MR) 
(mortgagee giving notice to tenants not to pay their rents to the mortgagor is liable to 
the mortgagor for any loss); Mexborough Urban DC v Harrison [1964] 1 WLR 733 
(Ch) 736, 737 (Pennycuick J); Cousins on the Law of Mortgages (n 147) para 26-09. 
	   156	  
before the mortgage. If tenancy is created after the mortgage, the 
mortgagee does not have a right to rents just by virtue of his possession 
as the mortgagee but must serve a notice to the tenant that the tenant 
should pay the mortgagee, not the mortgagor.530 If the tenant pays rents 
to the mortgagor after the mortgagee served him notice, the tenant is 
liable to pay the sums over again to the mortgagee.531  
4.2 Mortgagor in possession – mortgagee has no right to 
profits 
For as long as the mortgagor remains in possession, he is entitled to 
take all the profits from the security without being in any way obliged 
to account for them or to apply them in discharging the mortgage 
interest.532 This is so even if the originally encumbered asset is 
insufficient.533 A mortgagor in possession cannot be considered a bailiff 
for the mortgagee534 and so does not collect the rents or profits on 
mortgagee’s behalf, unless of course the parties so agree. In Ex p 
Wilson535 the mortgagor went bankrupt. The mortgagee had a mortgage 
over leased land. Lord Eldon refused to compel the assignee to account 
for past rents received by him. He held that the mortgagor had not 
received the rents for the mortgagee and that there was no instance 
when a mortgagor could be called to account for rents.536  
4.3 Equitable mortgagee or chargee 
A. Principle: no general right to rents or income 
An equitable mortgagee, unlike a legal chargee, does not have a right to 
take possession. Although this is debatable, it seems to be the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
530 Ibid. para 26-13.  
531 De Nicholls v Saunders (1870) LR 5 CP 589; Lord Ashburton v Nocton [1915] 1 Ch 
274 (CA) 282 (Lord Cozens-Hardy MR). 
532 Trent v Hunt (1853) 8 Exch 14, 22; 156 ER 7, 10 (Alderson B); Heath (n 504) 359 
(Selborne LJ), affirmed HL (n 504). 
533 Cousins on the Law of Mortgages (n 147) para 29-12. 
534 Ibid. para 29-12. 
535 (1813) 2 V&B 252, 35 ER 315. Cf Colman v Duke of St Albans (1796) 3 Ves 25, 30 
ER 874; Hele v Lord Bexley (1855) 20 Beav 127, 52 ER 551. 
536 Wilson (n 535) 253. See also Usborne v Usborne (1740) 1 Dick 75, 21 ER 196; 
Hippesley v Spencer (1820) 5 Mad 422, 56 ER 956. 
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prevailing view.537 Given that the right to rents, profits and income in 
the case of a legal mortgagee was based on the mortgagee being in 
possession, it is unlikely that a chargee or an equitable chargee, whose 
right to take possession is uncertain538, will have a right to rents or 
income. For an equitable security to extend to fruits, parties must agree 
so in the security agreement.539 The equitable mortgagee has no right to 
direct the tenants to pay the rents to himself, nor to collect such rents540, 
unless he has an order of the court. The mortgagee cannot give good 
discharge to the tenants so they would still remain liable for the rents to 
the owner or a legal chargee even if they paid to the equitable 
chargee.541 However, if a prior legal mortgagee is in possession and has 
collected rents and profits, the subsequent equitable mortgagee may ask 
for any surplus of rents and profits to be paid to himself, rather than to 
the mortgagor.542 
B. Charge over income of financial collateral – an 
exception? 
It is not clear whether a charge over financial instruments covers both 
the original collateral (the financial instruments) and dividends or 
interest payable under them. This issue does not seem to be fully 
resolved.543 A charge over financial instruments seems to extend ex 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
537 Barclays Bank Ltd v Bird [1954] Ch 274 but see Megarry & Wade, The Law of Real 
Property (7th edn, 2008) para 25-046. 
538 See Cousins on the Law of Mortgages (n 147) para 28-04. 
539 See e.g. Arthur D Little Ltd (In Administration) v Ableco Finance LLC [2002] 
EWHC 701 (Ch), [2003] Ch 217, which contained an express provision in the 
debenture which charged the entire bundle of rights making up the   shares, including 
the right to receive   dividends and to exploit the shares, including distribution rights, 
although this gave rise to doubts over the character of the charge; it was held the charge 
was fixed. 
540 Finck v Tranter [1905] 1 KB 427; Cousins on the Law of Mortgages (n 147) para 
28-06. 
541 Tenants cannot claim they made the payments of rents under a mistake of fact, Finck 
(n 540). 
542 LPA 1925, s101(1)(iii); Cousins on the Law of Mortgages (n 147) para 28-06. 
543 Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (n 1) para 1-61: “In relation to 
investment securities market usage considers it fair that dividend income and other 
distributions should enure for the benefit of the debtor”. 
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lege to the income derived from them under FCAR544 since the term 
“financial instrument” includes: 
“claims relating to or rights in or in respect of any of the 
financial instruments included in this definition, privileges or 
benefits attached to or arising from any such instruments”.545 
Yet, in practice it seems unlikely that a bank taking security in shares 
would expect his right to extend to dividends unless this was contracted 
for. Practice seems even more complicated because in many cases the 
securities account is in the name of the creditor so that the creditor can 
show that it has sufficient “control” for the purposes of perfecting its 
security. In such cases it is customary for the creditor and the debtor to 
agree that so long as the debtor is not in default the creditor will pass all 
the benefits to the debtor. These are referred to as “manufactured 
dividends”.546 These obligations are undertaken by the creditor (a firm) 
owed to the debtor (the firm’s client) in a stock-lending transaction to 
pay a sum equivalent to the dividends on those securities to the client. 
The firm has, however, a mere contractual liability to pay a sum to the 
client.547  
It seems prima facie that under the current law the right to dividends 
inheres automatically in the creditor, not the debtor, if the account is in 
the name of the creditor. This, it is submitted, is a result of 
technicalities of the law, put in place in order to ensure that the creditor 
has a fixed charge by having the account of securities in his name. 
Taking dividends is usually seen as an attribute of an owner of a share 
and it is unlikely that the secured creditor would be treated as such; the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
544 (n 210). 
545 FCAR, reg3. 
546 Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (n 1) para 1-61 citing ISDA Credit 
Support Deed (1995) para (e)(i),(g); TBMA/ISMA Global Master Repurchase 
Agreement (2000) para 5. 
547 Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) [2010] EWCA Civ 
917, [2011] Bus LR 277 [165]-[176] (Arden LJ). 
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secured creditor is not, for example, seen as acquiring any voting 
rights.548  
Even if under current law the secured creditor has an automatic right to 
the dividend (which he may contractually pass to the debtor), it does 
not mean that the relationship between the share and the dividend is the 
same as between a book debt and its proceeds. Suffice it to say that 
unlike a book debt, a share does not cease to exist once the dividend is 
paid, even if the market value of the share may drop immediately after 
payment of a dividend.549 It is notable, however, that it is the “right to 
income” which is treated as a book debt, not the share. This is 
consistent with our analysis of intangible fruits in chapter II.550 Even if 
we were to say that security automatically extends to dividends, we do 
not mean that dividends are “fruits” from shares analogous to natural 
fruits but that a charge over shares automatically also extends to cover 
right to income, which – when realised – produces dividends. Thus, 
unlike in the context of charges over book debts, a charge over shares 
should not be recharacterised as floating if the debenture provides for a 
floating charge over dividends. 
5 Security in proceeds under Article 9 UCC 
Two notions of proceeds have emerged under Article 9 UCC: 
disposition-based and value-based concept of proceeds. Disposition-
based proceeds are distinguished on the grounds of passage of title 
while value-based proceeds focus on the occurrence of an event that 
exhausts or consumes the economic value of collateral or its productive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
548 Scots law presents a good illustration of problems and consequence that must be 
accepted if the secured creditor is treated as an owner of the shares: Farstad Supply A/S 
v Enviroco Limited [2011] UKSC 16, it is particularly interesting to see reaction and 
arguments of Mr Moss QC sitting as a deputy judge in lower instance court, rendering a 
different judgment to the Supreme Court judgment (the case concerned the question of 
who a company was a subsidiary of if the shares were pledged, which under Scottish 
law can take place by transfer of ownership). For plans of Scottish reform in the area 
see Scottish Law Commission, Discussion Paper on Moveable Transactions 
(Discussion Paper No 151) 44. 
549 See text to nn 356-360.  
550 See text to nn 340-343. 
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capacity.551 The formulation of proceeds was expanded in the 2001 
revision from the previous disposition-based definition552 to the value-
based model of proceeds. The current definition in §9-102(a)(64) UCC 
therefore reads: 
"‘Proceeds’ means the following property:  
(A) whatever is acquired upon the sale, lease [includes rents], 
license, exchange, or other disposition of collateral;  
(B) whatever is collected on, or distributed on account of, 
collateral;  
(C) rights arising out of collateral;  
(D) to the extent of the value of the collateral, claims arising out 
of the loss, nonconformity, or interference with the use of, 
defects or infringement of rights in, or damage to, the collateral; 
or  
(E) to the extent of the value of collateral and to the extent 
payable to the debtor or the secured party, insurance payable by 
reason of the loss or nonconformity of, defects or infringement of 
rights in, or damage to, the collateral.”  
§9-102(a)(64)(D) and (E) UCC concern tort claims553 and insurance 
proceeds respectively, whilst the remaining sections focus on different 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
551 In correspondence on the issue of proceeds prior to the expansion to value-based 
concept of proceeds, one author stated “[i]t seems to me the ‘exchange’ idea has the 
benefit of fairness; it allows the secured party to make up what the secured party has 
lost” F Miller, 'Letter to Professor C Mooney' (1990) Permanent Editorial Board for 
Uniform Commercil Code, PEB Study Group Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 
(Oct 11, 1990), Document Nos 3-5 . 
552 Under previous UCC §9-306(1): "proceeds" included anything received upon the 
"sale, exchange, collection or other disposition of' the collateral”; under §9-306(2) 
(1990): "Except where this Article otherwise provides, a security interest continues in 
collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition thereof unless the 
disposition was authorized by the secured party in the security agreement or otherwise, 
and also continues in any identifiable proceeds including collections received by the 
debtor." 
553 Prior to the revision collateral did not extend to tort claims Bank of New York v 
Margiotta 416 NY S 2d 493 (Sup Ct 1979) but see McConigle v Combs 968 F 2d 810, 
(9th Cir 1992), cert dismissed 113 S Ct 399 (1992). 
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types of proceeds in the narrow sense (substitutes) and fruits. The 
expansion of the definition concerned primarily inclusion of the right to 
income and rents. It is therefore useful to examine what led to that 
extension of the definition to include fruits. In order to do so we will 
first look briefly at the historical approach of the US law to rents and 
we will then show examples of cases that were perceived as 
problematic prior to the change. Finally, we will investigate the 
rationale for the wide definition of proceeds and ask whether, based on 
the American experience, inclusion of a right to income and rents in the 
collateral would be a good solution in English law. 
5.1 Historical development of security in rents and income 
Historically, the question of fruits in the US, like in Roman law and 
English law, arose first in relation to mortgages over land. A mortgage 
has developed as an outright transfer (conveyance) of legal title, which 
involved right to possess the land and to collect rents from the real 
property. The traditional approach has been to allow the mortgagee to 
collect proceeds, e.g. rents accruing on land, and to apply them to the 
discharge of debt, unless the mortgage document provided otherwise, 
even prior to default by the debtor. The right to collect rents was treated 
as a substitute for collecting interest, which was a violation of 
ecclesiastical and legal prohibitions on usury.554 This approach later 
changed. On the prevailing theory of the mortgage the mortgagee does 
not implicitly have a right to collect rents arising from the mortgaged 
real property and to apply them towards the discharge of the debt.555 
Another way of looking at the right to rents is to treat it as implicit in 
the right to possess. In some US states the mortgagee’s right to 
possession accrues immediately upon default by the mortgagor, even if 
foreclosure proceedings have not yet been instituted, which enables the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
554 G Nelson and D Whitman, Nelson and Whitman's Real Estate Finance Law (4th edn 
2001) §1.2, 7, cited in RW Freyermuth, 'Modernizing Security in Rents: The New 
Uniform Assignment of Rents Act' (2006) 71 Missouri LR 1, 6. 
555 G Nelson and Whitman para 4.1, 153, cited in Freyermuth, (n 554) 2. 
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mortgagee to collect rents.556 To ensure that the mortgage lenders have 
this right to collect rents the mortgagor is required to separately assign 
rent payments in the event of default557 but prior to the completion of 
foreclosure.558  
As far as unaccrued rents were concerned common law traditionally 
treated such rents as an interest in land – an incorporeal 
hereditament,559 which required execution and delivery of an 
instrument conveying an interest in rents (an assignment of rents).560 
This was problematic in the context of income received under licence 
agreements,561 for example boat slip fees at marinas or hotel room 
charges. If a lender wanted to take security in such income, they needed 
to either obtain an assignment of that income as “rents” in the land or 
create a security interest in the present and after-acquired accounts and 
perfect it by filing a financing statement covering “accounts” under 
Article 9 UCC.562 A cautious lender needed to use the “belt and braces” 
approach by both requiring the debtor (e.g. a marina owner) to execute 
an assignment of rents and filing a financing statement covering 
accounts in a relevant UCC filing office.563 Although this solved the 
issue of a perfected and enforceable security interest outside of 
bankruptcy, the question of classification of the lender’s interest was 
crucial in the US in the context of bankruptcy because a security 
agreement covering after-acquired property did not (and still does not) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
556 Freyermuth cites Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Vermont, Freyermuth, (n 
554) 6. 
557 Article 9 UCC does not apply to mortgages over land and individual states have not 
enacted the relevant legislation dealing away with that requirement. 
558 When the process of foreclosure sale is completed the purchaser can collect rents as 
an incidents of its ownership of the land. 
559 In the US law see Independence Tube Corp v Levine (In re Tavern Motor Inn Inc) 
80 BR 659, 661-662 (Bankr D Vt 1987); R Freyermuth, 'Of Hotel Revenues, Rents, and 
Formalism in the Bankruptcy Courts: Implications for Reforming Commercial Real 
Estate Finance' (1993) 40 UCLA L Rev 1461, 1481. 
560 Freyermuth, 'Modernizing Security in Rents: The New Uniform Assignment of 
Rents Act' (n 554) 30. 
561 In the US it seems to be common to treat as licences the relationship between certain 
categories of occupiers and owners, e.g. marinas, nursing homes, parking garages, golf 
courses, student dormitories and hotels, see Ibid. 9-10 and cases cited there. 
562 Ibid. 10. 
563 Ibid. 11, 21. 
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attach to property that falls in the bankruptcy estate post-petition.564 It 
was perceived as key to characterise such income from licences as 
“rents”, “profits” or “proceeds” of land in order to insure that the 
security interest in newly accruing assets was enforceable after the 
bankruptcy proceedings commenced.565  
5.2 Difference between “proceeds” and after-acquired 
property in insolvency  
After petition for bankruptcy has been filed the interests of the secured 
creditor and the debtor with respect to accruing assets may diverge. The 
mortgagee is interested in preserving the post-petition rents so that they 
could be applied to the discharge of the mortgaged debt if necessary 
while the mortgagor is interested in applying the rents to fund its efforts 
to restructure the mortgage debt and to pay professional fees and 
expenses.566 The US Bankruptcy Code preserves any security interest 
acquired prior to bankruptcy so long as it is valid and perfected under 
state law.567 This applies to proceeds but not after-acquired property 
due to an express exclusion under section 552(a) of the US Bankruptcy 
Code, whereby a security agreement covering after-acquired property is 
not considered to create enforceable security in property acquired after 
the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings. By contrast, a pre-
petition security interest568 is valid and enforceable in post-petition 
property if the security agreement extends to “property of the debtor 
acquired before the commencement of the case and to proceeds, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
564 Title 11 of the United States Code (hereinafter referred to as 11 USC) §552(a). 
565 For problems in the US see R Freyermuth, 'The Circus Continues - Security Interests 
in Rents, Congress, the Bankruptcy Courts, and The "Rents Are Subsumed in the Land" 
Hypothesis' (1997) 6 J Bankr L & Prac 115; Freyermuth, 'Of Hotel Revenues, Rents, 
and Formalism in the Bankruptcy Courts: Implications for Reforming Commercial Real 
Estate Finance' (n 559). 
566 Commerce Bank v Mountain View Village Inc 5 F 3d 34 (3rd Cir 1993); In re Jason 
Realty LP 29 F 3d 423 (3rd Cir 1995); Sovereign Bank v Schwab 414 F 3d 450 (3rd Cir 
2005); Freyermuth, 'Modernizing Security in Rents: The New Uniform Assignment of 
Rents Act' (n 554) 7 and 32-33. 
567 11 USC §544(a). 
568 Security interests are defined separately in 11 USC §101(51) as a “lien created by an 
agreement” and applies not only to Article 9 UCC security interest. 
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products, offspring, or profits of such property, then such security 
interest extends to such proceeds, products, offspring, or profits 
acquired by the estate after the commencement of the case”.569 There 
are exceptions to this. For example, the rule does not apply to the extant 
that the trustee or debtor in possession may use, sell or lease proceeds, 
product, offspring or profits.570 The provision also allows the court to 
consider the equities in individual cases, for example to take into 
account and evaluate any expenditures by the estate relating to proceeds 
and any related improvement in position of the secured party. The 
difference in post-petition treatment of security in after-acquired 
property and security in proceeds and products has lead to significant 
changes in law in 2001, to which we now turn. It was driven to a large 
extent by desire to count rents as “proceeds” and not as “after-acquired 
property”. It is worth noting at this point that the difference in treatment 
of security in after-acquired property and proceeds is not a matter of 
doctrinal logic but rather a policy-driven rule. It is possible as a matter 
of logic, though may be undesirable,571 that security interests in assets 
acquired after commencement of insolvency proceedings be available 
for the secured creditor to resort to.  
5.3 Examples of problems prior to the 2001 revision of UCC 
A. Rental and licence fees 
Prior to 2001 case law suggested that rental and licence fees were not 
proceeds.572  Such assets were generated as a result of consumption, not 
disposition of the original collateral. “Disposition” was interpreted as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
569 11 USC §552(b). 
570 11 USC §363. 
571 For reasons outlined in text to nn 88-100 (prejudicial to interests of unsecured 
creditors). 
572 In re Value-Added Communications Inc 139 F 3d 543 (5th Cir 1998) (coins inserted 
in a pay phone); Gen Elec Credit Corp v Cleary Bros Constr Co (In re Cleary Bros 
Const Co) 9BR 40, 41 (Bankr DS Fla 1980) (holding that rental equipment does not 
generate proceeds). 
	   165	  
transaction effecting a transfer of property573 or a “permanent transfer 
of possession”.574 For example, in Value-Added case coins for use of 
pay telephones were held not to be proceeds of telephones because use 
of telephones was not a “disposition” within former §9-306UCC.575  
B. Stock dividends as proceeds 
Dividends can be seen as proceeds in the broader, value-based sense, as 
they reflect on the productive capacity of shares, but were not 
considered as “proceeds” under the disposition-based definition.576  
Interestingly, a distinction was drawn between a liquidating cash 
dividend and an ordinary cash dividend.  
(a) Liquidating dividend 
When shareholders of a company decide to dissolve the corporation, 
upon the dissolution the company pays its shareholders a liquidating 
dividend. Each shareholder exchanges its possession of a share 
certificate for a dividend. The transaction resembles a disposition – an 
exchange. The liquidating dividend derives its value from shares, but it 
is a functional equivalent of a “casualty that totally destroys stock”. 
Once the dividend is paid, the share certificate retains no value; it 
cannot be exchanged for anything else. A liquidating dividend was 
considered as falling within the term “proceeds” even prior to 2001 
revision.577  
(b) Ordinary cash dividend 
Liquidating dividends were contrasted with ordinary cash dividends. Re 
Hastie578 is an instructive case. Hastie borrowed $750,000 from First 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
573 Weisbart & Co v First National Bank 568 F 2d 391, 395 (5th Cir 1978). 
574 Mechanics National Bank v Gaucher 386 NE 2d 1052, 1055 (Mass App Ct 1979). 
575 Value-Added Communications (n 572). 
576 UCC §9-102(a)(64)(B). The former UCC §9-306(1) originally only included 
collections but not “whatever (…) is distributed on account of”. It was amended in 
1994 to include “payments or distributions made with respect to investment property”. 
The revised version of Article 9 does not limit “distribution” to investment property 
collateral.   
577 Under §9-306(1); see Aycock v Texas Commerce Bank NA 127 BR 17 (Bankr South 
Distr Tex 1991). 
578 In re Hastie 2 F 3d 1042 (10th Cir) 1043-44. 
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National Bank in Oklahoma City. Hastie granted a security interest in 
248 shares of stock of FirstBank to its creditor FNB. The security 
agreement provided that the secured party would have the right to 
receive from the issuer the share of dividends, profits and other 
distributions to which the debtor would be entitled. Subsequently the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) succeeded to the interest 
of First National Bank. FDIC took possession of the stock certificates 
and perfected the security interest in the stock under Oklahoma law but 
FDIC never asked the FirstBank to register a change of stock 
ownership. Hastie, therefore, continued to be listed as a registered 
owner of the FirstBank stock.579 After Hastie filed for bankruptcy (a 
voluntary Chapter 11 petition) FirstBank paid cash dividends three 
times to Hastie. FDIC asserted a lien against those dividends under its 
security agreement but Hastie sought a declaration that FDIC had no 
perfected security interest in those dividends. The bankruptcy court 
agreed with Hastie that FDIC failed to perfect its security interest in the 
dividends. It was held that at any time FDIC had the opportunity to 
cause the transfer of ownership of the FirstBank stock to be recorded, 
which would have ensured that it would receive notifications or 
dividends, to which the registered owner is entitled. The district court 
agreed. On appeal, FDIC tried a different argument. It submitted that its 
security interest in the dividends remained unaffected by Hastie’s 
bankruptcy filing because the dividends constituted proceeds of the 
stock under §9-306(1), which meant that even if “proceeds, products, 
offspring, rents, or profits” of collateral are acquired after the petition 
for bankruptcy is made, the security interest extends to them 
notwithstanding the bankruptcy.580 It was key how the term “proceeds” 
was understood.  
The Tenth Circuit, in finding for Hastie, focused on the transactional 
nature of (then) §9-306(1) UCC. Brorby Circuit Judge held: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
579 Hastie (n 578) 1044. 
580 11 USC §552(b). Note that the present formulation of that section has slightly 
changed. 
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“With respect to this definition, the term "sale" may be defined 
generally as "[a] revenue transaction where goods or services are 
delivered to a customer in return for cash or a contractual 
obligation to pay. [The] [t]erm comprehends [a] transfer of 
property from one party to another for valuable recompense." 
Similarly, the term "exchange" may be defined as "[the] [a]ct of 
giving or taking one thing for another," and the term "collect" in 
the context of a debt or claim may be defined as "payment or 
liquidation of it." Lastly, the phrase "other disposition" may be 
defined generally as the "[a]ct of disposing; [or] transferring to 
the care or possession of another; [or] [t]he parting with, 
alienation of, or giving up [of] property." Accordingly, each of 
the foregoing events describes an event whereby one asset is 
disposed of and another is acquired as its substitute”.581 
With this characterisation of proceeds as transaction-derived assets and 
in the absence of direct authority on whether dividends classed as 
proceeds,582 the Tenth Circuit court, concluded that:  
“The receipt of cash dividends by a registered owner of 
certificated securities bears no resemblance to the events 
specified in the definition of proceeds or to an act of disposition 
generally”.583 
For dividends to fall within the category of transaction-based proceeds 
the generation of dividends would need to involve a change in 
ownership or other disposition of the stock. It did not. Ownership 
interest in the issuing corporation was represented by the common 
stock (shares) not dividends.584 Payment of dividends, at least under 
Oklahoma law, was a distribution of the issuing corporation’s surplus 
or retained earnings. Therefore, the subject matter of security (the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
581 Hastie (n 578) 1045 (references to Black’s Law Dictionary (5th edn 1979) 1200, 
omitted here). 
582 The present definition is wider, §9-102(a)(64) and encompasses dividends. 
583 Hastie (n 578) 1045. 
584 Kerrigan v American Orthodontics Corp 960 F 2d 43, 46 (7th Cir 1992), referred to 
in Hastie (n 578) 1045. 
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stock) is not disposed of.585 Since dividends did not count as 
“proceeds” of shares, perfection of security interest in shares did not 
lead to perfection of security interest in the dividends. A security 
interest in dividends had to be perfected separately. In the lack of acts 
leading to perfection of security interest in the dividends, FDIC’s 
security interest in the dividends was not perfected. 
The decision was met with some criticism. Freyermuth, for example, 
argued that in some sense the payment of a dividend involved a 
disposition of the value represented by the issuer’s assets because 
“simple math demonstrates that the payment of a cash dividend has the 
effect of reducing [the shareholder’s] residual claim”.586 This does not 
seem to be right, however. If a shareholder wants to realise the value of 
its share prior to the issuer’s dissolution, they can only do so by selling 
the shares in a market transaction and the price of shares on the market 
is determined by a number of factors, least of which is whether 
dividends have just been distributed or not. 
C. Rents from leases 
Where a secured party held a perfected security interest in equipment, it 
did not have a perfected interest in the lease of the equipment. 
Therefore, proceeds of the collateral referred only to sale of the 
equipment and not to rents form the lease of the collateral.587 The 
seminal case in relation to proceeds of leased collateral is Re Cleary 
Brothers Construction Co.588 In that case Cleary granted a security 
interest to General Electric creditor Corp (GECC) in a crane. After 
filing for bankruptcy Cleary, without GECC’s permission, leased the 
crane to a third party for ten days for a specified rent. GECC argued 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
585 Hastie (n 578) 1046: “[A]lthough the cash dividend distributes assets of the 
corporation, it does not alter the ownership interest represented by the stock. The cash 
dividend, therefore, is not a disposition of the stock. Normally, stock is not disposed of, 
sold, or exchanged in any way unless a change in the ownership interest in the issuing 
corporation is thereby effected”. 
586 RW Freyermuth, 'Rethinking Proceeds: The History, Misinterpretation and Revision 
of UCC Section 9-306' (1995) 69 Tulane LR 645, 671. 
587 Cleary Bros (n 572) 41. 
588 Cleary Bros (n 572), see other cases cited in Freyermuth, 'Rethinking Proceeds: The 
History, Misinterpretation and Revision of UCC Section 9-306' (n 586) 661, fn 72. 
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that the rents paid on the lease of crane were proceeds but the court 
disagreed. The rents were not generated as a result of a disposition of 
the crane. 
D. The non-existent collateral problem 
Let us imagine that a company A manufactures and sells widgets to 
retailers. It has a £1m credit line with Bank X to finance its trading 
activity. X has a security on A’s accounts receivable. A’s competitor – 
company D pays A £1m to stop manufacturing and selling widgets. A 
accepts the payment and closes the business. The question is whether 
Bank X can assert its security interest in the payment A obtained from 
D as proceeds of its collateral. The problem is that the original 
collateral – the accounts receivable – never came into existence.589 This 
is known as a non-existent collateral problem. It has emerged in the US 
case law in relation to government agricultural subsidy payments590 and 
proceeds of business interruption insurance.591 Some courts took the 
view that the lender had an opportunity to take a security interest in 
these assets.592 Arguments to the contrary are that (a) the debtor would 
not have received the subsidy or other payment but for the participation 
in the subsidy or insurance program; (b) if the debtor proceeded and 
manufactured widgets or planted crop, these assets would have been 
covered by the security interest; (c) the payment obtained was a 
substitute for widgets that would otherwise have been manufactured (or 
crops grown).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
589 Ibid. 676. 
590 Farmers could agree with the government not to plant certain designated crops on a 
certain percentage of their acreage in return for a payment (in kind or in certificates) for 
the foregone crop. See In re Schmidt 38 UCC Rep Sev (Callaghan) 589, 590 (Bankr 
DND 1984). 
591 Re Kroehler Cabinet Co 129 BR 191 (Bankr WD Missouri 1991) (stating that the 
proceeds from a business interruption insurance policy were not insurance proceeds 
resulting from the destruction of the collateral but were paid as a result of the actual 
loss of business income, which was not subject to the security interest), reversed sub 
nom MNC Commercial Corp v Rouse 1992 WL 674733 (WD Mo 1992), cited in 
Freyermuth, 'Rethinking Proceeds: The History, Misinterpretation and Revision of 
UCC Section 9-306' (n 586) 691. 
592 Re Schmaling 783 F 2d 680, 684 (7th Cir 1986) (in relation to federal payment-in-
kind agricultural subsidy program received by the debtor who had granted security to a 
bank over all “crops grown or growing (…) together with all property of a similar 
nature or kind (…) which may be hereafter acquired” at 681). 
	   170	  
Prior to the 2001 amendment in the US such payments were not treated 
as proceeds as they did not fall within the term “disposition”. 
Freyermuth argued that the payments made in such cases, e.g. the 
subsidy paid for not growing the would-be covered crops, are proceeds 
of the collateral on the basis of the parties bargain. When the debtor and 
the secured party enter into a security agreement their mutual 
understanding is that the debtor will e.g. grow the crops, to which the 
secured creditor’s interest will attach. If the debtor accepts the subsidy 
or other payment the debtor is depriving the secured creditor from its 
bargained-for collateral, which is comparable to the debtor e.g. growing 
crops and selling them for cash. Freyermuth’s argument is therefore 
that the lack of recognition of the collateral in such payments 
“frustrates the ex ante bargain of the parties and accords [d]ebtor a 
windfall”.593  Under the current law post-2001 the subsidy would count 
as “rights arising on account of collateral”.  
If the rationale was to preserve the bargain between the parties, the 
problem of ‘non-existent collateral’ is that the bargain does not exist. 
Let us imagine that the farmer who creates security in crops finds a 
substitute use of his land and instead of growing crops hosts a rock 
concert.594 The question is whether the proceeds from renting the 
ground for such a purpose could be regarded as proceeds of crops. This 
would clearly be going exceedingly far since the security was agreed to 
extend to crops, not land itself. We could view proceeds of ticket sales 
from a rock concert as proceeds if we use the value-based definition of 
traceable proceeds595, but ticket sales would be proceeds of land, not 
crops. Even if we were to follow Professor Smith’s analysis that rent 
counts as traceable proceeds of leased land because the right to rent 
arises on the basis of a separate agreement whereby the owner of land 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
593 Freyermuth, 'Rethinking Proceeds: The History, Misinterpretation and Revision of 
UCC Section 9-306' (n 586) 683, citing some state court decisions which – unlike the 
federal court ones – recognized classification of agricultural subsidy as proceeds, e.g. 
Sweetwater Production Credit Association v O’Briant 764 SW 2d 230, 232 (Supreme 
Crt of Texas 1988). 
594 Argument made in Schmaling (n 592). 
595 See text to n 551.  
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parts with a portion of his ownership, namely the use of land596, we 
cannot say that ticket sales are proceeds of crops because they are 
generated on the basis of a different agreement of the owner to part 
with land use. Freyermuth himself admits that tickets sales would not 
be proceeds because the land-owner does not act as a farmer.597 Since 
farmers grow crops and do not host rock concerts it cannot be 
reasonably expected that a reasonable person in the position of the 
debtor and the secured party concluding a security agreement would 
have understood that the security over land extended to rents from rock 
concerts. 
5.4 The rationale for a wide ‘proceeds rule’  
The revised Article 9 UCC was expanded to cover not only proceeds 
that the debtor received as replacements for the original collateral (as a 
result of a “disposition”) but also to proceeds generated by or related to 
the original collateral.598 This enlarged concept of proceeds resolved the 
specific issues mentioned above by allowing classification of share 
dividends, rent collections or royalties from licensing as proceeds. It is 
particularly useful to look at these reasons since the Law Commission 
Draft Regulations also extend security interests automatically to 
proceeds but it is not yet clear how widely the term “proceeds” should 
be understood, in particular whether it should cover only substitutes or 
also fruits.599 
A. Arguments in favour of a wide definition of 
“proceeds”  
In the USA a number of reasons can be identified for the expansion of 
the definition of proceeds. First, reporters for Article 9 revision, 
Professors Steven Harris and Charles Mooney argued that changes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
596 Smith, The Law of Tracing (n 7) 22. 
597 Freyermuth, 'Rethinking Proceeds: The History, Misinterpretation and Revision of 
UCC Section 9-306' 685 fn 172. 
598 UCC §9-102(a)(64), cf former UCC §9-306(1). 
599 DR 2(1) defining term “proceeds” juncto DR 29. See also LC CP (n 15) paras 3.182-
3.187.  
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were needed to expand the lending base available to secured creditors, 
thereby increasing the debtor’s ability to obtain financing.600 Second, 
Freyermuth explained, the rationale for the proceeds rule is to “achieve 
efficiency of secured transactions by codifying the ex ante bargain of 
the hypothetical rationale debtor and secured party”.601 It is the 
presumed intention of the lender and the borrower that the security 
should extend to sums that reflect the economic value of the 
collateral.602 The law takes a paternalistic approach in inferring that 
intention. The UCC automatically gives the parties “a right to collateral 
(proceeds) that is usually bargained for even in those cases in which the 
parties have forgotten to implement their bargain by appropriate 
language in the security agreement.”603 This was meant to tie in with 
the UCC’s stated purpose, which is to simplify and clarify the law of 
commercial transactions through deterministic rules so as to decrease 
the transactional costs and increase predictability of the results of 
security interest disputes.604 
B. Critique of a wide “proceeds” definition 
There are two assumptions made by the drafters of the UCC legislative 
provisions and it is not obvious whether they hold every time. One 
relates to codification of the parties’ bargain and the other to efficiency. 
(a) Codification of a bargain, which may not exist 
The law sometimes codifies the perceived typical bargain of parties to a 
transaction. Providing a regulatory structure, which most parties would 
choose were they to bargain for these rules individually, reduces 
transaction costs and hence increases efficiency. The parties do not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
600 S Harris and C Mooney, 'Revised Article 9 Meets the Bankruptcy Code: Policy and 
Impact' (2001) 9 Am Bankr Inst LR 85, 96. 
601 Freyermuth, 'Rethinking Proceeds: The History, Misinterpretation and Revision of 
UCC Section 9-306' (n 586) 647. 
602 Ibid., 659-666, 692-700; Freyermuth, 'Of Hotel Revenues, Rents, and Formalism in 
the Bankruptcy Courts: Implications for Reforming Commercial Real Estate Finance' (n 
559) 1524-1535. 
603 W Hawkland, 'The Proposed Amendments to Article 9 of the UCC Part II. Proceeds' 
(1972) 77 Com LJ 12, 16. 
604 Kaunders (n 247) 806-807. 
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need to spend money on drafting rules from scratch because the law 
provides a set of default rules. In providing a set of default rules an 
assumption is made that the legislature is able to establish with a 
reasonable degree of certainty what parties usually bargain for. Such 
predictions as to parties’ behaviour are not unprecedented in 
commercial law. In the US, for example, under the Bankruptcy Code a 
bankrupt debtor cannot retain and use collateral unless the debtor has 
provided the secured party with adequate protection of its interest in the 
collateral:605 the debtor must at a minimum insure the collateral in order 
to provide the secured party with adequate protection. The rule is seen 
as a substitution for the need to include contractual clauses to that 
effect, which is what parties would normally do if the statutory 
provision did not exist. Naturally, the bargain envisaged by the law 
need not be a reflection of the true bargain between the parties. It rather 
reflects the usual bargain under the circumstances, which serves as a 
benchmark for legitimate expectations of the parties.  
In relation to collateral extending automatically to proceeds understood 
widely (i.e. including fruits), it is questionable whether the legislature 
has not gone too far in inferring intention that would never have been 
there. Unless it can be shown that parties to a secured transaction would 
typically agree that security interest extends to fruits it cannot be said 
that there exists any bargain to codify. If the typical bargain does not 
exist, the legislature should not be imposing default rules on 
commercial parties only for the parties to have to contract out of them. 
There appears to be no evidence of any such pattern of behaviour of 
commercial parties and further, empirical research would be needed to 
prove this point. Such research is, however, outside of the realm of the 
present work. Notwithstanding the outcomes of such future research, 
there are additional efficiency arguments against broadening the scope 
of the term “proceeds”, to which we now turn. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
605 11 USC §§361(1)-(3), 362(d)(1), 363(e). 
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(b) Inefficiency of treating fruits as proceeds 
If it is true that commercial parties usually bargain for proceeds, 
products and fruits, then a legislative provision implementing what is 
usually bargained for into the general commercial law seems to be a 
cost-saving measure because the parties no longer need to spend time 
drafting proceeds clauses but can rely on a legislative provision. This 
argument rests on an assumption that parties typically bargain for 
security in widely understood proceeds. If parties do not normally 
extend security to fruits, it cannot be said that the legislative provision 
is a cost saving measure. To the contrary, if parties do not typically 
want fruits to constitute collateral a legislative provision extending 
security to them would increase transaction costs because parties would 
have to incur cost in order to exclude the provision. 
Furthermore, it was suggested in chapter I security interests are 
efficient606 and that extension of security interests to substitutes 
promotes this efficiency because it reduces the risk of moral hazard and 
information asymmetry posed by the possibility of disappearance of the 
collateral.607 By contrast, extension of security interests automatically 
to fruits or income generated from collateral creates a problem of 
deadweight loss,608 which means that the secured creditor’s 
encumbrance grows, the debtor’s lending base shrinks and the debtor 
acquires no benefit from having her new assets (fruits, income) 
automatically subjected to security.  
It is sometimes argued that a broad proceeds rule broadens the debtor’s 
lending base so she may use all her assets, as they come into being, to 
raise finance. This point about broadening of the lending base was 
rightly refuted by Warner, who argued that this purpose is fulfilled by 
broad validation of after-acquired property clauses under §9-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
606 Chapter I section 2.3. 
607 See text preceding n 105. 
608 See text to nn 106-109. 
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201(a)UCC609 and that the expanded proceeds rule in fact does not lead 
to the achievement of the purpose because it captures ‘extra collateral’ 
in cases “where the parties did not care enough about the item to 
describe it in the security agreement”.610 Warner also argued that the 
broad expansion of security to proceeds violates bankruptcy rules (the 
deference rule) by diverting a wide pool of assets away from unsecured 
creditors, which is of particular importance in reorganization 
proceedings. Thus, it seems that not only is a rule extending security 
interests automatically to fruits inefficient but it also fails to advance 
the purpose of fair distribution of assets.611 
6 Should English law follow Article 9 UCC? 
Bearing in mind that under current English law a secured creditor has 
no automatic right to proceeds and fruits arising by operation of law, a 
question arises whether English law should follow the path of Article 9 
UCC extending security interests to proceeds widely understood, i.e. 
including fruits and income.  
There is little doubt that efficiency should be promoted by codifying 
the parties’ bargain. The legislator must, however, be very careful in 
inferring what the parties’ bargain is. It appears from anecdotal 
evidence that in commercial practice it is not expected that fruits (e.g. 
income, dividends) will fall within the scope of security.612 If the law 
imposes such a rule on commercial parties, the opposite effect to what 
is intended might happen. Instead of improving the efficiency of 
transactions, commercial parties will spend time and effort when 
dealing with the unexpected rule imposed by the legislator.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
609 G Warner, 'The Anti-Bankruptcy Act: Revised Article 9 and Bankruptcy' (2001) 9 
Am Bankr Inst L Rev 3, 51-61 and G Warner, 'Article 9's Bankrupt Proceeds Rule: 
Amending Bankruptcy Code Section 552  through the UCC "Proceeds" Definition ' 
(2011) 46 Gonz LR 521, 523. 
610 Warner, 'Article 9's Bankrupt Proceeds Rule: Amending Bankruptcy Code Section 
552  through the UCC "Proceeds" Definition ' (n 609) 523. 
611 On the issue of fair distribution by security interests see chapter I section 2.3.D. 
612 Based on discussions of Working Group A of Secured Transactions Law Reform 
Project, Meeting 2 (20th March 2012). 
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It seems that while an automatic proceeds rule should be encouraged, 
the term “proceeds” should not extend to fruits. Even though fruits 
could be seen as traceable proceeds arising as a result of alienation of a 
limited interest in the original asset (alienation of use-value of the 
original collateral), it is important that fruits accrue alongside the 
existing collateral, not instead of it.613 When a security interest extends 
to a substitute asset, the creditor only gets what he bargained for: a right 
to resort to an asset with priority to other creditors, even if it is not an 
asset the creditor originally bargained for but an equivalent. An 
automatic right to proceeds preserves the security interest, which 
otherwise would likely be defeated. The narrow proceeds rule preserves 
the existence of security. Consequently, efficiency of security interests, 
discussed in chapter I,614 is promoted. For example, the creditor 
continues to be able to limit monitoring of the debtor to the asset, thus 
reducing the cost of lending.615 At the same time substitution of original 
collateral for proceeds of disposition does not substantially affect the 
lending base of the debtor. If the debtor decided to subject a portion of 
her estate to a security in favour of a creditor, substitution of some 
assets for other assets does not substantially affect the proportion in 
which the debtor’s estate is encumbered. This is different in the case of 
automatic extension of security to fruits because new assets as well as 
the original collateral become subject to security. The lending base of 
the debtor diminishes as the proportion of encumbered assets in the 
debtor’s estate increases without any additional benefit to the debtor 
and probably only with an incremental benefit to the creditor.616 As a 
result, automatic extension of security to fruits is an inefficient form of 
asset distribution. Security interests should not extend to fruits or 
income without an agreement to that effect.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
613 Text to n 324. 
614 See above chapter I section 2.3. 
615 See text to n 104 
616 Text to nn 106-109. 
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7 Conclusion 
It seems that introduction of a rule in English law automatically 
extending security interests to substitutes would promote efficiency 
justifications of security. However, adoption of a rule extending 
security to fruits by operation of law would be likely to be inefficient. 
For this reason a possible future law reform of English law should not 
follow the example of Article 9 UCC, where security interests extend to 
proceeds, widely understood and comprising fruits. The state of current 
English law with respect to security in derived assets seems to be one 
of confusion. This thesis suggests that a principle, whereby security 
interests extend automatically (that is, by virtue of the property right) to 
fruits and substitutes does not find a sufficient support, in particular 
there is no parallel between the rights in accretions and rights to 
substitutes and fruits. Security interests automatically extend to 
accretions where a subsidiary asset (an accretion) accedes to collateral 
by attachment because the collateral does not change into a new asset. 
The reference to accession by natural increase in relation to fruits has 
caused lack of clarity in English law as it suggested analogous 
treatment to accretions. However, security interests do not, and should 
not, extend to fruits merely by virtue of the secured creditor’s property 
right in the original asset. Rights to fruits are related to possession of 
the original asset. Even if a secured creditor has a right to fruits by 
virtue of possession of the original asset, this is only by way of 
security. A secured creditor without possession of the original asset has 
no right to fruits unless he bargains for it.   
In relation to rights to substitutes (proceeds and products) the automatic 
extension of security to such assets is inconsistent with the distinction 
between fixed and floating charges in English law. The right to 
substitutes, being derived assets that usually arise as a result of an act of 
disposition of the original asset, must be looked at through the prism of 
whether the borrower was authorised to dispose or not. Rights to 
proceeds (sensu largo, i.e. comprising also products) of authorised 
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dispositions are analysed in chapter IV while rights to proceeds (sensu 
largo) of unauthorised dispositions are examined in chapter V.  
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CHAPTER IV – Security agreements 
covering derived assets  
1 Introduction 
It was argued in the previous chapter that security interests in 
substitutes and fruits do not generally arise as a matter of “principle”, 
that is by virtue of the secured creditor’s proprietary interest in the 
originally secured asset. As a matter of future changes to English law a 
rule extending security automatically to substitutes would arguably 
promote efficiency of security interests; an analogous rule in relation to 
fruits would not. In the current English law, as seen, the rule in relation 
to fruits does not have sufficient support unless the creditor has 
possession. In relation to substitutes the “principle” does not apply 
because substitutes are proceeds of disposition of the original asset, 
which are necessarily either authorised or unauthorised. When claims to 
substitutes arise, they do so through the prism of the debtor’s authority 
to dispose stemming from the agreement between the parties, not 
through the operation of a “principle of substitutions”.  
This chapter looks at security agreements, in which parties 
contemplated the extension of security interests to proceeds, products 
or fruits, whether expressly or impliedly by including a clause to that 
effect. The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, it examines the 
effect of clauses in security agreements whereby parties expressly 
extend security to assets that derive from the original collateral or 
whereby derived assets may fall within a class of assets subject to 
security under the security agreement (derived assets clause). It is not 
clear under the current law whether or not derived assets are covered by 
a security interest as original collateral and independently of their status 
as derived assets.617 Clarification of this point is needed to see whether 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
617 See Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (n 1) para 1-66 (asserting that 
derived assets can be covered as collateral and as an asset). 
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security agreements with derived clauses create one security interest (in 
original and derived assets) or multiple (in original asset and in each 
derived asset). If there are multiple security interests, a new security is 
created each time a new derived asset is acquired. A new and separate 
security would mean that fresh consideration and new registration 
would likely be needed.618 A new security would also be likely to have 
different priority than security in the original asset if priority dated 
from the date of creation of a security interest.619 In Goode on Legal 
Problems of Credit and Security it is argued that there are compelling 
reasons for there being one security.620 This seems to be based on a 
parallel analysis of charges in book debts and their proceeds. We 
observed, however, that proceeds of book debts are not derived assets 
but the same assets as book debts.621 It is therefore unsurprising that 
charges on book debts and proceeds are viewed as a single, continuous 
charge. This may be more difficult to establish where derived asset and 
original collateral are different assets. It is argued that whether there are 
multiple security interests or a single, continuous security depends on 
the parties’ intention. In some cases parties want to create multiple 
security interests, often of different character, for example a fixed 
charge over one asset (e.g. shares) and a floating charge over another 
(e.g. dividends on shares). In other cases parties may wish to create a 
single security in the original asset and the derived asset. A clause 
extending security to derived assets is similar to a clause creating 
security in an after-acquired property. If it can be shown that after-
acquired property clauses create a present security at the moment of 
security agreement it seems that we can also say that a security 
agreement with a derived assets clause creates a single security that 
covers from the date of the agreement both the original collateral and 
derived assets. In order to demonstrate that after-acquired property 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
618 Ibid. (n 1) para 1-64. 
619 Ibid. (n 1) para 1-64. 
620 Ibid. (n 1) para 1-64. 
621 See text to nn 372 and 418-447. 
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clauses create present security under English law, we contrast such 
clauses with cases of conditional security.  
Second, this chapter examines the way in which security interests 
extend to proceeds of dispositions (substitutes of the original asset) 
where the debtor had authority to dispose. It looks therefore at 
authorised dispositions of the asset subject to security. Claims to 
proceeds of unauthorised dispositions are different and so we discuss 
them separately in chapter V. Authorised disposition of collateral need 
not lead to proceeds; the debtor may simply withdraw an asset from 
security without receiving anything in exchange. We do not investigate 
such scenarios. We are only interested in cases where a new asset (a 
substitute) is obtained. The question posed is whether the creditor can 
assert a security interest in such a new asset. The answer sometimes 
given pertains to disposition of original collateral being either for the 
debtor’s own behalf or on the creditor’s behalf. Whether or not a 
disposition is on behalf of the creditor depends on characterisation of 
the charge as fixed or floating.  Dispositions of assets subject to a fixed 
charge are in principle not “allowed” and a term in the debenture 
enabling the debtor to dispose is likely to be characterised as creating a 
floating security. Although dispositions to which the fixed chargee 
specifically consented are likely to be consistent with a fixed character 
of the charge, as soon as the consent is given in advance this character 
of the charge is less certain. Dispositions of assets are of course 
characteristic of the floating charge. Yet dispositions of assets subject 
to a floating charge prior to crystallisation are on the debtor’s own 
behalf, not the chargee’s. These points have already been made in 
literature622 but it has not been fully explored why this is so. This 
chapter aims to fill this gap. A new way of looking at fixed charge is 
suggested. This new perspective focuses on the differing degrees of 
authority to dispose in a fixed and a floating charge. Whilst authority to 
dispose is limited, debtor’s power to dispose usually is not so limited. 	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This leads us to analysis of the charge in terms analogous to agency. It 
is proposed that a fixed charge can be seen as what would be an agency 
with very limited authority to dispose. This analysis allows us to view 
fixed and floating charges as similar devices and makes it redundant to 
look at whether or not the charge is an attached immediate interest in 
the assets subject to it.   
2 Security in derived assets as security in after-acquired 
property 
Derived assets can be seen as a sub-category of after-acquired property 
in that they do not yet exist at the time the agreement is made. What we 
say here about enforceability of security in after-acquired property 
ought to therefore apply also to derived assets. Security interests in 
after-acquired property raise a number of problems. Their clarification 
would be useful not only for the purposes of better understanding of 
security in derived assets but also to inform the debate on what the law 
is with respect to security in future assets. This section deals with the 
following questions. First, it is asked whether creation of security in 
future assets should be viewed as conditional security, the condition 
being the coming into existence of an asset. It is argued that it should 
not and we attempt to explain its nature as an “inchoate security” in the 
period between the security agreement and the coming into being of the 
property (part 2.1). Second, it is asked whether fresh consideration is 
required when the new asset comes into existence (part 2.2).   
2.1 Security in after-acquired property distinguished from 
conditional transfers 
Parties to a security agreement must intend to create a security interest 
in a particular asset.623 They do so by intending to create an immediate 
right to resort to an asset in case the debtor defaults. Only then a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
623 Swiss Bank Corporation v Lloyds Bank Ltd [1979] Ch 548, 566 (Browne-Wilkinson 
J) noting a difference between an intention to create a security and intention to merely 
pay from a specified source (decision on other grounds reversed in CA [1980] 3 WLR 
457; appeal upheld by HL (n 157)). 
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security interest can arise immediately. A security agreement 
contingent on some future event is a mere contract because there is no 
intention to create an immediate right. A charge expressed to cover 
after-acquired property also has an element of contingency: the charge 
cannot attach until the future property comes into existence. This could 
be seen as preventing the security interest being immediately created. 
Yet it is clear, both from authorities and literature, that such a charge is 
more than a mere contract. It is said to create an “inchoate interest” 
attaching automatically, and retrospectively, when the property comes 
into existence. This is explained in Legal Problems of Credit and 
Security in the following way:  
“an agreement for security over after-acquired property (…) 
creates an inchoate security interest which is waiting for the asset 
to be acquired so that it can fasten on to the asset but which, 
upon acquisition of the asset, takes effect as from the date of the 
security agreement. Acquisition of the asset produces the 
situation in which the security is deemed to have continuously 
attached to the asset from the time of execution of the security 
agreement”.624  
We will show, by contrasting a security in future property with security 
contingent on future and certain/uncertain events, that an agreement to 
create an immediate right in future property is not a mere contract 
because the parties’ intention to create a proprietary right is immediate 
and not contingent on any event.  
Contingencies can be classified depending on the certainty of the event 
occurring. The events can be future and certain or future and uncertain. 
Examples of future and certain event is deference in time, e.g. “I create 
a charge over my present car but I want it to take effect tomorrow” or 
“when my grandmother dies”. Both the advent of tomorrow and the 
death of someone are certain events and should not be treated 	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differently:625 we know that they will happen, although in some cases 
we do not know when. Events that are future and uncertain depend on 
the occurrence of future event, which may or may not occur, e.g. “I 
create a charge over my present car provided that I do not receive a 
loan from my neighbour”. It is probably fair to say that most future 
events are uncertain, although some may be more so than others. The 
future uncertain events can be either within a person’s control, in 
particular within the debtor or grantor’s control (for example, the 
debtor’s default on the obligation to pay) or outside of anyone’s control 
(such as an earthquake). We therefore propose the following 
distinctions, which are discussed in more detail immediately below: 
(a) parties to a security agreement express intention to attach at a 
later date than the security agreement (the contingency is a future 
and certain event) – intention to attach is not immediate because 
it is deferred in time;  
(b) parties to a security agreement express intention to create 
security upon the occurrence of a future and uncertain event – 
intention to create security is not immediate, it is conditional; it 
amounts to parties saying: “we do not intend to create any 
security unless X occurs”; 
(c) parties to a security agreement express intention to create 
security in after-acquired property. Even though the coming into 
being of future property can be seen as a future and uncertain 
event, parties do not make their intention conditional upon it. It is 
merely the proprietary effect of the security (its creation) that is 
conditional upon the property coming into existence. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
625 See Countess of Mornington v Keane (1858) 2 De G&J 292, 313; 44 ER 1001, 1010 
(Chelmsford LC), later referred to as Mornington. 
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A. Security interest conditional upon a future and certain 
event 
The parties to a security agreement may wish the security to attach at a 
later point, for example when the owner of a car, presently existing, 
agrees with the creditor on July 1 that the security created is to take 
effect in a few days’ time, on July 6. There will be no present security 
created on July 1 as their intention is to attach on July 6, which means 
that the intention parties expressed on July 1 was not to attach 
immediately.626 When the parties agree to create a security interest over 
presently existing assets in such a way that the security is to take effect 
at some point in the future, it seems it is not possible for the creditor to 
acquire any proprietary right in the asset prior to the agreed time. 
Equally, as soon as the certain future event occurs, the security should 
attach to the asset automatically, without any need for another security 
agreement as in the scenario (b), where attachment depends on a future 
and uncertain event. In the present scenario the security arises simply 
on the basis of the parties’ agreement to attach. The security interest is 
deemed to attach on the agreed date (July 6) and does not take any 
effect prior to that date. Unlike in the case of security interests in future 
assets the intention is not to create security immediately but at a future 
certain event. Therefore, we cannot say that the security attaches 
retrospectively from the date of the agreement.  
In the present scenario no security will have been created in favour of 
the creditor on July 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5. Consequently, the creditor cannot 
enforce the transfer on any of these days until July 6. What if an event 
occurs before July 6 that prevents the transfer from taking place? Let us 
imagine that the grantor in the meantime (between July 1 and July 6) 
purported to transfer the title to the asset (car) to a third party, for 
example by selling the car to a third party on July 3. The third party 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
626 Cf Draft Companies Act 2006 (Amendment of Part 25) Regulations 2013, to come 
into force 6th April 2013 (subject to Parliamentary approval), introducing s859E, which 
sets out the dates when the charge is created. For example, where the instrument 
creating security is a deed held in escrow, the date of creation of the security is the date 
of delivery into escrow; similarly, where an instrument does not have an immediate 
effect upon execution, the charge is created when the instrument takes effect. 
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will argue that they acquired a legal title to the car on July 3. On July 6 
the disposition of interest in the car would have taken place in favour of 
the creditor. We clearly have a competition between the claims of the 
creditor and the third party to the asset. The creditor, it seems, had 
assumed the risk of the grantor disposing of the asset in the period 
before July 6. The grantor had an unimpaired power to dispose of the 
asset before July 6, which he could exercise. Agreeing to postpone the 
exercise of the power created a risk for the creditor that the grantor 
might transfer the title to a third party. As a result, it seems, the third 
party acquires a full legal title to the car (on July 3) and the creditor can 
only sue the grantor for damages for loss incurred, including a loss of a 
promise to transfer incurred on July 6.  
Support for this reasoning is found in Mornington v Keane627 which is a 
case concerning the distinction between a covenant to create a charge 
of immediate effect and a covenant that is to have operation by a future 
act to be done by the covenantor.628 The case involved a covenant 
contained in a separation deed between a husband (Earl of Mornington) 
and his wife (Helena, Countess of Mornington) that “the earl would on 
or before the 1st day of February 1835” charge his freehold estates of 
inheritance “to be situate in England or Wales” to secure payment of an 
annuity to Helena.629 The question was whether Helena could assert an 
interest binding the defendant, which she could have if the separation 
deed actually created a charge. The parties did not identify the assets to 
the charge. It was an interest to be created on a future day and on any 
property “to be situate in England or Wales” on 1st February 1835. The 
formulation of the separation deed suggested it was a general covenant 
to specify and settle property at a later point in time, which would not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
627 (n 625). 
628 A note should be added that the case of Mornington v Keane, as many other cases in 
that period, did not use the term “charge” to mean security interest but rather a rent-
charge or annuity. The difference does not matter here because these are also 
encumbrances on assets and the points made in relation to rent-charge are relevant in 
the context of security interests.  
629 Mornington (n 625) 292-293. 
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be enforceable.630 The counsel for Helena sought to distinguish the 
covenant in the case from a general covenant, arguing that the covenant 
contained a time limitation to do a particular act on that date and such 
would have created a charge because “a Court of Equity has then the 
means of saying when the covenant ought to have been performed”.631 
Lord Chelmsford V-C, however, thought there was no such difference 
between a general and indefinite covenant and one with a time fixed for 
performance because:  
“if a definite time is fixed, a charge should be immediately 
created, whereas if the time be the whole of the covenantor’s life, 
so as to expire at his death, no charge should be created, or why 
the death in the latter case should not be equivalent to the fixed 
time in the former.”632  
What is crucial is that the question to Lord Chelmsford was not about 
the effect of a covenant creating a general charge on all the lands of 
Earl of Mornington. His Lordship did not agree that an additional act 
needed to be done to determine which assets fell within the charge and 
which did not. The problem was that the property was after-acquired 
property. If it had been future property covered by the charge in the 
covenant, Lord Chelmsford said, “it ought to be held to be bound by the 
agreement by reason of the purpose for which it was acquired”.633 He 
said further: 
“a covenant that particular lands shall be charged may of itself 
create a charge upon those lands, or (which is the same thing) 
that a covenant that all the lands which the covenantor shall have 
on a particular day shall stand charged will create a charge 
without more. But it is not the same thing when the covenant is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
630 Mornington (n 625) 300; see also Lord Chelmsford V-C (at 316): “it is giving a 
startling effect to say that every part of the covenantor’s property is to be so bound that 
he cannot deal with it except subject to the charge”. 
631 Mornington (n 625) 308-309. 
632 Mornington (n 625) 313 (Chelmsford LC). 
633 Mornington (n 625) 311. 
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to do an act on a future day which will create a charge on some 
unspecified property”.634  
These dicta, it is submitted, are crucial because they illustrate that an 
incumbrance over future property takes effect on the basis of an 
agreement provided it contains all the ingredients necessary to create 
the charge, such as an intention to create the charge, identifiability of 
assets, an appropriate form, if required, and that the chargor has a 
power to dispose of the assets. The properly asked question was 
therefore whether this was a covenant, which took effect as a charge, 
albeit with a deferred effect, or whether it was merely a personal 
obligation to settle (again) on a particular day.635 On the facts there was 
merely a covenant to do an act in the future to create a charge. Yet, it is 
clear from the case that a charge would have taken effect on the 
deferred date on the basis of the parties’ agreement.636 Thus a security 
agreement in which parties agree to create a charge on a particular day 
takes effect on that particular day. Such agreements are distinguished 
on the circumstance of each case, from “agreements to agree again” on 
a particular date, which do not take effect, other than contractually, 
until the particular date comes.637 A more modern authority can be 
found in the dicta of Lord Scott in Smith v Bridgend County Borough 
Council,638 who distinguishes a floating charge, which he considers to 
be a present security from:  
“a charge expressed to come into existence on a specified future 
event and then to attach to assets then owned by the company. 
Such a grant would not (…) vest in the grantee any immediate 
equitable interest in the company’s assets for the time being”.639 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
634 Mornington (n 625) 313 (Chelmsford LC). 
635 The authorities that were cited did not relate to the question of difference between a 
covenant and a covenant to settle on or before a particular day: Mornington (n 625) 
301-303 (Knight Bruce LJ) and 307 (Turner LJ). 
636 Mornington (n 625) 313 (Chelmsford LC). 
637 See also Re Jackson v Bassford Ltd [1906] 2 Ch 467, 476-7 (Buckley J). 
638 Smith (n 183) [61] and [63]. 
639 Smith (n 183) [61] (Scott LJ). 
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A note to make about this decision is that whilst Lord Scott held that 
security interest subject to a future certain event was not a present 
security, His Lordship suggested that an agreement to create a future 
charge over assets that cannot be identified until the future event 
happened was a present security – it was a present floating charge albeit 
“not (…) a classic floating charge”640 and thus registrable. This point 
was rightly criticised in the literature.641 It departs from the existing 
authority of Mornington v Keane. An agreement to create a future 
charge over assets not identifiable until a future event occurs would be 
what we have termed here as “agreements to agree” as such would not 
create any security. 
Referring back to our example above, could the parties expressly say 
that they wish the security to attach on July 6 but with a retrospective 
effect of attachment from July 1? It seems not. Such an intention would 
be treated either as an intention to attach immediately, on July 1, or on 
July 6. There would not be a period of any inchoate security between 
July 1 and July 6.  
B. Agreements to create security upon a future and 
uncertain event 
If an agreement to create security upon a future and certain event does 
not create security, then a maiore ad minus an agreement to create 
security upon a future and uncertain event also does not create present 
security. Thus, a security agreement contingent on a demand of the 
creditor to give security,642 default by the debtor or occurrence of other 
uncertain event, is a mere contract, not present security.643 For example, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
640 Smith (n 183) [61] (Scott LJ): “if parties want to create future charges over assets 
that cannot be identified until the future event happens, I do not see why, unless there 
be some public policy objection, they should not be free to do so”.  
641 Beale et al, The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing (n 2) para 10.14 arguing 
that a charge cannot be registered until it has come into existence, and citing (earlier 
edition of) G McCormack, Registration of Company Charges (3rd edn Jordan 
Publishing Limited, 2009) para 3.59. 
642 Williams v Lucas (1789) 2 Cox 160, 30 ER 73 cited with approval by Lord Justice 
Knight Bruce in Mornington (n 625) 303.  
643 See e.g. Rehman v Chamberlain [2011] EWHC 2318 (Ch); Re Jackson & Bassford 
Ltd [1906] 2 Ch 467.  
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if the intention is to create a security interest in an asset (say, a car) in 
favour of a creditor (Anton) as soon as the debtor (Darcy) enters into a 
security with another creditor (Brendan) it will amount to no more than 
a mere contract644 as the event that the debtor will in fact contract with 
Brendan is both future and uncertain. The fact that no one can tell if the 
event will ever occur is not relevant to the arrangement being a mere 
contract. What is relevant is that there is no immediate intention to 
create security. This distinguishes this scenario from security in after-
acquired property, where parties do intend to create security, as we 
explain below.  
Agreements to create security contingent on a future uncertain event are 
similar to agreements creating security contingent on a future certain 
event because parties express willingness to create an interest at a later 
point in time, whether the advent of that time is certain or not. Prior to 
the occurrence of the event parties do not intend to create a proprietary 
interest. Without the presence of intention to create a proprietary 
interest, the agreement can only have effect between the parties. 
C. Immediate intention to create a security interest in 
after-acquired property  
Agreements where parties purport to create a security interest in a 
future asset (scenario (c) above) could also be seen as contingent on 
future uncertain events: the coming into existence of a future asset is, 
after all, a future and – most likely – uncertain event. We illustrate the 
similarity, and explain the difference, by using examples. Let us 
imagine that the debtor (Dominique) creates security by assigning an 
interest to his creditor (Aliona), which will accrue on a loan that 
Dominique made to a third party (Tess). Unless the loan is a fixed term 
loan, we cannot be certain that Tess will not decide to pay up the loan 
earlier thus putting a stop to all interest accruing. The accrual of interest 
is uncertain. Each accrual of interest is a new debt that may or may not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
644 The Asiatic Enterprises (Pte) Ltd v United Overseas Bank Ltd [2002] 1 SLR 300 
[16], cited in Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (n 1) para 1-76. 
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arise depending on whether the loan is still outstanding. Prima facie this 
is similar to the intention to create security depending on Darcy’s 
entering into a security agreement with another creditor, Brendan, in 
the example above.645 There is a difference though. In the example of 
the security agreement between Darcy and Anton the intention to create 
security is dependent on a future event. Parties express no willingness 
to create a security for as long as Darcy has not entered into an 
agreement with Brendan. One could say that parties agree not to create 
a security interest unless a specified event takes place. Another 
example of this arrangement is security in a dividend on a share not yet 
declared (but not the share). Declaration of a dividend on a share is a 
future and uncertain event.646 The parties can be seen as agreeing not to 
create a security unless and until the dividend is declared. By contrast, 
when Dominique and Aliona make a security agreement over after-
acquired property (interest accruing in the future on the loan), their 
intention is not conditional on any event. They wish to create a security 
interest at the moment of creating the agreement but that security 
cannot take any proprietary effect until the asset comes into being (the 
interest accrues). Darcy/Anton add a contingency to their intention to 
create security while Dominique/Aliona’s intention is unconditional. 
The immediate intention to create security exists from the moment the 
parties enter into an agreement to create security in after-acquired 
property. The security does not attach to the future asset because there 
is nothing to attach to. Although the proprietary effect of security is 
postponed until the asset comes into existence, the agreement between 
the parties is unconditional. When the asset comes into existence, the 
security takes proprietary effect from the moment of the security 
agreement because this is when the parties first expressed intention to 
create security. This explains why the security takes effect 
retrospectively from the date of the security agreement once the asset 
comes into existence. Although at common law an agreement to give 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
645 See text to n 644. 
646 See text to nn 341-343. 
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security over future property creates no proprietary rights even after 
acquisition of the asset by the grantor of security (i.e. no disposition or 
grant of a proprietary interest takes place), in equity security is said to 
attach to the asset at the moment of acquisition by the debtor. This is on 
the authority of Holroyd v Marshall,647 where machinery in a mill was 
mortgaged in favour of Holroyd. The owner of the mill covenanted that 
when new machinery would be purchased in substitution for the old 
one he would ensure that it was subject to the same encumbrance as the 
old machinery. Although at law a new asset needed a formal act of 
conveyance648 it was held that in equity the covenant could take effect 
without any additional separate act of transfer. Thus creation of security 
in a future asset takes place by virtue of the agreement without a 
separate “act of transfer”. There are, however, exceptions, an example 
of which is the security in after-acquired property granted by 
individuals and unincorporated businesses under Bills of Sale Act 1878 
and Bills of Sale (1878) Amendment Act 1882649, which we need to 
briefly address. 
D. Problems of security in after-acquired property under 
Bills of Sale Acts 
Under section 5 of the 1882 Act, headed “bill of sale not to affect after-
acquired property”, a bill of sale shall be void, except as against the 
grantor, in respect of any personal chattels specifically described in the 
schedule thereto of which the grantor was not the true owner at the time 
of the execution of the bill of sale. This section is thus understood as a 
prohibition of transfer of after-acquired property in a bill of sale. The 
operation of this section is important also to the extent that it impacts 
on registrable charges under Companies Act 2006650 although under the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
647 (1862) 10 HL Cas 191, 11 ER 999; see also Tailby (n 423). 
648 Holroyd (n 647) 209 (Westbury LJ), 210-211 (Westbury LJ), 216 (Chelmsford LJ).  
649 Hereinafter referred to as 1878 Act and 1882 Act respectively. 
650 Companies Act 2006, s860(7)(b): a charge must be registered if “a charge created or 
evidenced by an instrument which,  if executed by an individual, would require 
registration as a bill of sale”. 
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draft Regulations 2013 the scope of registrable charges is extended to 
cover any charge with only few exceptions.651  
The first note to make is that section 5 of the 1882 Act does not use the 
words “after-acquired property” but “personal chattels not specifically 
described (…) of which the grantor was not the true owner”. The first 
step is therefore to understand whether future property can count as 
“personal chattels” under the Acts. In Reeves v Barlow,652 which 
concerned a future right to materials brought on a building site under a 
building contract, it was argued that it did not because the instrument 
did not confer a right to a personal chattel in equity but in law. As a 
result, Bowen LJ held653 that the Acts654 did not apply because there 
was never any existing right to future property: the right to materials 
was acquired only once they were brought to the building site, not 
before, so there was only ever a right to presently existing materials in 
the building site. 
A right to future chattels did, however, exist in Thomas v Kelly and 
Baker655 where a bill of sale assigned by way of security both existing 
chattels and future chattels of the mortgagor. A question asked was 
whether an instrument which purported to assign a right to resort to 
future property could fall within the Bills of Sale Acts formality 
provision making such assignments void. It was held that present 
assignments of goods not capable of specific description were not in 
accordance with the form and therefore void.656 Lord Macnaghten’s 
interpretation in this case was different because he thought future goods 
fell within the scope of section 5 of the 1882 Act because they did not 
count as “personal chattels” because personal chattels were only things 
“capable of complete transfer by delivery” at the time when the bill of 
sale was executed and clearly things that did not exist (in the hands of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
651 Draft Companies Act 2006 (Amendment of Part 25) Regulations 2013, to come in 
force 6th April 2013 (subject to Parliamentary approval), introducing s859A. 
652 (1884) 12 QBD 436. 
653 Reeves (n 652) 441-442 (Bowen LJ). 
654 Bills of Sale Act 1878, s4.  
655 (1888) 13 App Cas 506 (HL). 
656 Thomas (n 655) 512 (Halsbury LC) and 516 (Lord Fitzgerald concurring). 
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the transferor) were not.657 Lord Macnaghten’s view was therefore that 
the term “personal chattels” excluded after-acquired chattels because 
they were not capable of transfer by delivery.658 But this seemed to 
have been an isolated view and the proper reading of the case is that the 
bill of sale was not in the required form because the after-acquired 
property was not specified in a schedule to the bill contrary to section 9 
of the 1882 Act, “not that a security over after-acquired property cannot 
in any circumstances be a bill of sale”.659 
Lord Macnaghten’s dicta have been criticised and not followed in 
Welsh Development Agency v Export Agency v Export Finance Co 
Ltd,660 where Browne-Wilkinson V-C held that equitable rights over 
future property are clearly within the scope of the Act, so a document 
purporting to create a charge, sale or other transfer of such assets can be 
considered under section 5 of the 1882 Act.661 In order to avoid the 
invalidity sanction the rights must be described in accordance with the 
form in the schedule to the Act. This requires chattels to be specifically 
described in the schedule in the Act, and if the assignment is by way of 
security it must be for a sum advanced at the time of the execution of 
the bill of sale and the interest rate must be specified, the parties must 
also have included terms for maintenance of security or defeasance and 
it is necessary that section 7 of the 1882 Act is incorporated by 
reference (the section restricts the right of the grantee to take 
possession).662  
This brings us to the meaning of “void but enforceable against the 
grantor”, which is also puzzling. It could mean that the security in after-
acquired property is validly created so that the grantee has a right 
enforceable against the grantor to resort to the asset, even if not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
657 Thomas (n 655) 518-519 (Macnaghten LJ). 
658 By means of a digression, it is not entirely clear what Macnaghten LJ had in mind 
when he said “Notwithstanding a remark made by Lord Chelmsford in Holroyd v 
Marshall which obviously was not required for the decision of the case … [emphasis – 
MR]”. 
659 Chapman v Wilson [2010] EWHC 1746 (Ch) [95] (Vos J). 
660 [1991] BCLC 936. 
661 Welsh Development Agency (n 660) 956-7 (Browne-Wilkinson V-C).  
662 Thomas (n 655) 516 (Lord Fitzgerald). 
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enforceable against third parties such as purchasers from the third party 
or other creditor (view 1). Alternatively, it could be understood as a 
contract to grant security in property in the future, not as a right to 
resort to the asset when it comes to existence (view 2). If the first view 
is true, a security in an after-acquired property is created under the Bills 
of Sale Acts, but the security is unperfected (i.e. not enforceable against 
third parties) and requires another bill of sale to be entered into when 
the property comes into existence, in order to make the right effective 
against third parties. The second view is preferable. A bill of sale with 
respect to after-acquired property does not give rise to any present 
security right to an asset but merely confers a contractual right to 
demand another bill of sale being executed to create security over 
existing property. This has also been the preferred interpretation by the 
courts.663 Analogously, a bill of sale with respect to a derived asset does 
not give rise to any right in the derived asset. It may only create a 
present right in the presently existing original asset. It is important to 
note, however, that Bills of Sale Acts provide a possibility of 
substitutions of collateral, albeit in very limited circumstances such as 
maintenance or upgrading.664 
2.2 Consideration for security interests in future assets 
Like in any other area, the security agreement must satisfy conditions 
of a valid and enforceable contract, including a requirement of 
consideration. Although promised consideration need not be executed 
for a security agreement to be valid at law, it is often said that the case 
is different in equity for equity will not assist a volunteer. For example, 
equity will not enforce an uncompleted agreement for a gift or a charge 
by way of a gift, even if a security agreement is in the form a deed.665 
Thus, advancement must be made. A mere promise to advance money 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
663 Westen v Fairbridge [1923] 1 KB 667, 671 (Bray J) “Sect. 5 of the Bills of Sale Act, 
1882, has nothing to do with creditors; its first and main object is to provide against the 
assignment of after-acquired property, and it was rather for the protection of the true 
owner of the goods than for that of creditors”; see also Chapman (n 659). 
664 See text to nn 687-689. 
665 Re Lucan (1890) 45 Ch D 470. 
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in the future will not be sufficient for creditor to enforce the security.666 
If consideration must be executed for the contract to create security to 
be enforceable, a question arises whether security in after-acquired (and 
also in derived assets) property should be supported by fresh 
consideration when the asset is acquired. 
In the case of security governed by section 860 of the Companies Act 
2006, fresh consideration is not needed because a charge is created 
when the charge instrument was executed if this is what the parties 
intended667, whether or not a loan has been advanced. If a charge is 
created under section 860 Companies Act but loan has not yet been 
advanced, the charge is valid but unenforceable. The creditor cannot 
resort to the asset and enforce security until the loan has been advanced 
because otherwise there is no debt to be discharged from the security. 
For the creditor to be able to enforce the created charge it must also 
have been registered within the required period668 as otherwise it is 
void.669 
Where the Companies Act does not apply to security, the question is 
whether the creditor seeking to enforce a promise to create security in 
the security agreement must show that he has actually advanced the 
money. There are conflicting views on this.670 On one view, security 
can take effect in equity only if the consideration is executed, i.e. the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
666 Equity will not treat the creditor’s promise to make advancement as done; a contract 
to borrow money will not be specifically enforced, Rogers v Challis (1859) 27 Beav 
175, 54 ER 68. 
667 Cf under the Draft Companies Act 2006 (Amendment of Part 25) Regulations 2013 
(revised), to come into force on 6th April 2013 (subjectto Parliamentary approval), the 
date of creation of charge is defined (draft s859E). 
668 Companies Act 2006, s870 cf similar 21-day period Draft Companies Act 2006 
(Amendment of Part 25) Regulations 2013 (revised), draft s859A(4) (though the period 
begins on the day of creation of the charge, which is defined in draft s859E). 
669 Companies Act 2006, s874 cf similar sanction Draft Companies Act 2006 
(Amendment of Part 25) Regulations 2013 (revised), draft s859H. However, this reform 
removes the sanction of criminal penalty for not registering the charge, which is present 
under Companies Act s860. 
670 This problem has been discussed in the context of the so-called affirmative negative 
pledges. A clause prohibiting the debtor to grant security to a third party does not 
confer, without more, a proprietary right but such a clause may be also purport to create 
conditionally a security, see J Stone, 'The "Affirmative" Negative Pledge' (1991) 6 
JIBL 364, 365-366; P Gabriel, Legal Aspects of Syndicated Loans (Butterworths, 1986) 
85-90. 
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money has been actually advanced.671 This means that if the security 
agreement stipulates some contingency, security cannot automatically 
attach unless money has been advanced in consideration of the “new” 
security. On the opposite view, consideration given at the time of the 
agreement is sufficient to support both the agreement and the security 
interest.672 This work accepts the latter view. Consideration given at the 
time of the agreement is sufficient to support the security interest in 
after-acquired property. This is supported by cases on enforceability of 
security in property acquired after commencement of the grantor’s 
insolvency proceedings but without new funds being injected by the 
creditor. Authorities suggest that a new asset is caught by the security 
interest even if it falls into the hands of the grantor after the insolvency 
proceedings began.673 The only requirement for this to happen is that 
the consideration for security must have been executed before the 
proceedings began.674 
3 Impact of the character of security on the right to 
proceeds   
When a security agreement contains a derived assets clause extending 
security to derived assets, it may create one, single security, as we have 
just seen, if such are the parties intentions. However, it may raise a 
problem of characterisation of security. It will be remembered from 
chapter I that security interests in England are either fixed or floating.675 
If assets are in control of the secured creditor, the debtor’s power to 
deal with them is restricted and the charge is likely to be fixed. If assets 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
671 Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (n 1) para 1-76; supported by Ali 
(n 19) paras 3.20-3.24; A McKnight, 'Restrictions on Dealing with Assets in Financing 
Documents: Their Role, Meaning and Effect' (2002) 17 JIBL 193, 203; J Maxton, 
'Negative Pledges and Equitable Principles' (1993) JBL 458. 
672 Beale et al, The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing (n 2) para 8.81; C-H 
Tan, 'Charges, Contingency and Registration' (2002) 2 JCLS 191; Stone, (n 670); 
Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (n 1) para 1-76. 
673 Re Reis [1904] 2 KB 769 (CA) affirmed Clough v Samuel [1905] AC 442; Re Lind 
[1915] 2 Ch 345. 
674 Re Collins [1925] Ch 556; Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (n 1) 
para 2-13. 
675 See chapter I section 3.4.A. 
	   198	  
are in control of the debtor, who can deal with them without the 
creditor’s consent, the charge is floating.676 The focus of this section is 
not to examine the criterion dividing charges into fixed and floating, 
which is assumed to be correct, but rather to conceptually analyse the 
impact of the accepted distinction on the right to proceeds of 
dispositions. In this chapter we examine rights to proceeds of 
dispositions that are authorised within the framework of fixed and 
floating security interests. We will do so by drawing parallels between 
agency and charges. What we will say here will be important for our 
understanding of rights to proceeds of unauthorised dispositions, which 
are discussed in the next chapter.  
3.1 Fixed charges over proceeds of authorised dispositions 
The purpose of this section is twofold. We first outline the 
circumstances, in which a fixed character of security is consistent with 
the debtor’s powers of disposition. We will then examine the nature of 
the fixed charge from the perspective of the debtor’s powers of 
disposition and propose to conceptualise the fixed charge as what 
would be an unorthodox agency with very limited authority to deal and 
no fiduciary duties. Thus, the second part proposes a new way of 
rationalising fixed charges in English law. It will also prepare the 
ground for the analysis of unauthorised dispositions in chapter V. 
A. Consent to dispositions (the meaning of authorisation) 
For a substitute (a new asset) to be acquired, the original (old asset) 
must be disposed. Dispositions of charged assets with the consent of the 
chargee are consistent with a fixed charge. The need for the chargor to 
obtain consent to dispose is, in turn, a reflection of the chargee’s 
control over the charged assets.677 Typically, for the charge to be fixed, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
676 See text to nn 189-192. 
677 Beale et al, The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing (n 2) para 6.121. 
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consent must be given for each substitution; blanket consent is not 
consistent with the fixed character of the charge.678 
(a) Requirement of consent to each specific substitution 
Following the HL decision in Spectrum,679 for a charge to be fixed the 
chargor must be totally restricted in his dealing with the collateral. 
Consequently, if assets subject to a fixed charge are to be dealt with and 
substituted, the chargee must give consent to every substitution.680  It 
will be recalled from chapter I that Vaughan-Williams LJ held in Re 
Yorkshire Woolcombers681 that withdrawal of an asset from security 
even with another asset being “substituted more or less for it” is not 
consistent with a fixed charge. For the charge to be fixed the chargee 
ought to give consent to every specific substitution.682 Giving consent 
means that the chargee authorises disposition. Consent can only be 
given if there is a sufficiently specific obligation to substitute. If 
consent is given, i.e. disposition is authorised, a fixed chargee 
automatically has a fixed charge over substitutes (i.e. proceeds of 
authorised dispositions). Thus, in cases of fixed charges a right to 
substitutes seems to arise as a result of a new agreement between the 
parties modifying the previous one with respect to every disposal: the 
parties agree to a new asset becoming subject matter of the already 
existing charge. The meaning of “specific” is not clear. It is submitted 
that the degree of specificity will depend on the type of asset involved 
(tangible or intangible and, if intangible, whether it is any more than a 
right to obtain value). For example, parties may agree that a particular 
printing press can be sold and a new one can be purchased of similar 
technical specifications when the former ceases to print. But it is 
questionable whether criteria for substitution of intangibles could be 
any more specific than by referring to the value and type of asset.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
678 See Ibid. paras 6.110-6111. 
679 (n 181). 
680 See generally Beale et al, The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing (n 2) paras 
6.120-6.127. 
681 (n 173) 294 (Vaughan-Williams LJ).  
682 Beale et al, The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing (n 2) para 6.121. 
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What is also problematic is a situation where the chargee gives consent 
in advance and combines it with the chargor’s obligation to substitute.  
(b) Insufficiency of consent given in advance  
Following Spectrum cases that provided support for the creditor’s 
ability to give consent in advance to a substitution no longer seem to be 
good law.683 Consent given in advance with an obligation to substitute 
was seen as consistent with a fixed charge on the basis of Holroyd v 
Marshall.684 It was noted that consent could be given in advance if the 
criteria for substitution were specific and where there existed an 
obligation to substitute. This was because the creditor was likely to be 
seen as having sufficient control of the asset. In Re Cimex Tissue685 it 
was held that some freedom to deal might not be inconsistent with a 
floating charge where assets do not fluctuate. In that case an analogy 
was draw with Bills of Sale Acts 1878 and 1882.686 According to the 
Schedule to 1882 Act provision can be made for the maintenance of 
security,687 which includes substituted chattels.688 Substitutions for the 
purpose of upgrading were also allowed.689 Substitutions under the Bill 
of Sale Acts seem to be, however, distinguishable from substitutions 
under a fixed charge granted by a company, so the analogy, it is 
suggested, does not hold. The reason for the imposition of the 
requirement of control by the chargee of a fixed charge is to ensure that 
the debtor does not deal with the asset and does not sell it to a bona fide 
purchaser, thus withdrawing it from security. A similar risk is absent in 
relation to security interests granted under Bills of Sale Acts because of 
the requirement to register such security in a searchable register.690 A 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
683 Ibid. paras 6.120, 6.122. 
684 (n 647). 
685 [1995] 1 BCLC 409. 
686 See also Beale et al, The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing (n 2) para 
6.123. 
687 The 1882 Act, Sch to s9: “insert terms as to insurance, payment of rent, or 
otherwise, which the parties may agree to for the maintenance or defeasance of the 
security.” 
688 Coates v Moore [1903] 2 KB 140. 
689 The 1882 Act, s6(2); Seed v Bradley [1894] 1 KB 319. 
690 1882 Act, s16: any person can search the register; bills of sales are entered by name, 
residence and occupation of the grantor. See also 1882 Act, s 11 (where to search). 
	   201	  
third party purchaser is then bound by the security so the risk of 
withdrawal of security does not exist.691  
(c) Substitution of assets in financial collateral 
In charges over certain types of assets, such as investment portfolios, 
the chargees are mainly interested in the value of the subject matter 
being above the value of the outstanding indebtedness.692 The chargor 
will have an obligation to add security if the value of the assets 
decrease and will have a right to withdraw security if the secured debt 
decreases or the value of the portfolio increases. Since economic value 
of the security is the primary concern, the chargee in such cases is not 
worse off if the chargor has a right to substitute assets within the 
portfolio so long as the overall value remains above the secured debt. 
The right of substitution is expressly provided for under Financial 
Collateral Arrangements (No2) Regulations (FCAR),693 which broadly 
speaking apply to security interests in securities, cash and credit claims. 
FCAR state as follows: 
“any right of the collateral-provider to substitute financial 
collateral of the same or greater value or withdraw excess 
financial collateral (…) shall not prevent the financial collateral 
being in the possession or under control of the collateral-
taker”.694 
The motivation behind requiring the chargee under FCAR to be in 
possession or control is to ensure that the chargee is able to resort to 
sufficient value, not that the assets are to stay exactly the same.695 
Possession and control under FCAR is understood differently than the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
691 Bills of Sale Acts contain no express provision on the effect of a registered bill of 
sale on a purchaser but under s8 of the 1882 Act a bill of sale not registered within 7 
days after the execution thereof is rendered void with respect to chattels comprised 
within it and under s9 of the 1882 Act a bill of sale given by way of security is void 
unless made in accordance with the form provided. A contrario, a bill of sale in the 
appropriate form and duly registered is not void and binding on the world. 
692 Beale et al, The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing (n 2) para 6.120. 
693 (n 210); see also Financial Collateral Directive, art2(2).  
694 FCAR, reg3(1). 
695 Beale et al, The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing (n 2) para 6.126. 
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control that a fixed chargee must have.696 Under FCAR the chargee 
must have a legal right to possession and control and he must have 
taken practical steps ensuring that the chargor cannot deal with 
collateral freely.697 The requirement and meaning of control are 
controversial.698 The right to substitute provided under FCAR could be 
inconsistent with a fixed charge, leading to recharacterisation of 
financial collateral as a floating charge. Despite the lack of clarity as to 
the extent in which a floating charge may fall within FCAR, the 
possibility of recharacterisation is not met with the usual undesirable 
consequences because registration requirements699 are disapplied to 
financial collateral.700 Thus, even if the charge is recharacterised, there 
is no risk that it will be void for lack of registration as a floating charge.  
B. No-authority agency theory of a fixed charge  
Drawing parallels between agency and a fixed charge helps to clarify 
how dealings with collateral work under a fixed charge and also aids 
the understanding of claims to proceeds of dealings with assets subject 
to a fixed charge. We will also use the parallels with agency in 
discussing the floating charge, which will allow us to see that the 
mechanism of dealings with assets under a fixed charge and a floating 
charge is similar. Agency is a relationship between an agent and a 
principal whereby the agent has authority to bind the principal.701 This 
is sometimes expressed in terms of power-liability correlation as the 
agent has the power to affect the principal’s legal position and the 
principal is liable to see that his legal position is so altered.702 This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
696 Ibid. para 3.39. 
697 Gray v G-T-P Group Ltd Re F2G Realisations Ltd (in liquidation) [2010] EWHC 
1772 (Ch), [2010] BCC 869 [62] (Vos J); Ibid. para 3.40. 
698 See discussion in Ibid. para 3.42. See also recent discussion in Lehman (n 137)  
(Briggs J). 
699 Companies Act 2006, s860. 
700 FCAR, reg4. Contrast with the Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper 151 on 
Moveable Transactions (2011) para 2.23, which states that floating charges fall outside 
the scope of the Financial Collateral Directive “because an unregistered floating charge 
confers on the creditor no ‘control’ over the assets in question”. 
701 R Munday, Agency. Law and Principles (OUP, Oxford 2010) 12 para 1.24; P Watts 
and F Reynolds, Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency (19th edn Sweet & Maxwell, 2010) 
para 1-012. 
702 F Dowrick, 'The Relationship of Principal and Agent' (1954) 17 MLR 24, 37. 
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section shows that the relationship between the secured creditor and the 
grantor of security can also be viewed in this way. Fiduciary 
obligations, characteristic of an agent, should not, however, be imputed 
into the relationship between the secured creditor and the debtor. 
(a) Basic elements of agency 
To understand the relationship of the grantor and the holder of non-
possessory security we need to distinguish between the power to act 
and the authority to act. These concepts were shown not to be 
synonymous in the law of agency.703  
(i) Power to act and authority to act 
The distinction between power and authority, originally developed by 
German jurists in the nineteenth century704 in the course of 
development of the modern Civilian approach to the doctrine of 
agency, influenced thinking of scholars throughout the Common Law 
world. The original distinction, made by Rudolf von Jhering, between 
action and competence to act,705 was taken further and formed the basis 
for the studies of Paul Laband, who proposed to distinguish between 
power (Vollmacht) and mandate (Auftrag).706 Power can be defined as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
703 Ibid. 37 fn 69. 
704 The difference between acting for other’s behalf but in one’s own name was 
remarked also earlier see R Pothier, Traité Des Obligations (Paris 1777) I.1.5§4 no 82 
(p81). 
705 R von Jhering, Mitwirkung Für Fremde Rechtsgeschäfte. Jahrbuch 1 (Fischer, 1857) 
313 and R von Jhering, Mitwirkung Für Fremde Rechtsgeschäfte. Jahrbuch 2 (Fischer, 
1858) 84 (arguing that mandatary and the agent were two sides of the same legal 
relation: the relationship between Mandatar and Mandant reflected the internal side 
whilst the relationship between Stellvertreter and Prinzipal was its external expression; 
this was a conclusion which Laband disagreed with). 
706 P Laband, 'Die Stellvertretung Bei Dem Abschluß Von Rechtsgeschäften Nach Dem 
Allgemeinen Deutschen Handelsgesetzbuch' (1866) 10 Zeitschrift für das Gesamte 
Handelsrecht 183, 204: “Allein man muß sich darüber klar werden, daß Auftrag und 
Vollmacht nur zufällig, nicht notwendig zusammentreffen; daß sie keineswegs als die 
innere und äußere Seite desselben Verhältnisses aufzufassen sind, sondern daß sie zwei 
an sich verschiedene Verhältnisse sind, die nur tatsächlich in vielen Fällen sich 
decken.” (One has to be clear here that the mandate and the power may occur together 
but are not essential for one another; by no means are they to be understood as two 
sides of the same legal relationship but as two different legal relationships which may 
actually be covered in many situations; transl. MR). This distinction has been labelled 
“one of the major achievements of nineteenth century European legal science”, see W 
Müller-Freienfels, 'Legal Relations in the Law of Agency: Power of Agency and 
Commercial Certainty' (1964) 13 Am J Comp L 193, 196 and see 197-202 (discussing 
Laband’s doctrine and its impact) and W Müller-Freienfels, 'Book Reviews of 
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the ability of an agent to conclude a legal transaction with another, 
thereby altering legal relations of another; it delineates the sphere of 
one’s ability to act, irrespective of how it arises. This power exists even 
if it is inconsistent with the internal directions given to the agent. By 
contrast, “mandate” refers to the bilateral relationship between the 
agent and the principal inter se.707 It comprises the privilege or duty of 
the agent (A) to act on behalf of the principal (P). It arises not only on 
the basis of an explicit contract between A and P where A promises to 
act on behalf of P but it can also be present impliedly as part of other 
relationships such as employment or partnership, whereby the authority 
to act on behalf of P is incidental to the relationship between A and 
P.708 Authority to act on behalf of a principal can be narrow or wide. 
The extent of authority depends on express instructions of the principal 
or the nature of relationship in which it is implied.   
It should be noted that in literature the term “authority” is sometimes 
used to denote what we call here “power to conclude a legal 
transaction” while “mandate” is used in a sense in which we use 
“authority”.709  The terminology preferred here is “power to act” – 
“authority” instead of “authority” – “mandate”.  
(ii) Non-fiduciary agency 
The concept of agency is far from uncontroversial. The idea of a non-
fiduciary agency may seem a contradiction in terms. Yet an agency 
without fiduciary duties is conceivable under English law. First, we 
need to note that in English law agency has been described as (a) a 
special kind of contract; (b) a fiduciary relation and (c) a grant of 
authority. The prevailing view is that agency is a fiduciary relation.710 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Ställningsfullmarkt Och Bulvanskap by K Grönfors; the Law of Agency. Its History 
and Present Principles by S Stoljar' (1963) 12 Am J Comp L 272.  
707 See also A Corbin, 'The 'Authority' of an Agent - Definition' (1925) 34 Yale L J 788, 
794. 
708 For agency to arise a contract is not needed; Dowrick (n 702) 26-27. 
709 See e.g. Müller-Freienfels, 'Legal Relations in the Law of Agency: Power of Agency 
and Commercial Certainty' (n 706) 193, 199. 
710 Re Hallett’s Estate (1880) LR 13 Ch D 696, 709 (Jessel MR); Regal (Hastings) Ltd 
v Gulliver [1942] 1 All ER 378, 392 (Wright LJ); Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency  
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Dowrick explains that the doctrine of fiduciary relations historically 
developed as an extension of the law of trusts.711  Nowadays duties and 
disabilities of the trustees are imposed on agents by the courts and do 
not arise as a result of any actual or presumed common intention of the 
parties. Yet, Dowrick argues, where the parties expressly or impliedly 
agree that their relationship is to be governed by different rules, the 
agreement prevails. Dowrick also observes that not every agent is in a 
fiduciary position vis-à-vis his principal.712 For example, agents 
appointed to sign a memorandum have no fiduciary duties, as the 
principal places no particular trust in the agent.713 Another example of 
this unusual non-fiduciary agency is the receivership, where the 
receiver, appointed under a debenture714, acts as the company’s 
agent.715 In such cases it has been perceived that common law offers 
sufficient protection to the principal with respect to the obligations 
owed by the agent. This leads Dowrick to conclude that:  
“the fiduciary element in agency, though key to much of the law 
governing this relation, is not the essential element in the 
relation”.716 
What is key to the relationship between the principal and the agent is a 
power-liability relationship:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 (n 701) para 1-001; Munday (n 701) para 1.01; cf American Law Institute, Restatement 
of the Law Third – Agency §1.01 defining agency as “the fiduciary relationship that 
arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) 
that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, 
and the agent manisfests assent or otherwise consents so to act”. 
711 Dowrick (n 702) 28 and cases cited there (at fn 20); see e.g. Burdett v Willett (1708) 
2 Vern 628, 23 ER 1017; White v Lincoln (1803) 8 Ves 363, 32 ER 395; Burdick v 
Garrick (1870) LR 5 Ch App 233. 
712 Dowrick (n 702) 31. 
713 Ibid. 31. 
714 Under English law this is now very limited, see n 221. 
715 See Ratford v Northavon District Council [1987] 1 QB 357, 372 (it is a “real” 
agency); Re Actwane Pty Pte (2002) 42 ACSR 307 (a sale to a party related to the 
chargee does not breach self-dealing rules), cited in L Aitken, 'Squeezing the Lemon 
Dry-the Receiver, the Administrator, and the Specific Performance of the Company's 
Contract' (2007) 4 Macquarie J Bus L 1, 1; see also R Meagher, D Heydon and M 
Leeming, Meagher, Gummow & Lehane's Equity Doctrines and Remedies (4th edn 
Butterworths, 2002) para 28.225. 
716 Dowrick (n 702) 32. 
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“[t]he essential characteristic of an agent is that he is invested 
with a legal power to alter his principal’s legal relations with this 
persons: the principal is under correlative liability to his legal 
relations altered”.717 
This is consistent with what we said above about the distinction 
between power and authority to act. In the quote the term “legal power” 
corresponds to what we termed earlier as “authority”: the direction 
granted by the principal to do an act on behalf on of the principal. We 
now turn to drawing parallels between agency understood as a grant of 
authority and non-possessory consensual security interests.  
(b) Power to deal of the chargor 
Like an agent, to whom title to an asset has been transferred, the 
grantor of equitable charge or mortgage has power to deal with the 
asset in the sense that he has ability to act and transfer title to third 
parties. Both the agent and the grantor have the power to alter another’s 
legal relations. If the chargor disposes of the legal title to collateral into 
the hands of a third party for value and without notice of the charge, the 
chargee’s equitable security is defeated. The chargor has a power to do 
so but no authority. It may not always be clear where the power to deal 
with the asset comes from. It will depend on the nature of the security. 
(i) Source of the power to deal 
In an equitable charge the power to transfer legal title flows from the 
chargor’s status as a legal owner of the property, or at least a person 
with a power to dispose of property granted by the owner. The chargee 
acquires no beneficial ownership.718 If the power to deal with the 
encumbered asset flows from one’s title to the asset, the next question 
is whether a mortgagor can also be seen as having a power to deal with 
mortgaged assets and if so, what is the basis for it.719 The distinction 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
717 Ibid. 36. 
718 Text to n 161. 
719 A question recently arose in a corresponding scenario whether a mortgagee has a 
power to dispose of assets while the mortgagor is performing its obligation: Citibank 
NA v MBIA Assurance SA [2006] EWHC 3215 (Ch) [43] (Mann J) (it is not inconsistent 
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between legal and equitable mortgage is important here. A legal 
mortgage (in the case of personal property) involves a transfer of legal 
title to the mortgagee subject to an obligation to retransfer asset upon 
repayment.720 Although “the mortgagor does not lose dominion over his 
land”,721 for as long as mortgage continues the mortgagor cannot 
transfer legal title twice over. The mortgagor has no power to pass legal 
title to third parties unless the legal title is re-conveyanced to him prior 
to dealing with a third party.722 A possible exception exists under 
section 24 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. Under that section a seller in 
possession may pass legal title to the goods when dealing with a person 
in good faith and without notice of the previous sale on the basis that 
the seller is expressly authorised by the owner of the goods to transfer 
the legal title to the innocent buyer. Although mortgages are excluded 
from the scope of the Act723 an argument has been made that the 
exclusion only applies to two-party contract issues between buyer and 
seller and not where a third party issue arises in relation to a transfer of 
title.724 The policy argument is that there should be no difference 
between financiers who retain title to goods and who may lose title to 
good faith third party purchaser who take goods from the buyer in 
possession under section 25 of Sale of Goods Act and financiers who 
take a mortgage as security leaving the mortgagor in possession. 
Although the policy argument is convincing, it seems that the idea of 
drawing the distinction between two-party cases and three-party cases 
in order to bring mortgage within the scope of the Act is artificial. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
with the nature of the mortgage if parties agree that steps of enforcement can be taken 
prior to default, from the day of the mortgage), affirmed by CA [2007] EWCA Civ 11, 
[2007] 1 CLC 113.  
720 See Santley v Wilde [1899] 2 Ch 474 (CA). In the case of a mortgage of personal 
property where mortgage is by an outright transfer, the right to redeem is expressly or 
impliedly provided for in the mortgage agreement. See also Carter (n 117) 606 (Jessel 
MR): a legal mortgage involves an actual conveyance of the legal ownership but “the 
Court has interfered to prevent that from having its full effect, and when the ground of 
interference is gone by the non-payment of the debt, the Court simply removes the stop 
it has itself put on.” 
721 Re Kingsbury Collieries, Ltd and Moore’s Contract [1907] 2 Ch 259, 261(Kekewich 
J). 
722 Pilcher (n 11). 
723 Sale of Goods Act 1979, s62(4).  
724 M Bridge, Sale of Goods (2nd edn 2009) paras 5.125-5.126. See also Beale et al, 
The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing (n 2) para 13.25. 
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This is different in the case of a charge or equitable mortgage because 
the chargor or mortgagor continues to have a power to transfer legal 
title to third parties precisely because the legal title has not been 
transferred. A charge or equitable mortgage does not divest the chargor 
of the power to deal with the asset. For this reason parallels with 
agency can be drawn in relation to equitable charge (or mortgage) but 
not legal mortgage. It is important to understand the consequences of 
the exercise of this power on the holder of security.  
(ii) Consequences of the exercise of the power to deal 
Lloyd LJ in Yorkshire Bank Finance Ltd v Mulhall725 characterised the 
limits of mortgagor’s and chargor’s ability to deal as follows: 
“[the mortgage] needs to be cleared off the title if the mortgagor 
is to be able to deal with or dispose of the property free of the 
incumbrance. The same is true of an equitable mortgagee, and of 
a chargee, whether legal or equitable.”726  
Thus, a mortgagor or chargor cannot exercise their power to dispose 
other than subject to the security. This means that buyers of collateral 
should be bound by security. We know this is not the case. Due to the 
lack of a registration system of all security, third parties cannot always 
check whether a security interest exists. This puts innocent third party 
buyers at risk of acquiring an asset with encumbrance without having a 
chance to learn about security. Such a system necessitates protection of 
third parties to address this risk. In English law this is done by means of 
a defence of bona fide purchaser of legal title without notice. Thus, the 
issue of whether the chargor can confer good title depends not only on 
the chargor’s title to the asset but also the notice of the third party. In 
English law where assets are subject to a fixed charge, the purchaser 
takes free of a charge if he is a bona fide purchaser of legal title without 
notice of the charge. Notice may exist where charges are publicised 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
725 [2008] EWCA Civ 1156, [2009] CP Rep 7. 
726 Yorkshire Bank Finance (n 725) [27] (Lloyd LJ). 
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through registration. Where a fixed charge is granted by a company it 
may need to be registered if it falls within the scope of s860 of the 
Companies Act 2006.727 Purchasers expected to search the register take 
subject to the charge. It is not clear who is expected to search but a 
purchaser of an asset fixed enough to be subject to a charge or 
purchaser of receivables who financed as an outright purchaser would 
probably be expected to search.728 Thus, whilst it may be true that a 
legal mortgage must be “cleared off the title” if the debtor is to dispose 
free of the security, it is not so in the case of equitable security. If a 
third party may take the asset free of the encumbrance, the grantor of 
security clearly has a power to dispose of the asset free of security. The 
consequence of the exercise of this power is alteration of the position of 
the secured creditor, whose interest is extinguished in the asset 
disposed of. The power to extinguish one’s interest stems from the 
grantor’s interest in the asset. The exercise of power to deal is thus a 
matter between the debtor and a buyer. This does not mean that the 
grantor is authorised by the holder of security to dispose of asset free 
from security.  
(c) Lack of chargor’s authority to deal 
In a fixed charge debtor’s power to deal is restricted. There is an 
analogy here with agency because a contract concluded by an agent 
outside of the agent’s authority may be valid vis-à-vis the third party 
but implicate the agent in a breach of contract. This depends on the 
extent of authority given to the grantor to deal with property.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
727 Under Companies Act 2006 (Part 25 Amendment) Regulations 2013, to come into 
force on 6th April 2013 (subject to Parliamentary approval), all charges, whether fixed 
or floating, are registrable (introducing s859A). 
728 The Companies Act 2006 (Part 25 Amendment) Regulations 2013, to come into 
force on 6th April 2013, do not clarify the extent of notice. An earlier version of draft 
regulations included s859R, which proposed that any subsequent chargee would have 
notice of any matter requiring registration and disclosed on the register. This would 
have excluded purchasers. A buyer of an asset, whether subject to a fixed or a floating 
charge, would have been considered to take the asset without notice of the charge. This 
provision was removed as its effect was rightly seen as controversial and probably 
wider than originally intended. The Department of Business, Innovation & Skills noted 
the need for further consultation in this area, explanatory notes for the revised draft 
regulations’ (January 2013) URN 13/568, available at www.gov.uk (last accessed 27 
February 2013). 
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(i) Nature of the restriction 
The grantor of security cannot deal with secured assets free of security. 
The nature of this restriction, which the secured creditor imposes on the 
grantor is not that “you cannot deal free from security” but “you ought 
not deal free from security”. The former would imply that any dealings 
leading to withdrawal of the asset from security would be ineffective. 
We know this is not the case because innocent third parties can 
purchase assets free from security. Third parties have immunity from 
the creditor’s claims against the asset and, by the same token, the 
creditor is disabled from resorting to that asset in the hands of an 
innocent.729 The restriction, which the secured creditor imposes on the 
grantor is “you ought not deal free from security”. The act of 
withdrawing the asset from security is valid but it violates internal 
instructions of the chargee. If the fixed chargee finds out that the 
chargor is to dispose of the assets without the chargee’s consent, he 
may apply to the court for an injunction to prevent disposition.730 
(ii) No-authority or limited-authority “agency” 
We said above that the debtor has, like an agent, to whom title to an 
asset has been transferred, a power to deal with the asset in the sense 
that he has ability to act and to transfer title to third parties. Like an 
agent, the grantor has the power to alter another’s (the principal’s or 
the security holder’s) legal relations. By disposing of collateral to a 
bona fide purchaser the chargor may deprive the creditor of its security. 
The authority to do so is, however, very limited. Bearing in mind that a 
fixed chargee is restricted in giving consent to substitutions in 
advance,731 a fixed charge could be seen as an agency where the 
chargor has no general authority to deal free of encumbrance. By the 
same token, the chargor does have authority to deal with the asset 
subject to encumbrance. The chargee may grant authority to effectuate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
729 On the concepts of disability/immunity see Hohfeld (n 4); WN Hohfeld, 
'Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning' (1917) 26 Yale LJ 
710. 
730 Gullifer, 'Will the Law Commission Sink the Floating Charge?' (n 174) 130. 
731 As discussed above, text to nn 683-691. 
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a specific disposition free of security if it is combined with a specific 
obligation to substitute. Subject to this, the chargor may be said to have 
a very limited authority to deal with the originally encumbered asset 
free of the security (but no general authority to deal free of security). 
This is different in the case of financial collateral because of the right 
of substitution under FCAR. The collateral-provider may therefore be 
seen to have been granted a wider authority to deal than in a fixed 
charge outside of FCAR. The authority to deal free of security is not 
general. It is delineated by the criteria of provision of the same or 
greater value of assets and be relative to the indebtedness. 
(d) Charge as an agency without fiduciary duties  
We said above that a non-fiduciary agency is conceivable albeit 
unorthodox.732 Before we draw a parallel with a non-fiduciary agency 
and a relationship between the secured creditor and the debtor, a 
question that ought to be posed is whether fiduciary duties exist, or 
ought to exist, between the parties and if so, who owes them to whom.  
We have seen that the secured creditor sometimes holds property on 
trust for the debtor: following discharge of the secured obligation the 
secured creditor holds surplus for the debtor or other secured creditors 
of the debtor.733 Even if this means that the secured creditor owes 
fiduciary duties to the debtor734, it is difficult to see that any analogous 
duties are owed from the debtor to the secured creditor. There is no 
discussion in cases prior to Buhr v Barclays Bank735 of fiduciary duties 
owed by the grantor of security to the secured creditor. The proposition 
is theoretically viable because it is possible in law to be in a fiduciary 
position only in respect of some duties owed to another.736 With this 
consideration in mind Arden LJ in Buhr v Barclays Bank said that: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
732 See text to nn 712-715. 
733 See text to nn 118 (pledge), 151 (mortgage). 
734 See text to nn 832-844 for discussion on whether fiduciary relationship is the 
underlying rationale for the duty to hold the surplus on trust for the mortgagor (and 
subsequent mortgagees). 
735 (n 14). 
736 New Zealand Netherlands Society “Oranje” Inc v Kuys [1973] 1 WLR 1126. 
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“the mortgagor has no general duty to act in the interests of the 
mortgagee. But in the specific matter of accretions to or 
substitution of the mortgaged property equity has undoubtedly 
treated the mortgagor as a fiduciary: (see Re Biss [1903] 2 Ch 
40).”737 
The proposition that the mortgagor owes some fiduciary duties to the 
mortgagee seems to be a development in the existing law, which should 
not be accepted without a significant debate.738 We have already 
discussed in chapter III the secured creditor’s right to accretions. Such a 
right is not dependent on the mortgagor owing a fiduciary duty to the 
mortgagee and it is difficult to see that Re Biss739 suggests otherwise.  
It also seems that some arguments could be raised as to why a 
mortgagor should not be treated as a mortgagee’s fiduciary. It is a well-
established rule that a fiduciary is “not allowed to put himself in a 
position where his interest and his duty conflict”.740 The relationship 
between the grantor of security and the secured creditor is one of 
conflicting interests. As discussed in chapter I, inherent in a secured 
transaction is the moral hazard posed by the risk of debtor’s 
“misbehaviour”.741 Secured transactions are rarely, if at all, mutually 
interested relations.742 Of course, one could argue that the creditor, as 
the principal, consented to this position of conflict between the debtor’s 
own interest and duty, and so there is no breach of fiduciary duty.743 If 
so, why impose a fiduciary duty at all? If we say that the creditor 
consents to some acts that would otherwise amount to a breach of a 
fiduciary duty and not others, where should the line be drawn? A 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
737 Buhr (n 14) [47]. 
738 The proposition seems to have been followed without discussion in Dick v Harper 
[2006] BPIR 20 [40] (Kosmin QC sitting as a Deputy Judge), echoing Arden LJ’s dicta 
that “Equity treats the mortgagor as owing a fiduciary obligation to the mortgagee in 
this respect. An equitable chargee has a proprietary interest in the property and this is 
sufficient to give the mortgagee a proprietary interest in property which represents the 
property which was mortgaged.”  
739 (n 459). 
740 Bray v Ford [1896] AC 44 (HL) 51 (Herschell LJ); see also e.g. Parker v McKenna 
(1874) LR 10 Ch 96, 118 (Lord Cairns LC).  
741 See text to nn 69-72. 
742 See text to nn 79-82.  
743  J McGhee (ed), Snell's Equity (Sweet & Maxwell, 2010) paras 7.016, 7.019. 
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disposition free of encumbrance would probably count as a breach of 
fiduciary duty, but it is less clear how one should treat acts of the 
debtor regarding the collateral that lead to diminution of value of the 
collateral, for example where the debtor paints his encumbered car 
pink, thinking that he is improving its value but a year later pink cars 
go out of fashion and the market value of the collateral drops. The loss 
of value of the collateral is sometimes a result of market fluctuations. 
The question is who should bear the risk of loss in such cases. Making 
the mortgagor a fiduciary would place this risk on him. The detailed 
exploration of this issue is outside the scope of this work but it seems 
that that imposing fiduciary duties on the mortgagor may be going a 
step too far.  
Furthermore, we normally say that a person is a fiduciary in order to 
impose on them a specific duty744 to act in a particular way (e.g. fair-
dealing)745 or to impose a prohibition of a certain act (e.g. no self-
dealing).746 In the case of a grantor of a fixed security we already know 
the scope of the specific prohibition imposed on the chargor: he has no 
permission to dispose of the asset at all without consent from the 
chargee. The view accepted in this thesis is therefore that there is no 
need to resort to the law of fiduciaries because what we are trying to 
achieve (enable the secured creditor to have a remedy when the chargor 
disposes without chargee’s consent) can be done without imposing a 
fiduciary duty on the chargor.747 
3.2 Rights to proceeds of authorised dispositions of assets 
under a floating charge 
Similarly to a fixed charge, a floating charge can also be conceptualized 
in power and authority terms. Whilst in a fixed charge, the chargor’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
744 See generally Ibid. ch 7. 
745 Tito v Waddell (No 2) [1977] Ch 106. 
746 Campbell v Walker (1800) 5 Ves 678, 31 ER 801 (transaction voidable by the 
beneficiary if trustee purchases trust property); Tito (n 745).  
747 We will also suggest in chapter V section 2.2.B that the duties which the mortgagee 
owes with respect to sale proceeds also need not be characterised in terms of a fiduciary 
relationship, see in particular text between nn 845-847. 
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authority to dispose free of security is very limited,748 in a floating 
charge the chargor (the company) has a much wider authority to 
dispose. A floating chargor is authorised to deal with assets in the 
ordinary course of business free from the charge. If the chargor then 
sells as an asset subject to a floating charge in the ordinary course of 
business, the chargee is bound by the legal action exercised by the 
person authorised (the company) and the sale binds the chargee.749 We 
have seen that the authority to dispose in the case of a fixed charge 
must be coupled with an obligation to substitute and that this authority 
cannot be given in advance.750 A right to substitutes arises in such cases 
on the basis of agreement between the parties, specifically modifying 
the previous bargain. In floating charge authority is not given 
specifically to a particular substitution and an obligation to substitute 
need not be present. Thus, the basis for a right to proceeds of authorised 
dispositions in the case of a floating charge is less clear. The problem 
posed in this section is whether a floating chargee (prior to 
crystallisation) is automatically entitled to proceeds of authorised 
dispositions and if so, on what basis. Answering this question requires 
investigation into the nature of the floating charge prior to 
crystallisation. A number of theories have emerged to deal with this 
issue. 
A. Theories of the floating charge 
Theories that have developed can be broadly divided into non-
attachment theories and attachment theories, depending on whether the 
charge is considered to attach to any asset before it crystallises.751 They 
do not specifically refer to the chargee’s right to proceeds but a brief 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
748 The chargor has no general authority to dispose free of encumbrance but the chargee 
may grant authority specifically to a disposition coupled with a sufficiently specific 
obligation to substitute (unless the charge falls within FCAR), see text to and following 
n 731. 
749 Goode on Commercial Law (n 115) 180, 733. 
750 Text to nn 683-691. 
751 Re Panama, New Zealand and Australian Royal Mail Company (1870) 5 Ch App 
318 (CA) 322-323 (Giffard LJ): “the moment the company comes to be wound up, and 
the property has to be realized, that moment the rights of these parties, beyond all 
question attach”. 
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outline will help to set the background for the rest of the analysis. It 
should be noted at the start that courts in England appear to be 
undecided on this point. Although on a number of occasions courts 
sported the view that the charge is unattached in specie to any asset 
until crystallisation752 and assets are assigned to the chargee on 
crystallisation,753 there are also views from the highest authority 
approving of the ‘defeasible fixed charge’ theory of the floating charge, 
which is an attachment theory.754 
(a) No immediate interest, no attachment 
A floating charge is traditionally seen as not endowing the chargee with 
any immediate proprietary interest in any asset although the chargee 
has a present security interest before crystallisation.755 This view has 
been met with some approval in Australia.756 The chargor is free to deal 
with the assets because the charge is unattached. The interest becomes 
enforceable upon crystallisation but it relates back to the moment the 
charge was created. At the moment of crystallisation the charge 
becomes equivalent to a fixed charge. This theory does not explain why 
a disposition of assets subject to a floating charge outside the ordinary 
course of business, but still uncrystallised, binds a purchaser with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
752 Re Benjamin Cope & Sons Ltd [1914] 1 Ch 800, 806 (Sargant J); Agnew (n 178); 
Cosslett (n 110) 509-510 (Millett LJ). 
753 Biggerstaff v Rowatt’s Wharf Ltd [1897] 2 Ch 93 (CA) 106 (Kay LJ); Evans Rival 
Granite Quarries Ltd [1910] 2 KB 979 (CA) 1000 (Buckley LJ); Rother Iron Works 
Ltd v Canterbury Precision Engineers Ltd [1974] QB 1 (CA) 5 (Russell LJ); Business 
Computers ltd v Anglo-African Leasing Ltd [1977] 2 All ER 741, 745 (Templeman J); 
Re ELS Ltd [1995] Ch 11, 17 (Ferris J). 
754 Spectrum (n 181) [139] (Walker LJ), although this is immediately after Walker LJ 
also approved the ‘fund’ view of the floating charge (which is seen by some as a non-
attachment theory, see text to n 770). 
755 R Pennington, 'The Genesis of the Floating Charge' (1960) 23 MLR 630 (explaining 
the floating charge as a ‘mortgage of future assets theory’, apparently founding it on an 
older licence theory: at 644-646); E Ferran, 'Floating Charges: The Nature of the 
Security' (1988) 47 CLJ 213; Gough, Company Charges (2nd edn Lexis Nexis 1996) ch 
13; also R Calnan, 'Priorities between Execution Creditors and Floating Charges' (1982) 
10 NZULR 111, 121 and 123, with reference to Gough 349. See criticism by Beale et 
al, The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing (n 2) para 6.74 and Worthington, 
'Floating Charges: The Use and Abuse of Doctrinal Analysis' (n 192) 38 and see cases 
cited there (arguing that case law suggests that a floating charge is an immediate 
proprietary interest). 
756 Tricontinental Corporation Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1987) 73 ALR 
433 (Queensland CA) 444 (Williams LJ); Lyford v Commonwealth Bank of Australia 
(1995) 17 ACSR 211 (Federal Court of Australia) 218 (Nicholson J), cited in Beale et 
al, The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing (n 2) para 6.74. 
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notice (where the disposition is outside the scope of apparent or actual 
authority).757 The lack of an immediate property interest does not 
explain why a floating chargee can appoint an administrator out of 
court758 or an administrative receiver in certain cases,759 both of which 
will lead to crystallisation of the charge.760 
An explanation of the floating charge as a power to acquire a persistent 
right and a fixed charge as an immediate persistent right proposed by 
McFarlane761 could also fit under this heading. The term “persistent 
right” has been coined to depict a right against a specific right held by 
another,762 which traditionally is referred to as an equitable property 
right. The chargor therefore is not under a duty to hold any specific 
rights as security for its debt owed to the bank.   
(b) Immediate interest but unattached 
Professor Goode, on the other hand, argues that the chargee has an 
immediate proprietary interest but not in each and every one of the 
charged assets but in the fund comprised of the charged assets. This 
conceptualisation shows that the lack of a chargee’s present ability to 
exercise rights over assets does not mean that a floating charge is a 
mere contract to give security at a future date on the occurrence of a 
designated uncertain event.763 Equally, however, until crystallisation the 
charge is unattached since:  
“[the creditor] cannot exercise proprietary or possessory rights 
over the assets either as against the company or as against third 
parties, nor does he have a locus standi to obtain an injunction 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
757 Ibid. paras 6.74, 15.06.  
758 Insolvency Act 1986, Sch B1 para 14; Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and 
Security (n 1) para 4.37. 
759 Hubbuck (n 410) (chargee entitled to an interlocutory injunction restraining 
dispositions other than in the ordinary course of business). For charges created prior to 
September 2003 or falling within statutory exceptions, Insolvency Act 1986, ss72B-
72GA. 
760 Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (n 1) paras 4.41-4.42. 
Appointment of a receiver by the court will also crystallise the charge when the 
appointment takes effect (at 4.43). 
761 McFarlane (n 338) 600. 
762 Ibid. 23. 
763 Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (n 1) para 4-03. 
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against the company to restrain dealings with its assets in the 
ordinary course of business where the dealings are not in breach 
of the debenture or subject to the creditor’s veto and his security 
is not in jeopardy”.764  
Under this theory the charge is said to be an immediate security interest 
from the moment it is created. Although it does not attach to the 
encumbered assets, it “affects” them and, in that sense, it is a “present 
security”.765 Goode describes such interests as interests in a changeable 
fund of assets in the sense that the composition of fund changes from 
time to time but the interest in the fund remains the same.766 The 
changeability of the fund is not the charge’s pivotal feature. The 
hallmark is the freedom to deal. The fund itself may be closed and only 
reduce when the debtor pays over to the chargee the proceeds of the 
assets,767 or the floating charge may be even taken over a single 
identified asset.768 What matters is not the content of the fund but the 
power to deal with the assets contained in it, without the consent of the 
chargee, so long as the power continues.769 The notion of a reified fund 
as a subject matter of a property right is controversial.770 Thus, the idea 
that a floating charge is an immediate proprietary interest in a pool of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
764 Ibid. para 4-03, citing Re Borax Co [1901] 1 Ch 326 and Lawrence v West Somerset 
Mineral Ry Co [1918] 2 Ch 250. 
765 Evans (n 753) 999 (Buckley LJ). 
766 Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (n 1) para 4-03; see also Yorkshire 
Woolcombers (n 173) 295 (Romer LJ). It should be borne in mind that fund is deemed 
to have an existence separate from that of its components. 
767 Bond Worth (n 125) 267-268 (Slade J). 
768 Spectrum (n 181) [107] (Scott LJ). 
769 Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (n 1) para 4-04. 
770 For arguments against reification of a fund see R Nolan, 'Property in a Fund' (2004) 
120 LQR 108; Sheehan, 'Property in a Fund, Tracing and Unjust Enrichment' (n 7). For 
arguments in favour of the fund being a subject matter of a property right see J Penner, 
'Duty and Liability in Respect of Funds' in J Lowry and L Mistelis (eds), Commercial 
Law: Perspectives and Practice (Lexis Nexis, Butterworths, London 2006); J Penner, 
'Value, Property and Unjust Enrichment: Trusts of Traceable Proceeds' in R Chambers, 
C Mitchell and J Penner (eds), Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Unjust 
Enrichment (OUP, Oxford 2009). The previous literature seemed to have treated 
unanimously funds as the subject matter of property rights (i.e. as having existence 
separate from its components), see Goode on Commercial Law (n 115) 65-66. Brief 
discussions in the literature included FH Lawson and B Rudden, The Law of Property 
(3rd edn OUP, Oxford 2002) 44-46; Rudden (n 8); Honoré, 'Ownership' (n 4) 132-133; 
R Goode, 'The Right to Trace and Its Impact in Commercial Transactions. Part I' (1976) 
92 LQR 360, 384; R Goode, 'The Right to Trace and Its Impact in Commercial 
Transactions. Part II' (1976) 92 LQR 528, 529. 
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assets and not in any specific asset caused concern among authors who 
thought that property rights can only be taken in specific assets, not in a 
fictional pool.  
(c) Attached interest prior to crystallisation 
Two theories appear to rely on the chargee’s proprietary interest in each 
of the charged assets throughout the life of the charge, not merely upon 
crystallisation.771 When assets are dealt with in an authorised way (in 
the ordinary course of business) the proprietary interest in the assets is 
said to be defeated (defeasible charge theory) or overreached 
(overreaching theory). 
(i) Defeasible charge theory 
Professor Worthington suggested that a proprietary interest of a floating 
chargee is the same as that of a fixed chargee, with the same equitable 
right to protect chargee’s interests, except that it defeases if a charged 
asset is dealt with in a permitted way.772 Thus, defeasance occurs 
whenever, and to the extent that, a third party acquires an interest in the 
charged asset in a transaction, which falls in the ambit of the chargor’s 
licence to deal.773 It seems therefore that on this theory the charge 
attaches to the assets from the moment of creation.774 Nolan has raised 
the following objections to this theory.775 First, he observes that 
although defeasance of a charge may explain why the charge ceases to 
affect an asset, it cannot explain why the chargee, whose rights in that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
771 See also Driver v Broad [1893] 1 QB 744 (CA); Wallace v Evershed [1899] 1 Ch 
891; Re Dawson [1915] 1 Ch 626; Government Stock and other Securities Investment 
Co Ltd v Manila Railway Co Ltd [1897] AC 81 (HL) 86 (Macnaghten LJ); see also 
Sheehan, 'Property in a Fund, Tracing and Unjust Enrichment' (n 7) 229. 
772 Worthington, 'Floating Charges: The Use and Abuse of Doctrinal Analysis' (n 192) 
39-44; S Worthington, Proprietary Interests in Commercial Transactions (Clarendon 
Press, 1996) 79-86; S Worthington, 'Floating Charges - an Alternative Theory' (1994) 
53 CLJ 81; a similar theory of a defeasible equitable interest was advanced J Farrar, 
'The Crystallisation of a Floating Charge' (1976) 40 Conv 397, 397-398; J Farrar, 
'World Economic Stagnation Puts the Floating Charge on Trial' (1980) 1 The Company 
Lawyer 83, 83-87. 
773 Worthington, 'Floating Charges: The Use and Abuse of Doctrinal Analysis' (n 192) 
25, 39. 
774 See Beale et al, The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing (n 2) para 6.75, who 
point that the defeasible theory is not consistent with dicta in cases such as Evans (n 
753) 999 (Buckley LJ), where the floating charge was held not to attach until 
crystallisation.  
775 Nolan (n 770) 129-130. 
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asset have been defeated by sale, has then prima facie equivalent rights 
to any substitute for the asset. Second, until a defeasible interest is 
defeated the floating charge seems to take full effect. Nolan noted that 
the floating charge defies that because it is not capable of taking a full 
effect and is not enforceable until it crystallises.  
(ii) Overreaching theory 
On Nolan’s overreaching theory776, accepted by the leading text on 
Equity777, the interest in the hands of the third party is overreached 
rather than defeated.778 A floating charge is an interest, which is ab 
initio limited by the immunities of the chargor and successors in title to 
the chargor’s assets.779  When the asset is disposed of in the ordinary 
course of business the disponee acquires good title to the asset, free of 
the charge, because the chargor had power to dispose of the assets at 
law with immunity from the action in equity by the chargee and so the 
disponee is similarly immune.780 Until crystallisation the chargee 
cannot exercise his rights of recourse to the assets because his rights are 
subordinated to the chargor’s power to deal with these assets in the 
ordinary course of business.781 The charge attaches to the assets from 
the moment of creation of the charge, but it is a “weak” attachment782 
because, as Nolan says, it only takes place in the sense that the chargee 
can have recourse to the assets by way of security, when the charge 
crystallizes.783 A significant consequence of Nolan’s approach is that 
the explanation of the nature of the floating charge as an immediate 
property interest does not require the fund to be the subject matter of a 
property right, as suggested by Goode.784 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
776 Ibid. (n 775) 129. 
777 Snell's Equity (n 743) para 40-008. 
778 Worthington herself perceives Nolan’s theory as a variation on the defeasible charge 
theory: Worthington, 'Floating Charges: The Use and Abuse of Doctrinal Analysis' (n 
192) 39.  
779 Nolan (n 770) 129. 
780 Ibid. 130. 
781 Ibid. 130. 
782 As described by Beale et al, The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing (n 2) 
para 6.76. 
783 Nolan, (n 770) 129. 
784 Text to nn 763-765.  
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The overreaching theory is said to better explain the nature of the 
floating charge than the defeasibility theory because it avoids the 
problem of the chargee’s interest being prima facie brought to the end 
upon a disposition to a third party, making it easier to explain why a 
chargee has prima facie rights in the substitute of an asset disposed of 
by the chargor. It is tempting to say that overreaching is an explanation 
of the secured creditor’s right to substitutes in a floating charge.785 The 
doctrine of overreaching explains why a purchaser acquires title to an 
asset free of charge when the chargor deals with the asset in the 
ordinary course of business. Yet, it is not clear whether the right to 
proceeds is a necessary corollary of overreaching.786 We explore the 
support for the right to substitutes below and suggest that even if 
overreaching theory is the correct explanation of the floating charge, 
we ought to be cautious in how the right to substitutes is conceived 
within that theory.  
B. The source of right to substitutes under a floating 
charge  
Nolan seems to say that the right to substitutes under an uncrystallised 
floating charge can be implied as an accepted though silent default rule. 
But he also talks about it as a “principle” that the floating charge 
automatically covers proceeds of disposition of the original asset:  
“the principle that the proceeds of assets comprised in a security 
form part of that security unless they are released from it by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
785 Overreaching is, however, an explanation for right to substitutes in the context of 
trusts (and Nolan also uses overreaching to explain trust funds, Nolan, (n 770) 111-
117), see C Harpum, 'Overreaching, Trustees' Powers and the Reform of the 1925 
Legislation' (1990) CLJ 277, 278: “overreaching is concerned to transfer trusts from the 
original subject matter of the trust to the actual proceeds after sale”; D Fox, 
'Overreaching' in P Birks and A Pretto (eds), Breach of Trust (Hart, Oxford 2002) 95; C 
Rickett, 'Old and New in the Law of Tracing' in S Degeling and J Edelman (eds), 
Equity in Commercial Law (Lawbook Co, Sydney 2005) 119, 136. 
786 Overreaching may take place even where there are no proceeds: in relation to trusts 
see Harpum (n 785) 282: “The exercise of a power which does not give rise to any 
capital monies-such as an exchange of land-overreaches just as much as a transaction 
which does. In other words, overreaching is the process whereby existing interests are 
subordinated to a later interest or estate created pursuant to a trust or power”, cited with 
approval in State Bank of India v Sood [1997] Ch 276 [281] (Peter Gibson LJ). 
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terms of the security or by the consent of the person who owns 
the security.”787 
Nolan perceives the “principle” as one of two mechanisms of bringing 
after-acquired property into the scope of the floating charge, the other 
one being an after-acquired property clause, i.e. a clause stating that the 
security extends to proceeds, or a class of future assets which later 
happen to derive from the existing assets. In other words, according to 
Nolan, proceeds of authorised dispositions are automatically covered 
by the same floating charge. This is controversial. In The Law of 
Security and Title-based Financing it is suggested that a holder of a 
floating charge does not always have an automatic right to proceeds of 
authorised dispositions: 
“If an asset subject to a floating charge is disposed of within the 
permission [given by the charge], the chargor will receive 
proceeds of the disposition, either in the form of money, or 
receivables. These proceeds will often fall within the ambit of the 
floating charge anyway, but if they do not then they will not do 
so qua proceeds, since the disposition was not for the chargee’s 
benefit but the chargor’s”.788 
It is argued in this thesis that the “principle” that would give the 
floating chargee an automatic right to proceeds as of right does not find 
support in English law. A preferred view is therefore the latter: that 
proceeds of authorised dispositions only inure for the benefit of the 
floating chargee if they are covered by the floating charge. Both points 
require a more detailed explanation.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
787 Nolan (n 770) 125. 
788 Beale et al, The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing (n 2) para 15.05; also in 
the previous edition (H Beale, M Bridge, L Gullifer and E Lomnicka, The Law of 
Personal Property Security (1st edn OUP, 2007) para 13.35; see also Goode on Legal 
Problems of Credit and Security (n 1) para 1-59 fn 232. 
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(a) Lack of support for a “principle” that proceeds are 
automatically captured by a floating charge 
(i) Argument from authority 
Nolan refers to three cases to support the “principle” that a floating 
charge automatically covers proceeds: Barclays Bank Plc v Buhr,789 
Wickham v New Brunswick & Canada Railway Company790 and Re 
Bond Worth Ltd.791 It is argued that none of these cases provides 
support for a “principle” that proceeds of authorised dispositions 
(dispositions in the ordinary course of business) are automatically 
covered by a floating charge. If true, it means that the only way for a 
floating chargee to ensure that proceeds fall within the scope of the 
floating charge is by way of an after-acquired property clause. 
The first case, Barclays Bank v Buhr, contains references to a 
“principle of substitutions and accretions”. The existence of such a 
“principle” was questioned in chapter III in relation to agreements that 
are silent as to whether security extends to proceeds. Barclays Bank v 
Buhr itself was a case of an unauthorised disposition in the context of a 
fixed security.792 The issue of proceeds of unauthorised dispositions is 
complex. It is not clear whether just because a sale was unauthorised, 
the creditor can automatically claim proceeds. We explore claims to 
proceeds of unauthorised sales in the next chapter. Pre-empting the 
conclusions reached in chapter V, we may note that it will be suggested 
that claims to proceeds of unauthorised dispositions are also better 
explained otherwise than by reference to the “principle”.  
The case of Wickham v New Brunswick & Canada Railway Company 
similarly did not concern proceeds of an authorised disposition of 
collateral. In that case a railway company issued mortgage debentures 
on, among others, “the undertaking” and “all moneys to arise from the 
sale of the lands of the Company”. The question was whether the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
789 (n 14) [39]-[50] (Arden LJ). 
790 (1865-67) LR 1 PC 64. 
791 (n 125). 
792 See chapter V section 2.1. 
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debentures created an equitable mortgage on lands of the company. It 
was held that they did not because parties did not mean to include lands 
in the word “undertaking”.793 As a result, the mortgagees were not able 
to restrain the sale of the land by judgment creditors and were not able 
to obtain a title to the proceeds of lands when sold. What seems 
important, however are the following dicta of Lord Chelmsford:  
“if the word “undertaking” would ex vi termini contain [lands],  
the Debenture-holders would not only have been entitled to, but 
would have had the complete control over, the proceeds of the 
sales of lands, as the Company could not have sold without their 
consent, and it would, therefore, have been quite unnecessary to 
provide specifically for their having the moneys to arise from the 
sales.”794 
If a debtor is not able to sell an asset without the secured creditor’s 
consent, this means that the authority to deal with the collateral is 
restricted and the security interest is likely to be fixed. It seems that 
what Lord Chelmsford meant was that proceeds of sale would have 
been covered by security automatically, whether or not there was a 
clause extending security to proceeds, because he assumed that 
mortgagees would have only consented to sale subject to an obligation 
to substitute. Mortgagees can of course also consent to withdrawal of 
an asset from security without anything being substituted for it795 but 
then there would have been no asset to claim. If this is a correct reading 
of these dicta, what Lord Chelmsford says is consistent with our 
analysis of rights of a fixed chargee to proceeds of an authorised 
disposition.796   
Finally, Re Bond Worth also does not support the point that a floating 
charge automatically extends to proceeds of authorised dispositions. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
793 Wickham (n 790) 79 (Chelmsford LJ). 
794 Wickham (n 790) 79 (Chelmsford LJ). 
795 It is within a right of a secured creditor to surrender their security interest and 
become an unsecured creditor. For a recent example see Kelly v Inflexion Fund 2 Ltd 
[2010] EWHC 2850 (Ch), [2011] BCC 93.  
796 Text to n 682. 
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The case concerned retention of title clause, whereby the seller 
purported to retain “equitable and beneficial ownership (…) until full 
payment (…) or until prior resale, in which case [the] beneficial 
entitlement [would] attach to the proceeds of resale or to the claim for 
such proceeds”.797 The floating charge that was held to arise covered 
proceeds on the basis of this express contractual term. Re Bond Worth 
cannot therefore provide support for the “principle”, which is meant to 
apply when the contract is silent as to proceeds. In older cases, as 
Nolan explains, parties apparently often avoided including the 
reference to proceeds but understood impliedly that it was contained 
therein.   
(ii) Argument from principle 
The main point advanced in this thesis is that rights of a secured 
creditor to proceeds of dispositions of the original collateral differ 
depending on whether dispositions were authorised or unauthorised. 
The right to proceeds is closely linked to the grant of authority to 
dispose in a fixed charge. The authority to dispose of assets subject to a 
fixed charge can only be granted if coupled with a specific obligation to 
substitute or, if the charge falls with FCAR, if the substitution preserves 
the value of the collateral in a way required by FCAR.798 In a floating 
charge the authority is wider. The chargor is given a general authority 
to dispose free of the charge so long as the dispositions are in the 
ordinary course of business. For a disposition to be within the authority 
given by the chargee the chargor need not provide a substitute (by 
contrast to the fixed charge). The nature of the floating charge does not 
require that the proceeds of authorised dispositions fall within the 
charge. Thus, unless the parties agree that the proceeds of an authorised 
disposition would fall within a floating charge, there is no reason why 
they should be automatically covered by the charge. The nature of the 
security is not sufficient to explain the automatic right to substitutes. 
This seems to be precisely where fixed and floating charges differ. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
797 Bond Worth (n 125) (header). 
798 Text to nn 692-694. 
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Beale, Bridge, Gullifer and Lomnicka seem to be saying the same by 
referring to debtor’s disposals being either for the benefit of the chargee 
(in a fixed charge) or for the benefit of the chargor (in a floating 
charge) unless parties decide otherwise.799 This is why a “principle of 
substitutions” does not exist.   
(b) An express or implied bargain as the source of the right 
to proceeds 
It seems that if parties intend for the charge to extend to proceeds of 
authorised dispositions, they ought to say so in the agreement, whether 
by way of a proceeds clause or by specifying classes of assets, within 
which proceeds will fall. It is clear that where parties expressly agree 
that proceeds are to be covered by a floating charge, the charge extends 
to proceeds of authorised dispositions (dispositions in the ordinary 
course of business).800 However, where there is no such express 
provision it may be possible that one can be implied. Examination of 
debenture documentation led Nolan to conclude that parties simply 
often understand that the charge would extend to proceeds of 
disposition without saying so expressly.801 In practice the difference 
between an “implied or default rule” and a “principle” may be 
negligible so long as one can modify both of them contractually. There 
is a danger, however, that by calling it a “principle” the implied default 
rule may become a key element defining the nature of a floating charge, 
which it is not. Terms in contract (in the security agreement) can be 
implied as a matter of law or as a matter of fact.802 What Nolan 
suggests seems to fall into the former category. Bearing in mind what 
we said earlier about the lack of support in case law for the rule that 
substitutes fall within the floating charge automatically, it is submitted 
that extension of the floating charge to substitutes could be implied as a 
matter of fact if the court were to perceive it as the unexpressed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
799 See Beale et al, The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing  (n 2) para 15.05. 
800 Bond Worth (n 125). 
801 Nolan (n 770) 120-124. 
802 Scally v Southern Health and Social Services Board [1992] 1 AC 294 (HL) 306-307 
(Bridge LJ). 
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intention of the parties.803 It is suggested that the documentation 
examined by Nolan lacking the term extending the floating charge to 
substitutes could be understood as comprising a term implied as a 
matter of fact, so the proceeds could still be said to fall within the ambit 
of the charge. In other words, as well as on the basis of an express 
clause, the chargee may have a right to proceeds of authorised 
dispositions on the basis of an implied after-acquired property clause, 
not a “principle”. A right to proceeds is not a result of the floating 
chargee’s interests being overreached in the original asset. It is not 
correlated with whether or not third party buyers acquire title to the 
original asset unencumbered. 
4 Conclusion 
We saw in chapter III that security interests in fruits do not arise 
automatically by virtue of the secured creditor’s right to the original 
asset (with some exceptions where the creditor has possession of the 
original asset). If parties want a security interest to extend to fruits they 
need to say so in the security agreement. Such clauses take effect as 
security interests in after-acquired property. Security in an after-
acquired asset does not attach until the asset is acquired, at which point 
it takes effect retrospectively from the moment the security agreement 
was entered into.804 This chapter examined the effect of such clauses, 
which led us to conclusion that they form not multiple security interests 
but a single, continuous security that extends to fruits when they arise.  
As established in chapter II substitutes and fruits are different because 
substitutes are generated from an event that affects the original asset, 
usually a disposition, which is an act by the debtor or within the 
debtor’s control. This difference led us in chapter III to say that the 
secured creditor’s rights to substitutes, unlike fruits, necessarily depend 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
803 Trollope & Colls Ltd v North West Metropolitan Regional Hospital Board [1973] 1 
WLR 601 (HL) 609 (Pearson LJ); Attorney General of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd 
[2009] UKPC 10, [2009] 1 WLR 1988, 1993-1994 (Hoffmann LJ). 
804 Lind (n 673). 
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on the authorised or unauthorised character of the disposition that 
produced substitutes. The basis for the right to substitutes had to, 
therefore, incorporate the factor of authority. In this chapter we argued 
that fixed and floating charges could be conveniently analysed by 
drawing parallels with agency that was understood as a grant of 
authority, not as a fiduciary relationship. It was argued that the 
distinction between power to act and authority to act, inherent in 
agency, could be useful in construing the analytical framework of fixed 
and floating charges. The chargor’s power to act stems from his legal 
title to the asset, or at least from the power to dispose of the legal title 
granted by the owner. This is different from the chargor’s authority to 
act. In a fixed charge the chargor has no general authority to dispose of 
assets free of encumbrance but may be given very limited authority to 
do so if coupled with a specific obligation to substitute or, if the charge 
falls with FCAR, if the substitution preserves the value of the collateral 
in a way required by FCAR.805 In a floating charge the authority is 
wider. The chargor is given general authority to dispose free of the 
charge so long as dispositions are in the ordinary course of business. 
For a disposition to be within the authority given by the chargee the 
floating chargor need not provide a substitute (by contrast to the fixed 
charge). It was suggested that the floating chargee does not have an 
automatic right to proceeds of authorised dispositions. The nature of the 
floating charge does not support this conclusion and the support in case 
law of such a rule is also questionable. For a floating charge to extend 
to proceeds of authorised dispositions, the parties must have provided 
for this in the agreement, so the floating charge in substitutes arise on 
the basis of an after-acquired property clause in the security agreement, 
although it is not clear whether such a clause must be express. It seems 
that it may also be implied. The right to substitutes in a fixed charge 
also arises on the basis of an agreement between the parties but it 
cannot be said that it arises on the basis of an after-acquired property 
clause. If such a clause amounted to chargee’s consent to substitution 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
805 Text to nn 692-694. 
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given in advance it would not be consistent with a fixed charge. For the 
fixed charge to arise in proceeds of an authorised disposition the 
creditor must have granted authority to a specific disposition and it 
must be coupled with the chargor’s obligation to provide a substitution 
must be very specific.  
Finally, we may note that the analysis of fixed and floating charges 
proposed in this chapter has shown that the mechanisms of disposals 
under fixed and floating charge are analogous. Under a fixed charge the 
chargor has no authority to deal free of security unless the authority is 
granted specifically and unless it is accompanied by an obligation to 
substitute. Under a floating charge the chargor has general authority to 
deal free of security so long as the dealings are in the ordinary course of 
business, in which case there is no need for substitutes to fall within the 
scope of the charge unless the parties so agree. In both cases the 
chargor has a power to deal. If dispositions are outside of the authority, 
the creditor may have a right to proceeds of such dispositions but this is 
on a different basis than in the case of authorised dispositions.  
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CHAPTER V – Secured creditor’s right to 
proceeds of unauthorised dispositions 
1 Introduction 
The previous chapter examined security interest in proceeds generated 
in authorised dispositions. The basis of the secured creditor’s claim to 
proceeds of such dispositions was the parties’ agreement. The parties 
agreed that one asset substituted another whilst the same security 
interest was asserted to the new asset. The present chapter focuses on 
secured creditor’s proprietary rights to proceeds of unauthorised 
dispositions. The scope of analysis is therefore restricted threefold by 
(1) proceeds; (2) unauthorised dispositions and (3) proprietary claims. 
We need to elaborate on each of these.  
First, we are interested in claiming proceeds, not original followed 
assets. Provided the creditor’s security interest was attached in the 
disposed asset, the creditor can follow the asset and enforce security 
interest against purchasers of the followed asset. The exigibility 
(enforceability) of the security interest in such cases is limited by the 
protection of good faith purchasers. A purchaser of a legal title may 
defeat (clear) the secured creditor’s equitable interest if the purchaser is 
bona fide and without notice of the interest.   
Second, only proceeds of unauthorised dispositions are of interest; 
authorised dispositions were discussed in the previous chapter. In order 
to say that a disposition is, or is not, unauthorised, the act (the 
disposition) must be within the sphere of control of the debtor. The 
debtor must have the power to do the act that generates proceeds. 
Otherwise it is not possible to say whether or not the debtor had 
authority to do the act, and so whether the act was authorised or not. 
For example, payment of a dividend on a share does not count as a 
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disposition of the share,806 even if the value of the share were to drop 
considerably in the process, and so it would be illogical to talk about 
authorised or unauthorised dividend payment from the perspective of 
security interest. Thus, the term “unauthorised disposition” refers to 
any act within the debtor’s power to effectuate, which affects the 
original collateral but which is not within the authority given by the 
secured creditor. The chapter covers therefore not only proceeds of 
unauthorised sale by the debtor but also unauthorised manufacture 
using the original collateral into a completely new product 
(specificatio)807 or incorporating encumbered asset into another asset 
(accessio).808 That said, a sale of collateral without authority is treated 
as the paradigm case of an unauthorised disposition and sale proceeds 
as the paradigm case of proceeds of such a disposition.  
Third, the scope of the chapter is limited to proprietary claims only, 
thus excluding personal claims to proceeds. By a “personal claim” we 
mean a claim, which - if successful - gives the secured creditor a 
remedy enforceable in personam and does not endow the claimant with 
protection in the defendant’s insolvency.  
This chapter seeks answers to two major questions about the extent of 
the secured creditor’s right to proceeds of unauthorised dispositions: 
first, does the creditor acquire a new right to such proceeds or does the 
original security interest persist in the proceeds, and second, if it is a 
new right, how can this right be proprietary? The first question is asked 
because it is not clear to what extent the right to proceeds is correlated 
with the secured creditor’s right to assert the security interest in the 
followed asset in the hands of a third party. If the right to proceeds of 
unauthorised disposition is independent from the right to the original 
asset, the secured creditor ought to be able to assert his security in the 
proceeds irrespective of his persisting right to the original collateral. If, 
however, the right to proceeds is the same right as the secured creditor 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
806 Text to nn 340-342. 
807 Text to n 300. 
808 Text to n 265. 
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had in the original collateral, it cannot attach to the proceeds until the 
right has “detached” from the original collateral. We could explain this 
by borrowing a fishing line metaphor, which Peter Birks wielded in 
relation to real subrogation.809 Where the security agreement covers 
proceeds of an authorised disposition of the collateral, the security 
interest could be seen as a fishing line hooking on to proceeds as soon 
as the originally encumbered asset is disposed of and released off the 
hook. Where the disposition of collateral is unauthorised, the 
disposition itself does not release the asset from the hook. The secured 
creditor still holds the fishing rod with the asset attached to the hook 
but he may not be able to fish out that asset if the asset is with a bona 
fide purchaser. The question is whether in order to catch the proceeds 
of an unauthorised disposition the creditor needs a new fishing rod to 
hook on to the proceeds or whether he may still use the old fishing rod, 
even though the parties, in their bargain, did not contemplate that the 
creditor would do so. The second major question is whether, to 
continue with the metaphor and assuming that a new rod is needed, the 
secured creditor is able to use his new fishing rod and fish out the new 
asset (substitute) with priority to other creditors of the debtor. From the 
secured creditor’s perspective it would be preferable to assert a 
proprietary remedy to the proceeds and there may be compelling 
reasons to do so bearing in mind the rationale of security interests in the 
original collateral.810 The prevailing view is that proceeds of 
unauthorised disposition are held on constructive trust for the creditor. 
It is not clear, however, what constitutes the basis for this proprietary 
response. We must show that there is a causative event to warrant such 
a response.  
The questions about the potential new right and its nature are 
interlinked. There are three potential explanations. First, if the right to 
the proceeds is the same right as the one in the original collateral (“the 
same fishing rod hooking on to different assets as they swim past”), the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
809 P Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2nd edn OUP, Oxford 2005) 35. 
810 See chapter I section 2. 
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right to proceeds is clearly proprietary because it is the same right. 
Second, the right to proceeds could be a new right (“a new fishing rod”) 
and proprietary because the proprietary right in the collateral was 
interfered with. Third, the right to proceeds could be a new and a 
proprietary right arising on the basis of a causative event independent 
from the interference with property right in the original asset. The area 
is complex and it is better to state at the beginning that the preferred 
explanation is the third one with unjust enrichment as a causative event 
and lack of authority as an unjust factor. This view provides a more 
coherent analysis of unauthorised dispositions and it is consistent with 
the analysis of the authorised dispositions. For this explanation to work 
it is necessary to accept that unjust enrichment can lead to proprietary 
restitution, a view which is not free from controversy. Those 
commentators who reject it prefer the second view. The first view is the 
least tenable one because it amounts to accepting a principle that a 
security interest in an asset gives an automatic right to substitutes. It 
was suggested in Buhr v Barclays Bank that such an automatic right 
exists. We begin this chapter by discussion and a critique of the way in 
which the courts of both instances in that case treated rights to proceeds 
of an unauthorised disposition. We then go on to discuss the other two 
views.     
2 Automatic right to proceeds - Buhr v Barclays Bank 
The reasoning both by Judge Weeks QC in the first instance and by 
Lady Justice Arden, who delivered the judgment in the Court of Appeal 
in Buhr v Barclays Bank,811 is based largely on policy arguments and 
analogies, which are aimed at showing that the secured creditor’s right 
to proceeds of unauthorised dispositions is an implicit part of the 
bargain between the grantor of security and the security holder. Right to 
proceeds of unauthorised dispositions is thus put on a par with a right to 
proceeds of collateral expressly bargained for. The creditor 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
811 Buhr (n 14). 
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automatically has a right to proceeds of unauthorised disposition by 
virtue of his security interest in the original asset, which was disposed 
of. This seems to be a different approach to the one adopted in the 
House of Lords decision in Foskett v McKeown,812 where trust 
beneficiaries were given an election between a co-ownership share of 
proceeds and a lien on traceable proceeds of the misappropriated trust 
money. We discuss Foskett in greater detail later813 but it is useful to 
note now that the election is usually considered to be a power in rem. 
Although the nature of such a power is controversial, as seen below, it 
is different from an automatic exchange right to proceeds championed 
in Buhr v Barclays Bank.  
The difference of solutions to the same problem posed in parallel 
scenarios in cases decided by higher courts in the same year is hard to 
explain. Given that Foskett v McKeown was decided a bare couple of 
months before the Court of Appeal decision in Buhr v Barclays Bank, it 
is perhaps not surprising to see only a single reference to the House of 
Lords decision in Buhr.814 It is more difficult to understand, however, 
why Buhr v Barclays Bank is bereft of references to the reasoning of 
lower courts in Foskett v McKeown, in particular why it contains no 
trace of the debate whether rights to traceable proceeds are based on 
vindicatio of property rights or unjust enrichment. Before we embark 
on a more detailed analysis of how Buhr v Barclays Bank fits with the 
existing judicial and academic discussion of claims to traceable 
proceeds, it is convenient to spell out why the disposition in that case 
was unauthorised. 
2.1 The unauthorised disposition in Buhr v Barclays Bank 
Mr and Mrs Buhr executed a charge by way of legal mortgage in favour 
of Barclays Bank over their farm, which was unregistered land. This 
was a second charge. The bank gave notice of its interest to the first 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
812 Foskett (n 285). 
813 Text to nn  904-906. 
814 Buhr (n 14) [25]. 
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mortgagee, UCB Home Loans Corporation Ltd (UCB). Barclays sought 
to protect the land charge by entry of a Class C(i) as a puisne mortgage 
under the Land Charges Act 1972.815 However, the registration could 
not take effect as the entry was in a wrong name. The Buhrs later 
granted an option to purchase the mortgaged property to prospective 
purchasers. The Buhrs made a proposal to Barclays for an individual 
voluntary agreement. Barclays Bank understood that it would obtain 
some repayment from the sale of the farm. The option was later 
exercised. The solicitors obtained the deeds from UCB and undertook 
to hold them until the debt to UCB could be discharged from the 
proceeds. Buhrs admitted to their solicitors that there was a second 
charge over the farm in favour of Barclays Bank. Buhrs’ solicitors were 
also informed about this by the purchaser’s solicitors, who noted the 
incorrect registration of that charge. The sale of the farm took place and 
the proceeds were paid to the solicitors account in November 1998. 
UCB was discharged. A balance of £27,500 remained. In January 1999 
Mr Buhr went bankrupt. Barclays Bank sought to affirm that it had a 
proprietary interest in the proceeds of sale and that Buhrs’ solicitors 
held the money on constructive trust for Barclays, so that it would not 
have been available to satisfy unsecured creditors of Mr Buhr. Both the 
High Court and the Court of Appeal, led by Arden LJ, held that a trust 
existed in the Bank’s favour. 
One curious aspect of the case is that factually it appears unclear 
whether Barclays consented to the sale of the farm free of their 
security. If they did, the sale would have been authorised and the legal 
effect would have been arguably different than if the sale was 
unauthorised. Even if Barclays agreed in the voluntary arrangement to 
the discharge of the mortgage when the farm was sold, they are 
unlikely to have agreed not to have an interest in the sale proceeds.816 It 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
815 Land Charges Act 1972, s2(4). For the purposes of the Act a puisne mortgage is a 
legal mortgage not protected by a deposit of documents relating to the legal estate 
affected. 
816 Cf the rather enigmatic statement by the counsel: “The effect of the sale was to 
crystallise their contractual obligation to repay Barclays”, Buhr (n 14) [21]. 
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is likely that Barclays consented to sale free of its security on the 
understanding that their interest would carry through to the proceeds so 
that Barclays would be able to apply them in the discharge of its loan. 
If this is true, the sale was authorised and either an express trust arose 
or the charge carried through to the proceeds of the disposition because 
the parties so agreed. As the facts are inconclusive, we assume, as the 
courts have done817 but contrary to one commentator’s view818, that the 
sale of the farm was on the facts unauthorised. 
Before examining the reasoning, we need to briefly explain the effect of 
lack of registration of a land charge in an unregistered land. A class C 
land charge is void against a third party purchaser if not registered.819 
Lack of registration does not affect the validity of the charge as 
between the parties to the charge and remains enforceable against 
certain third parties, in particular the liquidators, trustee in bankruptcy 
or unsecured creditors.820 Thus an unregistered land charge in 
unregistered land remains protected in insolvency of the debtor.821 If 
the court ordered the land to be sold before Buhrs managed to sell the 
farm, the net proceeds of sale would be applied in repayment of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
817 Buhr (n 14) [45] (Arden LJ): “the disposition by the Buhrs was not authorised: their 
authority from Barclays to sell the mortgaged property could not extend to selling 
Rectory Farm in a manner which destroyed Barclay’s security” and [49]: “Buhrs’ 
disposition was unauthorised.  They purported to sell with full title guaratee and thus 
free from Barclays’ charge”. 
818 L McMurtry, 'The Extent of Security: Sale, Substitutions and Subsequent 
Mortgages' (2002) Conv 407, 411 (emphasising that the sale was done with consent 
from Barclays Bank and could not therefore be treated as a wrongful sale). 
819 Land Charges Act 1972, s4(5). See also K Gray and S Gray, Elements of Land Law 
(5th edn OUP, 2008) para 8.3.5 (noting that the term “purchaser” is defined under LCA 
1972, s17(1), as a person, including a mortgagee or lessee, who gives valuable 
consideration). 
820 An equitable chargee has no legal right to possession or legal right of property but 
can require that the property charged in his favour should be made available to 
discharge the debt due to him: see e.g. Charnley (n 166) 449-450 (Atkin LJ); Cosslett 
(n 110) 508 (Millett LJ).  
821 By comparison, the sanction for non-registration is more severe under Companies 
Act 2006, s874 (previously Companies Act 1985, s395(1) and before then Companies 
Act 1948, s95). A charge registrable under Companies Act 2006, s 860(1), executed but 
not registered at Companies House is void as against a liquidator and an administrator 
of the company but not as against the company itself, which means that when a 
company-chargor is wound up and debts payable in liquidation are satisfied, an 
unregistered charge will continue to encumber the company’s property because the lack 
of registration does not deprive the chargee of the enforceability of his interest against 
the company. See Independent Automatic Sales Ltd v Knowles & Foster [1962] 1 WLR 
974, header and 979-980 (Buckley J); Buhr (n 14) [36] (Arden LJ). 
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monies owed to the mortgagees.822 Yet the fact that an unregistered 
land charge remains valid and enforceable against the chargor does not 
ipso facto explain why the chargee would be able to claim proceeds of 
sale of a charged asset. 
2.2 The right to proceeds as an implied bargain (High Court 
reasoning) 
The arguments accepted by Judge Weeks QC in the first instance were 
not accepted in the Court of Appeal, although Arden LJ agreed with the 
High Court as to the outcome.  
A. Implied clause of conveyance of all estate including 
proceeds 
An argument was made, and was successful in the High Court, that 
Buhrs were charging not only the legal estate in the farm but also their 
equitable interests in the proceeds of sale of the security for the loan.823  
This argument essentially amounted to saying that a security interest 
covers automatically proceeds of an unauthorised disposition. It was 
based on section 63 Law of Property Act 1925, according to which: 
“[e]very conveyance (…) effectual to pass all the estate, right, 
title, interest, claim and demand which the conveying parties 
respectively have, in, to, or on the property conveyed”.  
It covers the passing of benefit of an equity with the land824 for example 
a right to break a lease.825 Section 63 LPA 1925 has been applied to 
protect secured creditors in matrimonial home cases to give effect to a 
legal charge by creating an equitable charge over the beneficial share in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
822 See argument by the counsel Buhr (n 14) [33]. 
823 First National Security v Hegerty [1985] QB 850. 
824 E Burn and J Cartwright, Cheshire and Burn's Modern Law of Real Property (17th 
edn OUP, Oxford 2006) 813. 
825 System Floors Ltd v Ruralpride Ltd [1995] 1 EGLR 48; Harbour Estates Ltd v 
HSBC Bank plc [2005] Ch 194 (an unusually framed clause allowing the first tenant 
and only a limited group of assigns, if permitted, to break the lease; the benefit passed 
to the assignee under s63 LPA 1925). 
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land of a spouse who sought to create a legal charge.826 Since this “all 
estate” clause was not excluded by the Barclays’ charge, Judge Weeks 
QC accepted that it could also cover proceeds of the unauthorised sale 
of mortgaged property.  Arden LJ rejected the reasoning of the High 
Court.827 McMurtry commenting on the case agreed with Arden LJ, 
arguing that a view that an equitable interest in land is represented by 
the proceeds of sale could be based on an analogy with a trust for sale 
whereby the equitable interest of co-owners was in the money, not in 
land. As McMurtry noted, following the Trusts of Land and 
Appointments of Trustees Act 1996 trusts for sale were reordered as 
trusts of land, so the analogy no longer exists and cannot support, if it 
ever would have supported, the claim to proceeds of sale of land, in 
which the claimant has an equitable interest other than under a trust.828  
B. Analogy with a statutory trust of proceeds of sale  
Section 105 of the Law of Property Act 1925 provides that the proceeds 
of sale are to be held under a statutory trust and it states in what order 
they are to be applied to the discharge of mortgagees’ claims.829 The 
provision only applies if it is the mortgagee who sells the property. It 
has not been explained in the case if a parallel could be drawn between 
situations where the sale is made by one of the mortgagees and where it 
is made by the mortgagor. In the Court of Appeal Arden LJ said that 
relying on the parallel with section 105 LPA 1925 was not necessary 
because the right to proceeds of unauthorised disposition arose because 
“the principle of substitution” applied.830 We examine this “principle” 
in relation to proceeds of an unauthorised disposition later and we will 
argue that the “principle” does not exist. The question posed here is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
826 Ahmed v Kendrick (1987) 56 P&CR 120; First National Bank Plc v Achampong 
[2003] EWCA Civ 487, [2003] 2 P&CR DG11, D35 (Blackburne J). 
827 Buhr (n 14) [52]. 
828 McMurtry (n 818) 413. 
829 The proceeds are to be applied first to discharge superior mortgages; second, to 
discharge the claims, including the expenses of the selling mortgagee third, to discharge 
inferior mortgages of which the selling mortgagee has notice (nb notice is constituted 
by registration of a land charge, Law of Property Act 1925, s198(1)); and finally, any 
remaining proceeds are to be paid to the mortgagor.  
830 Buhr (n 14) [53]. 
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whether the parallel could exist at all and if so, whether it is on the 
basis of a fiduciary relationship. McMurtry, commenting on the case, 
seems to have thought that the parallel rested on the presence of a 
fiduciary relationship and since in McMurtry’s view the mortgagor did 
not owe any fiduciary duty to the mortgagee, she rejected the 
analogy.831 In this section it is argued that parallels between a selling 
mortgagee and a selling mortgagor could be drawn but with caveats. 
First, it is suggested that consideration of a fiduciary relationship is 
irrelevant to the parallel with section 105 LPA 1925. Second, the 
rationale for the statutory trust in favour of other mortgagees under 
section 105 LPA 1925 is to protect an already imposed duty of the 
mortgagee not to sell the property without consent from other 
mortgagees. In order to understand if the parallel could exist we need to 
ask whom the provisions of section 105 LPA 1925 are intended to 
protect and whether the mortgagee (Barclays) could be said to be in a 
position justifying such protection.   
(a) Irrelevance of a fiduciary relationship  
It is argued that it is not necessary to show that the selling mortgagee 
stands in a fiduciary relationship to the mortgagor or mortgagor’s other 
creditors for the statutory trust to arise. This is by no means obvious 
because it is not clear to what extent a fiduciary relationship can be said 
to underlie the rationale of section 105 LPA 1925, and even if it can, 
whether it justifies any parallel of a fiduciary relationship between the 
debtor selling the collateral and the secured creditor.  
The principle now endorsed in section 105 LPA 1925 was previously 
found in the Conveyancing Act 1881832 and prior to that in case law, of 
which Banner v Berridge833 is a good example.834 Banner v Berridge 
concerned a claim of a second mortgagee835 of a steamship against the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
831 McMurtry (n 818) 412. 
832 Conveyancing Act 1881, s21(3). 
833 (n 151). 
834 See also Charles v Jones (1887) LR 35 Ch 544. 
835 The action was brought by Banner, who was a trustee of the liquidation of the 
second mortgagee, who themselves had become insolvent.  
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first mortgagee Berridge, who had seized and sold the mortgaged vessel 
when the mortgagor (Lacy) became bankrupt. Kay J held that so long 
as the surplus of sale proceeds could be ascertained, the enforcing 
mortgagee held the surplus on constructive trust for the first 
mortgagee.836 On the facts, however, the claimant could not prove 
surplus because the action was only brought six years after the sale.837 
It appears therefore to be settled law that a secured creditor is a 
fiduciary for the mortgagor and other mortgagees of his debtor.838 
Because of this position the mortgagee has a duty to hold the sale 
proceeds separately “in such a way as to be fruitful for the benefit of 
the persons beneficially entitled to it”.839 The need to keep the scope of 
fiduciary duties of the mortgagee narrow was recognized early on. 
Thus, in Quarrell v Beckford840 it was held that the mortgagee stands in 
a fiduciary position to the persons entitled to the money only to the 
extent and in the manner that he holds the surplus of sale proceeds. In 
Downsview Nominees v First City Corporation it was also stressed that 
the secured creditor who decides to sell the debtor’s property owes the 
debtor and subsequent encumbrancers a specific duty to do so in good 
faith and with reasonable care.841 This duty, albeit narrow in scope, 
arises as a result of the debtor’s equity of redemption.842 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
836 Banner (n 151) 269.  
837 Banner (n 151). 
838 Similarly, a fiduciary relationship was found to award an interest in equity between 
pawnee and pawnor in relation to any surplus on the sale of pawned articles: Mathew (n 
118) 1462 (Chadwick J); see also Rakestraw (n 454); Knight v Marjoribanks (1849) 2 
Mac & G 10, 13-14; 42 ER 4, 5 (Cottenham LC). 
839 Charles (n 834) 550 (Kay J). 
840 (1816) 1 Madd 269, 56 ER 100.  
841 Downsview (n 156) 314-315 (Templeman LJ). The mortgagee is for example 
obliged to obtain the best price: Cuckmere Brick Co Ltd v Mutual Finance Ltd [1971] 
Ch 949 (CA); Bishop v Bonham [1988] 1 WLR 742 (CA); Silven Properties Ltd v 
Royal Bank of Scotland Plc [2003] EWCA Civ 1409, [2004] 1 WLR 997 (as to the 
limits on what how far the mortgagee is expected to go in reasonably exercising the 
power of sale); see also Parker Tweedale v Dunbar Bank [1991] Ch 12 (CA); AIB 
Finance v Debtors [1998] 2 All ER 929; Medforth (n 514) 98-99 (Sir Richard Scott V-
C); Mortgage Express v Mardner [2004] EWCA Civ 1859; Felix McHugh v Union 
Bank of Canada [1913] AC 299 (PC) 311 (Lord Moulton).  
842 The mortgagee does not owe any general duty of care to the mortgagor, for example 
with respect to whether or when to exercise a power of sale. For arguments against such 
a general duty of care, see K Loi, 'Mortgagees Exercising Power of Sale: Nonfeasance, 
Privilege, Trusteeship and Duty of Care' (2010) JBL 576. 
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If we say that the mortgagee holds the surplus on trust for the 
mortgagor because he owes fiduciary duties to the mortgagor, there 
must be a reason why these fiduciary duties are limited to the surplus 
only, and not in relation to the entire mortgaged asset. If we find a basis 
for the mortgagee’s “fiduciary duties” relating to surplus, perhaps we 
can also find a better way to describe such duties than by reference to 
the term “fiduciary”. It seems that the reason why the mortgagee holds 
the sale proceeds on trust for the mortgagor is the nature of the 
mortgagee’s interest. The mortgagee only holds the property for 
security purposes. Kay J in Charles v Jones illustrates the point well:  
“[The creditor] takes his mortgage as a security for his debt, but, 
so soon as he has paid himself what is due, he has no right to be 
in possession of the estate, or of the balance of the purchase-
money. He then holds them, to say the least, for the benefit of 
somebody else, of a second mortgagee, if there be one, or, if not, 
of the mortgagor. What, then, is he to do? Surely he has a duty 
cast upon him. His duty is to say, ‘I have paid my debt: this 
property which is pledged to me, and in respect of which I now 
hold this surplus in my hands, is not my property. I desire to get 
rid of this surplus, and hand it back to the person to whom it 
belongs’.”843  
The mortgagee must hold the proceeds for the mortgagor because the 
mortgagor never consented to the mortgagee having the entire asset 
over and above the outstanding secured claim.844 Lack of mortgagor’s 
consent to the mortgagee having the surplus is the basis for the trust. It 
is not necessary to make the mortgagee a fiduciary for the mortgagor to 
make him account for the surplus.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
843 Charles (n 834) 549; see also Banner (n 151) 262 (Kay J). 
844 Foreclosure, where the creditor could take the property in satisfaction of the debt 
irrespective of its amounts and value of the property, is seen as a “traditional” though 
now “obsolescent” remedy, see Cukurova Finance International Ltd v Alfa Telecom 
Turkey Ltd [2009] UKPC 19 at [13] (Walker LJ); the mortgagee still has a right to take 
possession or to sell but he also has duty not to act in a way that unfairly prejudices the 
mortgagor: Palk v Mortgage Services Funding [1993] Ch 330 (CA) 337-338 (Sir 
Donald Nicholls V-C). 
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(b) Lack of consent as the triggering factor 
The fact that a trust arises on the basis of a lack of consent, rather than 
presence of a fiduciary relationship, is further supported by the 
relationship between two mortgagees of the same debtor. If two 
mortgagees agree that one of them is to sell the mortgaged asset, an 
express trust of sale proceeds arises in favour of the other.845 This 
situation, where the first mortgagee sells a mortgaged asset with 
consent from the second mortgagee is different from a situation where a 
mortgagee sells without the mortgagee’s consent, as was the case in 
Banner v Berridge. Why does it matter that one of the mortgagees did 
not consent to the sale by another? Clearly a lack of consent to an 
action is not legally significant unless the consent was required in the 
first place. On the facts of Banner v Berridge the requirement of 
consent was imposed by the Merchant Shipping Act 1854846. Where the 
sale was conducted nevertheless without such consent, it was for the 
benefit of prior mortgagees and the first mortgagee was consequently a 
“fiduciary vendor”. In Banner v Berridge the mortgagee was held to be 
a fiduciary but only insofar as the mortgagee held the surplus of the 
proceeds of sale and only because the mortgagee was obliged by a 
statute to obtain consent of the other mortgagee, which he had not done. 
Therefore, the relationship between the two mortgagees was not 
inherently fiduciary. It was not the perceived existence of a fiduciary 
relationship that was the basis for the trust of surplus arising in favour 
one of the mortgagees. If that is true, and the rationale behind section 
105 LPA 1925 and Banner v Berridge is the same, the presence of a 
fiduciary relationship is irrelevant for a statutory trust of sale proceeds 
to arise under section 105 LPA 1925.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
845 Tanner v Heard (1857) 23 Beav 555, 557; 53 ER 219, 219 (Sir Romilly MR):  
“Being entitled, in the first place, to the amount due on his mortgage and the expenses 
of the sale of the ship, and there being a surplus, he was bound to account to the 
Plaintiff in the character of trustee”; (the first mortgagee selling with the consent of the 
second mortgagee was accountable to the second mortgagee as a trustee). See also 
Banner (n 151) 262 (Kay J). 
846 Merchant Shipping Act 1854, s71, which provided that where there were more 
mortgages than one, any registered mortgagee could exercise a power of sale to enforce 
the mortgage so long as the enforcing mortgagee obtained the consent (“concurrence”) 
of the prior mortgagees. 
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Therefore, section 105 LPA 1925 does not require that the selling 
mortgagee owes fiduciary duties to other mortgagees and to the 
mortgagor. To draw a parallel between section 105 LPA 1925 and the 
selling mortgagors in Buhr v Barclays Bank it was not necessary to 
show that the mortgagor owed any fiduciary duties to the mortgagee. If 
a parallel is to be drawn we need to show that there was an obligation 
on the mortgagor to obtain consent of the mortgagee, just like one 
mortgagee had to obtain consent of another mortgagee under the 
Merchant Shipping Act 1854 in Banner v Berridge. This is consistent 
with the notion of a fixed charge advanced in this work. A fixed 
security is security whereby the chargor only undertakes to dispose of 
charged asset with consent of the chargee and consent must be given 
specifically for each substitution, not in advance,847 unless the charge 
falls within FCAR.848 Saying that the mortgagor is a fiduciary when he 
sells without consent in that respect for the mortgagee is redundant.849 
It follows that an analogy with section 105 LPA 1925 is not necessary 
to establish that the mortgagor holds proceeds of an unauthorised 
disposition on trust for the mortgagee. The mortgagee’s claim to 
proceeds of unauthorised disposition has its own legal basis, which 
involves the triggering factor of lack of consent. Lack of consent on its 
own is not an event that leads to a legal response. We will show later 
that it is best to think of it as an unjust factor of lack of authority in 
establishing the event of an unjust enrichment. In Buhr v Barclays 
Bank, however, Arden LJ rejected the analogy with section 105 LPA 
1925 for a different reason. She thought it was because a “principle of 
substitutions” applies.850 The following section examines why Arden LJ 
so held.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
847 Text to nn 683-691. 
848 Text to nn 692-700. 
849 For discussion of the mortgagor as a fiduciary see text to nn 732-747. 
850 Buhr (n 14) [53]. 
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2.3 The right to proceeds arising as a matter of law (Court of 
Appeal reasoning) 
A. The “principle of substitutions” in unauthorised 
dispositions 
In Arden LJ’s view the right to proceeds of an unauthorised disposition 
arose on the basis of the chargee’s proprietary right in the original 
property. Her Ladyship first held that a chargee (or a mortgagee) has a 
proprietary interest in the asset, thus rejecting an argument made by the 
counsel that an equitable charge was insufficient to give an interest in 
land.851 It is undoubtedly correct that a holder of a charge or mortgage 
has a proprietary interest in the subject matter of the charge.852 Arden 
LJ went on to say that this proprietary interest in an asset originally 
subject to the security “is sufficient to give the chargee a proprietary 
interest in an asset, which represents the property originally mortgaged 
following completion of an unauthorised disposition by the 
mortgagor”.853 Arden LJ further held that if the “principle of 
substitutions (and accretions854)” did not apply, there would have been 
a “significant lacuna in the law of mortgages”.855 Thus, the chargee 
would have a right to proceeds of an unauthorised disposition by 
operation of law, that is by virtue of his or her interest in the original 
asset. Yet, there is no explanation in the case why this was so or why it 
was better to explain the chargee’s interest in the proceeds of an 
unauthorised disposition by virtue of the chargee’s interest in the 
original property than, for example, by way of reversal of unjust 
enrichment of the defendant. This section aims to explore the rationale 
for and evaluate the “principle of substitutions” as an explanation of 
proceeds of unauthorised disposition. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
851 Buhr (n 14) [47] citing Bland v Ingrams Estate (No 1) [2001] 1 WLR 1638 (CA) 
1645 (Nourse LJ) (an equitable chargee obtains a proprietary interest in the property). 
852 See above chapter I sections 3.3 and 3.4. 
853 Buhr (n 14) [47]  
854 The right to accretions was discussed in chapter III section 2. 
855 Buhr (n 14) [50]. 
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(a) Rationale for the “principle” 
Perhaps it was the appearance of “simplicity and eminent fairness” of 
the proposition that a mortgagee should be entitled to substitutes856 as 
well as accretions to the mortgaged property that appealed. If so, it will 
be argued that the basis of unjust enrichment promotes fairness to a 
greater extent than the “principle” explanation because it ensures a 
better balance of interests of the secured creditor and innocent third 
party recipients of substitutes enabling the latter to raise the change of 
position defence if the secured creditor came to claim traceable 
proceeds from them. 
(b) Scope of application of the “principle” 
Arden LJ suggests that a mortgagee automatically has a right to 
substitutes of (and accretions to) the subject matter of the security. The 
automatic right to substitutes arises purely because a secured creditor 
has a proprietary interest in an asset.857 The principle was meant to 
apply in the same way in the case of the disposition being authorised or 
unauthorised in the sense that the right to proceeds arises automatically. 
We explained in chapter III that such a principle does not exist in 
relation to substitutes and we discussed in chapter IV that if parties 
wish for the security to extend to substitutes they should say so in the 
agreement.  
Although Arden LJ admitted that a distinction existed between 
authorised and unauthorised dispositions, this distinction did not seem 
to be relevant to the secured creditor’s right to substitutes because that 
right in both authorised and unauthorised dispositions was held to arise 
in the same way: automatically as a matter of principle. The distinction 
between authorised and unauthorised disposition only appears to have 
been relevant in relation to the remedy, not the basis for the right to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
856 Buhr (n 14) [41]. 
857 See Buhr (n 14) [47] (Arden LJ): “the equitable chargee obtains a proprietary 
interest in the property (…) This is sufficient to give the mortgagee a proprietary 
interest in property which represents the property originally mortgaged following 
completion of an unauthorised disposition by the mortgagor.” 
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substitutes. It is not clear whether by using the reference to “adoption” 
of an unauthorised transaction, Arden LJ meant to say that the 
mortgagee had an election or whether the mortgagee had an immediate 
right to proceeds. It seems, however, that since the “principle” was 
meant to apply automatically it applied as an immediate right, 
analogous to the “exchange product theory” known in the trust context, 
whereby the beneficiaries’ rights to traceable proceeds were considered 
to arise automatically.858  
B. Explanations of the automatic security interest in 
substitutes 
(a) Fraud prevention 
Lara McMurtry, who commented on Buhr v Barclays Bank doubted 
that the  “substitutions and accretions principle” could fully explain the 
proprietary interest of a mortgagee in the proceeds of sale.859 
Nevertheless, referring to the same section of Fisher & Lightwood on 
Mortgage as Arden LJ did, McMurtry did not question the existence of 
the principle860 and noted that the purpose of these rules was initially to 
prevent fraud but has later been adapted to promote commercial 
expediency. In this section we evaluate prevention of fraud as an 
explanation for the mortgagee’s right to proceeds of unauthorised 
dispositions. It is argued that prevention of fraud cannot be, if it ever 
were, a valid justification for secured creditor’s right to proceeds.  
First, fraud is based on a proof of wrongdoing861 and would necessarily 
require investigation into the state of mind of the grantor of security 
disposing of collateral. The secured creditor would not be able to claim 
proceeds of dispositions done innocently even if they were 
unauthorised, which is an absurd result.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
858 For discussion of the “exchange product theory” see text to nn 872-879. 
859 McMurtry (n 818) 410. 
860 Ibid. 410, citing Fisher and Lightwood’s Law of Mortgage (1988, 10th edn) 55-57. 
861 Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No 2) [2001] UKHL 44, [2002] 2 AC 773 
affirming [1998] 4 All ER 705 (CA) 712.  
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Second, given that fraud is “brought into play whenever one party has 
acted unconscionably in exploiting the power to direct the conduct of 
another which is derived from the relationship between them”,862 it only 
makes sense to talk about fraud if the victim was capable of behaving 
in a way influenced by the exploitation of the power. The victim must 
have herself done the act that had particular undesirable legal 
consequences. If another person has done that act whilst the victim 
remained inactive, then the act itself should be attacked. Thus, it is 
difficult to say that a secured creditor claiming proceeds of 
unauthorised disposition of collateral was a victim of fraud because he 
was not fraudulently influenced to do anything. He did nothing to 
effectuate the disposition. By disposing of the collateral in an 
unauthorised way, the grantor of security exploited the power derived 
from the relationship between the secured creditor and grantor, but he 
did not exploit the power to direct the conduct of the secured creditor. 
If the exploitation of the power (disposition of the collateral) was itself 
a wrong, then fraudulent or innocent intentions of the disponor should 
not matter. All that matters is that the disposition occurred and that it 
was not authorised by the creditor.  
Third, if fraud were the basis for a claim there would be no reason why 
liability of the mortgagor and the corresponding right of the mortgagee 
would relate to an asset – the proceeds. There is no proprietary 
restitution for wrongs, although until recently this was contentious.863  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
862 Etridge (CA) (n 861) 712.  
863 Lister & Co v Stubbs (1890) 45 Ch D 1 (CA), 15 (Lindley LJ) and Metropolitan 
Bank v Heiron (1880) LR 5 Ex D 319 (CA); confirmed in Sinclair Investments (UK) 
Ltd v Versailles Trade Finance Ltd (in administrative receivership) [2011] EWCA Civ 
347, [2011] 3 WLR 1153 at [66], [76]-[85] (Neuberger LJ) expressly not following 
Attorney General for Hong Kong v Reid [1994] 1 AC 324 (PC). Sinclair was followed 
in e.g. GHLM Trading Ltd v Maroo [2012] EWHC 61 (Ch). Approval for the outcome 
in Sinclair Investments see R Goode, 'Proprietary Liability for Secret Profits - a Reply' 
(2011) 127 LQR 493; G Virgo, 'Profits Obtained in Breach of Fiduciary Duty: Personal 
or Proprietary Claim?' (2011) 70 CLJ 502; approving case comment of the first instance 
judgment of Lewison J ([2010] EWHC 1614 (Ch), approved by CA): A Hicks, 'Case 
Comment. Constructive Trusts of Fiduciary Gain: Lister Revived?' (2011) Conv 62. A 
proprietary response of a constructive trust seems to still be available in Australia: 
Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 6. 
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Arden LJ did not herself consider fraud as a basis for the operation of 
the “principle of substitutions”. What Arden LJ did consider as 
relevant, however, as mentioned above, was the fiduciary duty owed by 
the mortgagor to the mortgagee and the retrospective agency imposed 
on the mortgagor following an unauthorised disposition of the collateral 
when the mortgagee chose to adopt the transaction. We established 
earlier that the possible reading of the Arden LJ dicta is that the claim 
to proceeds arose automatically as a result of a breach of a fiduciary 
duty. It is this fiduciary duty that we now turn to. 
(b) Breach of a fiduciary duty   
It is not clear that a mortgagor owes or ought to owe fiduciary duties to 
the mortgagee. Although the idea that a mortgagor owes fiduciary 
obligations to the mortgagee is controversial,864 for the purposes of this 
section we will assume that a mortgagor could be a fiduciary because 
we focus on how Arden LJ understood the relationship between the 
“principle of substitutions” and the imposition of fiduciary duties on the 
mortgagor. It is not clear whether the “principle of substitutions” 
applies because the mortgagor owes fiduciary duties to the mortgagee 
(the fiduciary relationship would be a pre-requisite for the principle to 
apply) or whether the “principle of substitutions” is a result of the 
existing fiduciary relationship between the mortgagor and the 
mortgagee. There is very little by way of analysis in the case report.  
Arden LJ does not explain why it was important that the mortgagor was 
a fiduciary with respect to the substituted assets while the “principle of 
substitutions (and accretions)” applied. Two alternate conjectures can 
be made: first, the “principle” depends on the existence of a fiduciary 
relationship; and, second, the “principle” exists independently of the 
fiduciary relationship. To see what Arden LJ meant to say it is useful to 
cite the following passage: 
“[Once the unauthorised sale took place] Barclays (if indeed it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
864 See text to nn 732-747. 
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has already done so by commencing these proceedings) could 
adopt this transaction and thus retrospectively make the Buhrs its 
agent. In the context of this transaction, the Buhrs would (…) 
then be bound to keep the proceeds of sale separate from their 
other assets and would hold them (subject to prior charges) on 
trust for Barclays and so would be bound to account to Barclays 
for the amount secured by its charge”.865   
If the “principle of substitutions” applies because the mortgagor owes 
fiduciary duties to the mortgagee the situation resembles the law prior 
to Foskett v McKeown.866 A fiduciary relationship was a pre-requisite to 
making the claim. It was at one point clear that a fiduciary relationship 
must be established before a claim to traceable proceeds could be 
made867 but following Foskett v McKeown the requirement appears to 
be redundant.868  
If Arden LJ meant to say that the fiduciary relationship between the 
parties enabled the mortgagee to assert a right to proceeds, it is difficult 
to understand why it was necessary to say that the mortgagor became 
retrospectively the mortgagee’s agent. As a fiduciary, the mortgagor is 
liable to account for proceeds; he does not need to be made 
retrospectively an agent.  Imposition of agency retrospectively on the 
mortgagor makes more sense on a different interpretation of Arden LJ 
dicta: that the “principle” was meant to apply without there being a 
fiduciary relationship in the first place, so that the mortgagor never 
owed any fiduciary duties to the mortgagee and it is only through the 
application of the “principle” that the mortgagor becomes an agent of 
the mortgagee and as a result of the retrospective agency, the mortgagor 
is said to owe fiduciary duties to the mortgagee with respect to 
substitutes. The position would resemble Chase Manhattan NA v 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
865 Buhr (n 14) [49]. 
866 Foskett (n 285). 
867 Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson [1990] Ch 265, affirmed [1991] Ch 547 (CA) 566. 
868 See also Smith, The Law of Tracing (n 7) 120-132 (arguing that the pre-requisite of 
a fiduciary relationship is not relevant to the exercise of tracing but to the ability of the 
claimant to assert equitable proprietary rights in traceable proceeds). 
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Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd,869 where the payment itself was 
sufficient to give rise to a fiduciary relationship. 
Unlike on the latter view, on the former view, which involves a pre-
requisite of a fiduciary relationship, the “principle of substitutions” is 
not really a principle. It is simply a right to traceable proceeds of an 
asset arising because the defendant owed fiduciary duties to the 
claimant with respect to that asset and because of that fiduciary duty he 
must account for the traceable proceeds. Neither view explains why a 
constructive trust of traceable proceeds would be a response to adoption 
of the unauthorised disposition of an asset in which the mortgagee had 
a security interest and not a beneficial ownership. Even if the 
mortgagor were a fiduciary, it does not automatically mean that the 
Buhrs would hold the proceeds on trust. As Smith noted, duties of good 
faith imposed by a fiduciary relationship are also found in the trust 
context as trustees are also fiduciaries but the trust analogy should not 
be extended too far because fiduciaries only have a duty to account, not 
to hold property on trust.870  Moreover, a person cannot acquire greater 
rights by adopting a transaction, which he did not authorise, than he 
would have acquired had the same transaction been authorised. A 
beneficiary of a constructive trust has greater rights to the subject 
matter of the trust than a secured creditor (mortgagee or chargee) has in 
relation to the subject matter of charge or mortgage.  
Arden LJ seems to be saying, therefore, that (i) a secured creditor is 
automatically entitled to substitutions and accretions; (ii) because of 
this automatic right the secured creditor can adopt an unauthorised 
transaction and (iii) because of the adoption the grantor of security is a 
fiduciary and holds the proceeds on trust for the secured creditor.  
C. Critique of the “principle” 
This section critiques the view that a right to proceeds of unauthorised 
dispositions arises automatically and by operation of law.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
869 [1981] Ch 105, 119. 
870 L Smith, 'Constructive Trust and Constructive Trustees' (1999) 58 CLJ 294. 
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(a) Rejection of the “exchange product theory” 
Since the “principle” was meant to apply automatically it might have 
been intended to work on the basis of the “exchange product theory”871, 
that was thought to have developed in the trust context. If so, we should 
note that the support for this theory in relation to trusts has been 
undermined. The authority for the view that a legal owner has an 
immediate claim to exchange proceeds has been questioned and this 
view, once prevailing,872 is no longer seen as well-founded.873 Taylor v 
Plumer,874 traditionally cited as support for “exchange product theory” 
in the context of legal claims,875 is said to have been decided on 
equitable principles, and cannot therefore be an authority that a legal 
owner has an immediate right to traceable proceeds.876 Similarly, a 
Court of Appeal “exchange product theory” case of Banque Belge pour 
l’Etranger v Hambrouck877 is seen as better explained in terms of a 
power in rem to acquire proceeds.878 In a trust context, a beneficiary’s 
automatic right to proceeds is inconsistent with the beneficiary’s 
choice879 between an ownership share and lien. Rejection of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
871 For discussion of the “automatic exchange product theory“ see further S 
Worthington, 'Justifying Claims to Secondary Profits' in E Schrage (ed) Unjust 
Enrichment and the Law of Contract (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, London, 
New York 2001) 462. Professor Worthington, it should be made clear, was far from 
adopting that theory, pointing out that there are too many cases where an exchange, 
even with the intention to deliver title is ineffective.  
872 Cave v Cave (1880) 15 Ch D 639. See e.g. W Swadling, 'A Claim in Restitution?' 
(1996) 1 LMCLQ 63; E Bant, 'Ignorance as a Ground for Restitution - Can It Survive?' 
(1998) LMCLQ 18. 
873 J Penner, The Law of Trusts (7th edn OUP, 2010) para 11.142. 
874 (1815) 3 M&S 562; see also P Birks, 'Overview: Tracing, Claiming and Defences' in 
P Birks (ed) Laundering and Tracing (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1995) 307-311. 
875 Taylor (n 874) 574 (Ellenborough LJ): “no change of that state and form can divest 
[the property covered with a trust] of such trust”. See also Scott v Surman (1743) Willes 
400, 404; 125 ER 1235, 1239 per Lord Willes CJ “the thing produced ought to follow 
the nature of the thing out of which it is produced” (although this did not apply to 
money since money was not distinguishable), cited with authority recently in Triffit 
Nurseries (a Firm) v Salads Etcetera Ltd (in administrative receivership) [2001] BCC 
457, 461 (Robert Walker LJ). 
876 L Smith, 'Tracing in Taylor v Plumer: Equity in the Court of King's Bench' (1995) 
LMCLQ 240; P Matthews, 'The Legal and Moral Limits of Common Law Tracing' in P 
Birks (ed) Laundering and Tracing (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1995); S Khurshid and P 
Matthews, 'Tracing Confusion' (1979) 95 LQR 78. 
877 [1921] 1 KB 321. 
878 Khurshid and Matthews (n 876).  
879 Foskett (n 285)131 (Lord Millet); Hallett's Estate (n 710) 709 (Sir George Jessel 
MR). 
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“exchange product theory” means that the claim to proceeds must be 
restitutionary.  
(b) Absence of a fiduciary duty 
We already questioned above the view that that the grantor of security 
could owe fiduciary duties to the secured creditor.880 If the “fiduciary 
duty” is so limited in scope as to say that the mortgagor is obliged to 
account to the mortgagee for the proceeds of an unauthorised 
disposition then there are better ways of explaining this than by way of 
a fiduciary duty. The imposition of a fiduciary duty on a mortgagor 
does not by itself ensure a proprietary response (i.e. it does not 
necessarily lead to imposition of a constructive trust). Crucially, a 
person is liable for a benefit because they are fiduciaries, not vice 
versa.881 McMurtry was right to say that if the mortgagee was found in 
a vulnerable position, it was due to its lack of care in dealing with the 
Buhrs not because of any “inherent weakness of its position as holder 
of a security interest”.882 
(c) Adoption of an unauthorised transaction 
Arden LJ said that as a result of the mortgagee’s adoption of the 
unauthorised disposition the mortgagor holds the proceeds on 
constructive trust for the mortgagee. We do not discuss here whether a 
constructive trust is the appropriate remedy.883 What we question now 
is whether a mortgagee can ever be said to have a right to proceeds by 
adopting a transaction. The language of “adoption” of a transaction 
stems from the doctrine of ratification of an act performed without 
authority by an agent in the name of the principal.884 In Bowstead & 
Reynolds on Agency we read that:  
“Ratification (…) involves the idea that in certain circumstances 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
880 See text to nn 732-747. 
881 Although this seems to be the reasoning adopted by Arden LJ, who seems to have 
thought that because a “principle of substitutions and accretions” operated the debtor 
became a fiduciary for the creditor, see text following n 870. 
882 McMurtry (n 818) 412. 
883 This is discussed below, see text to nn 1029-1057. 
884 Munday (n 701) para 6.01. 
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a person can by expression of will adopt a transaction entered 
into by another on his behalf on which he is not liable or entitled 
so as to become liable and/or entitled as if he had made it at the 
time.”885 
The would-be principal may ratify a transaction effected in his name by 
another because that other person either (i) exceeds his actual or 
apparent authority or any other authority conferred by operation of law, 
or (ii) was never employed by as the principal’s agent in the first 
place.886 It is argued that the parallel with the doctrine of ratification is 
insufficient to explain the rights to proceeds an unauthorised 
disposition. 
(i) Insufficiency of the parallel with ratification of an 
agent’s unauthorised act 
First, the debtor makes disposition of an encumbered asset in his own 
name, not in the name of the secured creditor. The debtor is the one 
with the power to dispose of the asset.887 That power does not stem 
from the security holder’s right to the asset. It stems from the debtor’s 
title to the asset.888 The secured creditor is seen as a principal only in a 
very narrow sense: the secured creditor’s right to the asset merely limits 
the debtor in disposing of the asset free of security. The debtor 
therefore lacks general authority to dispose of the asset free of security.  
Second, only a disposition, of which we can say that it is unauthorised, 
can be adopted.889 Here the relevant transaction is the transfer of the 
originally encumbered asset free of security without the secured 
creditor’s consent. In agency law the doctrine of ratification is normally 
justified on the basis of what the parties originally intended.890 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
885 Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency (n 701) para 2-050. 
886 Munday (n 701) para 6.01. 
887 See chapter IV section 3.1.B(b). 
888 See text to nn 718-722. 
889 See Yona International Ltd v Law Réunion Française SA [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 84, 
106 (Moore-Bick J): “The essence of ratification is a decision by the principal to adopt 
the unauthorized act as his own”. 
890 Munday (n 701) para 6.02. 
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Adoption of a transaction makes it authorised ab initio.891 A person 
who ratifies an act of his agent is usually “seeking to extend his 
rights”.892 Therefore, in order to establish what the secured creditor 
would obtain if he were to adopt the unauthorised transaction, we must 
first examine in what position the secured creditor would have been had 
the transaction been authorised. This question was explored in the 
previous chapter. We concluded that an authorised disposition 
necessarily leads to extension of the same security interest to proceeds 
in cases of a fixed charge,893 but for the substitution to be consistent 
with a fixed charge (other than a charge falling under FCAR) the 
chargee must have consented to the specific substitution and the debtor 
must have had a specific obligation to substitute.894 Authorised 
dispositions also lead to extension of the same security to proceeds in 
the case of a floating charge if proceeds, or a class of assets which 
proceeds fall into, are covered by a security agreement expressly or 
impliedly (which they are likely to be).895 If an authorised disposition is 
to withdraw an asset from security, adoption of an unauthorised 
disposition would mean the secured creditor antecedently agreed to the 
disposition free of security. An authorised disposition can of course 
also lead to the security interest being enforceable against a new party – 
the transferee – but a secured creditor cannot adopt an unauthorised 
transaction by enforcing a security interest against a third party if the 
third party can raise a defence clearing the asset of a security interest.896 
But, by analogy to agency law, a principal is restricted in ratifying an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
891 Koenigsblatt v Sweet [1923] 2 Ch 314, 325 (Lord Sterndale MR); Wilson v Tumman 
and Fretson (1843) 6 M & G 236, 242 (Tindal CJ) (adoption of an unauthorised act by 
the principal results in a situation as if the act had been antecedently authorised); Bird v 
Brown (1850) 4 Exch 786, 154 ER 1433. 
892 AMB Generali Holding AG & Ors v SEB Trygg LIV Holding AB [2005] EWCA Civ 
1237, [2006] 1 CLC 849 [46] (Buxton LJ). 
893 Such cases of fixed charges with substitution are rare because of the likelihood of 
recharacterisation as floating charges.  
894 See chapter IV section 3.1.A. 
895 See text to n 800. 
896 If a third party cannot raise a defence that clears the asset of the security interest, the 
secured creditor can still follow the original collateral and assert a security interest in it. 
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act that would constitute an unfair prejudice to third parties.897  
There are problems, however, with explaining rights to proceeds 
through an adoption of an unauthorised disposition. In a fixed charge 
the right to proceeds explained by adoption of an unauthorised 
disposition does not seem to be consistent with the character of the 
charge as fixed.  It is true that for the disposition to be authorised the 
secured creditor must give consent to specific disposition. However, 
there must also be an obligation to substitute. This is not for the creditor 
to allow but for the debtor to undertake. By ratification the creditor 
cannot, it seems, impose an obligation on the debtor to substitute.  
Furthermore, if the chargee gained a right to a substitute by adopting 
the unauthorised disposition this could be seen as giving consent 
retrospectively to a disposition free of security and would be similar to 
giving consent in advance to a disposition. If so, the result would not be 
consistent with a fixed charge where the creditor must give consent to 
each specific substitution.  
Ratification of unauthorised dispositions in the case of a floating charge 
also poses problems because of the possibility that an unauthorised 
disposition might automatically crystallise the charge.898 If a disposition 
without authority from the creditor (e.g. outside of the ordinary course 
of business) crystallises a floating charge, the chargee can only assert a 
right to proceeds by adopting the disposition if adopting the transaction 
automatically decrystallises the charge. A charge agreement may 
contain a clause that the charge can be decrystallised in a unilateral act 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
897 Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency (n 701) para 2-087 citing Lord Audley v Pollard 
(1597) Cro Eliz 561; see also The Owners of the ‘Borvigilant’ [2003] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 
520 [70] (Clarke LJ): “ratification is not effective where to permit it would unfairly 
prejudice a third party”; Smith v Henniker-Major & Co [2003] Ch 182 [71] (Robert 
Walker LJ). The strongest example of exception to ability of a principal to ratify 
concerns property rights: Bolton Partners v Lambert (1889) 41 Ch D 295, 307: “an 
estate once vested cannot be divested by the doctrine of ratification”; Bird (n 891) cf 
consideration of that case in Keighley Maxstead & v Durant [1901] AC 240 (HL) 247-
249 (Macnaghten LJ); see also Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency (n 701) para 2-089. 
This area of agency law is, however, complex and controversial. See generally Munday 
(n 701) para 6.36; C Tan, 'The Principle in Bird v Brown Revisited' (2001) 117 LQR 
626, 630-634 
898 Beale et al, The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing (n 2) para 6.84. 
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such notice given by the chargee.899 It is conceivable that an act 
constituting adoption of an unauthorised disposition could also be a 
notice of decrystallisation, in which case the chargee would end up with 
the same floating charge over the proceeds. Decrystallisation is, 
however, controversial.900 If by adopting the disposition the creditor 
cannot cause a crystallised charge to decrystallise, the creditor also 
cannot extend the rights to proceeds, which she otherwise would have 
had if the charge did not crystallised (i.e. adoption would not lead to a 
right to proceeds and the creditor would need to claim them as proceeds 
of authorised disposition). In cases where an unauthorised disposition 
does not automatically crystallise a floating charge, the creditor may 
adopt the disposition and extend the floating charge to proceeds of 
unauthorised disposition so long as she would have had a floating 
charge over proceeds if disposition was authorised. Whether a floating 
chargee automatically has a floating charge over proceeds is not a 
question of overreaching but – as was argued in the previous chapter – 
of an express or implied term, and is not inherent in the nature of the 
floating charge.901 
Ratification does not seem to explain the right to proceeds of an 
unauthorised disposition. In Buhr v Barclays Bank the security was 
fixed. Although Barclays Bank could be seen to retrospectively grant 
authority to the disposition free of security, it seems that they could not, 
due to the fixed character of security, impose an obligation to acquire a 
substitute by way of ratification. Therefore, Barclays Bank could not be 
said to claim proceeds as a result of adoption (ratification) of the 
unauthorised sale of collateral.   
(ii) Power in rem or election 
Assuming that there are cases, where a secured creditor may claim 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
899 Ibid. para 6.88 citing Covacich v Riordan [1994] 2 NZLR 502 (NZ HC).  
900 R Grantham, 'Refloating a Floating Charge' (1997) CFILR 53; C Tan, 'Automatic 
Crystallization, De-Crystallization and Convertability of Charges' (1998) CFILR 41 
(both suggesting that once crystallised, a fixed charge cannot turn into a floating 
charge). 
901 Text to n 800. 
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proceeds by adopting an unauthorised transaction, a question arises 
whether the right arises automatically or not. The support for the view 
that the right to traceable proceeds arises automatically902 has been 
questioned as already mentioned.903 Moreover, if the claim were to 
arise automatically the number of assets subject to the original title 
would be multiplied by the number of proceeds resulting from 
unauthorised transactions. The claimant would own all these assets 
prima facie so in order to prevent her from recovering more than once 
the law would need to find a mechanism of refusing the claimant the 
ownership (problem of geometrical multiplication).904 There are two 
ways of explaining why the claimant’s right to proceeds does not arise 
automatically upon the unauthorised disposition: a power or an 
election.905 If we say that the claimant has a “power”, we indicate that 
he has no right to the proceeds from the moment of the substitution and 
it is only by somehow asserting the claim that he acquires the right to 
proceeds.906 By contrast, if we say that the claimant has an “election” (a 
view preferred, for example, by Professor Smith) this means that the 
claimant already holds rights in the traceable proceeds from the 
moment of substitution and so he may pick between claiming proceeds 
and the original asset.907 This would be similar to an election by an 
innocent party to a breach of contract between treating the contract as 
discharged or continuing.908 Whether the claimant has an “election” or 
a “power” depends on whether we think the claimant (here: the secured 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
902 Cave (n 872); with respect to legal claims to traceable assets see nn 874-875. 
903 See n 876. 
904 See Smith, The Law of Tracing (n 7) 358-361; Worthington, 'Justifying Claims to 
Secondary Profits' (n 871) 462. 
905 Smith, The Law of Tracing (n 7) 380 (pointing out that this is a way of dealing with 
the problem of ‘geometrical multiplication’ of claims). 
906 Ibid. 380. 
907 Ibid. 380. There are in fact two kinds of election: between different kinds of assets 
(traceable proceeds and original asset) and between personal and proprietary claims, as 
Professor Smith pointed out (Smith, The Law of Tracing (n 7) 375-383). We are not 
interested here in the latter election because we are not interested in establishing 
personal claims. As stated at the beginning, the purpose of this chapter is to establish a 
proprietary claim to proceeds, which would be aimed at preserving the proprietary 
bargain the creditor made when a security interest was created. 
908 Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827 (HL), 849 (Diplock 
LJ); election as part of the general contract law – see Ultraframe (UK) Ltd v Fielding 
[2005] EWHC 1638 (Ch) [1417].  
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creditor) has a claim to proceeds arising from the moment of 
unauthorised disposition of the collateral or not. The issue of “election” 
or “power” is secondary. The first and foremost issue is when the right 
to proceeds is thought to arise. The rights, which the claimant holds in 
the substitutes from the moment of substitution, are easier to explain if 
we accept the rei vindicatio basis for the claim.  
Following the unauthorised disposition the secured creditor could 
choose to adopt the unauthorised transaction or not. If the parallel with 
agency is consequently to be drawn, adoption of the transaction ought 
to put the parties in a situation they would have been had the 
transaction been authorised ab initio. But ratification only gets us at 
most to the point where the creditor authorises disposition of the old 
asset free of security. It cannot explain the acquisition of the new asset 
by the debtor. 
3 A new right to proceeds of unauthorised dispositions  
Claims to traceable proceeds raise numerous problems in general law, 
not just in relation to secured transactions. The difficulties can be 
roughly divided into two groups. The first is the legal basis, or 
theoretical justification, for such claims. The issue is not purely of 
academic interest. The results may differ in practice depending on 
which justification of such claims is accepted. Moreover, a 
rationalization of the conflicting case-law would improve the certainty 
of law in this area.  The second issue, inevitably intertwined with the 
first one, is whether the claims are proprietary, to what extent they are 
proprietary and what their nature is. These questions have been widely 
explored in the context of misappropriation of trust property by a 
trustee but less so in the case of dispositions of property encumbered 
with a security interest.909 Parallels can be drawn between security 
interests and a beneficiary’s interest in trust property. A beneficiary’s 
interest under a trust can be seen as a proprietary interest in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
909 See Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (n 1) para 1-60. 
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individual assets within the trust fund.910 This is controversial911 but we 
assume so here.   A secured creditor’s right, whether under a mortgage 
or a charge, can also be seen as a property right in individual asset 
where the charge is fixed but it is controversial to say so of a floating 
charge prior to crystallisation. For the purposes of this work, a more 
useful way of thinking of a floating charge is as a charge with authority 
to deal and of a fixed charge as an interest in property removing from 
the grantor of security the authority to deal with the asset, as was 
suggested in the previous chapter.912 Assets encumbered with a security 
interest, just like trust assets, are held by another (a trustee, a chargor) 
who has a power to dispose of them. Unlike a trustee, a chargor under a 
fixed charge is not to exercise this power. He is not to invest or 
otherwise manage the property if managing involves dispositions. A 
chargor’s position resembles most closely the position of a trustee 
under a bare trust since the obligation of the latter is limited to merely 
holding the property.913 The difference between a charge and any type 
of trust is that in the latter the property right holder is a beneficial 
owner. A chargee is not. He only has an equitable interest in the 
property. Even a mortgagee, who holds legal or equitable title to 
property, does not have the beneficial ownership of an asset that a 
beneficiary does. A mortgagee only holds title to the property insofar as 
he may resort to it to discharge the secured debt when the debtor 
defaults; his title is in a sense contingent on a condition subsequent, the 
condition being the non-discharge of the obligation by the debtor.914 
Despite these differences between the nature of a trust interest and a 
security interest, parallels with beneficiary’s claims to traceable 
proceeds will help us shed light on secured creditor’s claims to 
proceeds.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
910 Nolan (n 770); Sheehan, 'Property in a Fund, Tracing and Unjust Enrichment' (n 7). 
911 For a view that a beneficiary has a property right in the reified fund, not individual 
assets, see Penner, 'Value, Property and Unjust Enrichment: Trusts of Traceable 
Proceeds' (n 770). For a view that the beneficiary has a right against the trustee’s right 
(so-called “persistent” right) see McFarlane (n 338). 
912 See Chapter IV section 3.1.B. 
913 See generally P Matthews, 'All About Bare Trusts: Part 1' (2005) Private Client 
Business 266. 
914 See also text to 147. 
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The discussion on proceeds is necessarily limited and outside of its 
scope are some important questions such as whether it is logically and 
conceptually possible that a right in rem is an event giving rise to other 
rights, or whether a right in rem itself can only be a response to other 
events such as unjust enrichment.915 Associated with these difficulties 
is the question about the nature of tracing, which we do not explore 
here. The prevailing view is accepted here, namely that tracing is 
neither a claim nor a remedy.916 The contrary view, questioning tracing 
as a neutral process disassociated from the proprietary claim,917 is not 
followed. 
3.1 Debate over the legal basis of a new right 
The question that we now address is why a creditor who has a security 
interest in asset 1 should have a property interest in asset 2 if asset 2 is 
an identifiable substitute of asset 1. There are two major explanations, 
discussed primarily in a trust context.  
A. Unjust enrichment and vindicatio as the primary 
sources of the new right 
Rights contingent on tracing are said to arise either to reverse unjust 
enrichment of the defendant918 or as a vindication of existing property 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
915 See the debate between e.g. R Grantham and C Rickett, 'Property Rights as a 
Legally Significant Event' (2003) CLJ 717 (arguing that property is an event) and P 
Birks, 'Receipt' in P Birks and A Pretto (eds), Breach of Trust (Hart Publishing, Oxford 
2002) 216-222; P Birks, 'Property, Unjust Enrichment and Tracing' (2001) 54 CLP 231 
(arguing that property is a response). For refinement of Grantham and Rickett’s thesis 
see L Smith, 'Unjust Enrichment, Property and the Structure of Trusts' (2000) 116 LQR 
412, 412, 421-422 (instead of treating property as the event, he suggests that it is the 
‘non-wrongful interference with property rights’ that is the event). 
916 Foskett (n 285) 128-129 (Millett LJ quoting Smith, The Law of Tracing (n 7) 120-
130, 277-289, 342-347; the issue of whether or not there are two separate rules 
917 S Evans, 'Property, Proprietary Remedies and Insolvency: Conceptualism or 
Candour' (2000) 5 Deakin L Rev 31 (arguing that tracing involves deliberate normative 
choices by the courts as to when equitable proprietary rights surviving mixing and 
substitution); C Rotherham, 'The Metaphysics of Tracing: Substituted Title and 
Property Rethoric' (1996) 34 Osgoode Hall LJ 321; J Dietrich and P Ridge, '"The 
Receipt of What?": Questions Concerning Third Party Recipient Liability in Equity and 
Unjust Enrichment' (2007) 31 Melb U L Rev 47, 53 (referring to L Smith’s view of 
tracing as “orthodox”); L Ho, 'Book Review of 'Mapping the Law: Essays in Memory 
of Peter Birks' ' (2007) TLI 110; see also R Calnan, Proprietary Rights in Insolvency 
(OUP, Oxford 2010) paras 7.3 and 7.11 “[tracing] is effected by operation of law”. 
918 Birks, Unjust Enrichment (n 809) 35; Birks, 'Receipt' (n 915) 216-222; P Birks, 'On 
Taking Seriously the Difference between Tracing and Claiming' (1997) 11 Trust Law 
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interest in the original asset (as proprietary restitutionary claims).919 
Some authors have also suggested a third basis for claiming,920 based 
on wrongs921, whilst others have altogether denied a need for a doctrinal 
justification for the claims based on tracing.922 However, it seems that 
the last two views have not gained much support in practice or 
academia, so we shall focus our analysis on the first two. The skeleton 
of the unjust enrichment explanation of beneficiary’s claims to 
treaceable proceeds is as follows.923 A claimant has a new proprietary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
International 2, 7-8; P Birks, 'Property and Unjust Enrichment: Categorical Truths' 
(1997) New Zeland Law Review 623, 661; P Birks, 'On Establishing a Proprietary 
Base' (1995) 3 RLR 83, 91-92; Birks, 'Property, Unjust Enrichment and Tracing' (n 
915); A Burrows, 'Proprietary Restitution: Unmasking Unjust Enrichment' (2001) 117 
LQR 412; A Burrows, The Law of Restitution (3rd edn OUP, Oxford 2011) 185-189; R 
Chambers, 'Tracing and Unjust Enrichment' in J Neyers, M McInnes and S Pitel (eds), 
Understanding Unjust Enrichment (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2004); Smith, The Law of 
Tracing (n 7) 300 but see L Smith, 'Restitution: The Heart of Corrective Justice' (2001) 
79 Texas L Rev 2115 which represents a more nuanced approach leaning towards the 
vindication view; L Smith, 'Unravelling Proprietary Restitution' (2004) 40 Can Bus L J 
317, 327-328 (explaining his “middle view (…) closer to the [vindicatio] position than 
[unjust enrichment view]”.) 
919 Foskett (n 285); G Virgo, The Principles of the Law of Restitution (2nd edn OUP, 
Oxford 2006) 11-17; G Virgo, 'Vindicating Vindication: Foskett v McKeown Reviewed' 
in A Hudson (ed) New Perspectives on Property Law, Obligations and Restitution 
(Rutledge Cavendish, London 2004); G Virgo, 'Restitution through the Looking Glass' 
in J Getzler (ed) Rationalizing Property, Equity and Trusts (Butterworths, London 
2003) 82; Penner, 'Value, Property and Unjust Enrichment: Trusts of Traceable 
Proceeds' (n 770) 313-314; Penner, The Law of Trusts (n 873) paras 2.46; 11.89-11.95; 
11.116-11.120; R Grantham and C Rickett, 'Property and Unjust Enrichment: 
Categorical Truths or Unnecessary Complexity' (1997) 2 NZ Law Rev 623; R 
Grantham and C Rickett, 'Property and Unjust Enrichment' (1997) NZLR 668, 675-684; 
P Millett, 'Proprietary Restitution' in S Degeling and J Edelman (eds), Equity in 
Commercial Law (Lawbook Co, Sydney 2005) 314; P Millett, 'Property or Unjust 
Enrichment' in A Burrows and L Rodger (eds), Mapping the Law: Essays in Memory of 
Peter Birks (OUP, Oxford 2006) 265, 273 (arguing that the law of tracing is itself part 
of the law of property); Ho, (n 917); W Swadling, 'Property and Unjust Enrichment' in J 
Harris (ed) Property Problems from Genes to Pension Funds (Kluwer, London 1997) 
130; Swadling, 'A Claim in Restitution?' (n 872); Bant, (n 872). See also Smith, 'Unjust 
Enrichment, Property and the Structure of Trusts' (n 915) 413; L Smith, 'Transfers' in P 
Birks and A Pretto (eds), Breach of Trust (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2002) 121, fn 42.  
920 The three options are presented by Birks, 'Receipt' (n 915) 213. 
921 Such as wrong of misappropriation, or a wrongful interference; WH Kelke, An 
Epitome of Leading Cases in Equity (3rd edn Sweet&Maxwell, London 1913) 22. For a 
recent revival see Worthington, 'Justifying Claims to Secondary Profits' (n 871) 451, 
455 (rejecting property and unjust enrichment analyses). If the basis were to be the law 
of tort, the claimant would need to show that they suffered a loss that the defendant is 
under a duty to compensate. See S Hedley, Restitution: Its Division and Ordering 
(Sweet&Maxwell, London 2001) 150-153 (comparing different causes of action); 
Chambers (n 918) 265-279. Cf Smith, 'Transfers' (rejecting the ‘wrongs’ basis). 
922 Rickett (n 785) 138 considering tracing rules to be simply just arbitrary problem 
solvers, without any doctrinal explanation. 
923 This is based on the summary in Smith, 'Unravelling Proprietary Restitution' (n 918) 
327-328. 
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interest in the traceable proceeds, which did not exist before the 
disposition. The new interest must have a source. Consent or a wrong 
are not suitable sources, leaving unjust enrichment and a category of 
“miscellany”. Unjust enrichment fits as an explanation since the trustee 
is enriched unless a new interest arises; the beneficiary is disenriched 
because of the misappropriation of the trust property, even though there 
is no transfer in the normal sense; and the enrichment is unjust. By 
contrast, the proponents of the vindicatio explanation begin with the 
premise that the law protects property, understood widely to include all 
assets in one’s patrimony. One of the methods of that protection is by 
giving rights in substitutes. The source of new right is, therefore, the 
interference with the defendant’s property rights. On either explanation, 
it is accepted that the beneficiary has an election924 or a power,925 which 
he must exercise before a proprietary right in the substitute is 
granted.926 This means that a right to a new asset is not immediate927 in 
the sense that it does not arise automatically upon disposition.928 
B. Distinction between unjust enrichment and vindicatio view 
The distinction between the unjust enrichment view and the vindicatio 
view is not purely academic. Choosing one over another has an impact 
on what the claimant must prove, what defences the defendant may 
raise and how robust the claimant’s claim is vis-à-vis third parties.929 
On the rei vindicatio view the claimant’s right to traceable proceeds 
flows from the property right he holds in the original asset. While a 
claimant on the vindicatio view must show that he had a property right 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
924 In a trust context this was so decided in Foskett (n 285) where the claimant was 
given an election between a beneficial co-ownership share and a lien. 
925 See Penner, The Law of Trusts (n 873) para 11.132. 
926 See, however, P Jaffey, The Nature and Scope of Restitution. Vitiated Transfers, 
Imputed Contracts and Disgorgement (Hart, Oxford 2000) 300 (suggesting that once it 
is agreed that the claim is a power in rem very little turns on classifying the claim as 
based on property law or unjust enrichment). 
927 This appears to be contrary to Cave (n 872). 
928 This is the so-called “automatic exchange product“ theory; see Worthington, 
'Justifying Claims to Secondary Profits' (n 871) 462. Professor Worthington, it should 
be made clear, was far from adopting that theory, pointing out that there are too many 
cases where an exchange, even with the intention to deliver title is ineffective. For 
rejection of this theory see text to nn 872-879. 
929 Foskett (n 285) 129 (Millett LJ). 
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to an asset and that the asset in the hands of the defendant is the 
traceable proceeds of the original asset, on the unjust enrichment view 
the claimant must show that the defendant has been enriched at his 
expense and that the enrichment was unjust. If unjust enrichment is the 
explanation, the defendant (other than the trustee or the chargor) may 
raise a change of position defence. If the defence is understood as based 
on disenrichment,930 it is not likely to be available on the vindicatio 
view931 because the claimant is not disenriched as the title was not 
transferred.932 Although it has been suggested that change of position 
may arise even on the vindicatio view, as it protects defendant’s 
reasonable reliance interest,933 the prevailing view seems to be that the 
third party defendant (i.e. other than the chargor or the trustee) would 
be left only with the defence of a bona fide purchaser of legal title to 
the proceeds without notice.934 That defence – if successful – will clear 
the asset of the claimant’s title.935 If the purchaser is of equitable title, 
the person who had equitable interest in the asset first prevails.936  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
930 P Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (Revised edn Clarendon Press, 
Oxford 1989) 441; R Nolan, 'Change of Position' in P Birks (ed) Laundering and 
Tracing (Clarendon Press, 1995) 136. 
931 Foskett (n 285) 108 (Browne-Wilkinson), 127 (Millett LJ). 
932 Millett, 'Proprietary Restitution' (n 919) 318; W Swadling, The Limits of 
Restitutionary Claims: A Comparative Analysis (UKNCCL, BIICL, 1997) 79 showing 
that these two defences perform two different functions; P Millett, 'Restitution and 
Constructive Trusts' (1998) 114 LQR 399, 409 agreeing with W Swadling and revoking 
his previous view that  the bona fide purchaser defence is a paradigm change of 
position defence in P Millett, 'Tracing the Proceeds of Fraud' (1991) 107 LQR 71, 82.  
933 Smith, 'Unravelling Proprietary Restitution' (n 918) 331. 
934 The issue of “bona fides” is separate from “without notice” although if the defendant 
had notice, there is no need to consider whether he was in good faith: Nelson v Larholt 
[1948] 1 KB 339; Midland Bank Trust Co Ltd v Green [1981] AC 513, 528 
(Wilberforce LJ), also noted in Dietrich and Ridge, (n 917) 53 fn 35. 
935 Foskett (n 285) 129; Millett, 'Proprietary Restitution' (n 919) 309, 315. 
936 See generally Cloutte v Storey [1911] 1 Ch 18 (CA) 31 (Farwell LJ): “a purchaser 
for value without notice but without the legal title can only rely on such equitable 
defences as are open to purchasers without the legal title who are subsequent in time 
against prior equitable titles”. See also Meagher, Heydon and Leeming Meagher, 
Gummow & Lehane's Equity Doctrines and Remedies (n 715) 339: “There is no general 
doctrine of “bona fide purchaser of an equitable estate for value without notice””. See 
also Dietrich and Ridge (n 917) 54. 
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3.2 Inadequacy of the vindicatio view  
It is argued that the rei vindicatio explanation is not consistent with the 
view of non-possessory security interests advanced in this work and 
that the secured creditor’s right to proceeds of unauthorised disposition 
should be based on unjust enrichment. It is not clear to whether the 
vindicatio view could be consistent with the view expressed above that 
adoption of an unauthorised disposition may be insufficient to explain 
the right to proceeds.937 Moreover, as Virgo says, a claimant wishing to 
vindicate his proprietary rights must show that the defendant received 
an asset, in which the claimant has an interest, either legal or 
equitable.938 The true difficulty rests with determining that the claimant 
still has his proprietary interest in the transformed new asset. This step 
is controversial in the context of owners, whether legal or equitable, 
and it is even more difficult in the context of secured creditors, as we 
shall see. We begin by looking at cases seen as supporting the view of 
vindicatio justifications of rights to traceable proceeds. It will be seen 
that considerations supporting the vindicatio view are either not likely 
to apply in the context of security interests or they are better seen as 
authority for unjust enrichment view. 
A. Reasons based on authorities for rei vindicatio view 
(a) Cases where the claimant remains equitable owner 
The seminal case on claims to traceable proceeds is Foskett v 
McKeown.939 It arose in the context of beneficiaries’ claims following 
misappropriation of trust property. It will be recalled that a trustee 
(Murphy) held money on trust for a number of purchasers of land. 
Murphy breached the trust by paying £20,000 trust money for two out 
of five premiums towards his own life insurance (fourth and fifth 
premiums). After Murphy’s suicide the insurers paid to the trustees of 
the policy monies (about £1m) as the death benefit held for the benefit 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
937 See text to nn 887-901. 
938 Virgo, The Principles of the Law of Restitution (n 919) 570, 581. 
939 Foskett (n 285). 
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of the policy beneficiaries – Murphy’s children. The purchasers 
claimed the proceeds of the policy.940 The question was whether they 
were entitled to a beneficial co-ownership share (which amounted to 
about £500k) of the insurance proceeds proportionate to their 
contribution to the money used to pay insurance premiums, or merely 
to a lien on the proceeds of the policy for the amount of money paid as 
premiums (£20k). The Court of Appeal held by majority941 that the 
beneficiaries could only claim a lien on the proceeds of the policy, but 
the House of Lords, by a bare majority, decided they had an election 
between the proportionate share and a lien. Lord Millett famously 
rejected the unjust enrichment explanation in favour of the property law 
basis but he did so by focusing on reasons why unjust enrichment 
justification does not work, not why interference with property law 
does work.  
(b) The authority involving legal title 
Cases, where the claimant purportedly retains legal title to the asset are 
more difficult than the trust beneficiary cases because, unlike with 
Foskett v McKeown, it is not clear on what legal basis they were 
decided. Lipkin Gorman (a firm) v Karpnale942 is a case of primary 
interest here. In Lipkin Gorman (a firm) v Karpnale a partner in a 
claimant firm of solicitors misappropriated client money, which he 
gambled away at the defendant’s casino. The claimant brought a 
restitutionary claim to recover the value of money received by the 
defendant. Although the House of Lords agreed that all restitutionary 
claims are based on unjust enrichment943 it has been argued that the 
term “unjust enrichment” has only been used in the broadest, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
940 This was after they obtained already a compensation from the bank from whose 
accounts the money had been misappropriated. 
941 [1998] Ch 265 (Sir Richard Scott V-C, Hobhouse LJ; Morritt LJ dissenting): 
purchasers were entitled only insofar as they could trace their money into the 
premiums. 
942 [1991] 2 AC 548 (HL). 
943 See e.g. Lipkin (n 942) 572 (Goff LJ). 
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descriptive sense and that the true basis was vindicatio.944 Since the 
House of Lords did not identify the elements of the defendant’s unjust 
enrichment it can be argued that the ground for restitution was the 
vindicatio of property rights if it can be shown that the claimant firm 
retained title to cash.945 Both Lord Goff and Lord Templeman spoke of 
the claimant’s continuing proprietary interest in the money from the 
moment it was stolen by the partner until its traceable proceeds were 
received by the defendant.946 This interpretation of Lipkin Gorman 
prevailed in Armstrong DLW GmbH v Winnington Networks Ltd.947 
Morris QC sitting as a deputy judge held that the firm had legal title to 
cash, thus characterizing the case as one of proprietary restitution but 
not unjust enrichment.  
However, this interpretation overlooks Lord Goff’s reliance948 on two 
Privy Council decisions,949 according to which where a partner draws 
on partnership account without authority, he alone and not the 
partnership obtains legal title to the money so obtained. Sheehan950 
rightly argued that what the firm had was a legal power to re-vest title 
in the money, akin to cases of rescission of contracts for fraud.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
944 Virgo, The Principles of the Law of Restitution (n 919) 13 and 571 (finding it ironic 
that a case, which in his view has nothing to do with unjust enrichment, stands as 
authority for its recognition in English law); cf E McKendrick, 'Restitution, Misdirected 
Funds and Change of Position' (1992) 55 MLR 377; P Birks, 'The English Recognition 
of Unjust Enrichment' (1991) LMCLQ 473. 
945 Virgo, The Principles of the Law of Restitution (n 919) 13. See also L Smith, 
'Simplifying Claims to Traceable Proceeds' (2009) 125 LQR 338, 341 and 348 (arguing 
that the firm had a “strange innominate interest”, behaving like the beneficial interest in 
a trust and concluding that this interest must have been a legal interest since the claim 
was a common law claim in money had and received, and that the claim was a common 
law claim to vindicate equitable interest under a trust, not a proprietary common law 
claim to traceable proceeds of unauthorised disposition). 
946 Lipkin (n 942) 560 (Lord Templeman), 572 (Lord Goff). 
947 [2012] EWHC 10 (Ch), [2012] 3 All ER 425; Morris QC also held that FC Jones v 
Jones [1997] Ch 159 was further support for this proprietary restitutionary claim. For 
further support see the interpretation of Macmillan v Bishopsgate Investment Trust plc 
(No 3) (CA) [1996] 1 WLR 387 (see in particular Auld LJ at 409 seeing unjust 
enrichment as difficult to find) by G Virgo, 'Reconstrucing the Law of Restitution' 
(1996 ) 10 TLI 20 and Swadling, 'A Claim in Restitution?' (n 872); Virgo, The 
Principles of the Law of Restitution (n 919) 12. 
948 Lipkin (n 942) 573 (Lord Goff). 
949 Union Bank of Australia Ltd v McClintock [1922] 1 AC 240 (PC) and Commercial 
Banking Co of Sydney Ltd v Mann [1961] AC 1 (PC). 
950 D Sheehan, 'Proprietary Remedies for Mistake and Ignorance: An Unseen 
Equivalence' (2002) RLR 69. 
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This argument, it is suggested, can be further strengthened. Lord Goff 
said that the “difficulty” posed by the Privy Council authority could be 
surmounted by viewing the cash in the bank account as a species of 
legal property.951 When a bank account is in credit the bank is the 
account holder’s debtor with respect to the amount represented by the 
bank balance. This does not raise problems. But then Lord Goff said:  
“since the debt was enforceable at common law, the chose in 
action was legal property belonging to the solicitors at common 
law. There is (…) no reason why the solicitors should not be able 
to trace their property at common law in that chose in action (…) 
into its product, i.e. cash drawn by Cass from their client 
account”.952  
The error committed in this reasoning is the divorcing of legal title 
from the subject matter of the title (the legal property – the debt). The 
debt in the account was enforceable at common law by the firm so long 
as the bank owed the sum to the firm. The debt was the firm’s property 
(the firm “owned” the debt) in the sense that the firm was able to 
transfer the debt to third parties, so that the bank would owe the debt to 
a third party. Debt owed by a bank is a chose in action. When Cass 
drew on the client account the debt owed by the bank to the firm was 
reduced. The bank cannot be said to owe the withdrawn sum to the 
firm. The firm therefore did not own the money withdrawn by Cass 
because Cass had power to draw on the account. It was not correct to 
extrapolate the legal title to the property so until the firm exercised their 
power to assert legal title to the traced money, the firm had no legal 
title to it. To support the solicitors’ right to trace their property Lord 
Goff cited Marsh v Keating.953 It is suggested that this case ought to be 
distinguished because Cass, unlike Fauntleroy in Marsh v Keating, had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
951 Lipkin (n 942) 573-574 (Lord Goff). 
952 Lipkin (n 942) 574 (Lord Goff). 
953 (1834) 1 Bing (NC) 198 (HL), 131 ER 1094. 
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power (ability) to draw on the account (but no authority).954 Fauntleroy 
forged Mrs Keating’s signature so she did not confer on him power to 
transfer her share in the stock. The legal title to money in Lipkin 
Gorman vested in Cass and the case is better explained by a power to 
vest legal title by the firm. 
A parallel can be drawn between Cass withdrawing cash from the 
firm’s client account with power to do so (but no authority) and a 
debtor disposing of his asset encumbered with a security interest. The 
debtor selling an encumbered asset, just like a solicitor drawing on an 
account, has the power to dispose of the asset but their authority to do 
so may be limited. In the case of a fixed charge, as we have seen in 
chapter IV, authority to deal is very limited.955  If Lipkin Gorman can 
be explained in terms of an unjust enrichment claim with the unjust fact 
of lack of authority, a similar claim must be available where a secured 
creditor sues the debtor who disposed of an asset within his power to 
dispose but in breach of the granted authority.  
B. Argument from principle  
Birks accepted that when the claimant seeks to recover an asset that 
belonged to her from the start, i.e. an asset to which she has title, the 
claim falls within the law of property. However, when the claimant 
seeks to recover a different asset than the one which originally 
belonged to the claimant, she must first show a right to it. Birks said 
that this cannot take place by a mere assertion of a property right to the 
traceable proceeds but requires a separate cause of action - unjust 
enrichment of the defendant.956  
 
We could say that the concept of ownership comprises, among its 
various incidents, also the right to retransfer property or its traceable 
proceeds when the exercise of the power to transfer was flawed in some 
way. This is in fact Peter Jaffey’s argument. He says that unjust 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
954 We have seen a parallel split between power to dispose and authority earlier, see text 
to nn 706-707. 
955 See text below n 731. 
956 Birks, Unjust Enrichment (n 809) 33-36 
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enrichment can be dispensed with because the claims that purport to be 
made in unjust enrichment can be subsumed to other areas of law. If an 
asset belonged to the claimant, Jaffey argues: 
 
“it is implicit in his or her right of ownership that he or she 
should be able to recover the money (or its value) from anyone 
who received it other than trough a valid exercise of his or her 
power as owner to transfer it”.957  
 
Jaffey’s argument depends on a premise that issues of transferability 
and modes of acquisition of property are part of property law. As a 
result, the questions of consequences of mistransfers are also within the 
ambit of property law. A counterargument was put forward by 
Klimchuk, who said that including among the incidents of ownership 
the rules that govern the consequence of mistransfer “overburdens the 
concept of ownership”.958 This is because the concept of ownership 
would have to include the effects of mistransfer of ownership rather 
than mistransfer of the asset itself. Exclusion of others from 
interference with the asset is the essence of ownership. An owner, 
whose asset was mistransferred ought to be able to recover the asset or 
obtain some other a remedy for the mistransfer. It does not necessarily 
follow that the owner ought to be able to recover the ownership of the 
asset automatically, as Jaffey seems to suggest. It seems that if Jaffey’s 
argument were to be correct, an owner whose asset had been 
mistransferred would prima facie be able to recover it from anyone on 
the basis of exercise of his power to recover, rather than by way of 
making a claim. This would arguably leave the state of the defence of a 
bona fide purchaser of legal title uncertain because there would be no 
reason why a bona fide purchaser should be able to raise a defence 
against the exercise of a power by the owner. No third party would be 
able to show that they are purchasers of legal title if ownership of every 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
957 P Jaffey, 'Two Theories of Unjust Enrichment' in J Neyers, M McInnes and S Pitel 
(eds), Understanding Unjust Enrichment (Hart, Oxford 2004) 139, 147. 
958 D Klimchuk, 'The Scope and Structure of Unjust Enrichment' (2007) 57 U Toronto 
LJ 795, 804 fn 25, indicating also that Lionel Smith expressed the view that it seems be 
asking too much of the concept of ownership.  
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asset mistransferred asset fell with the transferor. Moreover, Honoré 
who famously listed a number of incidents of ownership959 did not 
include a right to retransfer among them. Honoré’s list of incidents 
concerns the thing, not rights to the thing. Honoré does of course talk 
about protection of ownership. He lists as one of the attributes of 
ownership the right to security of possession or ownership (right to 
prevent others from use of the asset). This incident, however does not 
go as far as Jaffey’s argument that ownership encompasses the right to 
retransfer the thing or the thing’s value.  
Penner also argues that a right to give (right to transfer) is part of 
property rights.960 Unlike Jaffey, Penner argues that a power to sell 
(with sale being one of the main modes of conveyance of property) 
exists because people have the power to make contracts to exploit our 
resources, including property rights.961 Sheehan agrees that the right to 
sale is dependent on the right to contract.962 It must be true that a power 
to sell cannot exist without a right to contract. A comparative law 
argument could be added. In civilian jurisidictions transfers of property 
in sales or exchanges are always considered in the context of contracts 
to sell or to exchange. Even if transfer of property is seen as separate 
and independent from contract, like in German law,963 it cannot take 
place without a contract of sale having taken place. In French law,964 on 
the other hand, property is considered to pass solo consensus,965 so 
contract and conveyance are one act but with clearly distinguishable 
effects in contract law and property law. We will also draw on this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
959 Honoré, 'Ownership' (n 4) 108. 
960 Penner, The Idea of Property in Law (n 5) 88-90. 
961 Ibid. 91-92. 
962 D Sheehan, 'The Property Principle and the Structure of Unjust Enrichment' (2011) 
RLR 138, 152 (noting that this argument does not depend on accepting Penner’s 
justification for property so it can be accepted even if Penner’s justification for property 
is thought to give insufficient weight to policy or instrumental concerns). 
963 In German law the act of conveyance and act of contract to convey are two separate 
acts (this is known as the Trennungsprinzip); the separation of the acts opens door to 
discussion whether conveyance depends on contract. German law views the two acts as 
separate – Abstraktionsprinzip. 
964 French law accepts the principle of “consensualism”, which means that the property 
is transferred solo consensu, without an act of conveyance. 
965 Cf B Häcker, 'Causality and Abstraction in the Common Law' in MH E Bant (ed) 
Exploring Private Law (CUP, 2010) ch 9. 
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point later in our analysis when we discuss the inability of the secured 
creditor to have a power to dispose of (sell) encumbered asset without 
having the right to contract to sell that asset.  
If a power to sell were not to be inherent in a property right to an asset, 
a maiori ad minus, consequences of the exercise of power to sell also 
cannot be a part of it.966 Chambers builds on this his argument that even 
if rights based on tracing were inherently part of the right of ownership, 
that would not make them continuing rights.967  Another event must 
cause these rights to arise. 
(a) The defendant’s gain of an unencumbered title 
This point was discussed in relation to mistaken payments in relation to 
the so-called liability mistake, where the claimant paid a sum of money 
to the defendant because he had mistakenly thought he owed it. It has 
been noted that in relation to such mistaken payments unjust 
enrichment explanation is indispensable. The claimant makes a claim 
not to an asset that belongs to him but to the value realised by the 
defendant when the asset transferred became the defendant’s 
property.968 The heart of the unjust enrichment claim is that the 
defendant has gained the title to the asset, not that the defendant has 
received value without the transfer of asset.  Similar considerations 
apply to claims by a secured creditor to proceeds of unauthorised 
dispositions. Title to the original asset passes to a third party. That 
transfer is not vitiated but it is nevertheless “defective” because it was 
conducted without authority from the secured creditor. When the 
claimant-secured creditor makes a claim to the value realised by the 
defendant he complains that the defendant gained unencumbered title to 
the asset.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
966 See also Sheehan, 'The Property Principle and the Structure of Unjust Enrichment' (n 
962) 151: “[on Penner’s view] property does not justify sale, even if it justifies other 
ways to exploit the resource”; Chambers (n 918) 277: “ownership of an asset does not 
include ownership of any proceeds of sale of that asset”. 
967 Chambers (n 918) 277-278. 
968 Klimchuk (n 958) 804. 
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(b) Inability to adopt what cannot have been authorised 
If a right to proceeds of an unauthorised disposition arises by virtue of a 
property right (rei vindicatio basis), it must also be true that the 
claimant would have a right to proceeds of an authorised disposition 
unless he agreed to forego that right. If a person entitled to a property 
right in the original asset does not have a right to proceeds of 
authorised dispositions unless he contracts for that right, that person 
cannot similarly have a right to proceeds just because the disposition is 
unauthorised disposition. The distinction therefore concerns the scope 
of property rights. Some property rights are limited by their nature. The 
limitation might concern the scope of the powers over the asset or the 
type of assets. A secured creditor does not have a right to resort to 
proceeds of authorised dispositions unless he bargains for it. He does 
not have a right to proceeds without the bargain. Any right to proceeds 
outside of that bargain cannot arise on the basis of the very property 
right he bargained for. This seems to be more straightforward in the 
case of the floating charge because the holder of a floating charge does 
not have a right to proceeds unless there is an express or implied 
bargain that proceeds fall within the scope of the charge, although this 
is controversial.969 The mechanism of claiming proceeds in a fixed 
charge is more complex. A fixed chargee only has a right to proceeds if 
the chargor undertakes an obligation to substitute collateral 
specifically970 unless the charge falls within FCAR.971 It is 
questionable, as suggested above, whether acquisition of a right to 
proceeds by adoption of an unauthorised disposition of assets subject to 
a fixed charge would be consistent with the fixed character of the 
charge.972 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
969 See text to nn 791-797. 
970 See text to nn 679-683. 
971 See text to nn 692-700. 
972 See text to nn 887-901. 
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3.3 Unjust enrichment as the basis for the new right  
It is useful to begin this section by addressing some of the fundamental 
issues raised by Lord Millett’s analysis in Foskett v McKeown. Lord 
Millett is seen as expressing a clear preference for vindication view as 
the legal basis for claims contingent on tracing. He said: 
“the transmission of property rights from one asset to its traceable 
proceeds is part of our law of property, not the law of unjust 
enrichment.”973  
There are difficulties with this statement. First, property law and unjust 
enrichment are not mutually exclusive concepts in some authors’ 
views.974 Second, if unjust enrichment can lead to a proprietary 
response it is not necessarily because the unjust factor is “want of title”.  
A proprietary response may be justified on other grounds. The first 
difficulty leads to the analysis of the relationship between “property 
law” and “unjust enrichment”. There are some general considerations 
which we need to address first before discussing the unjust factor 
problem. 
A. Proprietary response to an unjust enrichment event 
(a) Argument from principle   
This is a well-known Birksian argument. To say that a right is a 
“property right” refers to a kind of right, whilst unjust enrichment is a 
source of rights.975 There are different sources of rights (“events”976), 
which apart from unjust enrichment include also consent, wrongs and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
973 Foskett (n 285) 119, see also 127, 132; similarly Lord Browne-Wilkinson 108-109, 
also at 110: “this windfall is enjoyed because of the rights which the purchasers enjoy 
under the law of property”; Lord Hoffmann at 115; Lord Steyn (in the minority) 
rejected unjust enrichment because he did not think that the payment of premiums 
constituted enrichment – at 112; Lord Hope thought it was not shown that the 
misappropriated money contributed to any extent to, or increased the value of, the 
amount paid out by the insurers as death benefit – at 122. 
974 Birks, Unjust Enrichment (n 809). 
975 Birks, 'Property, Unjust Enrichment and Tracing' (n 915) 238-241; Birks, 'Property 
and Unjust Enrichment: Categorical Truths' (n 918) 627-628; Smith, 'Unjust 
Enrichment, Property and the Structure of Trusts' (n 915) 413; Chambers (n 918) 265. 
976 Birks, Unjust Enrichment (n 809) 21-28. 
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other events. “Responses”977 to these events are rights realisable in 
court and can be either personal (exigible in personam) or proprietary 
(rights in rem).978 To say that restitution is “proprietary” merely points 
to the response being a proprietary right but says nothing about its 
source. The controversial statement is that the event of unjust 
enrichment can attract either personal or a proprietary response (i.e. 
trigger either rights in personam or in rem). This view has been 
advocated by Birks, who said that personal or proprietary response was 
a matter of choice or policy, not logic.979 Civilian jurisdictions opted for 
a personal response to the event of unjust enrichment. Swadling said it 
was preferable for English law to follow suit.980  
Virgo, however, argued that property rights can never arise from unjust 
enrichment.981 Lord Millett was clearly influenced by Virgo’s view 
when juxtaposing property law and unjust enrichment. Virgo’s point 
raises a fundamental question that cannot be comprehensively 
addressed in this thesis. The extent of the debate over this point in 
England suggests that it is far from clear that Virgo is correct.982 We 
proceed on the assumption that Birksian view is correct so that, as a 
matter of logic, a secured creditor can assert a right in rem to traceable 
proceeds of an unauthorised disposition of collateral by the debtor as a 
response to unjust enrichment. The next question is, however, whether 
there are any policy arguments for adopting a proprietary rather than a 
personal response. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
977 Ibid. 33; P Birks, 'Equity in the Modern Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy' (1996) 26 
Univ of Western Australia L Rev 1; Birks, 'Property, Unjust Enrichment and Tracing' 
(n 915). 
978 Birks, Unjust Enrichment (n 809) 28. 
979 Ibid. 34 and 39; Burrows, The Law of Restitution (n 918) 187. But see W Swadling, 
'Policy Arguments for Proprietary Restitution' (2008) 28 LS 506. 
980 Swadling, 'Property and Unjust Enrichment' (n 919). 
981 Virgo, The Principles of the Law of Restitution (n 919) 11-12 and ch 20, especially 
569-574. 
982 On the doctrinal justification for resulting trusts as a response to unjust enrichment 
see P Birks, 'Restitution and Resulting Trusts' in S Goldstein (ed) Equity and 
Contemporary Legal Developments (Jerusalem: Hebrew University 1992) 335; P Birks, 
'Trusts Raised to Reverse Unjust Enrichments: The Westdeutsche Case' (1996) RLR 3; 
R Chambers, Resulting Trusts (OUP, Oxford 1997) 93-110 but see R Chambers, 'Trust 
and Theft' in E Bant and M Harding (eds), Exploring Private Law (CUP, 2010); Millett, 
'Property or Unjust Enrichment' (n 919). But see critique by W Swadling, 'Explaining 
Resulting Trusts' (2008) 124 LQR 72. 
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(b) Policy arguments for a proprietary response to unjust 
enrichment  
As already mentioned, Birks viewed a proprietary response to unjust 
enrichment as a matter of choice. Choices in law are often made for 
policy reasons and should not be made lightly.983 The State decides 
whether a particular consequence of a legal rule is preferable. The 
question is essentially one of a competition of claims between the 
unjust enrichment claimant and other creditors of the defendant. For 
obvious reasons the outcome of the competition becomes particularly 
relevant in the defendant’s insolvency. The arguments advanced in 
favour of proprietary protection of unjust enrichment claimants have 
been encountered before in the context of protection of certain 
categories of unsecured creditors, such as tort claimants.984 It is useful 
to reiterate these arguments here.985  
 
Unjust enrichment claimants have no opportunity to bargain for a 
stronger position.986 The enrichment in the insolvent’s estate represents 
an undeserved windfall to other creditors987 and so unjust enrichment 
claimants ought to occupy a position analogous to secured creditors.988 
Swadling argued forcefully against the courts’ acceptance of policy 
arguments for a number of reasons, first, because the defendant’s 
insolvency is not the only area on which proprietary awards have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
983 Birks himself said so: P Birks, 'The End of the Remedial Constructive Trust?' (1998) 
12 TLI 202, 214-215; Birks, Unjust Enrichment (n 809) 181; see also Swadling, 'Policy 
Arguments for Proprietary Restitution' (n 979) 522. 
984 See text to nn 88-100. 
985 Also summarised in Swadling, 'Policy Arguments for Proprietary Restitution' (n 
979) 507. 
986 E.g. G Jones, 'Remedies for the Recovery of Money Paid by Mistake' (1980) 39 CLJ 
275, 276. 
987 Birks, Unjust Enrichment (n 809) 181. This argument is also made by saying that 
the assets of the defendant become ‘swollen’. Cf  E Sherwin, 'Constructive Trusts in 
Bankruptcy' (1989) U of Ill LR 297, 317 (arguing that a proprietary should only be 
made if the competing creditors were unjustly enriched); A Kull, 'Rationalising 
Restitution' (1995) 83 Cal LR 1191, 1217. 
988 Or possibly better position than secured creditors so that they would take prior to 
secured creditors rather than share pari passu with the secured creditors. See A 
Burrows, The Law of Restitution (2nd edn Butterworths, London 2002) 70-72 (only 
unjust enrichment claimants who can demonstrate analogy with secured creditors can 
obtain a proprietary award). 
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impact;989 second, because it is for the legislature to decide what policy 
should be.990 There is no reason, Swadling says, why unjust enrichment 
creditors should be given priority before other categories of unsecured 
creditors such as tort claimants.991 Thus, creditors who have an 
opportunity to bargain for protection in debtor’s insolvency, but do not 
take it, should be barred from proprietary rights.992 These arguments do 
not apply, however, in relation to the secured creditor’s right to 
proceeds.993  
 
A secured creditor, who makes an unjust enrichment claim to traceable 
proceeds of unauthorised substitution, deserves proprietary response 
precisely because he bargained for priority above other categories of 
creditors of the debtor and of any other third party who would hold the 
asset subject to the creditor’s original interest. He purposfully 
bargained to shield himself from the risk of non-payment of the 
problems of moral hazard, which the debtor poses.994 He agreed with 
the grantor of security that he would resort to an asset to discharge debt 
owed to him with priority to other creditors. A security interest is a 
measure of protection against the debtor’s non-payment. That measure 
would be worthless if the debtor (or a third party grantor) could single-
handedly destroy the security by disposing of the asset in an 
unauthorised way, for example by transferring to a bona fide purchaser 
of legal title without giving the secured creditor a proprietary response. 
Thus, in cases where parties to a security agreement allocated risk 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
989 Whether the award is personal or proprietary impacts on e.g. interest accruing 
(simple or compound) or conflicts-of-law issues; see Swadling, 'Policy Arguments for 
Proprietary Restitution' (n 979) 514, 519-520. 
990 Ibid.; ee also V Finch and S Worthington, 'The Pari Passu Principle and Ranking of 
Restitutionary Rights' in F Rose Restitution and Insolvency ' in F Rose (ed) Restitution 
and Insolvency (Mansfield Press, Oxford 2000) 1-20 (arguing that preferential status 
should be awarded to claims in unjust enrichment and this can only be done through 
legislation). 
991 Swadling, 'Policy Arguments for Proprietary Restitution' (n 979) 517. 
992 Ibid. 516. 
993 They do apply, however, in other contexts, for example a response to wrongs, such 
as a breach of a fiduciary duty, should not be proprietary restitution. See n 863. 
994 Text to nn 74-78. 
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contractually, the proprietary response would not give the claimant 
secured creditor any greater rights than he bargained for.995  
 
Similarly, the argument that the defendant’s other creditors would 
receive an undeserved windfall holds in relation to secured creditors 
claiming proceeds, even if it is questionable in other contexts.996 
Secured creditors bargained for a right to resort to an asset, leaving the 
grantor of security with equity of redemption. If the secured creditors 
are not given priority with respect to proceeds, their security becomes 
worthless whilst the equity of redemption of the grantor of security is 
enlarged. Thus, in the grantor’s insolvency, the pool of assets 
distributed to other creditors is enlarged. This enlargement is 
“undeserved” because the secured creditor did bargain for protection in 
insolvency, thus withdrawing an asset from the pool available to 
general creditors. Unless the secured debt is paid, or the security 
interest otherwise discharged, there is no reason why the other creditors 
should “deserve” the access to the value represented by the traceable 
proceeds of a disposition, which the secured creditor explicitly or 
implicitly prohibited.  
 
Finally, it may be added that Burrows argued997 that a proprietary right 
can be a response to unjust enrichment if there is an analogy with a 
secured creditor’s position. There is no need for drawing such an 
analogy where a chargee or mortgagee claims unauthorised proceeds 
purely because he is the secured creditor. 
B. Lack of authority as the unjust factor 
The major problem with unjust enrichment explanation seems to be the 
ground of restitution.998  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
995 For an identical argument but in a context of subrogation see Banque Financire de 
la Cite v Parc (Battersea) Ltd [1999] 1 AC 221 (HL) 237 (Hoffman LJ). 
996 Swadling, 'Policy Arguments for Proprietary Restitution' (n 979) 527. 
997 Burrows, The Law of Restitution (n 988) 71. 
998 Foskett (n 285) 119 (Millett LJ): “There is no ‘unjust factor’ to justify restitution 
(unless ‘want of title’ be one, which makes the point). The claimant succeeds if at all by 
virtue of his own title, not to reverse unjust enrichment”; see also at 127, 132 (Millett 
LJ); similarly 108-109 (Browne-Wilkinson LJ) and 115 (Hoffmann LJ). 
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(a) Overview of the difficulties with unjust factors 
The ground must be present to show that the receipt of property by the 
defendant was unjust. This is traditionally demonstrated by the 
presence of one of the unjust factors. Birks in his later writings altered 
his approach and suggested that the reason for recovery was the 
absence of basis for retaining the received asset by the claimant.999 This 
view was criticised by some authors1000 and defended by others.1001 It is 
assumed that the correct approach is the traditional position focusing on 
unjust factors.  
 
When the claimant knows nothing of the transfer the unjust factor is 
ignorance.1002 According to Birks’ original thesis, this is a fortiori from 
a mistake.1003 If a claimant can recover money when he made a 
mistaken payment as he did not mean to make that payment, he should 
also be able to recover if he did not know anything of the transfer. The 
unjust factor of ignorance is rightly criticised. It may be that the 
claimant is aware of the transfer but may not be able to prevent the 
transfer. To deal with the latter criticism an unjust factor of 
“powerlessness”1004 was suggested. The claimant is fully aware of the 
transfer but is unable to stop it. The problem with “powerlessness” in 
the context of security interests is that the secured creditor is not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
999 Birks, Unjust Enrichment (n 809) ch 5. 
1000 D Sheehan, 'Unjust Factors or Restitution of Transfers Sine Causa' (2008) OUCLF 
available at http://ouclf.iuscomp.org, accessed 30 September 2012; D Sheehan, 
'Resulting Trusts, Sine Causa and the Structure of Proprietary Restitution' (2011) 11 
Oxford University Commonwealth LJ 1; M Chen-Wishart, 'Unjust Factors and the 
Restitutionary Response' (2000) 20 OJLS 557. See also Sheehan, The Principles of 
Personal Property Law (n 482) 255. 
1001 T Baloch, 'The Unjust Enrichment Pyramid' (2007) 123 LQR 636; R Chambers, 'Is 
There a Presumption of Resulting Trust' in C Mitchell (ed) Constructive and Resulting 
Trusts (Hart, 2010). For rebuttal of Chambers’ view see Sheehan, 'Resulting Trusts, 
Sine Causa and the Structure of Proprietary Restitution' (n 1000). 
1002 Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (n 930) 140-146; Birks, 'Property, 
Unjust Enrichment and Tracing' (n 915) 246; but see Swadling, 'A Claim in 
Restitution?' (n 872). 
1003 Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (n 930) 141. 
1004 Burrows, 'Proprietary Restitution: Unmasking Unjust Enrichment' (n 918); 
Burrows, The Law of Restitution (n 918) ch 16; Birks, An Introduction to the Law of 
Restitution (n 930) 174. Cf W Swadling, 'Ignorance and Unjust Enrichment: The 
Problem of Title' (2008) 28 OJLS 627; R Chambers and J Penner, 'Ignorance' in J 
Edelman and S Degeling (eds), Equity and Commercial Law (Lawbook Co, Sydney 
2008). 
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entirely helpless. He may be able to apply for a freezing injunction1005 
to prevent the debtor from dealing with assets and so prevent the 
dissipation of assets prior to execution of judgment.1006 The creditor 
may also be able to inform the third party transferee of the 
encumbrance. This will put the third party on notice and deprive her of 
the bona fide purchaser without notice defence should the creditor try 
to enforce the security interest in the asset in her hands. Yet even if the 
secured creditor knows of the transfer and does nothing to preserve his 
interest in the asset, he should not be deprived of a remedy against the 
debtor who effected the unauthorised transfer. In addition, neither 
ignorance nor powerlessness gained judicial support and for that reason 
the usefulness of the analysis based on unjust factors has been criticised 
by the High Court of Australia.1007 
(b) Lack of authority 
A better explanation has been suggested by Peter Jaffey. He argued that 
a transfer is defective if the claimant did not authorise such a 
transfer.1008 The debtor may well have the power to transfer assets to 
third parties free from security but such transfers are in breach of the 
bargain between the secured creditor and the debtor. In the context of 
trusts, Jaffey says that when the trustee breaches the trust he acts 
outside of his authority conferred by the trust instrument and the very 
fact of the unauthorised exchange confers on trust beneficiaries a title 
to substitute assets.1009  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1005 Formerly known as Mareva injunction. 
1006 Snell's Equity (n 743) para 18-071. A freezing order may be granted where the 
claimant can make a good arguable case, Ninemia Maritime Corp v Trave 
Schiffartsgesellschaft mbH unde Co KG [1983] 1 WLR 1412. 
1007 Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd [2007] HCA 22; (2007) 230 CLR 
[158] (Tobias JA). 
1008 Jaffey, The Nature and Scope of Restitution. Vitiated Transfers, Imputed Contracts 
and Disgorgement  (n 926) 161-162, citing the following as support for “lack of 
authority” being a vitiating factor with respect to transfer: Nelson (n 934); Re Coltman 
(1881) Ch D 64; Blackburn & District Benefit BS v Cunliff, Brooks (1885) 29 Ch D 
902. 
1009 Ibid. 162. Jaffey adds a caveat that this cannot be misunderstood to imply that the 
trustee is an agent of the beneficiary with authority to bind him in contract.  
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The idea of lack of authority is not new, as Sheehan notes.1010 In Nelson 
v Larholt1011 an executor, Potts, fraudulently drew eight cheques on the 
banking account of his testator’s estate in favour of a turf accountant, 
Larholt (the defendant), receiving from Larholt money in cash, which 
he used for his own purposes. Larholt received the cheques for value 
and in good faith. However, this was not enough to raise the defence. It 
was held that the defendant also should have received the cheques 
without notice of the executor’s want of authority. On the facts, it was 
held that Larholt knew or ought to have known of the executor’s want 
of authority. Lord Denning in Nelson v Larholt held that   
 
“[when an asset is taken from] the rightful owner, or, indeed, 
from the beneficial owner, without his authority, he can recover 
the amount from any person into whose hands it can be traced, 
unless and until it reaches one who receives it in good faith and 
for value and without notice of the want of authority”.1012  
 
The language of the lack of authority is also found, as Sheehan says1013 
and as mentioned above, in Lipkin Gorman, where Lord Goff states that 
Cass received the cash from the client’s account by drawing on it 
“without authority”.1014 Sheehan notes that the problem with both 
Lipkin and Nelson is that in both cases the actors were authorised 
signatories.1015 Jaffey comments that this does not collide with the 
concept of “lack of authority” because the latter has nothing to do with 
agency law.1016 It is about authority but not one found in agency cases. 
Watts attempted to explain this by using a concept of mismotivation.1017 
We may add that in some cases there will be an actual lack of authority. 
In the analysis adopted in this thesis, parallels with agency do apply if 
we consider agency to be a grant of authority. The presence of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1010 Sheehan, The Principles of Personal Property Law (n 482) 255. 
1011 (n 934). 
1012 (n 934) 342-343. 
1013 Sheehan, The Principles of Personal Property Law (n 482) 255. 
1014 Lipkin (n 942) 573. 
1015 Sheehan, The Principles of Personal Property Law (n 482) 256. 
1016 Jaffey, The Nature and Scope of Restitution. Vitiated Transfers, Imputed Contracts 
and Disgorgement (n 926) 162. 
1017 P Watts, 'Authority and Mismotivation. Case Comment' (2005) 121 LQR 4.  
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“authority” in Lipkin and Nelson could be seen as the power to deal 
(which itself may be separately conferred from an owner and not, as in 
the case of a chargor, retained by him). The power to draw on an 
account would therefore be conceptually separate from the authority to 
do so. 
(c) Suitability of the lack authority unjust factor in the 
security interest context 
The grantor of a security interest limits his authority to dispose of assets 
in a particular way (free from the creditor’s security) in the security 
agreement concluded with the creditor. If the creditor consented to the 
substitution, his security interest cannot shift onto the proceeds of 
disposition by virtue of his consent only; an obligation to substitute is 
needed. The lack of consent to dispose free of encumbrance cannot 
explain why the creditor should be able to assert an interest over the 
asset against the third party.  
 
Criterion Properties v Stratford Properties1018 concerned enforceability 
of the so-called “poison pill” contract. It imposed a duty on the 
claimant, at the defendant’s election, to buy for a punitive price the 
defendant’s interest in the company. This put option was to be triggered 
by an outside party gaining control of the claimant or by either of its 
two directors ceasing to be a director. It was intended to work, and did 
so effectively, as a deterrent to a bidder for the company’s shares to 
prevent a takeover of the claimant by a certain third party. A year later, 
however, the directors fell out. One of them (the defendant) was 
dismissed and sought to invoke the put option. Hart J at first 
instance1019 held that the enforcement of the agreement, designed to 
severely impoverish the claimant, was an abuse of power, 
notwithstanding the directors’ good faith when concluding the contract. 
By comparison with cases in the context of directors’ shares,1020 the 
enforcement of poison pill agreements is even more improper. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1018 [2004] UKHL 28, [2004] 1 WLR 1846. 
1019 [2002] EWHC 496 (Ch). 
1020 Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum [1974] AC 821 (PC). 
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According to Hart J the defendant, in relation to the agreement, was in 
a position analogous to a recipient of assets misapplied in breach of a 
fiduciary duty. Because of that, Hart J thought that a test for 
unconscionability, set out in BCCI v Akindele1021 in relation to knowing 
receipt cases, was applicable. The Court of Appeal1022 agreed with most 
of the legal, but not factual, analysis. Abuse of power could exist 
because the agreement could not operate to injure the company 
irrespective of the circumstances. On the facts, however, the mere 
knowledge on the defendant’s part of the terms and purpose of the 
agreement was found to be insufficient to make the enforcement of the 
agreement in favour of the defendant “unconscionable”. 
 
Lord Scott held that the question whether there was authorisation could 
extend beyond the act of authorisation, i.e. whether there was a 
directors’ resolution at a meeting properly convened, to matters 
concerning motivation. Therefore the question was whether the purpose 
(motivation) of the agreement (here: that the directors were entitled to 
exercise their powers to deter a takeover by signing a poison-pill 
agreement) could be subsumed within the authority issue. Watts notes 
that although this aspect of Lord Scott’s analysis is presented as 
orthodoxy, it is far from it.1023 He indicates1024 that it is the opposite of 
the view1025 that agent’s motivations are altogether irrelevant to his 
authority.  
 
On the theory that an agent’s authority is determined by consent, an 
express purpose attached to an agent’s authority confines it.1026 Equity 
is said to further imply restrictions on the exercise of the powers, some 
of which entitle the person, in whose favour the restrictions are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1021 Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd v Akindele [2001] Ch 
437 (CA). 
1022 Criterion Properties Plc v Stratford UK Properties LLC [2002] EWCA Civ 1883, 
[2003] 1 WLR 2108, affirmed (n 1018). 
1023 Watts, 'Authority and Mismotivation. Case Comment' (n 1017) 7. 
1024 Ibid. 7. 
1025 AL Underwood Ltd v Bank of Liverpool & Martins [1924] 1 KB 775, 792 (Scrutton 
LJ); Reckitt v Barnett, Pembroke & Slater Ltd [1928] 2 KB 244, 257 (Scrutton LJ). 
1026 EBM Co Ltd v Dominion Bank [1937] 3 All ER 555, 568-569. 
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imposed, to set the contract aside.1027 It is not clear to what extent the 
promisee should have the knowledge of the relevant facts before the 
contract is deemed unenforceable.1028 
 
The lack of authority to transfer collateral free from security by the 
debtor or a third party grantor is different from an ultra vires doctrine, 
which applies, for example, in the case of a company acting outside its 
objects clause laid down in its memorandum. A debtor disposing of 
encumbered property in an unauthorised way cannot be said to act 
outside of what he is able to do, unlike a company, which would be said 
to have acted without capacity to act. A grantor of security agrees to 
limit its authority to act but does not limit its capacity. By contrast, a 
company only has as much capacity to act as granted by the company’s 
memorandum. 
C. Lien as a conceptually more suitable remedy than a 
constructive trust 
It is said that proceeds of unauthorised disposition of an encumbered 
asset are held on constructive trust for the secured creditor.1029 Yet, it is 
submitted, a more nuanced view should be adopted. First, as already 
shown, the trust does not arise automatically as an “exchange product” 
of the unauthorised disposition.1030 The secured creditor has a power to 
vest an interest in the proceeds. The second question is what interest it 
is. In a trust context1031 the beneficiaries elect between a trust and a lien 
depending on what is more preferential to them. It is not clear that a 
secured creditor claiming proceeds should get a similar choice.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1027 Watts, 'Authority and Mismotivation. Case Comment' (n 1017) 7-8. 
1028 Ibid. 8: “ In an attack founded on a mere breach of equitable duty by an agent, the 
state of the outsider's knowledge of that breach becomes critical in a way that is not the 
case where the outsider cannot establish that it dealt with someone with actual or 
apparent authority.” 
1029 Buhr (n 14). 
1030 Text to nn 872-879. 
1031 Foskett (n 285). 
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(a) Liens  
It is not difficult to show that a lien could arise in favour of the secured 
creditor, although Arden LJ in Buhr v Barclays Bank does not mention 
it.1032 Liens,1033 being non-possessory security interests in specific 
assets,1034 operate similarly to non-possessory consensual security 
interests.1035 Liens, like consensual security interests, are accessory 
(subordinate) to the obligation they secure. They are measured by the 
value of the claim, not the value of the asset, although they are limited 
by the latter.1036 Liens, unlike trusts, do not provide the claimant with a 
right to take the asset from the defendant but merely a right to resort to 
the specific asset if the personal right to restitution is not met.1037 A 
secured creditor, who was to be granted a lien over proceeds of an 
unauthorised disposition, would receive a functionally identical interest 
to the one he bargained for. The claimant may recover no more than the 
value of the secured amount of the unjust enrichment claim1038 and up 
to the value of the asset secured. 
(b) Constructive trusts 
It is more difficult to explain why a trust should arise in favour of a 
secured creditor.  
(i) Overview of constructive trusts	  
The trust means that the trustee holds property and owes certain kinds 
of obligation with respect to that property. Constructive and resulting 
trusts arise by operation of law. It is generally thought that constructive 
trusts arise out of an obligation to remit property acquired in breach of 
a fiduciary duty, so the trust can be seen as a response to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1032 Arden LJ in Buhr (n 14) only considers a constructive trust. 
1033 “Lien” refers to a non-possessory charge, not a common law lien. Birks, Unjust 
Enrichment (n 809) 184-185, 202. 
1034 E.g. Hallett’s Estate (n 710). 
1035 See text to nn 124-134. 
1036 Chambers, 'Tracing and Unjust Enrichment' (n 918) 284. 
1037 Ibid. 284. 
1038 This amount may be smaller or equal to the amount of the originally secured loan. 
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wrongdoing1039 and as such dependent on the awareness of an innocent 
recipient of the misappropriation and the knowledge that affects the 
recipient’s conscience.1040 A debtor disposing of property subject to a 
security interest without authority from the secured creditor is not in 
breach of a fiduciary duty because, as we saw previously, it is 
questionable that the grantor of security owes fiduciary duties to the 
secured creditor1041 unless we accept the Chase Manhattan logic that 
the unauthorised disposition makes him a fiduciary. Given that 
fiduciary duties arise voluntarily, there is no reason to say that the 
debtor owes fiduciary duties to the secured creditor. Since there is no 
breach of a fiduciary duty, no constructive trust can arise as a result of 
it. However, constructive trusts are also thought to arise out of unjust 
enrichment although some authors argue they are best described as 
resulting trusts.1042 The resulting trust explanation requires, depending 
on the preferred view, a presumed declaration of trust,1043 a common 
intention to create a trust1044 or simply a proof that the victim did not 
intend to make a gift.1045 If any of these views is correct, the trust 
arising in favour of the secured creditor cannot be resulting. A chargee 
or a mortgagee is not in a position to make a gift of the encumbered 
asset nor express an intention to transfer that property. If the secured 
creditor has no powers to dispose of the property beyond the 
enforcement of the secured obligation, a maiori ad minus he cannot 
intend to dispose of that property. The trust arising to reverse unjust 
enrichment may not be “institutional” because unlike an express trust it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1039 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council 
[1996] UKHL 12, [1996] AC 669, 716 (Browne-Wilkinson LJ): “when property is 
obtained by fraud equity imposes a constructive trust on the fraudulent recipient: the 
property is recoverable and traceable in equity”. 
1040 Westdeutsche (n 1039) 705 (Browne-Wilkinson LJ); problems arising when the 
trust is dependent on knowledge or notice were noted by Chambers, Resulting Trusts (n 
982) 201-212. 
1041 See text to nn 732-747. 
1042 Chambers, Resulting Trusts (n 982) but see Chambers, 'Trust and Theft' (n 982) 
223, where he seems to recognize problems with both constructive and resulting trusts, 
and citing (at 242); B Häcker, 'Proprietary Restitution after Impaired Consent 
Transfers: A Generalised Power Model' (2009) CLJ 324. 
1043 Swadling, 'Explaining Resulting Trusts' (n 982). 
1044 Westdeutsche (n 1039) 708 (Browne-Wilkinson LJ). 
1045 Chambers, 'Trust and Theft' (n 982) 239. 
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does not involve the imposition of fiduciary duties, duties to manage 
the property, e.g. to invest.1046 Yet it is “institutional” rather than 
“remedial” in the sense that it arises by operation of law at the moment 
of the unauthorised disposition, rather than by “judicial fiat” at a later 
date.1047 As Häcker noted, writing in the context of impaired consent 
transfers, that either type of trust creates more problems than it solves 
so a better solution is to treat the trust as “‘resulting’ in pattern and 
‘constructive’ in the sense of arising irrespective of the transferee-
trustee's consent”.1048  
(ii) The specific position of the secured creditor 
It may be that the secured creditor’s position is more akin to that of an 
insurer in Lord Napier & Ettrick v Hunter.1049 In that case an insured 
person received money in diminution of a loss, for which he had 
already been indemnified by the insurer. The House of Lords held that 
the insurer held a personal claim for the money received secured by a 
lien. Similarly, the Court of Appeal in Foskett v McKeown1050 held that 
the beneficiaries had no more than a lien for the amount of money 
actually used to pay premiums on the life policy. The Court of Appeal 
drew an analogy between paying premiums and making improvements 
on land.1051  Birks found the cases difficult to reconcile, which lead him 
to say that there may be no principle underlying these cases that would 
help us decide when a lien only arises and when there is an election 
between beneficial interest and a lien.1052  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1046 Smith, 'Unravelling Proprietary Restitution' (n 918) 324. 
1047 Ibid. 324 (in the context of mistaken payments). 
1048 Häcker, 'Proprietary Restitution after Impaired Consent Transfers: A Generalised 
Power Model' (n 1042) 330. 
1049 [1993] AC 713 (HL). 
1050 (n 941). 
1051 Foskett (CA) (n 941) 278 (Scott VC); Foskett (HL) (n 285) 109 (Browne-
Wilkinson); Unity Joint Stock Mutual Banking Association v King (1858) 25 Beav 72, 
53 ER 563 but cf Re Diplock [1948] Ch 465 (CA) 545-548. Courts have also awarded a 
lien over property owned by a defendant as unjustly enriched by a claimant performing 
services whose effect is to increase the value of the property Spencer v S Franses Ltd 
[2011] EWHC 1269 (QB). 
1052 Birks, Unjust Enrichment (n 809) 202. 
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(iii) Critique of a constructive trust in the context of 
security interest  
In the context of security interests, a distinction could helpfully be 
drawn between unauthorised disposition of collateral before and after 
the default of the debtor. After the debtor defaults the secured creditor 
can resort to the asset in order to discharge the outstanding secured 
debt. The range of remedies available to the creditor depends on the 
type of security interest but ultimately any equitable charge may be 
enforced by sale of the assets.1053 The creditor may also have a right to 
acquire ownership of the asset. Of course both lien and constructive 
trust provide the proprietary protection to the creditor. But unless the 
creditor can enforce the security by acquiring ownership of the asset, a 
constructive trust may lead to overcompensation of the secured 
creditor. The security interest extends only to the amount of the debt 
outstanding. A constructive trust would effectively give a beneficial 
ownership to the creditor, an interest that he did not have prior to the 
unauthorised disposition. Even if the value of the asset is presently 
below the value of the outstanding secured claim, the constructive trust 
should not arise because the creditor could receive a windfall of 
undeserved profit if the value of the asset were to go up the next day.  
One could argue that the constructive trust is on the unauthorised 
proceeds only to the extent that the proceeds represent the debtor’s 
enrichment, i.e. to the extent the previously secured debt is now 
unsecured. The problem is that it does not take into account that the 
debtor, or indeed a third party, can start repaying the secured debt. To 
maintain the constructive trust we would need to say that that the 
subject matter of the trust automatically decreases to reflect the amount 
of the repaid debt. The effect of such a “trust” would be very similar to 
a lien. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1053 Diplock (n 1051) 546-547. 
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In addition, if a constructive trust were admissible, the creditor would 
need to be able to collapse the trust under Saunders v Vautier1054 rule 
and so acquire absolute ownership of the asset. It is debatable whether  
trusts other than express trust are so collapsible1055 but we assume so 
here. This could lead to circumvention of policies underlying 
insolvency regulations where the secured creditor is only permitted to 
sell the encumbered asset and take the proceeds but is not allowed to 
take the asset as his own. In such cases the constructive trust would 
essentially amount to such a ‘prohibited’ remedy. 
Rimer J in Shalson v Russo said that the proprietary response to unjust 
enrichment of the defendant “would not involve giving him any 
preferential rights over creditors: it would merely assert his right to 
recover property in which they can have no interest”.1056 Thus, the 
purpose of restitution is to put the claimant where he would have been 
had the unauthorised act not occurred, not to put him in any better 
position. A constructive trust would indeed put the secured creditor in a 
better position. For these reasons the lien, as a proprietary remedy to 
give the claimant rights in rem in the proceeds, seems to better balance 
interest of the parties involved. This analysis, it will be recalled, is not 
the analysis of the Court of Appeal in Buhr v Barclays Bank1057 where a 
constructive trust over sale proceeds held in the solicitors’ account was 
found in favour of the mortgagee, although in that case on the facts the 
type trust did not overcompensate the mortgagee who was expecting 
payment anyway. In many cases in practice it will probably not make a 
difference whether the remedy endows the creditor with a beneficial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1054 (1841) 4 Beav 115, 49 ER 282; affirmed (1841) Cr & Ph 240 41 ER 482. 
1055 See J Glister, 'The Nature of Quistclose Trusts: Classification and Reconciliation' 
(2004) 63 CLJ 632, 649 (suggesting that the Saunders v Vautier right might apply to an 
express trust but not a resulting trust if the purpose attached to the transfer of property 
is still capable of being carried out) and cf P Birks, 'Retrieving Tied Money' in W 
Swadling (ed) The Quistclose Trust (OUP, 2004) 121, 126 (suggesting that even if 
there is no express contract, there may be an implied contract not to recall legal title so 
long as the purpose is in place). Where the trust arising is constructive, it is doubtful, 
however, that it could be argued that money was to be held for a particular purpose. If 
there was no intention in the first place for the money to be held on trust, arguably, 
there was also no intended purpose as to how the money was to be held.  
1056 [2003] EWHC 1637 (Ch), [2005] Ch 281 [126]. 
1057 (n 14). 
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ownership (a constructive trust) or merely enables the creditor to resort 
to the asset in priority to others (a lien). However, to the extent that in 
some cases it will make such a difference, we ought to strive to achive 
a coherent analytical framwork, which this thesis has aimed to present. 
4 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that a secured creditor does not have an 
automatic right to proceeds of unauthorised dispositions. He cannot 
acquire a right greater than he had if the transaction had been 
authorised. When the creditor contracts for security in proceeds the 
security interest in such proceeds will arise on the basis of the security 
agreement, so it is necessary to establish a right to the proceeds by 
operation of law (i.e. by virtue of the property right). Where a 
disposition is unauthorised and the creditor is faced with establishing a 
right to proceeds of such a disposition, the right arises on the basis of 
unjust enrichment, not vindicatio of the property interest which he had 
in the original asset. If vindicatio explanation depends on adoption of 
an unauthorised disposition by the creditor, it is questionable that 
vindicatio leads to acquisition of rights to proceeds of unauthorised 
disposition because adoption of an unauthorised disposition may not 
lead to a right to proceeds. This is so in the case of a floating charge. If 
a floating chargee has no right to proceeds of an authorised disposition 
unless bargained for, he also cannot acquire the right to proceeds by 
adopting an unauthorised disposition. He cannot have more than he 
would have had if the disposition were authorised. In the context of a 
fixed charge acquisition of a right to proceeds by way of adoption of an 
unauthorised disposition could be seen as inconsistent with the fixed 
character of the charge, where consent must be given to a specific 
disposition and not in advance. 
The controversial element of establishing an unjust enrichment claim, 
the unjust factor, was established as the lack of authority. Even though 
the debtor has a power to dispose of the asset as the owner of the asset, 
his authority to do so vis-à-vis the creditor is limited. In the case of the 
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fixed charge the authority is limited almost entirely, unless a charge 
falls within FCAR. In a floating charge the authority to dispose of 
assets free of encumbrance is wider but also not unlimited. The unjust 
enrichment based on a factor of lack of authority enables the secured 
creditor to claim the proceeds. The claim to proceeds of unauthorised 
dispositions is proprietary for Birksian policy reasons. The in rem 
response is necessitated by the type of bargain the creditor struck when 
the original security interest was created.  
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CONCLUSION 
This thesis dealt with a specific problem of security interests in 
property. Security interests are property rights taken in particular assets. 
Certain changes to the assets may lead to emergence of entirely new 
assets in the hands of the grantor of security. This happens when 
collateral is mixed with other asset into a new asset (product); when the 
debtor exchanges the originally encumbered asset for another asset 
(proceeds); and when new assets are generated without destruction of 
the originally encumbered subject matter (fruits). All three types of new 
assets were referred to as derived assets. The question asked in this 
thesis was how emergence of these new assets influences the rights of 
the secured creditor. The problem of rights to substitutes and fruits has 
attracted little interest in the specific context of security interests and 
this thesis aimed to fill this gap. The little that we know about security 
in derived assets stems from one Court of Appeal case, Barclays Bank v 
Buhr. The case suggests that the secured creditor has an automatic right 
to products, proceeds and fruits by operation of a “principle of 
substitutions and accretions”. It was argued that the “principle” is not 
supported in the current English law and that the understanding of 
security interests in derived assets based on this principle is flawed.  
The thesis began by showing that there is a functional and conceptual 
difference between substitutes and fruits. We examined how security in 
substitutes and in fruits differ functionally first in the context of the 
rationale for security interests. The most convincing explanation of why 
lenders seek security interests was that it makes lending more efficient 
compared to unsecured lending as between the borrower and the lender. 
We said that taking security means that lenders’ costs diminish whilst 
the benefit to borrowers grows, not because the lenders ask for payment 
of a smaller interest rate but because they are able to lend more. Both 
lenders and the borrowers are better off. In economic terms, this was 
expressed as a more efficient way of achieving market equilibrium. 
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Applying the efficiency considerations to security in derived assets, we 
examined rules that automatically extend security to substitutes and 
fruits. We noted that there is a functional difference between them. 
Whilst a rule automatically extending security to substitutes promotes 
efficient credit market equilibrium, a rule that automatically extends 
security to additional collateral, without parties’ agreement, makes the 
equilibrium less efficient. This is because a substitute replaces an 
original asset whilst a fruit is a new additional collateral, which could 
be used by the borrower to obtain more financing. This is not a question 
of value of the assets but the ability to raise extra finance with 
additional assets. We also noted that giving security in one’s assets 
raises issues in fairness of asset distribution between secured and 
unsecured creditors. Rules that automatically extend security to 
additional collateral (i.e. to fruits) may be seen as affecting the already 
delicate balance of asset distribution. Having examined rationale for 
security, we have presented an overview of security in English law and 
under Article 9 UCC, which lead us to observe a difference in approach 
to security in the two legal systems and so set the background for the 
rest of the thesis. 
The conceptual difference between substitutes and fruits was shown in 
Chapter II. We drew on Roman law to show how derived assets were 
classified. Whilst the Roman law of mixed assets remains of 
importance in the area of security interests, a new way of 
conceptualising fruits was suggested. Roman rules of accession and 
specification allow us to distinguish when mixing leads to emergence 
of a new asset (a product) from the perspective of the creditor. We 
followed Professor Smith’s view that confusion of assets does not lead 
to creation of a new asset and so it remains possible to follow the 
original asset. We suggested that it is useful to think of products and 
proceeds as assets generated by an event affecting the original asset, 
typically a disposition understood as either a physical act (e.g. 
manufacture) or a legal act (e.g. sale). By contrast, fruits were 
conceptualised as assets that arise on the basis of a pre-existing right, 
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not a disposition of the original asset. We also noted that it is not useful 
to use the principle of accession in relation to fruits because it suggests 
that improvements to assets are governed by the same rules as right to 
fruits and that both could be referred to as accretions. Such an approach 
is flawed and we suggested that for clarity purposes the term 
“accretion” should be used to cover improvements but not fruits. 
The rest of the thesis examined two scenarios: first, where the security 
agreement is silent as to whether security extends to substitutes or fruits 
and, second, where derived assets are contemplated by the parties, 
whether expressly or impliedly. The question posed in Chapter III 
concerned the effect of an agreement, which does not extend the 
created security interest expressly to derived assets. It was argued that 
the secured creditor has no right to extend security to fruits unless the 
security agreement expressly says so. As established in Chapter II, 
rights to fruits are determined on the basis of a pre-existing right to 
fruits, attached to the original collateral. Such rights must be conferred 
expressly (or impliedly, if by possession) onto the creditor. However, 
where assets derive from a disposition of collateral by the debtor (i.e. 
proceeds and products) the creditor may be able to claim the substitutes 
even if they are not expressly stated as subject matter of security in the 
security agreement. This will take place where the creditor did not 
authorise the disposition free from security.  
Chapter IV focused on the effect of a security agreement with a derived 
assets clause, i.e. automatically extending security to derived assets. 
We have seen that the effect of such a clause is similar to an after-
acquired property clause. One continuous security interest is created, 
embracing every new asset as and when it arises. By contrasting such 
security with conditional security interests, we attempted to explain 
why security interests in the new assets take effect retrospectively and 
not at the moment when assets come into existence. The second set of 
problems relating to security agreements, where parties expressly 
agreed to extend security to derived assets relates to the character of 
security as fixed or floating. We built on the discussion of 
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characterisation of security interests from Chapter I to present a new 
way of conceptualising a fixed security. We suggested that parallels 
could be drawn between charges and agency without fiduciary duties. 
In a fixed charge the debtor can be seen as having power to deal with 
assets, which stems from his title to the assets, but no authority to deal 
with the assets free of encumbrance. Only where the creditor consents 
to a specific disposition and where this is coupled with a specific 
obligation to substitute does the debtor have authority to deal with the 
asset. In such cases the parties’ agreement gives the creditor a right to 
resort to substitutes. This right arises on the basis of the parties’ 
agreement, not operation of law. Any disposition outside the debtor’s 
authority to deal was classed as an unauthorised disposition. In the case 
of a floating charge the right to substitutes is sometimes said to arise 
automatically by virtue of the nature of the security. There are a 
number of theories of the floating charge, of which the overreaching 
theory was the preferred one. Although overreaching explains why the 
creditor no longer has security to the original asset, it was questioned 
whether the support for the view that overreaching explains the right of 
the chargee to substitutes. We have suggested that substitutes only fall 
within the scope of the floating charge where the debenture expressly 
covers substitutes or where it covers a class of assets, within which 
substitutes fall.  
The final chapter considered claims of the secured creditor to assets 
resulting from an unauthorised disposition of the collateral. Such assets 
were collectively referred to as “proceeds of unauthorised disposition”, 
encompassing all assets resulting from mixed substitutions (products) 
and clean substitutions (proceeds sensu stricto). Claims to proceeds of 
unauthorised disposition were directly in question in the case of 
Barclays Bank v Buhr.1058 The view propounded in that case, and 
supported by a view expressed in Foskett v McKeown1059 in a parallel 
context of beneficiaries’ claims to proceeds of unauthorised 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1058 (n 14). 
1059 (n 285). 
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dispositions by a trustee, was that the creditor claims proceeds on the 
basis of vindication of his property right. This work suggested that this 
view is flawed and that the right to proceeds of unauthorised 
disposition arises on the basis of unjust enrichment. This means that the 
creditor does not assert the same property right (the same security 
interest) in the proceeds of an unauthorised disposition but a new right, 
which arises by operation of law. The work also rejected the view that 
the new right in proceeds could be a constructive trust and that the only 
right that arises in proceeds of an authorised disposition can be a lien. 
This thesis therefore presented a coherent analytical framework for 
rights to proceeds of authorised and unathorised dispositions of assets 
subject to fixed and floating charges. 
Although this thesis addressed a relatively narrow question of rights of 
a secured creditor following changes to the collateral that lead to 
emergence of new assets, the conclusions reached here can be seen as 
part of a wider question of extent of property rights. We know to what 
extent an absolute owner can mix assets and we know that he has a 
right to whatever he exchanged his assets for. We also know when 
ownership extends to fruits of the property. The basis for rights of the 
owner is the ownership itself. When the same questions are asked in 
relation to property rights, which are narrower in scope than absolute 
ownership, the answers become more difficult. It is particularly 
difficult to explain on what basis a person with a proprietary right in an 
asset should have a right to a substitute for that asset. It is not clear to 
what extent, if any at all, fiduciary duties can be imposed on debtors to 
enable secured creditors to claim such substitutes. This thesis suggested 
that the basis for such rights is the parties’ agreement. Security interests 
are property rights founded on a bargain between the parties and the 
secured creditor should not acquire security in assets he did not bargain 
for. Security interests extend to derived assets by express agreement or 
agreement implied as a matter of fact but not law. There is no 
“principle of substitutions and accretions”, which would resolve 
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problems in this area by operation of law, i.e. by virtue of the property 
right.  
In summary, the proposed analysis may prove to be a useful analytical 
tool, providing a coherent explanation of proprietary interests under 
fixed and floating charges and allowing disputes arising in the area of 
security in derived assets to be readily resolved. It may also be useful in 
determining the shape of the law to fruits, products and proceeds in the 
possible future reform of law of security interests. 
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